• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simply Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.

Abstract:
This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts: Part I deals with monetary policy in a simple Phillips curve model and focuses on credibility, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up; the main topics covered in this section are credibility of tax policy and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.

Abstract:
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs, which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics, as we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions: we model some styilized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision.

Abstract:
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.

Abstract:
Does democracy promote economic development? We review recent attempts to addresses this question, which exploit the within-country variation associated with historical transitions in and out of democracy. The answer is positive, but depends - in a subtle way - on the details of democratic reforms. First, democratizations and economic liberalizations in isolation each induce growth accelerations, but countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better than those carrying out the opposite sequence. Second, different forms of democratic government and different electoral systems lead to different fiscal and trade policies: this might explain why new presidential democracies grow faster than new parliamentary democracies. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms: expectations of regime change have an independent effect on growth, and taking expectations into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy.

Democracy, reform, growth, institutions, difference-in-difference estimations

Abstract:
Does democracy promote economic development? We review recent attempts to address this question, which exploit the within-country variation associated with historical transitions in and out of democracy. The answer is positive, but depends %u2013 in a subtle way %u2013 on the details of democratic reforms. First, democratizations and economic liberalizations in isolation each induce growth accelerations, but countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better than those carrying out the opposite sequence. Second, different forms of democratic government and different electoral systems lead to different fiscal trade policies: this might explain why new presidential democracies grow faster than new parliamentary democracies. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms: expectations of regime change have an independent effect on growth, and taking expectations into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Does democracy promote economic development? Despite many attempts to address this question, the answer remains elusive. Richer countries are generally democratic. But this cross-country correlation could reflect reverse causation or omitted variables. Evidence that political regime changes produce subsequent economic growth is considerably weaker. Does this mean that political regimes do not influence economic development? Not necessarily, but such causal effects are difficult to identify from the within-country variation. A plausible reason for this difficulty is that democracy is too blunt a concept. Political regimes come in various forms and are reformed in different circumstances. Such heterogeneity is interesting in its own right. Moreover, if heterogeneity is not random, correlation between specific reform features and their occurrence makes it hazardous to estimate an average causal effect on economic growth.

This paper illustrates three specific instances where the details of democratic reform influence their economic effects. Section I clarifies our empirical strategy. Section II zooms in on political and economic reforms, drawing on Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini (2005). Democratizations as well as liberalizations induce accelerations of growth. But the sequence of reforms is crucial: countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better. Section III considers different forms of democracy, drawing on Torsten Persson (2005). Specific democratic institutions influence the fiscal and trade policies implemented after democratization, which may explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy. Section IV distinguishes expected and actual political reforms, drawing on Persson and Tabellini (2005). Taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy.

Abstract:
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian elections, social transfers are smaller and aggregate spending less responsive to income shocks than under proportional elections. Institutions also shape electoral cycles: only in presidential regimes is fiscal adjustment delayed until after the elections, and only in proportional and parliamentary systems do social transfers expand around elections. Several of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical work; others are still awaiting a theoretical explanation.

Constitution, politics, presidentialism, electoral rule, government spending

Abstract:
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 and onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian elections, social transfers are smaller and aggregate spending less responsive to income shocks than under proportional elections. Institutions also shape electoral cycles: only in presidential regimes is fiscal adjustment delayed until after the elections, and only in proportional and parliamentary systems do social transfers expand around elections. Several of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical work; others are still awaiting a theoretical explanation.

Abstract:
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the Paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.

Comparative politics, corruption, political economies

Abstract:
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems influence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts ? and thus lower barriers to entry ? are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists ? and thus less individual accountability ? are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.

Abstract:
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems inauence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to dierent features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust.

Abstract:
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

Electoral rules, party systems, coalition governments, fiscal policy, electoral accountability

Abstract:
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

electoral rules, party systems, coalition governments, fiscal policy, electoral accountability

Abstract:
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian--as opposed to proportional--elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential--as opposed to parliamentary--regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.

Abstract:
We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of -2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogeneous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.

growth, democracy, development, political institutions

Abstract:
We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of −2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.

growth, democracy, development, political institutions

Abstract:
Do fiscal policy variables - overall spending, revenue, deficits and welfare-state spending - display systematic patterns in the vicinity of elections? And do such electoral cycles differ among political systems? We investigate these questions in a data set encompassing sixty democracies from 1960-98. Without conditioning on the political system, we find that taxes are cut before elections, painful fiscal adjustments are postponed until after the elections, while welfare-state spending displays no electoral cycle. Our subsequent results show that the pre-election tax cuts is a universal phenomenon. The post-election fiscal adjustments (spending cuts, tax hikes and rises in surplus) are, however, only present in presidential democracies. Moreover, majoritarian electoral rules alone are associated with pre-electoral spending cuts, while proportional electoral rules are associated with expansions of welfare spending both before and after elections.

Elections, constitution, form of government, electoral rules, fiscal policy

Abstract:
We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change. Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic capital - measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood - reduces the exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a successful coup. Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforces each other, promoting economic development jointly with the consolidation of democracy.

Economic growth, hazard rates, political regimes

Abstract:
We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change. Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic capital -- measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood -- reduces the exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a successful coup. Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development jointly with the consolidation of democracy.

Abstract:
We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change. Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic capital - measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood - reduces the exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a successful coup. Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development jointly with the consolidation of democracy.

Abstract:
One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors.

Abstract:
One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors.

US south, voting restrictions, political competition, economic growth

Abstract:
One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors.

Abstract:
We start by arguing that to understand growth differences across countries and time, one needs to understand differences in public policies that affect the incentives for productive accumulation of capital, human capital, or technically useful knowledge. And to understand policy differences one needs to understand how political institutions aggregate conflicting interests into public policies. We then survey some recent work along these lines, which argues that more inequality leads to slower growth. Next, we illustrate some of the basic ideas of this work, by help of a simple model of taxation. We also present some econometric cross-country evidence, which is largely supportive of the basic ideas. We end by suggestions for further work.

Abstract:
Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth and promoting activities, such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge. In the paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally captures this idea. The model has a politico-economic equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and initial conditions. We then confront the testable empirical implications with two sets of data. A first data set pools historical evidence - which goes back to the mid 19th century - from the US and eight European countries. A second data set contains post-war evidence from a broad cross-section of developed and less developed countries. In both samples we find a statistically significant and quantitatively important negative relation between inequality and growth. After a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not distorted by measurement error, reverse causation, hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems.

Abstract:
The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.

Democratic institutions, growth promoting policy, economic performance

Abstract:
The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.

democratic institutions , growth promoting policy , economic performance

Abstract:
The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies.

Abstract:
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision.

Abstract:
This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy (the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment) can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite general Ramsey policies, including time-varying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer (2004).

Time consistency, Ramsey policy, surprise inflation

Abstract:
This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy - the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment - can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).

Abstract:
A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimental if it creates a "common pool" problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointment rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collusion.

Incomplete contracts, information revelation, legislative organization, separation of powers

Abstract:
A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the appointed policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimentalif it creates a "common pool" problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointment rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collusion.

Abstract:
Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. Results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effects are indeed present in the data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare-state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events appears highly institution-dependent, as does the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.

Abstract:
Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. And results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effect are indeed present in international panel data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare-state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events is clearly institution-dependent, as is the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.

Abstract:
Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where policy choices, regulation of markets and tax rates, are constrained by economic institutions, which in turn reflect past investments in legal and fiscal state capacity. We study the economic and political determinants of these investments. The analysis shows that common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Preliminary empirical evidence based on cross-country data find a number of correlations consistent with the theory.

Development, property rights, state capacity

Abstract:
Economists generally assume the existence of sufficient institutions to sustain a market economy and tax the citizens. However, this starting point cannot easily be taken for granted in many states, neither in history nor in the developing world of today. This paper develops a framework where policy choices, regulation of markets and tax rates, are constrained by economic institutions, which in turn reflect past investments in legal and fiscal state capacity. We study the economic and political determinants of these investments. The analysis shows that common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Preliminary empirical evidence based on cross-country data find a number of correlations consistent with the theory.

Abstract:
This paper studies the incidence of civil war over time. We put forward a canonical model of civil war, which relates the incidence of conflict to circumstances, institutions and features of the underlying economy and polity. We use this model to derive testable predictions and to interpret the cross-sectional and times-series variations in civil conflict. Our most novel empirical finding is that higher world market prices of exported, as well as imported, commodities are strong and significant predictors of higher within-country incidence of civil war.

commodity prices, conflict, natural resources, political institutions

Abstract:
This paper studies the incidence of civil war over time. We put forward a canonical model of civil war, which relates the incidence of conflict to circumstances, institutions and features of the underlying economy and polity. We use this model to derive testable predictions and to interpret the cross-sectional and times-series variations in civil conflict. Our most novel emprical finding is that higher world market prices of exported, as well as imported, commodities are strong and significant predictors of higher within-country incidence of civil war.

Abstract:
The paper presents empirical findings regarding the economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements, in three different dimensions. First, the data are consistent with several theoretical predictions about the consequences of electoral rules and forms of government for fiscal policy and rent extraction, even when non-random constitution selection is taken into account. Second, empirical tests of the predictions from a new comprehensive model of parliamentary democracy show that proportional elections raise government spending through their indirect consequences for party structures and types of government, rather than through their direct effects on policymaking incentives. Third, new empirical results suggest that constitutional arrangements may have important consequences for structural polices that promote long-run economic performance, hinting at a missing link in the causal chain from history to current economic performance. All these empirical findings appear statistically robust, and the estimated effects are large enough to be of genuine economic interest.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives to, an increase in inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: with Swedish data from 1994, these gains would have been an annual real flow of 3-4 percent of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100 percent of GDP. They would mainly have arisen from the nominalistic features of the tax and transfer systems rather than from the traditional sources: seignorage and real depreciation of the public debt. The welfare costs of such an inflation increase would have been even larger, however, and would thus have reduced net welfare. Possible institutional reforms, aimed at making the political costs of inflation more equal to the social costs, are presented and discussed

Abstract:
The paper illustrates how one may assess our comprehensive uncertainty about the various relations in the entire chain from human activity to climate change. Using a modified version of the RICE model of the global economy and climate, we perform Monte Carlo simulations, where full sets of parameters in the model's most important equations are drawn randomly from pre-specified distributions, and present results in the forms of fan charts and histograms. Our results suggest that under a Business-As-Usual scenario, the median increase of global mean temperature in 2105 relative to 1900 will be around 4.5 °C. The 99 percent confidence interval ranges from 3.0 °C to 6.9 °C. Uncertainty about socio-economic drivers of climate change lie behind a non-trivial part of this uncertainty about global warming.

Abstract:
No abstract available.

Abstract:
This paper deals with public debt in open economies, extending Diamond`s overlapping generations model to deal with a small openeconor as well as an international eciuilibrium of two large economies. It focuses on the intergenerational welfare redistributions caused by an increase in the public debt triggered by a period of government budget deficit, and shows that these effects are markedly different in open and closed economies. The interplay between the deficits in the government budget and the current account is also analyzed. Here, it is shown how a single period with a deficit in the government budget can be followed by a seciuence of periods with a deficit in the current account.

Abstract:
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract available.

Abstract:
We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.

Abstract:
We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.

Abstract:
The current account dynamics is examined for a small open economy which is subject to exogenous changes in its static terms of trade and in world interest rates. The model used is one with overlapping finite-lived generations, which we argue gives rise to a more reasonable saving behaviour than previously used models with infinite lived consumers.In particular no restrictions on the rate of time preference is required.Anticipated and unanticipated, as well as temporary and permanent,terms of trade changes have very different effects. There is, however,a general tendency towards cycles in both savings and investment,which gives rise to cycles in the current account.The classic Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect on saving of a terms of trade deterioration can have any sign for plausible parameter values,both for temporary and permanent disturbances.

Abstract:
We report on an on-going project, which asks a number of questions relevant to the study of state capacity. What are the main economic and political determinants of the state's capacity to raise revenue and support private markets? How do risks of violent conflict affect the incentives to invest in state building? Does it matter whether conflicts are external or internal to the state? When are large states associated with higher income levels and growth rates than small states? What relations should we expect between resource rents, civil wars and economic development? The paper is organized into three main sections: 1. The origins of state capacity, 2. Sate capacity and the genius of taxation, and 3. State capacity and the strategy of conflict. Each of these begins with a specific motivation. A simple model is formulated to analyze the determinants of state capacity in the first section, and modified to address the new issues that arise in subsequent sections. The theoretical results are summarized in a number of propositions. We discuss the implications of the theory, comment on its relation to existing literature, and briefly mention some empiric applications.

development, state capacity

Abstract:
We report on an on-going project, which asks a number of questions relevant to the study of state capacity. What are the main economic and political determinants of the state's capacity to raise revenue and support private markets? How do risks of violent conflict affect the incentives to invest in state building? Does it matter whether conflicts are external or internal to the state? When are large states associated with higher income levels and growth rates than small states? What relations should we expect between resource rents, civil wars and economic development? The paper is organized into three main sections: 1. The origins of state capacity, 2. Sate capacity and the genius of taxation, and 3. State capacity and the strategy of conflict. Each of these begins with a specific motivation. A simple model is formulated to analyze the determinants of state capacity in the first section, and modified to address the new issues that arise in subsequent sections. The theoretical results are summarized in a number of propositions. We discuss the implications of the theory, comment on its relation to existing literature, and briefly mention some empiric applications.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of -2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.

Abstract:
This paper presents a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The solution involves formulating a law, institution, or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy and that can be sold by successive old generations to successive young generations. Each young generation pays for the law through the payment of taxes. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to obey the law. For the old generation that owns the law, breaking the law makes the law valueless, and the generation suffers a capital loss. For the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing law exceeds its cost as well as the economic gain from setting up the law.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
How can monetary policy in stage III of European Monetary Union be coordinated between the "ins" and the "outs"? This paper compares alternative institutional mechanisms, and concludes that a generalized system of inflation targets at the European level has several merits. It strengthens domestic credibility of monetary policy. It rules out deliberate attempts to gain competitiveness through devaluations. It forces monetary policy to respond automatically to various macroeconomic shocks which is stabilizing for the real exchange rate. It distributes these shocks symmetrically across countries. On the basis of a simple theoretical model of policy coordination, the paper shows that a system of inflation targets approximates an optimal policy of international cooperation. Preliminary empirical evidence supports these theoretical results.

Abstract:
Assume that an economy is in a state of Keynesian unemployment. Since production is demand-determined there are bootstraps (multiple) equilibria. Then, the more optimist agents are about the future the higher will be theur demand today and hence current production. In that limited sense optimism turns out to be unwarranted , which forces a download adjustment. Is this unwarranted optimism still good? We analyze this question by help of a general equilibrium model of a small open economy where the sequence of adjustment and readjustment is modeled as two successive temporary equilibria. The question wheter optimism is good is posed in terms of an explicit ( ex post) welfare evaluation. We fine that if the future is Walrasian, the future multiplier is unity, whereas the present multiplier is larger than unity. Then optimism increases ex post welfare. If the future has Keynesian unemployment, optimism still increases ex post welfare, as long as the present multiplier is larger than the future one. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is presented.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
The paper illustrates how one may assess our comprehensive uncertainty about the various relations in the entire chain from human activity to climate change. Using a modified version of the RICE model of the global economy and climate, we perform Monte Carlo simulations, where full sets of parameters in the model's most important equations are drawn randomly from pre-specified distributions, and present results in the forms of fan charts and histograms. Our results suggest that under a Business-As-Usual scenario, the median increase of global mean temperature in 2105 relative to 1900 will be around 4.5 °C. The 99 percent confidence interval ranges from 3.0 °C to 6.9 °C. Uncertainty about socio-economic drivers of climate change lie behind a non-trivial part of this uncertainty about global warming.

Climate-economy models, Global warming, Monte Carlo study

Abstract:
We estimate the effect of political regime transitions on growth with semi-parametric methods, combining difference in differences with matching, that have not been used in macroeconomic settings. Our semi-parametric estimates suggest that previous parametric estimates may have seriously underestimated the growth effects of democracy. In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of -2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.

democracy, economic growth, matching estimators

Abstract:
A main question regarding public finance is how well democratic institutions align the interest of voters and the incentives of self-interested politicians. It has been observed that fiscal policy reflects any incentive present in political institutions. In this paper we summarize a recent line of research attempting to provide such micro-political foundations. In a Presidential-Congressional Political System we have separation of powers, whereas in a Parliamentary System the main feature is legislative cohesion. The principal results of separation of powers are a smaller size of government and lower waste: analyzing legislative cohesion we find that there is a more equal distribution, but more waste and higher taxes.

Abstract:
Observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions. In this paper, we illustrate the effects of two general institutional features: separation of powers, which is common in Presidential-Congressional political systems, and legislative cohesion, which is typical of parliamentary systems. Compared to a simple legislative game, separation of powers brings about a smaller size of government and lower waste, whereas legislative cohesion induces a more equal distribution, but more waste and higher taxes.

Abstract:
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.

Abstract:
The paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers. Specifically, it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscalconstitutions, where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments. Realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a trade-off between risk sharing and redistribution. Different constitutions produce very different results. In particular, a federal social insurance scheme, chosen by voting, provides overinsurance, whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme, chosen by bargaining, provides underinsurance.

Abstract:
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave scope for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interests between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other at the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.

Abstract:
The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives for, an increase in the inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: Swedish data from 1994 suggests an annual real flow of 3-4% of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100% of GDP. These gains would have arisen mainly from the nominalistic features of the tax and transfer systems rather than from the traditional sources: seignorageand real depreciation of public debt. The welfare costs of such an inflation increase would have been even larger, however, and would thus have reduced net welfare. Possible institutional reforms, aimed at making the political costs of inflation more equal to the social costs, are presented and discussed.