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Abstract:
We present a method for evaluating the welfare of a decision maker, based on observed choice data. Unlike the standard economic theory of revealed preference, our method can be used whether or not the observed choices are rational. Paralleling the standard theory we present a model for choice such that the observations arise "as if" they were the result of a specific decision making process. However, in place of the usual preference relation whose maximization induces the observations, we explain choice as arising from a compromise among a set of simultaneously-held, conflicting preference relations. As in revealed preference theory, these simultaneously held preferences are inferred from the choice data and we use them as the basis to discuss the decision maker's welfare. In general our method does not yield a unique set of explanatory preferences and therefore we characterize all the explanatory sets of preferences. We use this set to compute bounds on welfare changes. We show that some standard results of rational choice theory can be extended to irrational decision makers. The theory can be used to explore a number of context-dependent choice patterns found in psychological experiments.

welfare economics, behavioral economics, psychology and economics, voting

Abstract:
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves. The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a nonnegative number, t. The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a "best claim for compensation". A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analagous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This paper presents a simple model of market equilibrium to explain why firms that maximize the value of their shares pay dividends even though the funds could instead by retained and and subsequently distributed to shareholders in a way that would allow them to be taxed more favorably as capital gains. The two principal ingredients of our explanation are: (1) the conflicting preferences of shareholders in different tax brackets and (2) the shareholders' desire for portfolio diversification, we should that companies will pay a positive fraction of earnings in dividends. We also provide some comparative static analysis of dividend behavior with respect to tax parameters and to the conditions determining the riskiness of the securities.

Abstract:
Three main types of mortgages are fixed interest contracts which automatically fall due on the sale of a dwelling, fixed rate loans which are assumable by a buyer, and floating rate instruments. When interest rates rise, the fall in the economic value of these assets in savings and loan associations` portfolios varies from one form of mortgage to another. For either of the fixed interest rate contracts, the cash flow from the mortgage is constant as long as it has not been prepaid. If the interest rate rises,the homeowner has a nominal capital gain, since his loan is then at a below market interest rate. He would therefore be less likely to prepay. The fall in the savings and loans` net worth arises from two factors: (1) the interest rate differential for mortgages of a fixed duration, and (2) the endogenous lengthening of the duration.This paper is an attempt to measure the dependence of the duration of mortgages on the implicit unrealized capital gain of mortgage holders resulting from interest rate changes. Our estimate is based on a sample of 4,000 mortgages issued in California which were active in 1975. We follow their payment history from 1975 to 1982. Using a Proportional Hazards Model, we estimate the percentage reduction in prepayment probability associated with interest rate changes. Our results indicate that for due-on-sale fixed interest rate mortgages, a sudden increase in the interest rate from 10 to 15 percent would induce a 23 percent loss in the economic value of the mortgage. If the mortgage were assumable,this loss would be 28 percent. Correspondingly, the 6-year average time to repayment of mortgages at a constant interest rate would be lengthened to nine years for due-on-sale mortgages, and 13-1/2 years for assumable ones.

Abstract:
The behavior of stock prices around ex-dividend days has been suggested as evidence for tax-induced clientele effects and as a means to estimate the average effective tax rate faced by investors. In this paper these possibilities are examined theoretically and empirically. Theoretically it is shown that the measured price drop per dollar of dividend may provide a biased estimate of the effective tax rate. Looking at the volume of trade around ex-dividend days we show that the conditions under which it would be unbiased are unlikely to hold. Strong evidence, based on a broader data base than that used by previous investigators, is presented for the presence of the clientele effect.

Abstract:
A century ago, everyone thought time and distance were well defined physical concepts. But neither proved absolute. Instead, measures/reports of time and distance were found to depend on one’s reference point, specifically one’s direction and speed of travel, making our apparent physical reality, in Einstein’s words, “merely an illusion.” Like time and distance, standard fiscal measures, including deficits, taxes, and transfer payments, depend on one’s reference point/reporting procedure/language/labels. As such, they too represent numbers in search of concepts that provide the illusion of meaning where none exists. This paper, dedicated to our dear friend, David Bradford, provides a general proof that standard and routinely used fiscal measures, including the deficit, taxes, and transfer payments, are economically ill-defined. Instead these measures reflect the arbitrary labeling of underlying fiscal conditions. Analyses based on these and derivative measures, such as disposable income, private assets, and personal saving, represent exercises in linguistics, not economics.

Abstract:
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such as agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. However, employment is above rather than below the efficient level when the conditions of profitability are worse than average. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as it is traditionally conceived.

Abstract:
This paper presents a structural model of production and inventory accumulation based on the hypothesis of cost minimization. It differs from previous attempts in several respects. First, it integrates the analysis of input inventories with output inventories, treating the two stocks separately. Second, it distinguishes between temporary and permanent fluctuations in sales as they are anticipated by the industry. Third, it allows for a more general structure of adjustment costs, and in particular for a cost changing the production level rather than only for deviations of the production level from a fixed target.

Empirically, there are three principal conclusions. This model performs much better than those with no cost of production adjustment allowed. Disaggregation of inventories provides significant insights into the dynamics of the adjustment process. However, the restrictions on our model implied by the continuous-time stochastic control theory that we utilize are rejected by the data. We believe that a more disaggregated specification or a more detailed econometric treatment of the discrete-time nature of the observations would avoid this difficulty.

Abstract:
This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers` earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. The firms ` superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk. It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral, employment is always above the efficient level. Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information.

Abstract:
In these notes I hope to touch on a variety of issues relating to public debt and social insurance and to suggest ways in which they might be approached. It is to be viewed as a research proposal, or an outline of open problems rather than as a statement of results. The notes are divided into two sections. In the first, problems of intertemporal reallocation of resources through the public debt and social security are treated in the context of complete certainty about future events. Both positive and normative aspects of the problem are investigated, but principle emphasis is given to the latter. In the second section, the set of issues related to uncertainty and the role of intergenerational social insurance in its mitigation are explored.

Abstract:
The basic assumption of this paper is an attempt to be specific about price formation while retaining a fixed-price, quantity-constrained equilibration in the short-run. The second theme of this paper is the role of inventories in macrodynamics a topic of long-recognized importance, but one which has not received much attention within the disequilibrium literature. We will analyze how the level of inventories interacts with the level of prices and wages, and how the spillover effects in a fixed-price equilibrium produce certain testable characteristics in macro time series data. We will argue that these can be used to discriminate between a model of the type we study and the analogous flexible-price system. In section 2 we set out the basic model and discuss its assumptions. Section 3 derives the short-run quantity-constrained equilibrium as it depends on initial inventory stocks and on the random disturbances within the period. Section 4 presents, for comparison purposes, the analogous results under conditions of full price flexibility after these shocks are realized. Sections 5 and 6 are the heart of the paper. We first derive the probabilistic nature of the equilibrium as it depends upon the underlying stochastic disturbances. The probabilities of different types of quantity constrained equilibria can be compared. Then, we use these results to present the dynamics of inventory behavior and the statistical relationships between real wages, inventories and employment. We emphasize the possibility of using this type of analysis to test the disequilibrium hypothesis with anticipatory pricing, against the market-clearing assumptions.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
A two-period lifetime overlapping generations growth model is used to evaluate the possibility that social insurance can effectiely offset economic risks associated with uncertainty about the rate of population growth. Crude measures of the seriousness of this type of risk in the current United States situation are presented. Sufficient conditions on the structure of the economy for such intergenerational risk pooling to be mutually beneficial to all members of society are dervied. Although it is logically possible to satisfy them, we argue that they are unlikely to be realized empirically in an economy similar to that of the United States. Because of this failure, some more complex types of policy options are also discussed.