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Abstract:
The framework of the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement for the world's rich countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, is deeply flawed. This paper explains why. The Protocol lacks essential country coverage, provides an inadequate basis for allocating emission rights, lacks provision for monitoring and enforcement, and implies politically unacceptable transfers among governments under a (necessary and desirable) arrangement for trading emission rights. In addition, it would by itself do little to limit climate change. An alternative approach to limiting greenhouse gas emissions is suggested, focussing on international agreement on common actions to reduce emissions.
And contingency plans for adaptation to climate change and for sequestration greenhouse gases are urged.

Emissions trading, global climate change, greenhouse gases, Kyoto Protocol

Abstract:
This paper reviews 80 years of cooperation among central banks. Diverse modes of collaboration are identified, ranging from simple exchange of relevant information to mutual financial support and coordination of monetary actions. Central bank cooperation got off to a rocky start in the 1930s, following the creation of the Bank for International Settlements in 1930, but it improved in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s. Most early cooperation was among European central banks, although need for a trans-Atlantic dimension was soon evident. By the end of the 20th century both the problems addressed and the participants were drawn from around the world. The alleged dangers of central bank cooperation are found to have been exaggerated.

central banking, international economic cooperation, monetary policy, exchange rates, Federal Reserve

Abstract:
This paper addresses the question of external borrowing from the perspective of the borrowing country. The first section sketches a formal framework for optimal borrowing by a developing country, as seen from the planner`s point of view. The next three sections use this framework for the development of three important limits on external borrowing: the problem of solvency, the problem of liquidity and the problem created by the possibility of repudiation. The fifth section relates external borrowing to macroeconomic management of the borrowing country, and the sixth section pulls together the many factors that suggest that external debt of a country should be subject to central management or at least surveillance. Following that, we offer some guidelines for limits to the magnitude of external debt, and then discuss the character or mix of external debt. In an appendix, we present various simulation exercises for optimal debt management in a discrete-time infinite-horizon setting.