• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
We evaluate the contribution of analysts' earnings forecasts to investors' decisions by comparing the association between annual excess returns and a broad set of information items derived from financial statements with the association between excess returns and that information set plus the present value of five-year ahead analysts' earnings forecasts. We thus bring to a sharp focus the incremental contribution (over financial statement information) of the major product of analysts - near and medium-term earnings forecasts - to investors' decisions as reflected by annual excess returns. Large differences in explanatory power between the regressions with and without analysts' forecasts are evidence in favor of analysts' contribution to investors' decisions.

However, in assessing analysts' contribution from associations with stock returns care should be taken to account for the inherent simultaneity - analysts not only contribute (possibly) to investors, they also observe stock price behavior and learn from investors' decisions. We are therefore using a system of simultaneous equations to control for the endogeneity of both excess returns and analysts' forecasts, allowing us to isolate the net contribution of analysts' forecasts to capital markets.

Our findings, based on cross-sectional regressions covering the period 1982-1997, indicate that over the sample period, analysts add a hefty 40 percent (in Adj-R2 terms) to the explanatory power of financial information with respect to stock returns. However, when simultaneity (i.e., analysts' learning from returns) is accounted for, their contribution is estimated as a modest 12 percent. This result suggests that analysts' mostly react to changes in market values rather than cause them.

Additional findings are: (1) The explanatory power of the broad-based financial statement information set decreased significantly over the examined period, while the explanatory power of the model including analysts' forecasts decreased at a lower rate. Analysts, therefore, mitigate to some extent the decrease in the informativeness of financial statements. (2) The incremental contribution of analysts in firms that report losses is substantially larger than in profitable companies. (3) The incremental contribution of financial analysts is largest in high-tech industries followed by low-tech industries, and regulated firms, suggesting that the contribution of analysts is larger in sectors where the informativeness of financial reports is low. (4) Analysts' contribution to valuation in firms with substantial research and development (R&D) capital is relatively larger than in firms without such R&D capital. (5) The incremental contribution of analysts during economic boom periods is higher than during recessions (e.g., the early 1990s). (6) Based on a firm-specific measure of analysts' incremental contribution, we find that this contribution decreases with firm size, systematic risk, and earnings persistence, and increases with the firm's R&D capital. All in all, we find the direct contribution of analysts' forecasts of earnings to investors' decision to be quite modest. However, this contribution is substantial in firms, sectors and circumstances where the informativeness of financial statements is relatively low.

Abstract:
This study explores the major value-drivers of business-to-consumer ("B2C") Internet companies' share prices both before and after the "bursting of the Internet bubble" in the spring of 2000. Although many market observers had predicted that the bubble would eventually burst (e.g., Perkins and Perkins 1999), the ultimate and previously unanswered challenge lay identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would survive the shakeout. We develop an empirical valuation model and provide evidence that the Internet stocks that this model suggests were relatively over-valued prior to the Internet stock market correction experienced relatively larger drops in their price-to-sales ratios when the bubble burst. This result is robust to the inclusion of competing explanatory variables suggested by the economics literature related to industry rationalizations.We also investigate a number of additional issues related to the rapidly changing Internet world. First, we provide descriptive evidence of the correlation between monthly stock returns and contemporaneous and lagged Nielsen/Netratings web traffic metrics (both levels and changes). We then undertake a factor analysis on the set of Nielsen/Netratings raw web metrics with a view to synthesizing the data into a parsimonious set of orthogonal web performance measures. Our factor analysis results in the extraction of three factors that capture the most relevant dimensions of website performance: (1) reach, (2) "stickiness", and (3) customer loyalty. Our findings suggest that all three web performance measures are value-relevant to the share prices of Internet companies in each of 1999 and 2000. Our findings of significance for the year 2000 contradict the recent claims of some analysts that web traffic measures are no longer important. We also explore the valuation role of our proxy for B2C companies' ability to sustain their current rate of "cash burn" and find that this proxy is a significant value-driver in each of 1999 and 2000. Finally, our results suggest that investors adopted a more skeptical attitude towards expenditures on intangible investments as the Internet sector began to mature. Consistent with the results of prior studies in other knowledge asset based industries, we find that investors appear to implicitly capitalize product development (R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) during the "bubble" period when the market was more optimistic about the prospects of B2C companies. However, neither marketing expenses nor product development costs are implicitly capitalized into value, on average, subsequent to the shakeout in the spring of 2000. Overall, our study provides a preliminary view of the shakeout and maturation of one of the most important New Economy industries to emerge to date - the Internet.

Abstract:
This study explores the major value-drivers of business-to-consumer ("B2C") Internet companies' share prices both before and after the "bursting of the Internet bubble" in the spring of 2000. Although many market observers had predicted that the bubble would eventually burst (e.g., Perkins and Perkins 1999), the ultimate and previously unanswered challenge lay identifying which stocks would fall and which ones would survive the shakeout. We develop an empirical valuation model and provide evidence that the Internet stocks that this model suggests were relatively over-valued prior to the Internet stock market correction experienced relatively larger drops in their price-to-sales ratios when the bubble burst. This result is robust to the inclusion of competing explanatory variables suggested by the economics literature related to industry rationalizations.

We also investigate a number of additional issues related to the rapidly changing Internet world. First, we provide descriptive evidence of the correlation between monthly stock returns and contemporaneous and lagged Nielsen/Netratings web traffic metrics (both levels and changes). We then undertake a factor analysis on the set of Nielsen/Netratings raw web metrics with a view to synthesizing the data into a parsimonious set of orthogonal web performance measures. Our factor analysis results in the extraction of three factors that capture the most relevant dimensions of website performance: (1) reach, (2) "stickiness", and (3) customer loyalty. Our findings suggest that all three web performance measures are value-relevant to the share prices of Internet companies in each of 1999 and 2000. Our findings of significance for the year 2000 contradict the recent claims of some analysts that web traffic measures are no longer important. We also explore the valuation role of our proxy for B2C companies' ability to sustain their current rate of "cash burn" and find that this proxy is a significant value-driver in each of 1999 and 2000. Finally, our results suggest that investors adopted a more skeptical attitude towards expenditures on intangible investments as the Internet sector began to mature. Consistent with the results of prior studies in other knowledge asset based industries, we find that investors appear to implicitly capitalize product development (R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) during the "bubble" period when the market was more optimistic about the prospects of B2C companies. However, neither marketing expenses nor product development costs are implicitly capitalized into value, on average, subsequent to the shakeout in the spring of 2000. Overall, our study provides a preliminary view of the shakeout and maturation of one of the most important New Economy industries to emerge to date - the Internet.

Internet, valuation, cash burn, web traffic, intangibles, knowledge assets

Abstract:
We examine in this study the relevance to investors of information on the capitalization of software development costs, as promulgated in 1985 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in its Statement No. 86 (SFAS 86). We find that software capitalization is value-relevant to investors: The annually capitalized development costs are positively and significantly associated with stock returns and the cumulative software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with stock prices. Furthermore, software capitalization figures are associated with subsequent reported earnings, indicating another dimension of relevance to investors. We also find that investors undervalue firms that expense all their software development costs. Finally, we find no support for the frequent argument that the judgment and subjectivity involved in software capitalization adversely affects the quality of reported earnings. We also investigate why the industry petitioned the FASB, in March 1996, to abolish SFAS 86. We document a significant shift in the mid-1990s in the impact of software capitalization on reported earnings and return-on-equity of software companies. Whereas in the early period of SFAS 86 application (mid- to late-1980s) software capitalization enhanced reported earnings considerably more than its detraction by the amortization of the software asset (since that asset was still small), during the early 1990s the gap between capitalization and amortization narrowed, and in 1995, the amortization?s negative impact on reported profitability roughly offset the positive impact of capitalization. This diminished impact of capitalization on reported performance may have been among the reasons underlying the petition to abolish SFAS 86. Finally, we find that analysts? earnings forecast errors are positively and significantly associated with the intensity of software capitalization.

Abstract:
This study examines the impact of corporate philanthropy growth on sales growth using a large sample of charitable contributions made by U.S. public companies from 1989 through 2000. Applying Granger causality tests, we find that charitable contributions are significantly associated with future revenue, whereas the association between revenue and future contributions is marginally significant at best. We then identify the mechanism underlying our findings. Our results are particularly pronounced for firms that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, where individual consumers are the predominant customers. In addition, we document a positive relationship between contributions and customer satisfaction. Overall, our evidence suggests that corporate philanthropy, under certain circumstances, furthers firms' economic objectives.

corporate philanthropy, revenue growth, customer satisfaction, social responsibility, causality tests

Abstract:
The absence of organized markets in intangibles has been a major hindrance to their recognition as assets in financial reports. Economic conditions, however, change fast and markets in intangibles, particularly in patents and know-how, are operating both off and on-line (Internet). We examine various valuation and disclosure aspects of the most active of these markets - the licensing of patents and know-how - which has grown substantially in recent years.Our findings indicate that: (a) a significant nonuniformity exists in the financial reporting of royalty (licensing) income across firms, (b) royalty income is a highly relevant variable to investors, (c) in addition to being an important source of income, the intensity of patent royalties provides investors with a strong signal concerning the value and potential of R&D expenditures, and (d) given both the direct and indirect (signaling) valuation implications of royalty income, and the heightened public concern about the adequacy of information concerning intangibles, accounting standard-setters should reevaluate firms' disclosure of various aspects of patents, technology, and know-how.

patent licensing, royalty, intangibles

Abstract:
The absence of organized markets in intangibles has been a major hindrance to their recognition as assets in financial reports. Economic conditions, however, change fast and markets in intangibles, particularly in patents and know-how, are operating both off and on-line (Internet). We examine various valuation and disclosure aspects of the most active of these markets - the licensing of patents and know-how - which has grown substantially in recent years.

Our findings indicate that: (a) a significant nonuniformity exists in the financial reporting of royalty (licensing) income across firms, (b) royalty income is a highly relevant variable to investors, (c) in addition to being an important source of income, the intensity of patent royalties provides investors with a strong signal concerning the value and potential of R&D expenditures, and (d) given both the direct and indirect (signaling) valuation implications of royalty income, and the heightened public concern about the adequacy of information concerning intangibles, accounting standard-setters should reevaluate firms' disclosure of various aspects of patents, technology, and know-how.

Patent licensing; Royalty; Intangibles

Abstract:
A paper presented at the July 2002 conference Economic Statistics: New Needs for the Twenty-First Century, cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, and the National Association for Business Economics.

accounting, intangibles, intangible assets, investment

Abstract:
A paper presented at the July 2002 conference "Economic Statistics: New Needs for the Twenty-First Century," cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, and the National Association for Business Economics.

accounting, intangibles, intangible assets, investment

Abstract:
The accruals anomaly - the negative relationship between accounting accruals and subsequent stock returns - has been well documented in the academic and practitioner literatures for almost a decade. To the extent that this anomaly represents market inefficiency, one would expect sophisticated investors to learn about it and arbitrage the anomaly away. Yet, we show that the accruals anomaly still persists and its magnitude has not declined over time. While we find that institutional investors react promptly to accruals information, it is clear that their reaction is rather weak and is primarily characteristic of active investors who constitute a minority of institutions. The main reason: Extreme accruals firms have characteristics which are unattractive to most institutional investors. Individual investors are by and large unable to profit from trading on accruals information due to the high transaction and information costs associated with implementing a consistently profitable accruals strategy. Consequently, the accruals anomaly persists, and will probably endure.

Abstract:
Estimates and projections are embedded in most financial statement items. These estimates potentially improve the relevance of financial information by providing managers the means to convey to investors forward-looking, inside information (e.g., on future collections from customers via the bad debt provision, or on expected assets' cash flows reflected in impairment charges). On the other hand, the quality of financial information is compromised by: (i) the increasing difficulty of making reliable forecasts in a fast-changing, often turbulent economy, and (ii) the frequent managerial misuse of estimates to manipulate financial data. Given the prevalence of estimates in accounting data, whether these opposing forces result in an improvement in the quality of financial information or not is arguably the most fundamental issue in accounting.We examine in this study the contribution of accounting estimates embedded in accruals to the quality of financial information by focusing on the major use of this information by investors - the prediction of enterprise cash flows and earnings. Our extensive tests, reflecting both the statistical and economic significance of estimates, indicate that, by and large, accounting accruals and the estimates they embed do not improve the quality of financial information in terms of enhancing the prediction of enterprise performance. Accruals do not improve the prediction of cash flows, beyond that achieved by current cash flows, and improve only marginally the prediction of earnings. This latter improvement, however, appears to be economically insignificant. Thus, the objective difficulties of generating reliable estimates and projections in a volatile economy, and their frequent misuse by managers appear to offset the positive role of estimates in conveying forward looking information to investors.

Abstract:
Estimates and projections are embedded in most financial statement items. These estimates potentially improve the relevance of financial information by providing managers the means to convey to investors forward-looking, inside information (e.g., on future collections from customers via the bad debt provision). On the other hand, the quality of financial information is compromised by: (i) the increasing difficulty of making reliable forecasts in a fast-changing, often turbulent economy, and (ii) the frequent managerial misuse of estimates to manipulate financial data. Given the ever-increasing prevalence of estimates in accounting data, whether these opposing forces result in an improvement in the quality of financial information or not is among the most fundamental issues in accounting.

We examine in this study the contribution of accounting estimates embedded in accruals to the quality of financial information, as reflected by their usefulness in the prediction of enterprise cash flows and earnings. Our extensive out-of-sample tests, reflecting both the statistical and economic significance of estimates, indicate that accounting estimates beyond those in working capital items do not improve the prediction of cash flows. Estimates do, however, improve the prediction of next year's earnings, though not of subsequent years' earnings. Our economic significance tests corroborate that accounting estimates do not improve cash flow or earnings prediction. We conclude that the usefulness of accounting estimates to investors is limited, and provide suggestions for improving their usefulness.

Abstract:
In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing managerial short-termism and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance - decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability - is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once managers free themselves from investors' myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.

earnings guidance, voluntary disclosure, managerial myopia, guidance cessation

Abstract:
In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing managerial short-termism and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance - decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability - is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once managers free themselves from investors' myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.

earnings guidance, voluntary disclosure, analyst following, managerial myopia

Abstract:
The immediate expensing of R&D expenditures is often justified by the conservatism principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative throughout the firm' life. We ask the following questions: (a) When is the expensing of R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitalization? and (b) What are the capital market implications of these reporting biases? To address these questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth (momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early cycle companies) report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend to report aggressively under current GAAP. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 1972-2003, generally supports the analytical predictions.In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice versa.

Abstract:
The immediate expensing of R&D expenditures is often justified by the conservatism principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative throughout the firm's life. We ask the following questions: (a) When is the expensing of R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitalization? and (b) What are the capital market implications of these reporting biases? To address these questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth (momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early cycle companies) report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend to report aggressively under current GAAP. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 1972-2003, generally supports the analytical predictions.

In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice versa. This evidence is consistent with behavioral finance arguments about investor cognitive biases.

R&D Accounting, Reporting Biases, Market Valuation, Mispricing

Abstract:
The immediate expensing of R&D expenditures is often justified by the conservatism principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative throughout the firm' life. We ask the following questions: (a) When is the expensing of R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitalization? and (b) What are the capital market implications of these reporting biases? To address these questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth (momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early cycle companies) report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend to report aggressively under current GAAP. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 1972-2003, generally supports the analytical predictions.

In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice versa.

R&D Accounting, Reporting Biases, Market Valuation, Mispricing

Abstract:
This study documents an association between changes in institutional ownership during a calendar quarter and abnormal returns at the time of subsequent announcements of quarterly earnings. The result is driven by the portfolio returns of the extreme deciles of changes in institutional ownership, suggesting that institutions trade based on information about future earnings, but that such trading is not widespread. We also find that the difference between earnings announcement returns of the extreme deciles of change in institutional ownership is much greater when change in institutional ownership of a stock is driven by relatively few institutions, measured using the skewness of the distribution of change in institutional ownership of the stock. This result suggests that when fewer differentially informed investors make disproportionately large purchases or sales of stocks, a greater amount of the information on which they base their trades is not impounded in prices until the subsequent earnings announcement. Finally, we show that our results obtain for institutional investors with short-term focus, such as independent advisors, investment companies and insurance companies, but not for institutional investors with long-term focus, such as internally managed pension funds, educational institutions, and private foundations. This result further supports our conclusions regarding informed trading by institutions based on information about forthcoming earnings.

institutional ownership, informed trading, correlated information

Abstract:
This study documents an association between change in institutional ownership during a calendar quarter and abnormal returns at the time of the subsequent announcement of quarterly earnings. The result is driven by the portfolio returns of the extreme deciles of changes in institutional ownership, and within the top (bottom) deciles, the third of the stocks with the most positive (negative) skewness of the distribution of changes in institutional ownership. We also show that our results obtain only for institutional investor types with short-term focus. These results suggest informed trading by institutions based on information about forthcoming earnings.

institutional ownership, informed trading, correlated information

Abstract:
The valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is of considerable interest, given the important role these enterprises play in economic growth and investors' decisions. IPO valuation is particularly challenging due to the meager information available about new enterprises at offering dates. We extend the research on IPO valuation in various directions: First, we penetrate deep beyond the traditional proxies for value drivers, like R&D expenditures and cash flows, by defining and testing a host of specific product-related and competitive environment value drivers; second, we examine IPO valuations at three distinct phases of the going-public process; third, we employ both the direct valuation and relative valuation approaches; and fourth, we round up the analysis by examining the long-term performance of IPOs. Based on a sample of biotech IPOs that went public in the 1990s, we document the overwhelming importance of product-related and intellectual property fundamentals, as well as the irrelevance of several key signals, such as venture capital backing and the quality of underwriters, which played prominent roles in previous research.

Valuation, Biotech IPOs, Non-Financial information

Abstract:
The valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is of considerable interest, given the important role these enterprises play in economic growth and investors' decisions. IPO valuation is particularly challenging due to the meager information available about new enterprises at offering dates. We extend the research on IPO valuation in various directions: First, we penetrate deep beyond the traditional proxies for value drivers, like R&D expenditures and cash flows, by defining and testing a host of specific product-related and competitive environment value drivers; second, we examine IPO valuations at three distinct phases of the going-public process; third, we employ both the direct valuation and relative valuation approaches; and fourth, we round up the analysis by examining the long-term performance of IPOs. Based on a sample of biotech IPOs that went public in the 1990s, we document the overwhelming importance of product-related and intellectual property fundamentals, as well as the irrelevance of several key signals, such as venture capital backing and the quality of underwriters, which played prominent roles in previous research.

Valuation, Biotech IPOs, Non-Financial information

Abstract:
Research on the usefulness of financial information generally focuses on the innovation in the information examined, such as an earnings surprise or cash flow growth. Consequently, prior research sheds little light on the role of the rich historical record of financial information in users' decision-making. Using a sample of published restatements of earnings, we show that the revision of the historical pattern of earnings, distinct from the magnitude of the restatement and its impact on current earnings, significantly affects investors' decisions and predicts class action lawsuits. Specifically, we find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have significantly more adverse effects for investor valuations and the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements. This evidence about the value-relevance of refreshing the historical record of earnings is pertinent to the FASB's recent cautious expansion of the scope of circumstances that require a restatement of financial information in FAS 154.

Historical record, revisions, financial information, investors' decisions, class action lawsuits

Abstract:
Financial scholars who research the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs generally attribute these phenomena to information asymmetry and investors' misevaluations. Here, we identify, on a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980-1995, a widespread source of information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty - the R&D activities of issuers - and document that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs (R&D is positively correlated with underpricing) and their long-term performance (R&D is positively related to long-term performance). Given the pervasiveness and constant growth of firms' R&D activities in modern economies, our identification of R&D as a major factor affecting IPO's performance contributes to the understanding of this important economic and capital market phenomenon.

R&D, IPO's performance, information asymmetry, investor optimism

Abstract:
We hypothesize that the root cause of many goodwill write-offs - managers' public admission of ill-advised corporate acquisitions - is the overpriced shares of buyers at acquisition. Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to invest, and particularly to acquire businesses, even at excessive prices and doubtful strategic fit, in order to buy themselves out of the overpriced share predicament and postpone the inevitable price correction by portraying continued growth. We corroborate our hypothesis by documenting: (1) share overpricing is strongly and positively associated with the intensity of corporate acquisitions, (2) share overpricing is negatively related to the post-acquisition share performance of buyers, beyond the price correction, indicating a negative relation between overpricing and the quality of acquisitions, (3) share overpricing is positively related to the size of goodwill write-offs. We further show that share overpricing predicts both goodwill write-offs and their magnitude, and that acquisition by overpriced companies is a losing proposition for shareholders. Finally, we document some of the serious private and social consequences of the ill-advised acquisitions made by overpriced firms. These findings contribute to the accounting literature on business combinations and goodwill, as well as to the finance/economics research on investor sentiments and corporate investment.

Abstract:
Quantifying managerial ability is an essential component in the consideration of many important research questions, such as those examining investment choice, executive compensation, and corporate governance. To date, researchers have used ad hoc and noisy ability proxies, such as stock price performance and media mentions. We develop a comprehensive managerial efficiency score and show that this measure is significantly associated with important attributes of managerial talent, such as stock price performance, executive compensation and investment opportunities, but outperforms these measures in explaining stock price reactions to managerial turnovers, where the price reactions reflect the market’s assessment of the outgoing manager’s ability. Such a measure opens the door to an abundance of previously difficult-to-pursue research questions. For example, we illustrate the use of our measure in the setting of the implications of equity financing. We document that the negative association with future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability.

Managerial ability, data envelopment analysis

Abstract:
Research has established that R&D-intensive firms are characterized by substantial future risk-adjusted stock returns. The reasons for this phenomenon and its policy implications, however, are widely debated. Some attribute the excess returns to investors' systematic undervaluation of R&D firms and argue for improved disclosure to mitigate the mispricing, while others claim that the excess returns are just compensating for an R&D-specific risk factor and, therefore, no accounting changes are called for.

We aim at resolving this controversy by distinguishing between "R&D leaders" who focus mainly on basic research, and their activities are obscured from investors and therefore susceptible to mispricing, and "R&D followers" who largely modify current technologies and are therefore more transparent. We show that R&D leaders enjoy substantial risk-adjusted returns during the first four-five future years, after which these excess returns converge to those of R&D followers. This evidence is consistent with a significant undervaluation of the shares of R&D leaders. We also show that both R&D leaders and followers enjoy long-term excess returns which are attributable to both business and information risks. Regarding policy implications, we show that the excess returns of R&D leaders (reflecting undervaluation) are cut in half by voluntary information disclosure (earnings guidance). Improved information is an obvious remedy for share mispricings.

R&D Valuation, Innovation Strategy, R&D mispricing, R&D risk

Abstract:
We identify in this study the determinants of firms' decision to provide disaggregated earnings guidance (i.e., earnings, revenue, and specific expense forecasts), and the consequences of such disclosure practice. Almost a quarter of the S&P 500 firms provide disaggregated earnings guidance. We document that the guidance disaggregation decision is primarily driven by demand factors: relatively low decision-usefulness of earnings, analysts' difficulties in predicting earnings, high institutional ownership, and high decision-usefulness of revenue. Interestingly, we do not find evidence consistent with opportunistic management motives in guidance disaggregation. As for the consequences of guidance disaggregation, we document that this information allows analysts to quickly revise earnings estimates, and results in lower dispersion of the estimates. Furthermore, guidance disaggregation improves the likelihood of firms to meet or beat analysts' estimates. Finally, we document some of the costs of disaggregating guidance, explaining why many firms do not practice such disclosure.

management earnings forecast, earnings guidance, disaggregated earnings, voluntary disclosure

Abstract:
We hypothesize that the root cause of many goodwill write-offs - managers' public admission of ill-advised corporate acquisitions - is the overpriced shares of buyers at acquisition. Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to invest, and particularly to acquire businesses, even at excessive prices and doubtful strategic fit, in order to buy themselves out of the overpriced share predicament and postpone the inevitable price correction by portraying continued growth. We corroborate our hypothesis by documenting: (1) share overpricing is strongly and positively associated with the intensity of corporate acquisitions, (2) share overpricing is negatively related to the post-acquisition share performance of buyers, beyond the price correction, indicating a negative relation between overpricing and the quality of acquisitions, (3) share overpricing is positively related to the size of goodwill write-offs. We further show that share overpricing predicts both goodwill write-offs and their magnitude, and that acquisition by overpriced companies is a losing proposition for shareholders. Finally, we document some of the serious private and social consequences of the ill-advised acquisitions made by overpriced firms. These findings contribute to the accounting literature on business combinations and goodwill, as well as to the finance/economics research on investor sentiments and corporate investment.

Abstract:
We develop a firm-specific measure of organization capital and estimate it for a sample of approximately 250 companies. We test the validity of the organization capital measure within a widely used investment valuation model and show that our organization capital estimate contributes significantly to the explanation of market values of firms, beyond assets in place and expected abnormal earnings (growth potential). We then examine whether capital markets are efficient with respect to organization capital, namely whether stock prices fully reflect the value of this resource. We find that while investors recognize the importance of organization capital, they do not fully factor its value into equity prices. We ascribe this fault or market inefficiency to poor disclosure of information about intangible capital.

Abstract:
We examine future excess returns, earnings variability and stock volatility of R&D Leaders and Followers. Drawing on the business strategy literature, which makes a clear distinction between R&D Leaders and Followers, we show that R&D Leaders do earn significant future excess returns, while R&D Followers just earn average returns. We further document that R&D Leaders generate higher future sales growth, and return-on-assets than Followers. We also tackle the perennial question of whether the excess returns subsequent to R&D are due to mispricing or risk, and show that only a small part of the returns can be attributed to risk compensation. Finally, it has been documented that R&D expenditures are strongly associated with future earnings volatility, suggesting that R&D is less reliable (verifiable) an asset than physical capital. We show that the association between R&D intensity and future earnings volatility of R&D Leaders is not lower than that of R&D Followers. Thus, penetrating the population of R&D firms to distinguish between R&D Leaders and Followers, we bridge the chasm between the major findings of the economics/finance strand and the accounting body of R&D research.

Abstract:
The accruals anomaly - the negative relationship between accounting accruals and subsequent stock returns - has been well documented in the academic and practitioner literatures for almost a decade. To the extent that this anomaly represents market inefficiency, one would expect sophisticated investors to learn about it and arbitrage the anomaly away. Yet, we show that the accruals anomaly still persists and its magnitude has not declined over time. While we find that institutional investors react promptly to accruals information, it is clear that their reaction is rather weak and is primarily characteristic of active investors who constitute a minority of institutions. The main reason: Extreme accruals firms have characteristics which are unattractive to most institutional investors. Individual investors are by and large unable to profit from trading on accruals information due to the high transaction and information costs associated with implementing a consistently profitable accruals strategy. Consequently, the accruals anomaly persists, and will probably endure.

Abstract:
The valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is of considerable interest, given the important role these enterprises play in economic growth and investors' decisions. IPO valuation is particularly challenging due to the meager information available about new enterprises at offering dates. We extend the research on IPO valuation in various directions: First, we penetrate deep beyond the traditional proxies for value drivers, like R&D expenditures and cash flows, by defining and testing a host of specific product-related and competitive environment value drivers; second, we examine IPO valuations at three distinct phases of the going-public process; third, we employ both the direct valuation and relative valuation approaches; and fourth, we round up the analysis by examining the long-term performance of IPOs. Based on a sample of biotech IPOs that went public in the 1990s, we document the overwhelming importance of product-related and intellectual property fundamentals, as well as the irrelevance of several key signals, such as venture capital backing and the quality of underwriters, which played prominent roles in previous research.

Valuation, Biotech IPOs, Non-Financial information

Abstract:
Financial scholars who research the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs generally attribute these phenomena to information asymmetry and investors' misevaluations. Here, we identify, on a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980-1995, a widespread source of information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty - the R&D activities of issuers - and document that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs (R&D is positively correlated with underpricing) and their long-term performance (R&D is positively related to long-term performance). Given the pervasiveness and constant growth of firms' R&D activities in modern economies, our identification of R&D as a major factor affecting IPO's performance contributes to the understanding of this important economic and capital market phenomenon.

R&D, IPO's performance, information asymmetry, investor optimism

Abstract:
In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing managerial short-termism and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance - decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability - is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once managers free themselves from investors' myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.

earnings guidance, voluntary disclosure, managerial myopia, guidance cessation

Abstract:
This study documents an association between change in institutional ownership during a calendar quarter and abnormal returns at the time of the subsequent announcement of quarterly earnings. The result is driven by the portfolio returns of the extreme deciles of changes in institutional ownership, and within the top (bottom) deciles, the third of the stocks with the most positive (negative) skewness of the distribution of changes in institutional ownership. We also show that our results obtain only for institutional investor types with short-term focus. These results suggest informed trading by institutions based on information about forthcoming earnings.

institutional ownership, informed trading, correlated information

Abstract:
Research on the usefulness of financial information generally focuses on the innovation in the information examined, such as an earnings surprise or cash flow growth. Consequently, prior research sheds little light on the role of the rich historical record of financial information in users' decision-making. Using a sample of published restatements of earnings, we show that the revision of the historical pattern of earnings, distinct from the magnitude of the restatement and its impact on current earnings, significantly affects investors' decisions and predicts class action lawsuits. Specifically, we find that restatements that eliminate or shorten histories of earnings growth or positive earnings have significantly more adverse effects for investor valuations and the likelihood of lawsuits than other restatements. This evidence about the value-relevance of refreshing the historical record of earnings is pertinent to the FASB's recent cautious expansion of the scope of circumstances that require a restatement of financial information in FAS 154.

Historical record, revisions, financial information, investors, decisions, class action lawsuits.

Abstract:
A key question concerning socially responsible corporate activities is whether such actions achieve traditional goals, such as profit maximization and shareholder value creation, or whether such activities represent a drain on resources by opportunistic managers. Much of the debate about the legitimacy of and justification for socially responsible activities would be settled if it is convincingly shown that they further traditional business goals. In this study we provide such evidence. Using a large sample of charitable contributions made by public companies from 1989 through 2000, and a statistical methodology that distinguishes causation from association, we document that charitable contributions enhance the future revenue growth of the donors. In particular, we find evidence that, for firms in industries that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, corporate giving is associated with subsequent sales growth. On the other hand, our results do not provide strong evidence that revenue growth drives future charitable giving.

Abstract:
A key question concerning socially responsible corporate activities is whether such actions achieve traditional goals, such as profit maximization and shareholder value creation, or whether such activities represent a drain on resources by opportunistic managers. Much of the debate about the legitimacy of and justification for socially responsible activities would be settled if it is convincingly shown that they further traditional business goals. In this study we provide such evidence. Using a large sample of charitable contributions made by public companies from 1989 through 2000, and a statistical methodology that distinguishes causation from association, we document that charitable contributions enhance the future revenue growth of the donors. In particular, we find evidence that, for firms in industries that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, corporate giving is associated with subsequent sales growth. On the other hand, our results do not provide strong evidence that revenue growth drives future charitable giving.

Abstract:
Financial scholars who research the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs generally attribute these phenomena to information asymmetry and investors' misevaluations. Here, we identify, on a sample of 2,696 US IPOs issued during 1980-1995, a widespread source of information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty - the R&D activities of issuers - and document that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs (R&D is positively correlated with underpricing) and their longterm performance (R&D is positively related to longterm performance). Given the pervasiveness and constant growth of firms' R&D activities in modern economies, our identification of R&D as a major factor affecting IPO's performance contributes to the understanding of this important economic and capital market phenomenon.

Abstract:
We develop a firm-specific measure of the most important intangible asset - organization capital - and document that organization capital is associated with five years of future operating and stock return performance, after controlling for other factors. Thus, our organization capital measure captures firms' fundamental ability to generate abnormal performance. We also find that executive compensation is positively associated with our measure of organization capital, showing that the measure indeed reflects managerial ability.

Abstract:
Much of the research on management compensation focuses on the level and structure of executives' pay. In this study, we examine a compensation element that has not received so far considerable research attention - the dispersion of compensation across managers - and its impact on firm performance. We examine the implications of two theoretical models dealing with pay dispersion - tournament vs. equity fairness. Tournament theory stipulates that a large pay dispersion provides strong incentives to highly qualified managers, leading to higher efforts and improved enterprise performance, while arguments for equity fairness suggest that greater pay dispersion increases envy and dysfunctional behaviour among team members, adversely affecting performance. Consistent with tournament theory, we find that firm performance, measured by either Tobin's Q or stock performance, is positively associated with the dispersion of management compensation. We also document that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion. Furthermore, effective corporate governance, especially high board independence, strengthens the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Our findings thus add to the compensation literature a potentially important dimension: managerial pay dispersion.

Compensation, Corporate Governance, Performance, Pay dispersion

Abstract:
We investigate the ability of a tax-based fundamental - the ratio of tax-to-book income - to predict earnings growth and stock returns and to explain the earnings-price ratio. This tax fundamental reflects both temporary and permanent book-tax differences as well as tax accruals, such as changes in the tax valuation allowance. We find that the tax-to-book income ratio predicts subsequent five-year earnings changes, both before and after the implementation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 109 in 1993. For the pre-SFAS 109 period, the tax information is unrelated to contemporaneous earnings-price ratios and strongly related to subsequent stock returns. Conversely, for the post-SFAS 109 period, the tax fundamental is strongly related to contemporaneous earnings-price ratios and only weakly related to subsequent stock returns, indicating improvement over time in investors' perceptions of the implications of the tax information for future earnings. Deferred taxes, a component of our tax fundamental and the focus of recent research, exhibit relatively modest ability to predict earnings or stock returns both before and after the implementation of SFAS 109. Finally, throughout the examined period, the taxable income information about future earnings is incremental to that in accruals and cash flows.

taxable income, deferred taxes, earnings quality, earnings management, market efficiency

Abstract:
It is widely agreed that corporate financial reports provide deficient information about intangible assets. However, investors are exposed to substantial information beyond financial reports, such as managers' direct communications to capital markets and analysts' reports. We ask: To what extent do these nonfinancial report sources compensate for the intangibles-related deficiencies of financial statements?

To address this question we assume that analysts' forecasts of earnings reflect, among other things, the beyond-financial-report information we seek, and we use simultaneous equations to estimate the incremental information contribution of earnings forecasts over the information contained in financial reports, thereby isolating value-relevant information not available in financial report. We focus particularly on intangibles-related information, by comparing analysts' contribution for firms with and without R&D. We find that, to some extent, analysts do compensate for the intangibles-related information deficiencies of financial reports, but definitely not for all the deficiencies. Accordingly, we identify the "weakest links"-industries in which analysts don't get intangibles.

Abstract:
We examined whether traffic data on sites owned by publicly listed Internet companies provide information about the future of those companies that is useful in portfolio management. The study shows that when Internet companies are classified into portfolios according to above-median and below-median traffic data, the more popular sites provide significantly better stock returns than the less popular sites. These results may be explained by the superior ability of popular sites to attract advertising revenues and extract greater compensation from affiliated sites. They may also indicate investors' perceptions that the more popular sites have greater network externalities (in which the value of being a part of the network increases with the number of members already in the network) and have the ability to generate higher future profits and cash flows. These results carried through to offline companies with Internet sites in 1999 but not in 2000, possibly because the online operations of offline companies were still not a material component of the companies' revenues and cash flows.

Abstract:
Wealth and growth in today's economy are primarily driven by intangible (intellectual) assets. Physical and financial assets are rapidly becoming commodities, while abnormal profits, dominant competitive positions, and sometimes even temporary monopolies are achieved by the sound deployment of intangibles, along with other types of assets.

This book advances the intangible (intellectual, knowledge) assets literature in four key dimensions: It lays the foundation for the economics of intangibles, balancing the value drivers (scalability, increasing returns, network effects) against the value detractors (nonexcludability, inherent risk and nonmarketability). The discussion proceeds to survey and analyze the voluminous evidence in the economic, organization, finance and accounting literature on the attributes of intangibles and their impact on corporate performance and market value.

The discussion then turns to information issues, particularly to the deficient reporting on intangible investments by the accounting system, adversely affecting both managers' and investors' decisions. Extensive evidence of private and social harms associated with the reporting on intangibles is presented.

Finally, a comprehensive proposal for a new information system reporting on the firm's value chain, with particular focus on intangibles, is advanced.

The book will be published in 2001 by the Bookings Institution, but an early version can be downloaded from my website: baruch-lev.com

Abstract:
This study documents that change in institutional ownership of a company during a calendar quarter is associated with abnormal returns at the time of subsequent announcements of quarterly earnings. This result suggests informed trading by institutions based on superior information about forthcoming earnings. The study also shows that the association is observed primarily for firms with low book to market value of equity and high levels of R&D activity, measures of unrecorded intangible assets. These results are consistent with such firms being good candidates for productive information search and interpretation by institutional investors because accounting numbers of such firms provide relatively less value-relevant information.

Institutional trading, earnings accouncements, selective disclosure

Abstract:
We examine the relation across firms and industries between the stock market's valuation of R&D expenditures and the fundamental benefits due to, and the risk of, the R&D outlays. We hypothesize and find that the market's valuation of R&D varies across firms and industries, and that it is positively correlated with the R&D's fundamental benefits, and negatively correlated with the R&D's risk. This is the first empirical evidence that the market's valuation of R&D varies cross-sectionally and, more importantly, that the valuation differences are meaningfully related to measures of the investments' fundamental benefits and risks.

Abstract:
The study examines the value-relevance of reported financial information of fast-changing science-based companies and the incremental value-relevance of publicly available nonfinancial information. Based on a sample of independent cellular phone companies we find that on a stand-alone basis financial information (earnings book values and cash flows) appears largely irrelevant for valuation. However when combined with nonfinancial information these variables contribute to the explanation of stock prices and returns. Also the value- relevance of nonfinancial information overwhelms that of traditional financial indicators. Finally regarding investors' timely recognition of the implications of nonfinancial information we find that a key cellular nonfinancial growth measure -- POPS -- is positively associated with subsequent stock returns after controlling for various risk and growth measures. This may indicate either a systematic investor underreaction to nonfinancial information (market inefficiency) or that this nonfinancial measure proxies for risk.