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Abstract:
This paper examines the pervasiveness of earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999. It documents systematic differences in earnings management across different clusters of countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our evidence is consistent with this prediction. The findings suggest a link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings, and complement prior finance research that treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous.

corporate governance, earnings management, investor protection, law, private control benefits

Abstract:
This paper examines the pervasiveness of earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999. It documents systematic differences in earnings management across different clusters of countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our evidence is consistent with this prediction. The findings suggest a link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings, and complement prior finance research that treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous.

Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Investor Protection, Law, Private Control Benefits

Abstract:
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date. Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting. Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.

Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity, Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets

Abstract:
This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date. Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting. Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self-selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the capital-market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting countries have made concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.

Regulation, International accounting, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Market liquidity, Cost of equity, Enforcement, Security markets

Abstract:
This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure regulation. We integrate theoretical and empirical studies from accounting, economics, finance and law in order to contribute to the cross-fertilization of these fields. We provide an organizing framework that identifies firm-specific (micro-level) and market-wide (macro-level) costs and benefits of firms' reporting and disclosure activities and then use this framework to discuss potential costs and benefits of regulating these activities and to organize the key insights from the literature. Our survey highlights important unanswered questions and concludes with numerous suggestions for future research.

Accounting, Asymmetric information, Capital markets, Institutional economics, International, Mandatory disclosure, Political economy, Regulation, Standards

Abstract:
Economic theory suggests that a commitment by a firm to increased levels of disclosure should lower the information asymmetry component of the firm's cost of capital. But while the theory is compelling, so far empirical results relating increased levels of disclosure to measurable economic benefits have been mixed. One explanation for the mixed results among studies using data from firms publicly registered in the US is that, under current US reporting standards, the disclosure environment is already rich. In this paper, we study German firms that have switched from the German to an international reporting regime (IAS or US-GAAP), thereby committing themselves to increased levels of disclosure. We show that proxies for the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital for the switching firms, namely the bid-ask spread and trading volume, behave in the predicted direction compared to firms employing the German reporting regime.

Disclosure, International accounting, Cost of capital, Information asymmetry, Liquidity

Abstract:
Economic theory suggests that a commitment by a firm to increased levels of disclosure should lower the information asymmetry component of the firm's cost of capital. But while the theory is compelling, so far empirical results relating increased levels of disclosure to measurable economic benefits have been mixed. One explanation for the mixed results among studies using data from firms publicly registered in the US is that, under current US reporting standards, the disclosure environment is already rich. In this paper, we study German firms that have switched from the German to an international reporting regime (IAS or US GAAP), thereby committing themselves to increased levels of disclosure. We show that proxies for the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital for the switching firms, namely the bid-ask spread and trading volume, behave in the predicted direction compared to firms employing the German reporting regime.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital.

Abstract:
In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the CAPM and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures reduce the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is non-diversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline the cost of capital.

Cost of capital, disclosure, information risk, asset pricing

Abstract:
In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the CAPM and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures reduce the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is non-diversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline the cost of capital.

Cost of capital, disclosure, information risk, asset pricing

Abstract:
This paper examines international differences in firms' cost of equity capital across 40 countries. We analyze whether the effectiveness of a country's legal institutions and securities regulation is systematically related to cross-country differences in the cost of equity capital. We employ several models to estimate firms' implied or ex ante cost of capital. Our results support the conclusion that firms from countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. We perform extensive sensitivity analyses to assess the potentially confounding influence of countries' long-run growth differences on our results. We also show that, consistent with theory, the cost of capital effects of strong legal institutions become substantially smaller and, in many cases, statistically insignificant as capital markets become globally more integrated.

Cost of equity, Disclosure regulation, Law and finance, International finance, Country risk, Legal system

Abstract:
This paper examines international differences in firms' cost of equity capital across 40 countries. We analyze whether the effectiveness of a country's legal institutions and securities regulation is systematically related to cross-country differences in the cost of equity capital. We employ several models to estimate firms' implied or ex ante cost of capital. Our results support the conclusion that firms from countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. We perform extensive sensitivity analyses to assess the potentially confounding influence of countries' long-run growth differences on our results. We also show that, consistent with theory, the cost of capital effects of strong legal institutions become substantially smaller and, in many cases, statistically insignificant as capital markets become globally more integrated.

Cost of equity, Disclosure regulation, Law and finance, International finance, Country risk, Legal system

Abstract:
The recent financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the pros and cons of fair-value accounting (FVA). This debate presents a major challenge for FVA going forward and standard setters’ push to extend FVA into other areas. In this article, we highlight four important issues as an attempt to make sense of the debate. First, much of the controversy results from confusion about what is new and different about FVA. Second, while there are legitimate concerns about marking to market (or pure FVA) in times of financial crisis, it is less clear that these problems apply to FVA as stipulated by the accounting standards, be it IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Third, historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be the remedy. There are a number of concerns about HCA as well and these problems could be larger than those with FVA. Fourth, although it is difficult to fault the FVA standards per se, implementation issues are a potential concern, especially with respect to litigation. Finally, we identify several avenues for future research.

Mark-to-market, Fair value accounting, Financial institutions, Liquidity, Financial crisis, Banks, Procyclicality

Abstract:
The competition between IAS and US GAAP to become the global accounting standard has created a debate about the relative quality of the two standards. This paper compares IAS and US GAAP in terms of information asymmetry and market liquidity - two key constructs in securities regulation. It uses firms trading in Germany's New Market, which must choose between IAS and US GAAP in preparing their financial statements, but face the same regulatory environment. That is, institutional factors, such as listing requirements, market microstructure and standards enforcement, are held constant in the comparison. The findings do not indicate that US GAAP is of higher quality as frequently claimed. Differences in the bid-ask spread and trading volume between IAS and US GAAP firms are economically and statistically insignificant. Subsequent analyses of the dispersion of analysts' forecasts, IPO underpricing and firms' standard choices corroborate these findings. Thus, at least for New Market firms, IAS and US GAAP appear to be comparable in their ability to reduce information asymmetries.

Key Words: International Accounting, Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Market Liquidity

Abstract:
We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.

Going private, Disclosure, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Deregistration, Private control benefits, Pink sheets, Liquidity, Stock market reactions

Abstract:
We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.

SEC deregistration, Disclosure, Going private, Regulation, Private control

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from twenty-nine countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

G11, G15, G32, G34

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand the factors that influence whether foreign outside investors provide capital to a country's firms. This study examines whether and why investor concern about corporate governance results in fewer foreign holdings. We use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by U.S. investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 emerging market and developed economies. We find that foreigners invest significantly less in firms that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more conducive to outside investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a country%u2019s economic development but appears to be directly related to a country%u2019s information rules and legal institutions. We therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors play an important role in this result. Supporting this explanation, we show that foreign investment is lower in firms that appear to engage in more earnings management.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from 29 countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

Corporate governance, Foreign investment, Ownership structure, Information flow, Earnings management, Shareholder base, Home bias

Abstract:
This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

international accounting, earnings management, private companies, legal system, accounting harmonization, earnings properties

Abstract:
This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

International accounting, Earnings management, Private companies, Legal system, Accounting harmonization, Earnings properties

Abstract:
This paper examines market liquidity and cost of capital effects associated with voluntary IFRS adoptions around the world. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement IFRS. Some firms may simply adopt the label, while for others IFRS adoption may be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To illustrate these differences, we classify firms into ‘label’ and ‘serious’ adopters using changes in firms’ underlying reporting incentives and actual reporting behavior, and then analyze whether capital markets respond differently around IFRS adoptions. We find that, on average, voluntary IFRS adoptions are not associated with capital market benefits, especially when compared to other forms of commitment such as cross-listing in the U.S. Consistent with our predictions, we find an increase in market liquidity and a decline in the cost of capital for ‘serious’ adopters. These benefits are likely attributable to broader changes in firms’ commitment to transparency, and not just IFRS.

International accounting, Reporting incentives, IAS, U.S. GAAP, Disclosure, Cost of equity, Enforcement, IFRS implementation

Abstract:
Drawing on the academic literature in accounting, finance and economics, we analyze economic and policy factors related to the potential adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the U.S. We highlight the unique institutional features of U.S. markets to assess the potential impact of IFRS adoption on the quality and comparability of U.S. reporting practices, the ensuing capital market effects, and the potential costs of switching from U.S. GAAP to IFRS. We discuss the compatibility of IFRS with the current U.S. regulatory and legal environment as well as the possible effects of IFRS adoption on the U.S. economy as a whole. We also consider how a switch to IFRS may affect worldwide competition among accounting standards and standard setters, and discuss the political ramifications of such a decision on the standard setting process and on the governance structure of the International Accounting Standards Board. Our analysis shows that the decision to adopt IFRS mainly involves a cost-benefit tradeoff between (1) recurring, albeit modest, comparability benefits for investors, (2) recurring future cost savings that will largely accrue to multinational companies, and (3) one-time transition costs borne by all firms and the U.S. economy as a whole, including those from adjustments to U.S. institutions. We conclude by outlining several possible scenarios for the future of U.S. accounting standards, ranging from maintaining U.S. GAAP, letting firms decide whether and when to adopt IFRS, to the creation of a competing U.S. GAAP-based set of global accounting standards that could serve as an alternative to IFRS.

Accounting, Regulation, IFRS, U.S. GAAP, SEC, Standard setting, U.S. equity markets, Mandatory disclosure, Political economy

Abstract:
This paper examines whether cross-listing in the U.S. reduces foreign firms' costs of capital. While prior studies show that U.S. cross-listings are associated with substantial increases in firm value, the sources of these valuation effects are not well understood. We estimate cost of capital effects implied by market prices and analyst forecasts, which accounts for changes in growth expectations around cross-listings. We find strong evidence that firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a significant decrease in their cost of capital between 70 to 120 basis points. These effects are sustained and still present after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we find smaller cost of capital reductions for firms that cross-list in the over-the-counter market and for exchange-listed firms from countries with stronger home-country institutions. For exchange-traded cross-listings, the reduction in cost of capital accounts for more than half of the increase in value around cross-listings, whereas for the other types of cross-listings the valuation effects are primarily attributable to contemporaneous revisions in growth expectations.

Corporate governance, cross-listing, bonding hypothesis, cost of equity, disclosure, law and finance, international finance

Abstract:
This paper examines whether cross-listing in the U.S. reduces foreign firms' costs of capital. While prior studies show that U.S. cross-listings are associated with substantial increases in firm value, the sources of these valuation effects are not well understood. We estimate cost of capital effects implied by market prices and analyst forecasts, which accounts for changes in growth expectations around cross-listings. We find strong evidence that firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a significant decrease in their cost of capital between 70 to 120 basis points. These effects are sustained and still present after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, we find smaller cost of capital reductions for firms that cross-list in the over-the-counter market and for exchange-listed firms from countries with stronger home-country institutions. For exchange-traded cross-listings, the reduction in cost of capital accounts for more than half of the increase in value around cross-listings, whereas for the other types of cross-listings the valuation effects are primarily attributable to contemporaneous revisions in growth expectations.

Cross-listing, corporate governance, bonding hypothesis, cost of equity, disclosure, law and finance, international finance

Abstract:
In this paper, we establish a link between information quality, firms' capital investment decisions and their cost of capital. We characterize asset prices in a market equilibrium framework with perfect competition for firm shares and derive a pricing equation that is equivalent to the CAPM. Using this characterization, we show that higher information quality leads to a lower cost of capital via its effect on expected cash flows. Better information improves the coordination between firms and investors with respect to capital investment decisions, which investors price in equilibrium by discounting firms' expected cash flows at a higher rate. This effect survives the forces of diversification in a capital market with perfect competition, even when information quality is uncorrelated across firms.

Cost of capital, Disclosure, Information risk, Asset pricing, Risk premium

Abstract:
This paper examines the economic consequences of a recent regulatory change mandating OTC Bulletin Board firms to comply with the reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases the required disclosures for firms that previously did not file with the SEC. We document that the imposition of SEC disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, essentially forcing them off the OTCBB. However, SEC disclosure regulation also has significant benefits. Firms filing with the SEC prior to the change experience positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity, consistent with positive externalities from disclosure regulation. Moreover, newly compliant firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity upon compliance consistent with the notion that disclosure reduces information asymmetry and improves market liquidity.

Mandatory disclosure, Enforcement, Externalities, Over-the-counter market, Liquidity, Listing choices, Eligibility rule

Abstract:
This paper examines the economic consequences of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases mandated disclosures for firms previously not filing with the SEC. We document that the imposition of disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, forcing them off the OTCBB. SEC regulation also has significant benefits. Firms previously filing with the SEC experience positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity, suggesting positive externalities from disclosure regulation. Newly compliant firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity consistent with improved disclosure reducing information asymmetry.

Mandatory disclosure, enforcement, externalities, over-the-counter market, liquidity, listing choices, eligibility rule

Abstract:
The consequences of information differences across investors in capital markets are still much debated. This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors and the cost of capital, and makes three points. First, in models of perfect competition, information differences across investors affect a firm's cost of capital through investors' average information precision, and not information asymmetry per se. Second, the average information precision effect is unlikely to diversify away when there exist many firms whose cash flows covary. Thus, better disclosure can reduce a firm's cost of capital. Third, the precision effect does not give rise to a separate information risk factor. These points are important to empirical research in financial economics, as well as to regulators who debate future disclosure requirements and the consequences of prior requirements such as Regulation Fair Disclosure.

Information risk, Cost of capital, Expected return, Asset pricing, Disclosure, Rational expectations, Diversification

Abstract:
This study examines the role of political connections in firms' financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms' financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.

Cross listing, Financing choices, Emerging markets, Asian financial crisis, Indonesia, Disclosure

Abstract:
This study examines the role of political connections for firms' financing strategies and their long-run financial performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with close political ties are less likely than firms with weak connections to have publicly traded foreign securities. We also show that estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political connections are ignored. Political relationships not only alter firms' financing strategies, they also impact the long-run performance of companies. Tracking returns across several changes in regimes, we document that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patrons fall from power. As a result, closely-connected firms underperform under new regimes and subsequently increase their foreign financing.

Cross listing, Financing choices, Emerging markets, Asian financial crisis, Indonesia, Disclosure

Abstract:
This paper describes and analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common (international) perception that German accounting is rather uninformative. This characterization has its merits from the perspective of an arm's length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments.

Accounting, Disclosure, Germany, Standards, Survey

Abstract:
Discretionary disclosure theory suggests that proprietary costs are an important reason why firms often withhold material information. However, empirically testing this hypothesis has proven to be difficult, due especially to the elusive nature of proprietary costs and lack of settings in which proprietary disclosures are voluntary. This paper exploits the fact that that until recently, German firms were not required to disclose business segment reports, which are generally viewed as competitively sensitive and proprietary in nature. Analyzing firms' voluntary business segment disclosures, I find evidence consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. As Germany now requires segment reporting by all listed firms, I also examine ex post whether segment reporting is more revealing for those firms that previously chose not to disclose. I find that firms are less likely to voluntarily provide segment reports if segment profitability is more heterogeneous and the average profitability reported in the income statement is less revealing. This finding is also consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis and shows that segment disclosures are not governed by capital-market considerations alone. I benchmark my findings using voluntary cash flow statement disclosures. In comparison to segment reports, which likely reveal proprietary information to competitors, cash flow statements are less competitively sensitive. I find that cash flow disclosures appear to be governed primarily by capital-market considerations. This finding lends further support to the proprietary cost interpretation of the segment reporting results.

Proprietary Costs, Voluntary disclosure, Competitive harm, Disclosure costs, Segment disclosures, Cash flow statements

Abstract:
Lang, Lins and Miller (2002) investigate the relation between cross listing in the U.S. and information intermediation by analysts. The results suggest that cross listing in the U.S. increases analyst following and forecast accuracy and that both variables are associated with Tobin's Q. These findings are interesting and advance the cross-listing literature in several ways. This discussion raises two issues. First, I highlight that the sources of cross-listing effects are not obvious and are difficult to disentangle. To illustrate this point, I replicate the analysis using cross-listed Canadian firms, for which mandated disclosures are held constant. Thus, if disclosure effects are important for documented cross-listing effects, I expect to find no relation in the Canadian sample. The findings for forecast accuracy are consistent with this hypothesis. However, analyst following continues to be significantly higher for cross-listed Canadian firms. These findings suggest that the sources of cross-listing effects differ for analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. Second, I discuss the link between analyst variables, firm value and cost of capital. As they are only tenuously related, I draw attention to some unresolved questions and areas for future research.

analyst forecasts, cross listing, cost of capital, disclosure, enforcement

Abstract:
This paper discusses empirical evidence on the costs (and benefits) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), particularly from stock returns and firms' going-private decisions. Zhang (2006) analyzes stock returns around key legislative events and concludes that SOX and its provisions have imposed significant net costs on firms. Engel et al. (2006) examine going-private decisions before and after SOX and point to unintended consequences of SOX. Both studies are carefully conducted and deserve praise for tackling a timely and important issue. However, as my discussion and its evidence highlight, several of the key findings may not be attributable to SOX. Instead, they may reflect broader market trends. Thus, we need to exercise caution in interpreting the existing evidence. While it is not implausible that one-size-fits-all regulation imposes significant costs on firms, we presently do not have much SOX-related evidence supporting this conclusion. In fact, there is a growing body of evidence (which I review) that SOX has increased the scrutiny on firms and has produced certain benefits. The net effects on firms or the U.S. economy, however, remain unclear.

Securities regulation, Event study, Disclosure, Corporate governance, Cost-benefit analysis, Stock returns, Going private, Going dark

Abstract:
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks’ assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.

Mark-to-market accounting, Financial institutions, Liquidity, Financial crisis, Banks, Financial regulation, Procyclicality, Contagion

Abstract:
This paper examines the link between disclosure and the cost of capital. We exploit an exogenous cost of capital shock created by the Enron scandal in Fall 2001 and analyze firms' disclosure responses to this shock. These tests are opposite to the typical research design that analyzes cost of capital responses to disclosure changes. In reversing the tests and using an exogenous shock, we mitigate concerns about omitted variables in traditional cross-sectional disclosure studies. We estimate shocks to firms' betas around the Enron events and the ensuing transparency crisis. Our analysis shows that these beta shocks are associated with increased disclosure. Firms expand the number of pages of their annual 10-K filings, notably the sections containing the financial statements and footnotes. The increase in disclosure is particularly pronounced for firms that have positive cost of capital shocks and larger financing needs. We also find that firms respond with additional interim disclosures (e.g., 8-K filings) and that these disclosures are complementary to the 10-K disclosures. Finally, we show that firms' disclosure responses reduce firms' costs of capital and hence the impact of the transparency crisis.

Transparency, Disclosure, Cost of capital, Capital-market shocks, Financial crisis, Annual reports, Accounting scandals

Abstract:
This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements. Although cash flow statements have not been mandatory in Germany until recently, an increasing number of firms have voluntarily provided cash flow statements. These firms are likely to be influenced by recommendations of the German accounting profession, IAS 7, and the respective standards of other countries. This paper studies this influence by looking at the adoption pattern of the cash flow statement over time, and ist format. It uses milestones in the evolution of German professional recommendations and respective international standards to chart the development of voluntary cash flow statements. The paper analyzes the cross-sectional determinants of voluntary (international) cash flow statements using probit regressions and factor analysis. The results support the idea that capital-market forces drive the disclosure of cash flow statements that conform with international reporting practice.

Abstract:
This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements over time. While cash flow statement are mandated under many GAAP regimes, its disclosure has not been mandatory in Germany until recently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of firms provides cash flow statements voluntarily. These firms are likely to be influenced by recommendations of the German accounting profession, IAS 7 as well as the respective standards of other countries. The idea of the paper is to study this influence by looking at the adoption pattern over time and the format of the cash flow statement. It documents the development of voluntary cash flow statement disclosures by German firms with respect to "milestones" in the evolution of German professional recommendations and respective international standards. The cross-sectional determinants of voluntary (international) cash flow statements are analyzed using probit regressions and factor analysis. The results are generally consistent with the idea that capital-market forces drive the disclosure of cash flow statements that are in line with international reporting practice.

Abstract:
Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006) examine the properties of U.S. GAAP accounting numbers provided by cross-listed firms and compare them to those of U.S. firms. Using a wide range of properties related to earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance, LRW show that accounting data are not comparable across cross listed and U.S. firms, despite the fact that all firms use the same accounting standards. In this paper, I discuss how these findings advance the literature and what they imply for the effectiveness of cross listing as a bonding mechanism. My discussion highlights that the documented reporting differences cannot be solely attributed to weak U.S. legal and SEC enforcement. I emphasize that accounting standards provide discretion and that cross-listed firms are likely to have different incentives than U.S. firms to use this discretion. To illustrate, I document that cross listed and U.S. firms differ with respect to their ownership concentration and that these differences are associated with differences in earnings management. Consistent with the authors' findings, I also provide evidence that home-country institutions continue to influence cross-listed firms' reporting behavior.

Cross listing, Earnings quality, Enforcement, Ownership structure, Bonding, US GAAP, Reconciliation

Abstract:
The consequences of information differences across investors in capital markets are still much debated. This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors and the cost of capital, and makes three points. First, in models of perfect competition, information differences across investors affect a firm's cost of capital through investors' average information precision, and not information asymmetry per se. Second, the average precision effect of information that is heterogeneously distributed across investors is unlikely to diversify away when there exist many firms whose cash flows covary. Thus, better disclosure can reduce a firm's cost of capital. Third, the precision effect does not give rise to a separate information-risk factor. These points are important to empirical research in accounting and finance, as well as to regulators who debate future disclosure requirements and the consequences of prior requirements such as Regulation Fair Disclosure.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks' assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
This paper examines the link between disclosure and the cost of capital. We exploit an exogenous cost of capital shock created by the Enron scandal in Fall 2001 and analyze firms’ disclosure responses to this shock. These tests are opposite to the typical research design that analyzes cost of capital responses to disclosure changes. In reversing the tests and using an exogenous shock, we mitigate concerns about omitted variables in traditional cross-sectional disclosure studies. We estimate shocks to firms’ betas around the Enron events and the ensuing transparency crisis. Our analysis shows that these beta shocks are associated with increased disclosure. Firms expand the number of pages of their annual 10-K filings, notably the sections containing the financial statements and footnotes. The increase in disclosure is particularly pronounced for firms that have positive cost of capital shocks and larger financing needs. We also find that firms respond with additional interim disclosures (e.g., 8-K filings) and that these disclosures are complementary to the 10-K disclosures. Finally, we show that firms’ disclosure responses reduce firms’ costs of capital and hence the impact of the transparency crisis.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
As domestic sources of outside finance are limited in many countries around the world, it is important to understand factors that influence whether foreign investors provide capital to a country's firms. We study 4,409 firms from 29 countries to assess whether and why concerns about corporate governance result in fewer foreign holdings. We find that foreigners invest less in firms that reside in countries with poor outsider protection and disclosure and have ownership structures that are conducive to governance problems. This effect is particularly pronounced when earnings are opaque, indicating that information asymmetry and monitoring costs faced by foreign investors likely drive the results.

Corporate governance, Firm valuation, Foreign investment, Ownership structure, Information flow, Earnings management, Shareholder base, Emerging markets, Home bias

Abstract:
Lang, Raedy and Wilson (JAE 2006) compare the properties of U.S. GAAP accounting numbers across cross-listed and U.S. firms. Using a wide range of properties, LRW show that accounting data are not comparable, even though sample firms use the same accounting standards. I discuss how these findings advance the literature and what they imply for the effectiveness of cross listing as a bonding mechanism. My discussion highlights that documented differences cannot be solely attributed to weak U.S. legal enforcement. I emphasize that accounting standards provide discretion and that cross-listed and U.S. firms are likely to have differential incentives to use this discretion. To illustrate, I document that cross-listed and U.S. firms differ in ownership concentration and that these differences are associated with the level of earnings management. I also provide evidence that home-country institutions continue to influence cross-listed firms' reporting behavior.

Cross listing, Earnings quality, Enforcement, Ownership structure, Bonding, US GAAP, Reconciliation

Abstract:
Motivated by the debate about globally uniform accounting standards, this paper investigates whether firms using US GAAP vis-a-vis IAS exhibit differences in several proxies for information asymmetry. The study exploits a unique setting where the two sets of standards are put on a level playing field. Firms trading in Germany's New Market must choose between IAS and US GAAP for financial reporting, but face the same regulatory environment otherwise. Thus, institutional factors such as listing requirements, market microstructure and standards enforcement are held constant. In this setting, differences in the bid-ask spread and share turnover between IAS and US GAAP firms are statistically insignificant and economically small. Subsequent analyses of analysts' forecast dispersion, IPO underpricing and firms' standard choices corroborate these findings. Thus, at least for New Market firms, the choice between IAS and US GAAP appears to be of little consequence for information asymmetry and market liquidity. These findings do not support widespread claims that US GAAP produce financial statements of higher informational quality than IAS.

International accounting, Disclosure, Cost of capital, Accounting standards, Harmonization

Abstract:
This paper addresses the question why net earnings and other accrual accounting numbers are frequently used to restrict dividends to shareholders. Even though this role of accrual accounting is widely accepted in the literature, a theory explaining the role of accruals in dividend restrictions is still in its early stages. Building on the principal-agent framework, I argue that basic features of the accrual process can be viewed as arising from the demand for dividend restrictions mitigating debt-related incentive problems. This explanation is consistent with the observation that, historically, debt contracting, dividend restrictions and the development of accrual accounting have been closely related. The basic idea is that the use of transactions and events in the accrual process leads to a contingent formulation of the upper bound on dividends in an earnings-based constraint. Transactions and events act as imperfect, but verifiable indicators for (unverifiable) determinants of debt-related incentive problems. In particular, by shifting cash flows through time, e.g. with provisions or depreciation charges, the accrual process can mitigate distortions in shareholders' investment decisions that regularly arise in a multi-period context. Several examples illustrating this are provided. Although the accrual process is not the only way to mitigate these distortions, an equivalent cash-based constraint requires a complex menu of payout parameters. Such a menu is generally not observed in practice.

Abstract:
This paper addresses the question why net earnings and other accrual accounting numbers are frequently used to restrict dividends to shareholders. Even though this role of accrual accounting is widely accepted in the literature, a theory explaining the role of accruals in dividend restrictions is still in its early stages. Building on the principal-agent framework, I argue that basic features of the accrual process can be viewed as arising from the demand for dividend restrictions mitigating debt-related incentive problems. This explanation is consistent with the observation that, historically, debt contracting, dividend restrictions and the development of accrual accounting have been closely related. The basic idea is that the use of transactions and events in the accrual process leads to a contingent formulation of the upper bound on dividends in an earnings-based constraint. Transactions and events act as imperfect, but verifiable indicators for (unverifiable) determinants of debt-related incentive problems. In particular, by shifting cash flows through time, e.g. with provisions or depreciation charges, the accrual process can mitigate distortions in shareholders' investment decisions that regularly arise in a multi-period context. Several examples illustrating this are provided. Although the accrual process is not the only way to mitigate these distortions, an equivalent cash-based constraint requires a complex menu of payout parameters. Such a menu is generally not observed in practice.

Abstract:
Agency theory shows that payout constraints can play an important role in debt contracting and mitigating debt- related incentive problems. In this paper, we compare how, empirically, corporations in the UK, the USA and Germany are restricted in their ability to pay dividends (and other forms of payouts) to shareholders. Our study is novel in two respects: First, although there is ample evidence on the use of accounting-based payout restrictions in US debt contracts, and some evidence in the UK, there are no comparable studies on accounting-based payout constraints in German debt contracts. Second, we include debt contracts as well as regulation on dividends in the comparison to highlight the interdependencies between mandated and contractual payout restrictions.

Despite marked institutional differences between the US, the UK and Germany, our comparison demonstrates that corporations are restricted in a similar fashion in all three countries. This holds for the shape of the dividend restrictions based on accounting numbers as well as some key accounting principles determining net earnings and other accounting numbers used in payout restrictions. Our comparison suggests, for instance, that historical cost valuation and conservatism are ubiquitous in restricting dividends. We find that differences mainly exist with regard to the origin of the restrictions. In Germany, dividend restrictions are predominantly mandated, in the UK, mandated restrictions are supplemented by debt covenants and in the US, dividend restrictions follow primarily from debt contracting. By integrating contractual provisions as well as regulation on dividends, our comparison provides additional insights into the debt contracting process and offers a more complete picture than previous studies.

Abstract:
Agency theory shows that payout constraints can play an important role in debt contracting and mitigating debt-related incentive problems. In this paper, we compare how, empirically, corporations in the UK, the USA and Germany are restricted in their ability to pay dividends (and other forms of payouts) to shareholders. Our study is novel in two respects: First, although there is ample evidence on the use of accounting-based payout restrictions in US debt contracts, and some evidence in the UK, there are no comparable studies on accounting-based payout constraints in German debt contracts. Second, we include debt contracts as well as regulation on dividends in the comparison to highlight the interdependencies between mandated and contractual payout restrictions.

Despite marked institutional differences between the US, the UK and Germany, our comparison demonstrates that corporations are restricted in a similar fashion based in all three countries. This holds for the shape of the dividend restrictions based on accounting numbers as well as some key accounting principles determining net earnings and other accounting numbers used in payout restrictions. Our comparison suggests, for instance, that historical cost valuation and conservatism are ubiquitous in restricting dividends. We find that differences mainly exist with regard to the origin of the restrictions. In Germany, dividend restrictions are predominantly mandated, in the UK, mandated restrictions are supplemented by debt covenants and in the US, dividend restrictions follow primarily from debt contracting. By integrating contractual provisions as well as regulation on dividends, our comparison provides additional insights into the debt contracting process and offers a more complete picture than previous studies.