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Abstract:
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the managerial power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm's length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and thereby hurt shareholder value. The authors show that the processes that produce compensation arrangements, and the various market forces and constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, the authors show that managerial power and the desire to camouflage rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as puzzling or problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The authors conclude that the role managerial power plays in the design of executive compensation is significant and should be taken into account in any examination of executive pay arrangements or of corporate governance generally.

corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage, insider trading, indexed options, vesting

Abstract:
The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is underappreciated. Positive accounting theory teaches that even cosmetic changes in reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs. However, agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number of reasons, including the fact that executive compensation often is tied to reported earnings, managerial preferences for high earnings generally will exceed shareholder preferences, leading to share value reducing tradeoffs between reported earnings and net cash flows. The empirical literature on the details of positive accounting theory is mixed, but the evidence firmly establishes the power of accounting to shape corporate behavior.

The power of accounting and the divergence of interests have many implications for courts and policy makers. For example, consideration of proposals to increase conformity between tax and financial accounting rules as a means of combating tax sheltering and/or artificial earnings inflation must take into account the incentive properties of accounting standards and recognize that narrowing the gap between tax and book income will have economic consequences, however the gap is narrowed. This Article considers this and other implications of the behavioral effects of accounting standards, including the possibility of setting accounting standards instrumentally as a means of regulating corporate behavior, an alternative to tax incentives, mandates, or direct subsidies.

financial accounting, tax accounting, tax sheltering, artificial earnings inflation, tax income, book income, corporate behavior, positive accounting theory, agency theory

Abstract:
The corporate stock option backdating scandal has dominated business page headlines during the summer of 2006. The SEC is currently investigating more than seventy-five companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the number of firms caught up in the scandal seems to increase every day. This essay contributes to our understanding of the backdating phenomenon by analyzing the economics of backdating and the characteristics of the firms under investigation. Its main points are the following: First, given the high volatilities of the stocks of the technology companies that dominate the list of firms under investigation and the fact that options granted to executives and employees typically may not be exercised for several years, press reports that focus on the size of the strike price "discounts" achieved by backdating significantly overstate the value of backdating. In some cases, reducing the strike price by a dollar per share by backdating increased the Black-Scholes value of the option by less than twenty cents per share. Second, completely unnoticed in the discussion so far is the fact that in many cases backdating dramatically reduced the apparent value of options. Because the size of executive stock option grants often is determined first by establishing the value to be delivered and then by calculating the number of shares to be covered by the option, reducing the apparent value of option shares may have substantially increased the size and true economic value of backdated executive option grants. Third, comparison of semiconductor firms under investigation for backdating with peer companies that are not suggests an association between backdating and the use of options in compensating non-executive employees. This essay considers several explanations for backdating non-executive options, including share limitations, minimizing apparent rank and file compensation, and cognitive biases. Finally, this essay argues that the backdating phenomenon is really not an accounting scandal. Backdating has accounting consequences, but it is unlikely to have been accounting driven.

stock options, backdating, option valuation, Black-Scholes

Abstract:
The paper identifies problems with the ordered breakup of Microsoft that seem to have been completely overlooked by the government, the judge, and the commentators. The breakup order prohibits Bill Gates and other large Microsoft shareholders from owning shares in both of the companies that would result from the separation. Given this prohibition, we show, dividing the securities in the resultant companies among the shareholders is not as straightforward as the government has suggested. Any method of distributing the securities that would comply with this mandate would either (i) impose a significant financial penalty on Microsoft's large shareholders that is not contemplated by the order, or (ii) create a risk of a substantial transfer of value between Microsoft's shareholders. In addition to identifying the difficulties and costs involved in the two distribution methods that would comply with the cross-shareholding prohibition, we examine how the breakup order could be refined to reduce these difficulties and costs. The problems that we identify should be addressed if a breakup is ultimately to be pursued and should be taken into account in making the basic decision of whether to break up Microsoft at all.

Valuation, Microsoft, breakup, spin-off

Abstract:
This paper identifies problems with the ordered breakup of Microsoft that seem to have been completely overlooked by the government, the judge, and the commentators. The breakup order prohibits Bill Gates and other large Microsoft shareholders from owning shares in both of the companies that would result from the separation. Given this prohibition, we show, dividing the securities in the resultant companies among the shareholders is not as straightforward as the government has suggested. Any method of distributing the securities that would comply with this mandate would either (i) impose a significant financial penalty on Microsoft's large shareholders that is not contemplated by the order, or (ii) create a risk of a substantial transfer of value between Microsoft's shareholders. In addition to identifying the difficulties and costs involved in the two distribution methods that would comply with the cross-shareholding prohibition, we examine how the breakup order could be refined to reduce these difficulties and costs. The problems that we identify should be addressed if a breakup is ultimately to be pursued and should be taken into account in making the basic decision of whether to break up Microsoft at all.

Abstract:
As typically employed, the contract provision known as the right of first refusal provides the grantee with a contingent option to purchase an asset if the grantor elects to sell. Conventional wisdom teaches that rights of first refusal are employed to avoid a costly future breakdown in bargaining between the grantor and the grantee and to guard against a sale to an undesirable party. In this Article I argue that the traditional justification is faulty. Because the provision deters potential buyers, the right of first refusal is costly for the contracting parties, and, if the sole aim of the contracting parties is to eliminate a future breakdown in bargaining, that goal can be achieved at a lower cost by committing to a paper auction. Having rejected the traditional justification, I go on to argue that the real motivation behind the adoption of rights of first refusal, at least in co-venturing relationships, must be a desire to inhibit the unilateral departure of a participant. I also argue that the use of rights of first refusal in other relationships, such as the lessor/lessee relationship, may be explained as an example of suboptimum standardization of contract terms. I conclude with a few thoughts concerning the implication of this analysis for private contracting and for legislatures that are considering mandating rights of first refusal.

Abstract:
As typically employed, the contract provision known as the right of first refusal provides the grantee with a contingent option to purchase an asset if the grantor elects to sell. Conventional wisdom teaches that rights of first refusal are employed to avoid a costly future breakdown in bargaining between the grantor and the grantee and to guard against a sale to an undesirable party. In this Article I argue that the traditional justification is faulty. Because the provision deters potential buyers, the right of first refusal is costly for the contracting parties, and, if the sole aim of the contracting parties is to eliminate a future breakdown in bargaining, that goal can be achieved at a lower cost by committing to a paper auction. Having rejected the traditional justification, I go on to argue that the real motivation behind the adoption of rights of first refusal, at least in co-venturing relationships, must be a desire to inhibit the unilateral departure of a participant. I also argue that the use of rights of first refusal in other relationships, such as the lessor/lessee relationship, may be explained as an example of suboptimum standardization of contract terms. I conclude with a few thoughts concerning the implication of this analysis for private contracting and for legislatures that are considering mandating rights of first refusal.

Abstract:
The corporate stock option backdating scandal has dominated business page headlines since the summer of 2006. The SEC has launched investigations of more than one hundred companies with respect to the timing and pricing of stock options granted during the boom years of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the number of firms caught up in the scandal continues to increase. This Article contributes to our understanding of the backdating phenomenon by analyzing the economics of backdating and the characteristics of the firms under investigation. Its main points are the following: First, given the high volatilities of the stocks of the technology companies that dominate the list of firms under investigation and the fact that options granted to executives and employees typically may not be exercised for several years, press reports that focus on the size of the strike price "discounts" achieved by backdating significantly overstate the impact on the value per share of backdated options. In some cases, reducing the strike price by a dollar per share by backdating increased the Black-Scholes value of the option by less than twenty cents per share. Second, backdating dramatically reduced the apparent value of options, which reduced the total level of executive compensation reported to shareholders. However, because the size of executive stock option grants often is determined by first establishing the value to be delivered and then "backing into" the number of shares to be covered by the option, reducing the apparent value of option shares may have substantially increased the size and economic value of some backdated executive option grants. Third, comparison of semiconductor firms under investigation for backdating with peer companies that are not suggests an association between backdating and the use of options in compensating non-executive employees. This Article considers the effects of and several possible explanations for backdating non-executive options, including reducing apparent rank and file compensation. Finally, this Article argues that the backdating phenomenon is not an accounting scandal. Backdating has accounting consequences, but it is unlikely to have been accounting driven.

stock options, backdating, option

Abstract:
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm's length; rather, executives have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be structured sub-optimally. The presence of rent extraction, we argue, is consistent both with the processes that produce compensation schemes and with the market forces and constraints that companies face. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, we show that the picture emerging from it is largely compatible with the rent extraction view. Indeed, rent extraction, and the desire to camouflage it, can better explain many puzzling features of compensation patterns and practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in US executive compensation; and that the significant presence of rent extraction should be taken into account in any examination of the practice and regulation of corporate governance.

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, private benefits of control, agency costs, rent extraction

Abstract:
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm's length; rather, executives have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be structured sub-optimally. The presence of rent extraction, we argue, is consistent both with the processes that produce compensation schemes and with the market forces and constraints that companies face. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, we show that the picture emerging from it is largely compatible with the rent extraction view. Indeed, rent extraction, and the desire to camouflage it, can better explain many puzzling features of compensation patterns and practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in U.S. executive compensation; and that the significant presence of rent extraction should be taken into account in any examination of the practice and regulation of corporate governance.

Abstract:
A consensus is developing that executive compensation in the U.S. is inadequately linked to long-term company performance, resulting in reckless, short-term decision making. Congress, the Obama administration, and academic commentators have recently embraced dramatic restrictions on the form and holding period of senior executive pay, at least at some companies. A common view, apparently, is that while regulation of the amount of executive pay would do more harm than good, regulation of form and term is desirable.

This essay questions that view. It highlights the challenges of fruitfully regulating the term and form of pay arising from the complexity and diversity of executive pay arrangements, uncertainty as to the underlying reasons (and hence appropriate remedies) for short-termism, and the conflict between deterring reckless short-term behavior and encouraging sufficient risk-taking to maximize share value over the long term. This essay goes on to analyze and critique existing regulatory proposals, and, while not endorsing a regulatory solution, offer two ideas that policy makers should consider if faced with the job of crafting a regulatory response to short-termism: focusing regulation solely on the term of pay, leaving form to individual company discretion, and adopting a comprehensive disclosure-based response.

executive compensation, short-termism, stock options, restricted stock

Abstract:
Employees who receive stock options and other forms of equity compensation generally are able to defer paying tax on this compensation for years, sometimes decades. In a rising market this deferral results in a tax benefit at the employee level. This article asks whether the employee-level tax benefit in a rising market results in a global tax advantage for companies that rely heavily on equity compensation and their employees. There are two primary issues. First, on initial inspection one might conclude that the employee-level benefit in a rising market is offset by a disadvantage in a stagnant or declining market. But this is not the case. This article demonstrates that the apparently symmetric disadvantage of equity compensation in a declining market is undermined by capital loss limitations, the likelihood of employee-favorable ex post adjustments to equity compensation contracts, and the general upward drift in stock prices. Thus, equity compensation and deferral do provide a tax benefit at the employee level on an expected value basis.

The second question is who bears the burden of the employee-level tax benefit? This article demonstrates that the key to determining the overall winners and losers lies in tracking the actual corporate investment of the cash that is saved when employees are compensated with equity. The evidence suggests that this investment results in significant corporate tax revenues for the fisc that offset the employee-level tax savings. In aggregate, taxpayers do not appear to be subsidizing corporate equity compensation programs and these programs are not producing a global tax advantage.

However, this does not mean that equity compensation tax reform should be off the table. The aggregate global tax advantage (and taxpayer subsidy) could increase if companies become more adept at hedging stock and option grants. In addition, the employee-level tax benefit associated with equity compensation is concentrated in the hands of senior executives, which 1) results in vertical inequity between the taxation of these executives and rank and file employees who tend to be cash compensated and 2) could undermine the formation of broad-based qualified savings plans. Thus, a modest reform to the taxation of equity compensation, such as the imposition of a special employee-level tax on equity gains, may be justified.

stock options, equity compensation, global tax advantage, delta hedging

Abstract:
Should we require companies to report the same amount of income to the IRS as they report to their shareholders? The idea behind "book/tax conformity" is that managers' desire to increase reported earnings would act as a check on their desire to minimize taxable income, and vice versa. Some scholars have proposed a comprehensive approach, adopting financial income as the basis for corporate taxation. Legislators, meanwhile, have offered a targeted approach that singles out equity compensation, which has historically been a significant source of the "gap" between book income and taxable income.

This Article argues that book/tax conformity carries unexplored costs that reduce its attractiveness, at least in the context of equity compensation (and quite possibly in other areas as well). Conforming the employer's tax treatment of stock and options with the accounting rules creates a paradox for employee-level taxation. Either employee taxation is also conformed to book, which raises liquidity, fairness, and other concerns, or we must diverge from section 83(h), which limits the employer's deduction to the amount included by the employee as income. Severing this link between the employer's deduction and the employee's inclusion would eliminate an important check on tax gamesmanship that is analogous to the check that book/tax conformity proponents seek to create. Conforming tax deductions for options with book, in other words, may simply trade one form of gamesmanship for another.

More broadly, book/tax conformity must be evaluated in light of (1) the cost of other gamesmanship that may result from conformity, (2) the availability of other means of combating manipulation, (3) potential distortions in compensation design, and (4) effects on the decision to be a private or public company. We conclude that equity compensation should be excluded from comprehensive book/tax conformity regimes, and one-off proposals to conform employer taxation of stock and options with book are probably misguided. On the other hand, we suggest that if targeted conformity of equity compensation is desired, revising the accounting rules for options to match those of stock appreciation rights, which would yield conformity at the tax end of the spectrum, possibly could improve upon the status quo.

book/tax conformity, equity compensation

Abstract:
Executive equity compensation in the U.S. is evolving. At the turn of the millennium, stock options dominated the equity pay landscape, accounting for over half of the aggregate ex ante value of senior executive pay at large public companies, while restricted stock and similar compensation accounted for only about ten percent. Beginning in 2006, stock grants have displaced options as the single largest component of senior executive compensation at these firms. Accompanying this shift has been increased variation among companies in their relative emphasis on stock and options in equity pay packages. Both phenomena provide an opportunity for a rich exploration of executive pay contracting focusing specifically on equity pay design. Such an exploration is timely given the current focus in Washington on the relationship between equity compensation and corporate risk taking. This article begins that exploration and has two primary aims. First, it describes the evolution in executive equity pay practices and the current equity compensation landscape. Second, it considers the extent to which this evolution and the current use of stock and option pay can be explained as a function of efficient contracting (and what 'efficient contracting' means in this context). The analysis reveals several features of the executive equity pay landscape that suggest limitations on efficient compensation contracting. First, although directionally consistent with changes in the conventional economic determinants of equity pay design, the dramatic shift over the last decade from very heavy reliance on options to a more balanced emphasis on stock and options suggests that option expensing, option taint, and/or increased perceived option risk played leading roles. Second, the tri-modal distribution of the mix of stock and options being granted in recent years suggests that optimizing incentives is not the sole consideration of issuing firms. Third, the extent to which the same mix of stock and options is granted to the various member of the executive suite suggests that individual optimization is quite limited.

executive compensation, stock options, restricted stock, optimal contracting, managerial power

Abstract:
It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature that the total share of corporate value that can be extracted by a manager is fixed and independent of the avenues through which value is extracted. Shareholders need not worry about an activity such as insider trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager through insider trading will simply offset conventional compensation. This article challenges that idea and argues that whether one views the manager's share as being capped by external market forces, set by an optimal principal/agent contract, or limited by saliency and outrage in accordance with a managerial power view of corporate governance, the total value that can and will be appropriated by managers will be a function of the number and type of avenues through which value can be appropriated.

Although the foregoing theories provide the same overall prediction that additional avenues of appropriation increase total managerial appropriation, the factors affecting the magnitude of the effect depend on the model or mechanism employed. For example, potential avenues of appropriation that are easily monitored and under the unilateral control of the directors, such as bonuses or perks, should have little affect on incremental appropriation under an optimal contracting model, but could have significant impact under a managerial power model. A review of the relevant empirical literature suggests that additional avenues of appropriation do indeed lead to greater overall appropriation. The evidence, moreover, is largely inconsistent with the optimal contracting view.

executive compensation, managerial slack, optimal contracting, managerial power

Abstract:
Contemporaneous grants of both stock and at-the-money options to individual employees of U.S. public companies indicates demand for equity compensation packages that are in the money, i.e., packages of equity pay instruments that in aggregate have payoff profiles and incentive properties that are similar to explicit in-the-money employee stock options. However, several tax rules (and formerly accounting rules) strongly discourage grants of explicit in-the-money options, including recently enacted IRC - 409A, which essentially precludes the use of explicitly discounted options by taxing these instruments at vesting, rather than at exercise, and adding a 20% penalty tax. This article explores whether the tax and accounting distinction between discounted and non-discounted options makes sense.

The stated legislative rationales for rules discriminating against explicit in-the-money options are weak, reflecting a dichotomous view of equity compensation divided between discounted and non-discounted options, when, in fact, option design is a continuum. However, this article sets forth a novel tax policy rationale for forcing firms to bifurcate in-the-money pay packages into discrete grants of stock and non-discounted options, a combination that I refer to as a synthetic in-the-money option. In short, doing so precludes the unwarranted expansion of preferential option tax treatment to instruments resembling restricted stock.

Employee stock options, In-the-money, options, Discounted options, NQSO, ISO, Restricted stock

Abstract:
At first blush, the deferral of employee income recognition associated with equity compensation appears to provide a tax advantage in a rising market but an offsetting disadvantage in a declining market. Merton Miller and Myron Scholes argued, however, that this apparent symmetry is misleading and that employees can hedge to ensure tax efficiency despite market uncertainty. This article demonstrates that the effect of employee hedging is fairly small, but that a combination of factors, including capital loss limitations, the possibility of employee-favorable ex post adjustments to equity compensation arrangements, and employee hedging, do cause compensatory stock grants and nonqualified options to be tax advantaged on an expected value basis.

stock options, restricted stock, equity compensation, global tax advantage

Abstract:
Long-range Social Security and Medicare spending projections vastly exceed projected program revenues. If left unchecked, the resulting fiscal imbalance (estimated at $40 to $70 trillion in present value terms) would fall primarily on future generations. To avoid generational inequity, and perhaps fiscal meltdown, Professor Daniel N. Shaviro and others propose immediate fiscal austerity. This reply Commentary argues that near-term austerity is unlikely to play a significant role in overcoming the fiscal imbalance, which can be thought of as a balloon payment due mid-twenty-first century. Significant near-term fiscal austerity would eliminate the public debt and replace it with a public surplus. Political economy theory and U.S. public debt history suggest that this path is infeasible. This Commentary also stresses the importance of disaggregating the "Social Security and Medicare" problems. Contrary to popular belief, Medicare is by far the larger problem, and the Medicare imbalance is driven by projected spending increases outpacing overall economic growth indefinitely. These observations suggest that a focus on Medicare cost control, rather than revenue enhancement, is called for.

Social Security, Medicare, fiscal gap, tax cuts, size of government

Abstract:
Recently promulgated regulations under section 457 (Deferred Compensation Plans of State and Local Governments and Tax-Exempt Organizations) will put an end to tax-exempt organizations' use of options on third-party stock or mutual funds as an executive compensation device. These regulations have sparked protests from exempt organizations and option plan promoters, and a bill has been introduced in Congress that would overturn the regulations. In this article, Professor Walker argues in favor of the new regulations as a matter of tax policy and good corporate governance. Professor Walker argues that (1) exempt organization options are only superficially similar to public company stock options and have been provided solely as a means of avoiding the dollar limitation on qualified deferred compensation under section 457, (2) the limitation under section 457 is justified and should be protected because, unlike public company stock options, exempt organization deferred compensation, including options, results in a fairly certain drain on the public fisc, and (3) option compensation raises very troubling governance issues for exempt organizations: Options are much less transparent than cash, are susceptible to being undervalued, and are difficult and costly to hedge. For all of these reasons, Professor Walker argues that the Treasury was justified in effectively eradicating exempt organization options, and that Congress should refrain from resuscitating them.