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Abstract:
Employing a new method of industry tests we examine investment bank governance. Most of the findings reject the view that banks are governed suboptimally over a sample period from 1990 through 2003. CEO pay is large and significantly sensitive to stock price performance, and stock price performance often outperforms the market. Results are consistent with bank directors being reputable, independent, and in control of their committees. Bank management is disciplined by pressure from a number of competitive product markets and from a vigorous market for bank control. No evidence exists that unusual governance qualities that could be unique to investment banking are indications of poor governance performance. The evidence agrees with the view that investment banks choose optimal governance.

Boards of directors, board size, board composition, bond offerings, CEOs, commercial banks, comparative corporate governance, corporate control, corporate governance, directorships, endogeneity, executive compensation, Glass-Steagall, initial public offerings, investment bankers, investment banking

Abstract:
Abnormal returns in the week before equity offerings are unusually negative and widespread, afflicting 65% of issuers during 1985-2000. They also are large, as the mean is -2.6%. Stock prices increase in the offer week, but the increases are small and they are not a reversal of the pre-offer price declines. The resulting longer-term losses are comparable to the widely known losses inflicted on stockholders when the offerings are first announced. An offer-size effect that agrees with modest longer-term price pressure can explain only a small part of longer-term negative returns. Further findings agree with the notion that the fall in stock prices is a reaction to negative information that may be produced by the underwriting process. While the price drop is not a market inefficiency in the presence of transaction costs, the fact that it is not incorporated sooner in the market price remains a puzzle.

Underwriters, Seasoned public offerings, Investment banking, Underpricing

Abstract:
This study examines whether security analyst earnings forecasts are informative. A widely held view supported by several empirical studies is that security analyst earnings forecasts are informative. We present evidence drawn from more detailed analyses of security returns than used in past studies which shows analyst forecasts are not particularly informative. This finding agrees with the recent finding of Altinkilic and Hansen (2009), that analyst recommendations are not informative. We also show that analysts forecast tend to piggyback on the news and recent events. We examine whether our conclusions also apply in the case of bold forecasts, more accurate forecasts, more timely forecasts, and forecasts from analysts at more reputable brokerages. However, in all cases we find forecast revisions to be information-free. We conclude from the combined findings that security analysts are not information agents in securities markets, contrary to the conventional view.

Analysts, Analysts' forecasts, Analysts' under/overreaction to information, Brokerage research, Capital markets, Contrarian strategies, Efficient markets, Financial markets, Information production, Market efficiency, Momentum effects, Post-earnings announcement drift, Sell-side analysts

Abstract:
We examine the information transmission role of stock recommendation revisions by sell-side security analysts. Revisions are associated with economically insignificant mean price reactions and often piggyback on recent news, events, long-term momentum, and short-run contrarian return predictors, typically downgrading after bad news and upgrading after good news. However, the revisions are usually information-free for investors. The findings go against the long-standing view that recommendations are an important means by which analysts assimilate information into stock prices. They disagree with the view of policymakers that analysts’ stock picks materially impact stock prices.

analysts’ recommendations, brokerage research, capital markets, investment banking, market efficiency, security analysts

Abstract:
Discounting and underpricing spread across most seasoned equity offers in the 1990s and were four to five times higher than in earlier years - particularly for riskier and more difficult to market offers, which were more prevalent. Analyses suggest that expected discounting is a cost of uncertainty about firm value, marketing new shares, and acquiring information that raises the offer price. Stockholders appear to recognize this as they incorporate predictable discounting in stock prices when equity offers are first announced. The surprise component of discounting, which reflects the lead bank's final adjustment to the offer price after the close of trading the night before the offer, releases information that often causes economically large swings in firm value on the offer day. The evidence points to disparities between the issuer's closing price and the price suggested in the lead bank's final order book as a primary source of information. The discount surprise appears to be an effective mechanism used by lead banks to update capital suppliers with that eleventh hour information before they commit their funds.

Underwriters, Seasoned public offerings, Investment banking, Underpricing

Abstract:
This study examines the behavior of spreads paid in firm underwritten seasoned common stock offerings and straight bond offerings. Estimates indicate that up to 85% of the spread is variable cost and that the marginal spread is rising. Further, offerings that are likely to require greater underwriting services encounter higher marginal spreads. These findings are consistent with there being a family of U-shaped spreads, with lower quality offerings priced on higher spreads, unlike the economies of scale view of spreads. They agree with the views that underwriters provide valuable services and that the marginal cost of external finance is rising.