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Abstract:
We document that investment in private equity is extremely concentrated. Yet despite the very poor diversification of entrepreneurs' portfolios, we find that the returns to private equity are surprisingly low. Given the large premium required by investors in public equity, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a far worse risk-return tradeoff. We examine various explanations and conclude that private nonpecuniary benefits of control must be large and/or entrepreneurs must greatly overestimate their probability of success in order to explain the observed concentration of wealth in private equity.

Abstract:
This paper parsimoniously characterizes how past returns affect the cross-section of expected returns. Using Fama-MacBeth regressions, it shows that the momentum and reversals associated with past returns over various horizons are strongly affected by a turn-of-the-year seasonal that differs for winners and losers, depending on both the tax environment and the month of the year, and differs by exchange listing. The analysis also uncovers a consistent winners effect - high fractions of positive return months tend to increase expected returns. Out-of-sample evidence suggests that the documented relation between past returns and expected returns cannot entirely be due to data snooping biases.

Abstract:
Value and momentum ubiquitously generate abnormal returns for individual stocks within several countries, across country equity indices, government bonds, currencies, and commodities. We study jointly the global returns to value and momentum and explore their common factor structure. We find that value (momentum) in one asset class is positively correlated with value (momentum) in other asset classes, and value and momentum are negatively correlated within and across asset classes. Liquidity risk is positively related to value and negatively to momentum, and its importance increases over time, particularly following the liquidity crisis of 1998. These patterns emerge from the power of examining value and momentum everywhere simultaneously and are not easily detectable when examining each asset class in isolation.

value effect, momentum, commonality, liquidity risk

Abstract:
Multihorizon temporal relationships between stock returns are complex due to confounding sources of return premia, microstructure effects, and changes in the relationship over various horizons. We find the relation to be further complicated by the sign and consistency of the past return that also varies, somewhat sensibly, with the season and the tax environment. Accounting for these additional effects using a parsimonious technical trading rule generates surprisingly large abnormal returns, despite controlling for microstructure effects, transaction costs, and date-snooping biases. The documented variation in profits across stock characteristics, season, and tax environment appears inconsistent with existing theory, but may point to future explanations for the relation between past and expected returns.

Abstract:
This paper examines the link between several well-known asset pricing anomalies and covariance risk. Estimating the time-series of the covariance matrix of asset returns via a multivariate GARCH model, I quantify the contribution made by each anomaly to the covariance matrix of asset returns, as well as its ability to forecast future covariances. I find that anomalous returns associated with firm size are closely linked to the covariance matrix, while those associated with book-to-market equity are weakly linked. However, returns associated with momentum do not appear related to covariance risk and do not forecast future covariances. Finally, despite its lack of predictive power on the cross-section of expected returns, the market portfolio is the single most important factor contributing to and forecasting covariance risk.

Abstract:
We augment the standard principal-agent model to accommodate an entrepreneurial setting, where effort, ownership, and firm size are determined endogenously. We test the model's predictions (some novel) using new data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth. Accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables, we find entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth, decrease with firm risk, and decrease with firm size; effort increases with ownership and size; and both ownership and effort increase firm performance. The magnitutde of the effects in the cross-section of firms suggests that agency theory is important for explaining the large average ownership shares of entrepreneurs.

Abstract:
We parsimoniously characterize the severity of market frictions affecting a stock using the delay with which its share price responds to information. The most severely delayed firms command a large return premium that captures the size effect and half the value premium. Moreover, idiosyncratic risk is priced only among the most delayed firms. These results are not explained by other sources of return premia, microstructure, or pure liquidity effects, but appear most consistent with investor recognition and firm neglect. The very small segment of neglected firms (less than 0.02% of the market) captures a sizeable amount of cross-sectional variation in average returns.

Abstract:
This paper uses geography to shed light on the role of asymmetric information in asset pricing. Demonstrating that investors possess significant informational advantages in evaluating nearby investments, we find that active mutual fund managers overweight proximate firms in their portfolios and earn substantial abnormal returns in local holdings. These findings are more pronounced among funds which are small, have few holdings, and operate out of remote locations. Aggregating across all funds, we use the fraction of a stock's shares held by local investors as a measure of the information asymmetry in its investor base. We find that a firm's degree of local ownership is positively related to the cross-section of expected returns, even when controlling for other factors known to explain return variation. The results document new evidence of informed trading and establish a link between such trading and asset prices.

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of asymmetric information in commercial real estate markets in the U.S. We propose a novel and exogenous measure of information based on the quality of property tax assessments in different regions. Employing direct and indirect information variables, we find strong evidence that information considerations are significant in this market. We show that market participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby properties, trading properties with long income histories, and avoiding transactions with informed professional brokers. The evidence that the choice of financing is used to address information concerns is mixed and weak.

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of asymmetric information in commercial real estate markets in the U.S. and Canada. We propose a novel and exogenous measure of information based on the quality of property tax assessments in different regions and time periods. Employing direct and indirect information variables, we find strong evidence that information considerations are significant in real estate. We show that market participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby properties and by avoiding trades with informed professional brokers. There is some indication that purchasers also make use of informed intermediaries. The evidence that the choice of financing is used to address information concerns is mixed and fairly weak.

Abstract:
This paper examines a novel form of financial intermediation by studying the role of professional property brokers in the commercial real estate market. We find that broker intermediation is an important feature of the financing of commercial properties. Controlling for endogenous broker selection, we determine that hiring a broker significantly increases the probability of obtaining a bank loan by a striking 18 percent. We find, however, that brokers have only a modest effect on the sale price. Our results are most consistent with the theory that brokers and lending institutions establish informal relationships and provide less support for theories of broker monitoring or certification.

Abstract:
We examine the link between the competitiveness of the local banking market, urban development, and crime. We provide micro-level evidence that neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to future reduced loan provision, diminished local construction, lower prices and rents, an influx of poorer households, and higher crime in subsequent years. A one standard deviation increase in bank concentration raises homicide and burglary rates by approximately 1 percent. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.

Abstract:
We study the political economy of financial regulation by examining the determinants and effects of U.S. state usury laws during the 18th and 19th centuries. We argue that regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups. We find that strictness of usury coexists with other exclusionary policies such as suffrage laws and lack of general incorporation or free banking laws, which also respond less to competitive pressures for repeal. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group and limit access to others, are associated with lower future economic growth rates, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth.

Financial Development, Regulation, Usury

Abstract:
We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting micro-level household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or non-stockholder consumption risk, and provides more plausible economic magnitudes. We find that risk aversion estimates around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French size and value portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.

Abstract:
We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return tradeoff. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Working with a sizeable (greater than $15 billion in assets) anonymous money manager, we exogenously shift the supply of lendable shares for certain stocks by randomly making available for lending 2/3 of the stocks in the manager’s portfolio and withholding 1/3 of the stocks from the loan market. The lending program commenced in early September 2008 and the loans were recalled in mid-September 2008, with over $700 million of securities lent out at the peak of the study. During the lending (recall) period, returns to stocks randomly made available for lending were not lower (not greater) than returns to stocks randomly withheld from lending. Stocks randomly made available for lending experienced no differences in volatility, bid-ask spreads, or skewness than stocks randomly withheld from lending during either the lending or recall period. We find some evidence that loan supply increases volatilities and spreads for stocks with high short interest and expected loan spreads.

Abstract:
Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide microlevel (within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experienced more bank mergers are subjected to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.

Abstract:
Multihorizon temporal relationships between stock returns are complex due to confounding sources of return premia, microstructure effects, and changes in the relationship over various horizons. We find the relation to be further complicated by the sign and consistency of the past return that also varies, somewhat sensibly, with the season and the tax environment. Accounting for these additional effects using a parsimonious technical trading rule generates surprisingly large abnormal returns, despite controlling for microstructure effects, transaction costs, and data-snooping biases. The documented variation in profits across stock characteristics, season, and tax environment appear inconsistent with existing theory, but may point to future explanations for the relation between past and expected returns.

Abstract:
We develop a model of informal financial networks and present corroborating evidence by studying the role of professional property brokers in the U.S. commercial real estate market. Our model demonstrates how service intermediaries, who do not supply finance themselves, can facilitate their clients' access to finance via repeated informal relationships with lenders. Empirically, we find that, controlling for endogenous broker selection, hiring a broker strikingly increases the probability of obtaining a bank loan from 40 to 58 percent. Our results demonstrate that even in the U.S., with its well-developed capital markets, informal networks play an important role in controlling access to finance.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth.

Abstract:
We examine the impact of asset liquidation value on debt contracting using a unique set of commercial property non-recourse loan contracts. We employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property's permitted uses as a measure of an asset's redeployability or value in its next best use. Within a census tract, more redeployable assets receive larger loans with longer maturities and durations, lower interest rates, and fewer creditors, controlling for the current value of the property, its type, and neighborhood. These results are consistent with incomplete contracting and transaction cost theories of liquidation value and financial structure.

Abstract:
A principal agent model in an entrepreneurial settingis developed and tested using Federal Reserve Board data on entrepreneurialeffort and wealth in privately held firms. The implications of agency theoryare tested based on three questions: (1) What determines the entrepreneur'sequity share? (2) How does the entrepreneur respond to the incentives providedby the contract?(3) How is firm performance related to the response ofthe entrepreneur? The study develops a model of optimal contracting applied to anentrepreneurial setting, describes the data on private firms and entrepreneurs(from the Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business Finances,Survey of Small Business Finances, and Survey of Consumer Finances), andpresents summary statistics.The study then presents empirical resultsfrom the three-stage analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurial ownershipshare, the response to the contract by way of effort, and the effect of theeffort on firm performance. Using instrumental variables techniques, it was found that entrepreneurialownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk;effort increases with ownership; and effort increases firmperformance.The extensive effects in the sample of firms studied suggestthat agency costs may assist in understanding why entrepreneurs concentratelarge portions of their wealth in firm equity. (JSD)

Risks, Survey of Small Business Finances (Federal Reserve Board), Principal agent model, Survey of Consumer Finances, National Survey of Small Business Finances (Federal Reserve Board), Firm performance, Wealth, Agency theory, Private firms, Firm ownership, Equity, Contracts & agreements, Incentives

Abstract:
Applying a geographic lens to mutual fund performance, this study finds that fund managers earn substantial abnormal returns in nearby investments. These returns are particularly strong among funds that are small and old, focus on few holdings, and operate out of remote areas. Furthermore, we find that while the average fund exhibits only a modest bias toward local stocks, certain funds strongly bias their holdings locally and exhibit even greater local performance. Finally, we demonstrate that the extent to which a firm is held by nearby investors is positively related to its future expected return. Our results suggest that investors trade local securities at an informational advantage and point toward a link between such trading and asset prices.