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Abstract:
Events of the past quarter century have renewed the interest of economic historians in major financial disturbances. The study of financial crises was common before World War II, but for the next quarter century little fresh work was done in the area. The chief exception was J. K. Galbraith's The Great Crash. 1929 (1954). Then came M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz's Monetarv History of the United States. 1867-1960 (1963) with its bold analysis of the great contraction of 1929-1933. Just as that analysis was gaining the attention of economic historians, the United States began to experience credit crunches, steeply rising interest rates, bank failures, debt crises, and a host of other financial disturbances the likes of which had not been seen for a good long time. Soon C. P. Kindleberger's widely read book, Manias. Panics. and Crashes--A Historv of Financial Crises (1978) reminded economic historians and others of the long history of such disturbances.

My assignment here, from H. Minsky, is to review what economic historians, especially in recent years, have had to say about financial disturbances and depressions. I inferred from discussions with Prof. Minsky and from some familiarity with his own work that he very much wanted to tie together the two concepts, financial disturbance and depression. The "It" in his book, Can "It Can Happen Again? (1982) is, it will be recalled, a Great Depression. In Minsky's work, a Great Depression results from a debt deflation or, in other words, from an extreme form of the financial instability that he and others regard as inherent in a capitalist economic system.

Abstract:
This paper brings together two strands of the economic literature - that on the finance-growth nexus and that on capital market integration - and explores key issues surrounding each strand through both institutional/country histories and formal quantitative analysis. We begin with studies of the Dutch Republic, England, the U.S., France, Germany and Japan that span three centuries, detailing how in each case the emergence of a financial system jump-started economic growth. Using a cross-country panel of seventeen countries covering the 1850-1997 period, we then uncover a robust correlation between financial factors and economic growth that is consistent with a leading role for finance, and show that these effects were strongest over the 80 years preceding the Great Depression. Next, we show that countries with more sophisticated financial systems engage in more trade and appear to be better integrated with other economies by identifying roles for both finance and trade in the convergence of interest rates that occurred among the Atlantic economies prior to 1914. Our results suggest that the growth and increasing globalization of these economies might indeed have been "finance-led."

Abstract:
Most scholars know little about the Panic of 1792, America's first financial market crash, during which securities prices dropped nearly 25 percent in two weeks. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton adroitly intervened to stem the crisis, minimizing its effect on the nascent nation's fragile economic and political systems. U.S. policymakers soon forgot the crisis management techniques Hamilton invented but failed to codify. Many of them were later rediscovered, and became theoretical and practical standards of modern central bank crisis management. Hamilton, for example, formulated and implemented Bagehot's rules for central bank crisis management eight decades before Walter Bagehot wrote about them in Lombard Street.

Panic of 1792, Alexander Hamilton, Bagehot's Rules, government bonds, securities markets, financial crises

Abstract:
Studies of early U.S. growth traditionally have emphasized real-sector explanations for an acceleration that by many accounts became detectable between 1815 and 1840. Interestingly, the establishment of the nation's basic financial structure predated by three decades the canals, railroads, and widespread use of water and steam-powered machinery that are thought to have triggered modernization. We argue that this innovative and expanding financial system, by providing debt and equity financing to businesses and governments as new technologies emerged, was central to the nation's early growth and modernization. The analysis includes a set of multivariate time series models that relate measures of banking and equity market activity to measures of investment, imports and business incorporations from 1790 to 1850. The findings offer support for our hypothesis of finance-led' growth in the U.S. case. By implication, the interest today in improving financial systems as a means of fostering sustainable growth is not misplaced.

Abstract:
During the 1820s and 1830s, American state governments made large investments in canals, banks, and railroads. In the early 1840s, nine states defaulted on their debts, four ultimately repudiated all or part of their debts, and three went through substantial renegotiations. This paper examines how the states got into the debt crisis and, as a result of their earlier history, how they responded to fiscal pressure in the debt crisis. The explanation is built around revenue structures. States along the developed eastern seaboard were able to avoid politically costly property taxes, while states along the frontier were forced to rely heavily on property taxes. When faced with fiscal pressures, two of the defaulting states -- Maryland and Pennsylvania -- were able to resume debt payments, with back interest, as soon as a property tax was enacted. The other defaulting states, however, already had high property taxes. Without access to new revenue sources, these states were forced to default, and then either renegotiate or repudiate their debts.

Abstract:
In 1841 and 1842, eight states and the Territory of Florida defaulted on their sovereign debts. Traditional histories of the default crisis have stressed the causal role of the depression that began with the Panic of 1837, unexpected revenue shortfalls from canal and bank investments as a result of the depression, and an unwillingness of states to raise tax rates. This paper shows that none of these stylized facts fits the experience of states at all well. The majority of state debts in default in 1842 were contracted after the Panic of 1837; most states did not expect canal investments to return substantial revenues by 1841 and so could not experience unexpected shortfalls in those revenues; and, finally, most states were willing to raise tax rates substantially. The relationship between land sales and land values explains much of the timing of state borrowing and the default experience of western and southern states. Pennsylvania and Maryland defaulted because they postponed the imposition of a state property tax until it was too late.

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