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Abstract:
There are two main forces behind the large US current account deficits. First, an increase in the US demand for foreign goods. Second, an increase in the foreign demand for US assets. Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid-1990s. This increase has been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation since. The depreciation has accelerated recently, raising the questions of whether and how much more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or the renminbi. Our purpose in this paper is to explore these issues. Our theoretical contribution is to develop a simple portfolio model of exchange rate and current account determination, and to use it to interpret the past and explore alternative scenarios for the future. Our practical conclusions are that substantially more depreciation is to come, surely against the yen and the renminbi, and probably against the euro.

Dollar exchange rate, current account, portfolio models

Abstract:
There are two main forces behind the large U.S. current account deficits. First, an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods. Second, an increase in the foreign demand for U.S. assets. Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid--1990s. This increase has been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation since. The depreciation has accelerated recently, raising the questions of whether and how much more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or the renminbi. Our purpose in this paper is to explore these issues. Our theoretical contribution is to develop a simple portfolio model of exchange rate and current account determination, and to use it to interpret the past and explore alternative scenarios for the future. Our practical conclusions are that substantially more depreciation is to come, surely against the yen and the renminbi, and probably against the euro.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
There are two main forces behind the large U.S. current account deficits. First, an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods. Second, an increase in the foreign demand for U.S. assets.

Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid-1990s. This increase has been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation since. The depreciation accelerated in late 2004, raising the questions of whether and how much more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or the renminbi.

Our purpose in this paper is to explore these issues. Our theoretical contribution is to develop a simple model of exchange rate and current account determination based on imperfect substitutability in both goods and asset markets, and to use it to interpret the past and explore alternative scenarios for the future. Our practical conclusions are that substantially more depreciation is to come, surely against the yen and the renminbi, and probably against the euro.

current account deficit, dollar, depreciation, appreciation, euro, portfolio choice, yen, renminbi

Abstract:
The purpose of this lecture is to look beyond the complex events that characterize the global financial and economic crisis, identify the basic mechanisms, and infer the policies needed to resolve the current crisis, as well as the policies needed to reduce the probability of similar events in the future.

financial crisis, credit, liquidity, spreads, leverage

Abstract:
In the 1970s, European unemployment started increasing. It increased further in the 1980s, to reach a plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. The focus of researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks. As unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to institutions. This paper reviews the interaction of facts and theories, and gives a tentative assessment of what we know and what we still do not know.

Abstract:
In the 1970s, European unemployment started increasing. It increased further in the 1980s, to reach a plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. The focus of researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks. As unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to institutions. This paper reviews the interaction of facts and theories, and gives a tentative assessment of what we know and what we still do not know.

Abstract:
In the 1970s, European unemployment started increasing. It increased further in the 1980s, to reach a plateau in the 1990s. It is still high today, although the average unemployment rate hides a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. The focus of researchers and policy makers was initially on the role of shocks. As unemployment remained high, the focus has progressively shifted to institutions. This paper reviews the interaction of facts and theories, and gives a tentative assessment of what we know and what we still do not know.

unemployment, institutions, shocks, hysteresis, labor market

Abstract:
Our paper is an attempt to define the contours of the right macroeconomic strategy for China. In a nutshell, we believe that the package includes a decrease in saving, with a focus on private saving, an increase in the supply of services, in particular health services, and an appreciation of the RMB. This is why we refer to this strategy as a three-handed approach: action on the fiscal and budgetary front, accompanied by currency revaluation.

We start by asking how the Chinese economy got to where it is - what the strategy has been since the beginning of the reforms, and what the main characteristics of the economy are today. We then ask what is the desirable path for the future, and which are the main policy tradeoffs implied by such a path. Finally, we put the various pieces together to describe what we believe is a consistent policy package.

China, growth, appreciation, services

Abstract:
We characterize the macroeconomics performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.

oil, oil price, inflation, credibility, oil share, Great moderation, supply shocks, stagflation, monetary policy, real wage rigidities

Abstract:
After three years of near stagnation, the mood in Europe is definitely gloomy. Many doubt that the European model has a future. In this paper, I argue that things are not so bad, and there is room for optimism. Over the last thirty years, productivity growth has been much higher in Europe than in the United States. Productivity levels are roughly similar in the European Union and in the United States today. The main difference is that Europe has used some of the increase in productivity to increase leisure rather than income, while the U.S. has done the opposite. Turning to the present, a deep and wide ranging reform process is taking place. This reform process is driven by reforms in financial and product markets. Reforms in those markets are in turn putting pressure for reform in the labor market. Reform in the labor market will eventually take place, but not overnight and not without political tensions. These tensions have dominated and will continue to dominate the news; but they are a symptom of change, not a reflection of immobility.

Abstract:
After three years of near stagnation, the mood in Europe is definitely gloomy. Many doubt that the European model has a future. In this paper, I argue that things are not so bad, and there is room for optimism.

Over the last thirty years, productivity growth has been much higher in Europe than in the United States. Productivity levels are roughly similar in the European Union and in the United States today. The main difference is that Europe has used some of the increase in productivity to increase leisure rather than income, while the U.S. has done the opposite.

Turning to the present, a deep and wide ranging reform process is taking place. This reform process is driven by reforms in financial and product markets. Reforms in those markets are in turn putting pressure for reform in the labor market. Reform in the labor market will eventually take place, but not overnight and not without political tensions. These tensions have dominated and will continue to dominate the news; but they are a symptom of change, not a reflection of immobility.

Europe, growth, deregulation, goods markets, labor markets

Abstract:
Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non-trivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

Oil price shocks, inflation targeting, monetary policy, inflation inertia

Abstract:
Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation - unemployment relation found in the data.

Abstract:
Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real
imperfections.

We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation - unemployment relation found in the data.

oil price shocks, inflation targeting, monetary policy, inflation inertia

Abstract:
For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked like a battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts do not go away, a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology has emerged. Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and suffers from extremism and herding. None of this deadly however. The state of macro is good. The first section sets the stage with a brief review of the past. The second argues that there has been broad convergence in vision, and the third reviews the specifics. The fourth focuses on convergence in methodology. The last looks at current challenges.

Abstract:
For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked like a battle field. Over time however, largely because facts do not go away, a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology has emerged. Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and suffers from extremism and herding. None of this is deadly however. The state of macro is good.

The first section sets the stage with a brief review of the past. The second argues that there has been broad convergence in vision, and the third reviews the specifics. The fourth focuses on convergence in methodology. The last looks at current challenges.

Macroeconomics, shocks, propagation mechanisms, fluctuations

Abstract:
Both Portugal and Greece have been running large current account deficits, and these are expected to continue in the future. Yet, financial markets do not appear to be worried. Starting from this observation, we document that Portugal and Greece are in fact representative of a broader evolution: Increasing goods and financial market integration is leading to an increasing decoupling of saving and investment within the European Union, and even more so within the Euro area. In particular, it is allowing poorer countries to invest more, save less, and run larger current account deficits. The converse holds for the richer countries.

Current Account, Europe, Euro, Feldstein Horioka Puzzle, Saving, Investment, Capital Market Integration, Product Market Integration

Abstract:
A standard proposition in open-economy macroeconomics is that a central-bank-engineered increase in the real interest rate makes domestic government debt more attractive and leads to a real appreciation. If, however, the increase in the real interest rate also increases the probability of default on the debt, the effect may be instead to make domestic government debt less attractive, and to lead to a real depreciation. That outcome is more likely the higher the initial level of debt, the higher the proportion of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and the higher the price of risk. Under that outcome, inflation targeting can clearly have perverse effects: An increase in the real interest in response to higher inflation leads to a real depreciation. The real depreciation leads in turn to a further increase in inflation. In this case, fiscal policy, not monetary policy, is the right instrument to decrease inflation. This paper argues that this is the situation the Brazilian economy found itself in in 2002 and 2003. It presents a model of the interaction between the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the probability of default, in a high-debt high-risk-aversion economy such as Brazil during that period. It then estimates the model, using Brazilian data. It concludes that, in 2002, the level and the composition of public debt in Brazil, and the general level of risk aversion in world financial markets, were indeed such as to imply perverse effects of the interest rate on the exchange rate and on inflation.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
A standard proposition in open-economy macroeconomics is that a central-bank-engineered increase in the real interest rate makes domestic government debt more attractive and leads to a real appreciation. If, however, the increase in the real interest rate also increases the probability of default on the debt, the effect may be instead to make domestic government debt less attractive, and to lead to a real depreciation. That outcome is more likely the higher the initial level of debt, the higher the proportion of foreign-currency-denominated debt, and the higher the price of risk.

Under that outcome, inflation targeting can clearly have perverse effects: An increase in the real interest in response to higher inflation leads to a real depreciation. The real depreciation leads in turn to a further increase in inflation. In this case, fiscal policy, not monetary policy, is the right instrument to decrease inflation.

This paper argues that this is the situation the Brazilian economy found itself in 2002 and 2003. It presents a model of the interaction between the interest rate, the exchange rate, and the probability of default, in a high-debt high-risk-aversion economy such as Brazil during that period. It then estimates the model, using Brazilian data. It concludes that, in 2002, the level and the composition of public debt in Brazil, and the general level of risk aversion in world financial markets, were indeed such as to imply perverse effects of the interest rate on the exchange rate and on inflation.

Inflation targeting, fiscal dominance, debt dynamics, Brazil, default exchange rate

Abstract:
Product and labor market deregulation are fundamentally about reducing and redistributing rents, leading economic players to adjust in turn to this new distribution. Thus, even if deregulation eventually proves beneficial, it comes with strong distribution and dynamic effects. The transition may imply the decline of incumbent firms. Unemployment may increase for a while. Real wages may decrease before recovering, and so on. To study these issues, we build a model based on two central assumptions: Monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents, and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firms. We then think of product market regulation as determining both the entry costs faced by firms, and the degree of competition between firms. We think of labor market regulation as determining the bargaining power of workers. Having characterized the effects of labor and product market deregulation, we then use our results to study two specific issues. First, to shed light on macroeconomic evolutions in Europe over the last twenty years, in particular on the behavior of the labor share. Second, to look at political economy interactions between product and labor market deregulation.

Deregulation, imperfect competition, rents, unemployment

Abstract:
Product and labor market deregulation are fundamentally about reducing and redistributing rents, leading economic players to adjust in turn to this new distribution. Thus, even if deregulation eventually proves beneficial, it comes with strong distribution and dynamic effects. The transition may imply the decline of incumbent firms. Unemployment may increase for a while. Real wages may decrease before recovering, and so on. To study these issues, we build a model based on two central assumptions: Monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firms. We then think of product market regulation as determining both the entry costs faced by firms, and the degree of competition between firms. We think of labor market regulation as determining the bargaining power of workers. Having characterized the effects of labor and product market deregulation, we then use our results to study two specific issues. First, to shed light on macroeconomic evolutions in Europe over the last twenty years, in particular on the behavior of the labor share. Second, to look at political economy interactions between product and labor market deregulation.

Abstract:
Product and labor market deregulations are fundamentally about reducing and redistributing rents, leading economic players to adjust in turn to this new distribution. Thus, even if deregulation eventually proves beneficial, it comes with strong distribution and dynamic effects. The transition may imply the decline of incumbent firms. Unemployment may increase for a while. Real wages may decrease before recovering, and so on.

To study these issues, we build a model based on two central assumptions: Monopolistic competition in the goods market, which determine the size of rents; and bargaining in the labor market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firms. We then think of product market regulation as determining both the entry costs faced by firms, and the degree of competition between firms. We think of labor market regulation as determining the bargaining power of workers.

Having characterized the effects of labor and product market deregulation, we then use our results to study two specific issues. First, to shed light on macroeconomic evolutions in Europe over the last twenty years, in particular on the behavior of the labor share. Second, to look at political economy interactions between product and labor market deregulation.

Macroeconomics, regulation, deregulation, rents, bargaining, labor share, unemployment, labor market, product market

Abstract:
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption.

There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new firms to enter.

The question then is why this has not happened in China. We argue that the answer lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. Transition in China has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both to reward or to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local capture or the scope of competition for rents. By contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy. The central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth. As a result, local governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents.

Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism could play a central role in development. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization.

Russia, China, Transition, Decentralization, Centralization, Federalism, Local Governments, Corruption

Abstract:
The current crisis calls for two main sets of policy measures. First, measures to repair the financial system. Second, measures to increase demand and restore confidence. While some of these measures overlap, the focus of this note is on the second set of policies, and more specifically, given the limited room for monetary policy, on fiscal policy. The optimal fiscal package should be timely, large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable: timely, because the need for action is immediate; large, because the current and expected decrease in private demand is exceptionally large; lasting because the downturn will last for some time; diversified because of the unusual degree of uncertainty associated with any single measure; contingent, because the need to reduce the perceived probability of another "Great Depression" requires a commitment to do more, if needed; collective, since each country that has fiscal space should contribute; and sustainable, so as not to lead to a debt explosion and adverse reactions of financial markets. Looking at the content of the fiscal package, in the current circumstances, spending increases, and targeted tax cuts and transfers, are likely to have the highest multipliers. General tax cuts or subsidies, either for consumers or for firms, are likely to have lower multipliers.

fiscal policy, financial crisis, stimulus

Abstract:
We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities and unemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade- off and for the conduct of monetary policy. We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that, under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect on unemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on the implications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un- employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities in determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment. We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting by firms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discuss how it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

New-Keynesian model, labor market frictions, search model, unemployment, sticky prices, real wage rigidities

Abstract:
In this lecture, I argue that the efficiency cost of generous but well designed social insurance need not be very large, and that there is indeed a viable European model, based on three legs: competition in goods markets, insurance in labor markets, and the active use of macroeconomic policy.

Europe, euro, insurance, competition

Abstract:
Current account imbalances have steadily increased in rich countries over the last 20 years. While the U.S. current account deficit dominates the numbers and the news, other countries, especially within the Euro area, are also running large deficits. These deficits are different from the Latin American deficits of the early 1980s, or the Mexican deficit of the early 1990s. They involve rich countries; they reflect mostly private saving and investment decisions, and fiscal deficits often play a marginal role; and the deficits are financed mostly through equity, FDI, and own-currency bonds rather than through bank lending. Yet, there appears a widely shared worry that these deficits are too large, and government intervention is required. My purpose, in this lecture, is to examine the logic of this argument. I ask the following question: Assume that deficits reflect private saving and investment decisions. Assume also that people and firms have rational expectations. Should the government intervene, and, if so, how? To answer the question, I construct a simple benchmark. In the benchmark, the outcome is first best and there is no need nor justification for government intervention. I then introduce simple distortions in either goods, labor, or financial markets, and characterize the equilibrium in each case. I derive optimal policy and the implications for the current account. I show that optimal policy may or may not lead to smaller current account deficits. I see the model and the extensions very much as a first pass. Sharper conclusions require a better understanding of the exact nature and the extent of distortions, and we do not have it. Such understanding is needed however to improve the quality of the current debate.

Abstract:
Current account imbalances have steadily increased in rich countries over the last 20 years. While the U.S. current account deficit dominates the numbers and the news, other countries, especially within the Euro area, are also running large deficits.

These deficits are different from the Latin American deficits of the early 1980s, or the Mexican deficit of the early 1990s. They involve rich countries; they reflect mostly private saving and investment decisions, and fiscal deficits often play a marginal role; and the deficits are financed mostly through equity, FDI, and own-currency bonds rather than through bank lending.

Yet, there appears a widely shared worry that these deficits are too large, and government intervention is required. My purpose, in this lecture, is to examine the logic of this argument. I ask the following question: Assume that deficits reflect private saving and investment decisions. Assume also that people and firms have rational expectations. Should the government intervene, and, if so, how?

To answer the question, I construct a simple benchmark. In the benchmark, the outcome is first best and there is no need nor justification for government intervention. I then introduce simple distortions in either goods, labor, or financial markets, and characterize the equilibrium in each case. I derive optimal policy and the implications for the current account. I show that optimal policy may or may not lead to smaller current account deficits.

I see the model and the extensions very much as a first pass. Sharper conclusions require a better understanding of the exact nature and the extent of distortions, and we do not have it. Such understanding is needed however to improve the quality of the current debate.

current account deficit, distortion, nominal rigidities, financial constraints, global imbalances, euro, optimal policy

Abstract:
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. ln this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the 'first best', unemployment insurance comes with employment protection - in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and ex-ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.

Employment protection, experience rating, layoff taxes, layoffs, severance payments, unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance

Abstract:
Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design.

We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that unemployment insurance comes with employment protection - in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits.

We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and ex-ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation.

Unemployment insurance, employment protection, unemployment benefits, layoff taxes, layoffs, severance payments

Abstract:
There is a clear negative relation across OECD countries between measures of the quality of labor relations and unemployment. We argue that conflictual labor relations cause high unemployment, and we propose a model to think about this issue. Empirically,we use historical evidence from the 19th century to construct an instrument for current labor relations and establish causality. Theoretically, we consider an economy where asymmetric information can result in bargaining failures, inefficiencies and high unemployment in equilibrium. These inefficiencies can however be alleviated by higher trust, sustained through repeated interactions between firms and workers. We think of countries with different labor relations as playing different equilibria of the same repeated game, and we use our model to interpret cross-country and time series facts about labor relations, strikes, and unemployment in OECD countries since the early 1970s.

Abstract:
In countries where wages are primarily set by collective bargaining, the effects on unemployment of changes in the economic environment depend crucially on the speed of learning of unions. This speed of learning is likely to depend in turn on the quality of the dialogue that unions have with firms, on what can more generally be called the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we examine the role this quality of labor relations has played in the evolution of unemployment across European countries over the last 30 years. We conclude that it has played an important role: Countries with worse labor relations have experienced higher unemployment. This conclusion remains even after controlling for labor institutions.

Abstract:
In countries where wages are primarily set by collective bargaining, the effects on unemployment of changes in the economic environment depend crucially on the speed of learning of unions. This speed of learning is likely to depend in turn on the quality of the dialogue that unions have with firms, on what can more generally be called the quality of labor relations. In this paper, we examine the role this quality of labor relations has played in the evolution of unemployment across European countries over the last 30 years. We conclude that it has played an important role: Countries with worse labor relations have experienced higher unemployment. This conclusion remains even after controlling for labor institutions.

Unemployment, labor relations, unions, strikes, Europe

Abstract:
The last two U.S. expansions have been unusually long. One view is that this is the result of luck, of an absence of major adverse shocks over the last twenty years. We argue that more is at work, namely a large underlying decline in output volatility. This decline is not a recent development, but rather a steady one, visible already in the 1950s and the 1960s, interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s, with a return to trend in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The standard deviation of quarterly output growth has declined by a factor of 3 over the period. This is more than enough to account for the increased length of expansions.

We reach two other conclusions. First, the trend decrease can be traced to a number of proximate causes, from a decrease in the volatility in government spending early on, to a decrease in consumption and investment volatility throughout the period, to a change in the sign of the correlation between inventory investment and sales in the last decade. Second, there is a strong relation between movements in output volatility and inflation volatility. This association accounts for the interruption of the trend decline in output volatility in the 1970s and early 1980s.

output volatility, recession, expansion, fluctuations, amplitude

Abstract:
Starting with a simple benchmark, we first derive the characteristics of optimal employment protection. In the benchmark, employment protection takes the form of layoff taxes, used to finance unemployment benefits. We then consider a number of extensions, and show how this principle must be modified and refined, but not abandoned.

We then turn to the employment protection system in place in France today, and show that it differs from this principle in two main dimensions. First, contributions by firms to the unemployment insurance fund take the form of payroll taxes rather than layoff taxes. Second, the layoff process is subject to heavy administrative and judicial control.

This leads us to make two main recommendations for reform: The introduction of a layoff tax, with a corresponding decrease in the payroll tax; and a reduced role of the judicial system in the layoff process.

employment protection, severance payments, layoffs, layoff taxes, unemployment insurance, unemployment contributions

Abstract:
Stanley Fischer is a macroeconomist par excellence. After three careers, the first in academia at Chicago, and at MIT, the second at the World Bank and at the International Monetary Fund, the third in the private sector at Citigroup, he is starting a fourth, as the head of the Central Bank of Israel. This interview, to be published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, took place in April 2004, before the start of his fourth career.

macroeconomics, international monetary fund, central banking

Abstract:
In a dynamically efficienct economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of production economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.

Dynamic efficiency, pareto optimality, bubbles, Ponzi games, public debt, riskless rate.

Abstract:
In the second half of the 1990s, the prospect of entry in the euro led to an output boom and large current account deficits in Portugal. Since then, the boom has turned into a slump. Current account deficits are still large, and so are budget deficits. This paper reviews the facts, the likely adjustment in the absence of major policy changes, and examines policy options.

Unemployment, competitive disinflation, euro, productivity growth, common currency, competitiveness

Abstract:
Rather than decrease firing costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowed firms to hire workers on fixed-duration contracts. At the end of a given duration, these contracts can be terminated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to regular firing costs. We argue in this paper that the effects of such a partial reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in fixed-duration jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and fixed duration jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their effect on welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.

Abstract:
Rather than decrease firing costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowed firms to hire workers on fixed-duration contracts. At the end of a given duration, these contracts can be terminated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to regular firing costs.

We argue in this paper that the effects of such a partial reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in fixed-duration jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment, And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and fixed duration jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their effect on the welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.

Labor Market Reform, Temporary Employment, Unemployment, Turnover, Employment Protection

Abstract:
The purpose of this lecture is to look beyond the complex events that characterize the global financial and economic crisis, identify the basic mechanisms, and infer the policies needed to resolve the current crisis, as well as the policies needed to reduce the probability of similar events in the future.

Financial crisis, Fiscal policy, Monetary policy, Housing prices, Securities markets, Financial instruments, Globalization, Financial institutions, Emerging markets, Debt, Credit risk

Abstract:
This paper explores the characteristics of both optimal and actual unemployment insurance and employment protection. It then sketches potential paths for reforms in both rich and middle-income countries. It reaches three main conclusions:

There is a role for both state-provided unemployment insurance and employment protection.

In rich countries, one challenge is to combine unemployment insurance with strong incentives for the unemployed to take jobs. Financial incentives are unlikely to be enough at the low end of the wage scale. The other challenge is to redefine employment protection by reducing administrative constraints and judicial intervention, and relying more on financial incentives.

In middle-income countries, the main challenge is to move from the current system of high severance payments and employment protection to a system of state-provided unemployment benefits and lower severance payments.

Unemployment insurance, Employment protection, unemployment benefits, layoff taxes, layoffs, severance payments, informal sector

Abstract:
This paper investigate the nature and the presence of bubbles in financial markets.

Are bubbles consistent with rationality? If they are, do they, like Ponzi games, require the presence of new players forever? Do they imply impossible events in finite time, such as negative prices? Do they need to go on forever to be rational? Can they have real effects? These are some of the questions asked in the first three sections. The general conclusion is that bubbles, in many markets, are consistent with rationality, that phenomena such as runaway asset prices and market crashes are consistent with rational bubbles.

In the last two sections, we consider whether the presence of bubbles in a particular market can be detected statistically. The task is much easier if there are data on both prices and returns. In this case, as shown by Shiller and Singleton, the hypothesis of no bubble implies restrictions on their joint distribution and can be tested. In markets in which returns are difficult to observe, possibly because of a nonpecuniary component, such as gold, the task is more difficult. We consider the use of both "runs tests" and "tail tests" and conclude that they give circumstantial evidence at best.

Abstract:
This note, prepared ahead of the G20 Summit (November 15), builds upon the points laid out in the Managing Director's letter to the Heads of State and Government (November 9). It lays out two tasks ahead for policy makers. Policies for now should cover: (i) implementing and coordinating policies to sustain demand; (ii) providing liquidity support to emerging economies; and (iii) protecting low-income countries. Longer term reforms of the financial architecture should touch upon: (i) the design of financial regulation; (ii) a better way of assessing systemic risk; and (iii) mechanisms for more effective actions for crisis prevention and resolution.

Group of Twenty, Economic summits, Economic policy, Demand management, Liquidity management, Low-income developing countries, Risk management, Crisis prevention

Abstract:
We interpret fluctuations in GNP and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances: disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not. We interpret the first as supply disturbances, the second as demand disturbances.

We find that demand disturbances have a hump shaped effect on both output and unemployment; the effect peaks after a year and vanishes after two to five years. Up to a scale factor, the dynamic effect on unemployment of demand disturbances is a mirror image of that on output. The effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time, to reach a peak after two years and a plateau after five years. "Favorable" supply disturbances may initially increase unemployment. This is followed by a decline in unemployment, with a slow return over time to its original value.

While this dynamic characterization is fairly sharp, the data are not as specific as to the relative contributions of demand and supply disturbances to output fluctuations. We find that the time series of demand determined output fluctuations has peaks and troughs which coincide with most of the NBER troughs and peaks. But variance decompositions of output at various horizons giving the respective contributions of supply and demand disturbances are not precisely estimated. For instance, at a forecast horizon of four quarters, we find that, under alternative assumptions, the contribution of demand disturbances ranges from 40 to over 95 per cent.

Abstract:
Should managers, when making investment decisions, follow the signals given by the stock market even if those do not coincide with their own assessments of fundamental value? This paper reviews the theoretical arguments and examines the empirical evidence, constructing and using the new US time series of data on the q ratio from 1900 to 1988. We decompose q - the ratio of the market value of corporate capital to its replacement cost - into the product of two terms, reflecting "fundamentals" and "valuation", the ratio of market value to fundamentals. We then examine the relation of investment to each of the two, using a number of alternative proxies for fundamentals. We interpret our results as pointing, strongly but not overwhelmingly, to a larger role of "fundamentals" than of "valuation" in investment decisions.

Abstract:
Over the past thirty years, macroeconomists thinking about aggregate labor market dynamics have organized their thought around two relations, the Phillips curve and the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve, the relation between unemployment and vacancies, has very much played second fiddle. We think that emphasis is wrong. The Beveridge relation comes conceptually first and contains essential information about the functioning of the labor market and the shocks that affect it.

Labor markets in the United States are characterized by huge gross flows. Close to seven million workers move either into or out of employment every month. While that movement could be consistent with workers reallocating themselves across a given set of jobs, recent evidence by Steve Davis and John Haltiwanger suggests that these flows are associated with high rates of job creating and job destruction. Using a measure of job turnover, defined as the sum of employment increases in new or expanding establishments and employment decreases in shrinking or dying establishments, Davis and Haltiwanger find that during 1979-83, a period of shrinking employment, job turnover in manufacturing averaged some 10 percent per quarter. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the labor market is highly effective in matching workers and jobs, yet those flows are so large that they imply the coexistence of unfilled jobs and unemployed workers. Examination of the joint movement of unemployment and vacancies can tell us a great deal about the effectiveness of the matching process, as well as about the nature of shocks affecting the labor market. In this paper, we first develop a conceptual frame in which to think about gross flows, about the matching process, and about the effects of shocks on unemployment and vacancies. We then turn to the empirical evidence, using data for the postwar United States. We focus first on the matching process, estimating the "matching function," the aggregate relation between unemployment, vacancies, and new hires. We then interpret the Beveridge relation. More precisely, we look at the joint behavior of unemployment, employment, and vacancies, and infer from it the sources and the dynamic effects of the shocks that have affected the labor market over the past 35 years.

Abstract:
European unemployment has been steadily increasing for the last 15 years and is expected to remain very high for many years to come. In this paper, we argue that this fact implies that shocks have much more persistent effects on unemployment than standard theories can possibly explain. We develop a theory which can explain such persistence, and which is based on the distinction between insiders and outsiders in wage bargaining. We argue that if wages are largely set by bargaining between insiders and firms, shocks which affect actual unemployment tend also to affect equilibrium unemployment. We then confront the theory to both the detailed facts of the European situation as well as to earlier periods of high persistent unemployment such as the Great Depression in the US.

Abstract:
The early 1980s were a time of large budget deficits and increasing ratios of government debt to GNP for many of the OECD countries (Table 1), prompting concerns that the fiscal policies which led to such outcomes were not only unwise, but also unsustainable. Assessing wisdom is not easy, however, and surely not an exercise which can or should be reduced to the construction and examination of a few indicators. Assessing sustainability, on the other hand, is a much less ambitious task and one for which indicators are well suited. The purpose of this paper is to derive, construct and examine the behaviour of such indicators for the recent past and for the present.

Abstract:
Two key facts about European unemployment must be explained: the rise in unemployment since the 1960s, and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences. While adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment, there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross-country differences. Alternatively, while explanations focusing on labor market institutions explain cross-country differences explain current heterogeneity well, many of these institutions pre-date the rise in unemployment. Based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 OECD nations since 1960, we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylized facts. We test two specifications, and each offers significant support for our interactions hypothesis. The first speculation assumes that there are common but unobservable shocks across countries, and that these shocks have a larger and more persistent effect in countries with poor labor market institutions. The second constructs series for the macro shocks, and again finds evidence that the same size shock has differential effects on unemployment when labor market institutions differ. We interpret this as suggesting that institutions determine the relevance of the unemployed to wage-setting, thereby determining the evolution of equilibrium unemployment rates following a shock.

Abstract:
In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until the end of 2007, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach Blanchard and Gali (2007a) argued that this has reflected in large part a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. In order to shed light on the possible factors behind the decrease in the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, we develop a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in production and consumption, and we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples (pre and post 1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by the model. Our results point to two relevant changes in the structure of the economy, which have modified the transmission mechanism of the oil shock: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary policy. The relative importance of these two structural changes depends however on how we formalize the process of expectations formation by economic agents.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until the end of 2007, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach Blanchard and Gali (2007a) argued that this has reflected in large part a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. In order to shed light on the possible factors behind the decrease in the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, we develop a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in production and consumption, and we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples (pre- and post 1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by the model. Our results point to two relevant changes in the structure of the economy, which have modified the transmission mechanism of the oil shock: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary policy. The relative importance of these two structural changes depends however on how we formalize the process of expectations formation by economic agents.

oil, real wage rigidity, new Keynesian, credibility

Abstract:
The standard model of optimal growth, interpreted as a model of a market economy with infinitely long-lived agents, does not allow separation of the savings decisions of agents from the investment decisions of firms. Investment is essentially passive: the "one good" assumption leads to a perfectly elastic investment supply; the absence of installation costs for investment leads to a perfectly elastic investment demand.

On the other hand, the standard model of temporary equilibrium used in macroeconomics characterizes both the savings-consumption decision and the investment decision, or, equivalently, derives a well-behaved aggregate demand which, in equilibrium, must be equal to aggregate supply.

Often, however, we want to study the movement of the temporary equilibrium over time in response to a particular shock or policy. The discrepancy between the treatment of investment in the two models makes imbedding the temporary equilibrium model in the growth model difficult. This paper characterizes the dynamic behavior of the optimal growth model with adjustment costs. It shows the similarity between the temporary equilibrium of the corresponding market economy and the short-run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models: consumption depends on wealth, investment on Tobin's q. Equilibrium is maintained by the endogenous adjustment of the term structure of interest rates. It then shows how the equivalence can be used to study the dynamic effects of policies; it considers various fiscal policies and exploits their equivalence to technical shifts in the optimal growth problem.

Abstract:
Transition in Central Europe is four years old. State firms which dominated the economy are struggling with market forces. A new private sector quickly emerged and has taken hold. Unemployment, which did not exist, is high and still increasing. Will this process of transition accelerate, or slow down? Will unemployment keep increasing? Can things go wrong and how? Our paper represents a first pass at answering those questions. The basic structure of the model we develop is standard, that of the transition from a low to a high productivity sector. But we pay attention to two aspects which strike us as important. The first is the interactions between unemployment and the decisions of both state and private firms. The second are the idiosyncracies which come from the central planning legacy, from the structure of control within state firms to the lack of many market institutions, which limits private sector growth. We start with a description of transition in Poland so far. We then develop a model and use it to think about the determinants of the speed of transition and the level of unemployment. Finally, we return to the role of policy and the future in Poland, as well as the causes of cross-Central European country variations.

Abstract:
We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labour markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.

Great Moderation, Monetary policy credibility, Real wage rigidities, Sticky Prices

Abstract:
We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c) more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We conclude that all four have played an important role.

Abstract:
Over the past three decades, a large amount of research has attempted to identify the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment. It is this body of work we assess in this paper. We reach two main conclusions. First, there has been considerable theoretical progress over the past 30 years. A framework has emerged. We present it, and show how it can be used to think for example about the relation between technological progrss and unemployment. Second, empirical knowledge lags behind. Economists do not have a good quantitative understanding of the determinants of the natural rate, either across time or across countries. We look at two issues, the relation of wages to unemployment, and the risk of European unemployment.

Abstract:
Over the past three decades, a large amount of research has attempted to identify the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment. It is this body of work we assess in this paper. We reach two main conclusions. First, there has been considerable theoretical progress over the past 30 years. A framework has emerged. We present it and show how it can be used to think, for example, about the relations between technological progress and unemployment. Second, empirical knowledge lags behind. Economists do not have a good quantitative understanding of the determinants of the natural rate, either across time or across countries. We look at two issues: the relation of wages to unemployment and the rise of European unemployment.

Abstract:
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of shocks in government spending and taxes on economic activity in the United States in the post-war period. It does so by using a mixed structural VAR/event study approach. Identification is achieved by using institutional information about the tax and transfer systems and the timing of tax collections to identify the automatic response of taxes and spending to activity, and, by implication, to infer fiscal shocks. The results consistently show positive government spending shocks as having a positive effect on output, and positive tax shocks as having a negative effect. The multipliers for both spending and tax shocks are typically small. Turning to the effects of taxes and spending on the components of GDP, one of the results has a distinctly non-standard flavor: Both increases in taxes and increases in government spending have a strong negative effect on investment spending.

Abstract:
Many issues in macroeconomics, such as the level of the steady state interest rate, or the dynamic effects of government deficit finance, depend crucially on the horizon of economic agents. This paper develops a simple analytical model in which such issues can be examined and in which the horizon of agents is a parameter which can be chosen arbitrarily.The first three sections of the paper characterize the dynamics and steady state of the economy in the absence of a government. The focus is on the effects of the horizon index on the economy. The paper clarifies in particular the separate roles of finite horizons and declining labor income through life in the determination of steady state interest rates.The next three sections study the effects and the role of fiscal policy.The focus is on the effects of deficit finance both in closed and open economies. The paper clarifies the respective roles of government spending, deficits and debt in the determination of interest rates.

Abstract:
In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new firms to enter. The question then is why this has not happened in China. We argue that the answer lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. Transition in China has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both to reward and to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rents. By contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy. The central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth. As a result, local governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents. Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism could play a central role in development. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization.

Abstract:
Besides widening wage inequality, if the demand for skills continues to increase it will probably reduce aggregate employment. Policy measures to offset the impact of increased demand for skills on wage inequality and employment would be very costly. Moreover, given local funding of primary and secondary education a sufficiently large supply response cannot be assumed.

wages, inequality, employment, education

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
The "flow approach" to labor markets builds up from the flows of workers and of jobs. It is based on three essential components, a specification of labor demand in terms of flows of job creation/destruction, a process of matching between workers and firms, and a process of wage determination where wages depend on the labor market prospects of employed workers and firms, We think that this approach gives the right basic picture of unemployment and unemployment dynamics, and of the relation between wage movements and the state of the labor market. The additional richness it naturally delivers also captures important implications of labor market mechanisms for macroeconomics. Finally, its structure is realistic enough to allow for a productive interaction with - and use of - micro-work and micro-evidence in both labor and product markets. This paper shows the structure of the approach and some of its implications. The first section develops a barebone model; the second adds the flesh.

Abstract:
A long standing issue in macroeconomics is that of the relation of imperfect competition to fluctuations in output. In this paper we examine the relation between monopolistic competition and the role of aggregate demand in the determination of output. We first show that monopolistically competitive economies exhibit an aggregate demand externality. We then show that, because of this externality, small menu costs, that is small costs of changing prices may lead to large effects of aggregate demand on output and on welfare.

Abstract:
This paper examines two questions. The first is whether economic fluctuations-business cycles-are due to an accumulation of nall shocks or instead mostly to infrequent large shocks. The paper concludes that neither of these two extreme views accurately characterize fluctuations. The second question is whether fluctuations are due mostly to one source of shocks, for example monetary, or instead to many sources. The paper concludes that evidence strongly supports the hypothesis of many, about equally important, sources of shocks.To analyze the empirical evidence and to reach these conclusions, the paper uses two different statistical approaches. The first is estimation ofa structural model, using a set of just identifying restrictions. The secondis non-structural and may be described as a formalization of the Burns Mitchell techniques. Both approaches are somewhat novel and should be of independent interest.

Abstract:
This paper starts from two sets of facts about Continental Europe.The first is the steady increase in unemployment since the early 1970s. The second is the evolution of the capital share, an initial decline in the 1970s, followed by a much larger increase since the mid-1980s. The paper then develops a model of capital accumulation, unemployment and factor prices. Using this model to look at the data, it reaches two main conclusions: The initial increase in unemployment, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, was mostly due to a failure of wages to adjust to the slowdown in underlying factor productivity growth. The initial effect was to decrease profit rates and capital shares. Over time, the reaction of firms was to reduce capital accumulation and move away from labor, leading to a steady increase in unemployment, and a recovery of the capital share. The reason why wage moderation, clearly evident in the data since the mid-1980s, has not led to a decrease in unemployment is that another type of shift has been at work, this time on the labor demand side. At a given wage and a given capital stock firms have steadily decreased employment. The effect of this adverse shift in labor demand has been to lead to both continued high unemployment, and increasing capital shares. What lies behind this shift in labor demand? There are two potential lines of explanation. The first is shifts in the distribution of rents away from workers, for example, the elimination of chronic excess employment by firms. The second explanation points to technological bias: firms in Continental Europe are introducing technologies biased against labor and towards capital.

Abstract:
U.S. macroeconomic evidence shows a negative relation between the rate of change of wages and unemployment. In contrast, most theories of wage determination imply a negative relation between the level of wages and unemployment. In this paper, we ask whether one can reconcile the empirical evidence with theoretical wage relations. We reach three main conclusions. First, we derive the condition under which the two can indeed be reconciled. We show the constraints that such a condition imposes on the determinants of workers' reservation wages as well as the relative importance of workers' outside options as opposed to match specific productivity in wage determination. Second, in the light of this condition, we reinterpret the presence of an "error correction" term in macroeconomic wage relations for most European economies but not in the United States. Third, we show that whether this condition holds or not has important implications for the effects of a number of variables -- from real interest rates to oil prices to payroll taxes -- on the natural rate of unemployment.

Abstract:
We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients: agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information; these anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. Our objective is to separate fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary errors in the private sector's estimates of these fundamentals (noise). Using a simple model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly, we address some basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First, we show that if the econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in the model, structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next, we develop a structural Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify the model's parameters and to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to postwar U.S. data, this approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role in short-run fluctuations.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Most of the empirical work on investment is based on the existence of a relation between investment and the expected present val of marginal profits.Thus, in this paper we compute such a present value series, under various assumptions about demand and technology and examine its relation to investment.We find that variations in this present value series are, surprisingly,due more to variations in the cost of capital than to variations in marginal profit. We also find that the present value series, although significantly related to investment, still leaves unexplained a large, serially correlated fraction of investment.

Abstract:
This paper discusses the recent research on the consumption function that has attempted to relax the assumption of certainty equivalence. While there remain many open questions, both theoretical and empirical, it is clear that the assumption of certainty equivalence can be misleading. Under more plausible specifications of preferences toward risk, uncertainty lowers the level of consumption, increases the expected rate of growth of consumption, and increases the response of consumption to news about income. Moreover, changes in the amount of uncertainty are a potentially important source of fluctuations in consumption.

Abstract:
Over the last 15 years, Portugal and the United States have had the same average unemployment rate, about 6.5%. But behind these similar rates hide two very different labor markets. Unemployment duration in Portugal is more than three times that of the United States. Symmetrically, the flow of workers into unemployment in Portugal is, in proportion to the labor force, less than a third of what it is in the United States. Relying on evidence from Portuguese and U.S. micro data sets, we show that these lower flows come in roughly equal proportions from lower job flows, and from lower worker flows relative to job flows. We then argue that these differences plausibly come from high employment protection in Portugal. We finally show how, looking across countries, higher employment protection is associated with lower flows and higher unemployment duration. In short, high employment protection makes economics more sclerotic; but because it affects unemployment duration and flows in opposite directions, it has an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate.

Abstract:
This paper examines, in light of the Lucas Critique, the behavior of the Phillips curve and of the term structure of interest rates after October 1979. It starts with an informal account of the policy change and then discusses how we might expect these two relations to shift after such a change. It finds little evidence of a direct effect of the policy change on the Phillips curve, at least until 1982. It finds substantial evidence of a direct effect on term structure.

Abstract:
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) contains a serious error: the way governments are expected to account for public investment. Correcting this error and applying, as article 104.3 of the EU Treaty allows, the current rules of the Pact to a measure of the budget where the treatment of investment expenditures is done properly would, over time, drive the debt-GDP ratio to the ratio of public capital to GDP. Excluding net public investment from the definition of the budget that is relevant for the Pact would also help in the short run, by inducing countries to shift the composition of domestic demand, rather than to reduce its level.

EMU, stability pact

Abstract:
The recent European experience of high persistent unemployment has led to the development of theories of unemployment hysteresis embodying the idea that the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the history of the actual unemployment rate. This paper summarizes two directions of research on hysteresis that appear especially promising. Membership theories are based on the distinction between insiders and outsiders and explore the idea that wage setting is largely determined by firms` incumbent workers rather than by the unemployed. Duration theories explore the idea that the long term unemployed exert much less downwards pressure on wages than do the short term unemployed.

Abstract:
Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both unemployment insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
If price decisions are taken neither continuously nor in perfect synchronization, the process of adjustment of all prices to a new nominal level will imply temporary movements in relative prices. It might then well be that, to avoid these movements in relative prices, each price setter will want to move his own price slowly compared to others. The result will be a slow movement of all prices to their new nominal level, and substantial inertia of the price level. This paper formalizes this intuitive argument and reaches four main conclusions: (1) Even small departures from perfect synchronization can generate substantial price level inertia. (2) If price decisions are desynchronized, even anticipated movements in money will usually have an effect on economic activity. It is however possible to find paths of money deceleration which reduce inflation at no cost in output. (3) Price desynchronization has implications for relative price movements as well as for the price level. Goods early in the chain of production have more price and profit variability than goods further down the chain. (4) Price inertia, if it is due to price desynchronization, may be difficult to remove. It may well be that, given the timing decisions of others, no agent has an incentive to change his own timing decision: the time structure of price desynchronization may be stable.

Abstract:
Real interest rates in the United States have reached extremely high levels in the last several years. This surge in real rates at all maturities has not lacked explanations. Large current and prospective deficits, tight money, better profit prospects, financial deregulation, and increased uncertainty are among the factors than have been blamed for high real rates. If one looks only at the performance of the U.S. bond market, it is difficult to discriminate among possible explanations for the behavior of real interest rates. This paper examines the worldwide behavior of interest rates and the performance of other asset markets besides the U.S. bond market in order to better explain high real rates.

Abstract:
There is widespread feeling that current deficits, in Europe and the U.S.,may hurt rather than help the recovery. This paper examines some of the issues involved, through a sequence of three models.The first model focuses on sustainability and characterizes its determinants. It suggests that the issue of sustainability may indeed ber elevant in some countries.The second model focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on real interestrates, and in particular on the relative importance of the level of deficits andthe level of debt in determining interest rates.The third model focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on the speed of the recovery. It shows how a sharply increasing fiscal expansion might be initially contractionary rather than expansionary.

Abstract:
Recovery from the global economic crisis has begun, but the crisis has most likely caused a drop in potential output. The higher-than-normal growth that follows most recessions should not be expected this time. Sustaining the recovery will require two delicate rebalancing acts. First, countries will have to rebalance from public to private spending. Second, aggregate demand will have to be rebalanced across counties, with a shift from domestic to foreign demand in the United States and a reverse shift from foreign to domestic demand in the rest of the world, especially Asia.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor markets prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain not only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades - an evolution which triggered their development - but many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.

Abstract:
Central to the Keynesian interpretation of economic fluctuations is the notion that prices and wages are rigid or "sticky," so that movements in aggregate demand, rather than being quickly reflected in price level movements, have instead long-lasting effects on output and economic activity. The word "rigidity" covers, in fact, two quite different notions. The first, which I shall refer to as real rigidity, is that real wages and markups of prices over wages respond little to shifts in demand. The second, which I shall refer to as nominal rigidity, is that nominal wages and prices respond slowly to changes in their determinants and in particular respond slowly to each other. Both real and nominal rigidities combine to lead to lasting effects of changes in aggregate demand on output.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
Firms often receive multiple acceptable applications for vacancies, requiring a choice among candidates. This paper contrasts equilibria when firms select workers at random and when firms select the worker with the shortest spell of unemployment, called ranking. With the filling of vacancies unaffected by the selection rule, both equilibria have the same aggregate dynamics, but different distributions of unemployment durations. With the threat point for the Nash bargained wage being a worker with zero unemployment duration, the wage with ranking is much more sensitive to changes in the tightness of the labor market. The same holds for efficiency wages.

Abstract:
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that outputs has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in the Central Europe.

Abstract:
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that outputs has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in the Central Europe.

Abstract:
Our paper is an attempt to define the contours of the right macroeconomic strategy for China. In a nutshell, we believe that the package includes a decrease in saving, with a focus on private saving, an increase in the supply of services, in particular health services, and an appreciation of the RMB. This is why we refer to this strategy as a 'three-handed approach': action on the fiscal and budgetary front, accompanied by currency revaluation. We start by asking how the Chinese economy got to where it is - what the strategy has been since the beginning of the reforms, and what the main characteristics of the economy are today. We then ask what is the desirable path for the future, and which are the main policy tradeoffs implied by such a path. Finally, we put the various pieces together to describe what we believe is a consistent policy package.

China, economic development, international economics

Abstract:
We argue that the effects of a partial reform of employment protection by allowing firms to hire workers on fixed-term contracts may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in entry-level jobs, leading to higher, not lower, unemployment. Even if unemployment falls, workers may be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and entry-level jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Considering French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, the effect on their welfare appears to have been negative.

Abstract:
This paper attempts to give a structural interpretation to the distributed lag of sales on investment at the two-digit level in US manufacturing. It first presents a simple model which captures the various sources of lags and their respective implications. It then estimates the model, using both data on investment and sales as well as direct evidence on the sources of lags. The spirit of the paper is exploratory ; the model is used mainly as a vehicle to construct, present and interpret the data. We find that the following model can roughly generate the distributed lag structure found in the data. Firms face delivery lags of 3 quarters. They also face adjustment costs, which lead them to take into account expected future sales, with discount factor -9 when constructing the desired capital stock, and to close about 5% of the gap between actual and desired capital per quarter. They pay for orders at a constant rate between the time of order and that of delivery. The model is however not very successful in explaining differences in dynamics across sectors.

Abstract:
We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients: agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information; these anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. our objective is to separate fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary errors in the private sector’s estimates of these fundamentals (noise). Using a simple model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly, we address some basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First, we show that if the econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in the model, structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next, we develop a structural Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify the model’s parameters and to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to postwar U.S. data, this approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role in short-run fluctuations.

Aggregate shocks, business cycles, vector autoregression, invertibility

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the issue of persistent high unemployment. It focuses on two channels of persistence. The first is capital accumulation. The paper analyzes investment decisions under imperfect competition, focusing in particular on the effects of demand and cost shocks on investment, capital composition and bankrupcies, and their effect on unemployment and unemployment. The second is labor supply. The paper analyzes the various channels through which the unemployed may become disenfranchised, leading to higher equilibrium unemployment. In both cases, it briefly reviews and assesses the available empirical evidence. It ends by drawing several implications.

Abstract:
European unemployment is widely regarded as a problem of excessive real wages. This view as it is usually expressed carries the disturbing implication that there is a sharp conflict between the interests of those currently employed and the unemployed because it suggests that increases in employment will require reductions in the real wages of those currently employed. The first part of this paper shows that increases in employment in Europe are likely to be associated with rising real take-home pay for workers because of fiscal increasing returns. Increases in employment and output will make possible reductions in taxes sufficiently large to offset any effects of diminishing returns to labor. The second part of the paper considers alternative explanations for the failure of nominal wages to adjust so as to restore full employment and their implications for the efficacy of fiscal policies. It concludes that under a variety of plausible conditions tax cuts would succeed in stimulating employment.

Abstract:
A decrease in aggregate demand at given prices and wages decreases output and employment. The decrease in employment exerts downward pressure on real wages. The decrease in production exerts downward pressure on markups. With perfectly synchronized price and wage decisions, nominal wages and prices decrease instantaneously until equilibrium is reestablished at a lower price level and the initial relative prices. If, however, price and wage decisions are a synchronized, this process can not take place instantaneously but rather takes place over time. If real wages and markups are rather insensitive to shifts in demand, the process of adjustmentis slow, the effects of money on output are strong and lasting.The paper formalizes this intuitive argument and characterizes the implications of asynchronization for the joint behavior of relative and nominal prices.

Abstract:
This paper presents an intertemporal disequilibrium model with rational expectations, i.e. a model in which agents anticipate the future rationally, but in which prices and wages may not adjust fast enough to maintain continuous market clearing. Therefore, optimizing firms and households base their intertemporal plans on anticipations of both future quantity constraints and future prices. Such a model shows clearly that the effect of a policy depends not only on its current values but its anticipated path, After a presentation of the model and its basic dynamics, we therefore consider the effects of various paths of fiscal policy on the economy.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
In this paper, I investigate US post war price, wage and employment dynamics by identifying and estimating a price and a wage equation. I reach the following two main conclusions: Nominal wages adjust faster to prices than prices do to nominal wages. This may be taken as evidence that price inertia is more important empirically than nominal wage inertia. The wage equation implies that the effect on wage inflation of a permanent increase in unemployment, given prices, is largely temporary. This can be interpreted in various ways. One is that, if the wage equation is interpreted as a Phillips curve, both the rate of change and the level of unemployment play an important role in wage determination. The methodology of the paper is somewhat different from the traditional approach to the estimation of price and wage equations. Its spirit is to impose on the reduced form a just identifying set of restrictions. In this way, a structural interpretation is made possible, while the data are left free to speak.