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Abstract:
Social norms are usually neglected in economics, because they are to a large extent enforced through non-market interactions and difficult to isolate empirically. In this paper, we offer a direct measure of the social norm to work and we show that this norm has important economic effects. The stronger the norm, the more quickly unemployed people find a new job. This behavior can be explained by utility differences, probably due to social pressure. Unemployed people are significantly less happy than employed people and their
reduction in life satisfaction is the larger, the stronger the norm is.

job searching, social norms, subjective well-being, unemployment, duration of unemployment

Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to study whether schooling choices are affected by social interactions. Such social interactions may be important because children enjoy spending time with other children or parents learn from other parents about the ability of their children. Identification is based on a randomized intervention that grants a cash subsidy encouraging school attendance among a sub-group of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico. Results indicate that (i) the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, (ii) but also the neligible children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village, (iii) social interactions are economically important, and (iv) they may arise due to changes in parents' perception of their children's ability.

Peer effects, schooling, field experiment, PROGRESA

Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to study whether schooling choices are affected by social interactions. Such social interactions may be important because children enjoy spending time with other children or parents learn from other parents about the ability of their children. Identification is based on a randomized intervention that grants a cash subsidy encouraging school attendance among a sub-group of eligible children within small rural villages in Mexico. Results indicate that (i) the eligible children tend to attend school more frequently, (ii) but also the ineligible children acquire more schooling when the subsidy is introduced in their local village, (iii) social interactions are economically important, and (iv) they may arise due to changes in parents' perception of their children's ability.

peer effects, schooling, field experiment, PROGRESA

Abstract:
We study the causal effects of changes in parental leave provisions on fertility and return-to-work behavior. We exploit a policy change that took place in 1990 in Austria which extended the maximum duration of parental leave from the child's first to the child's second birthday. As parental leave benefits can be automatically renewed when a new mother is still on leave from a previous child, this created a strong incentive to "bunch" the time off work in case of multiple planned children and/or to increase fertility. We study the quantitative effect of this incentive using an empirical strategy which resembles a true experimental set-up very closely. In particular, assignment to treatment is random and treated and controls face (almost) identical environmental conditions. We find that treated mothers have a 4.9 percentage points (or 15 percent) higher probability to get an additional child within the following three years; and a 3.9 percentage points higher probability in the following ten years. This suggests that not only the timing but also the number of children were affected by the policy change. We also find that parental leave rules have a strong effect on mothers' return-to-work behavior. Per additional months of maximum parental leave duration, mothers' time off work is reduced by 0.4 to 0.5 months. The effects of a subsequent policy change in 1996 when maximum parental leave duration was reduced from the child's second birthday to the date when the child became 18 months old brought about no change in fertility behavior, but a labor supply effect that is comparable in magnitude to the one generated by the 1990 policy change. This can be rationalized by the incentives created through automatic benefit renewal.

parental leave, fertility, pro-natalist policy, family and work obligations, return to work, labor supply

Abstract:
This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance - the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD) - affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longer PBD; and a fourth group experienced no change in the policy parameters. We find that unemployed workers react to the disincentives by an increase in unemployment duration, and our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory. We use our parameter estimates to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system with unchanged behaviour and costs due to behavioural responses of unemployed workers. Our results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial.

Abstract:
This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance - the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) - affect the duration of unemployment. In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits and the earnings replacement ratio. We find that increasing the replacement ratio has much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits. We use these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of unemployed workers. Results indicate that costs due to behavioral responses are substantial.

Maximum benefit duration, replacement rate, unemployment duration, unemployment insurance, policy change

Abstract:
This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance - the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) - affect the duration of unemployment. In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits and the earnings replacement ratio. We find that increasing the replacement ratio has much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits. We use these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of unemployed workers. Results indicate that costs due to behavioral responses are substantial.

maximum benefit duration, replacement rate, unemployment duration, unemployment insurance, policy change

Abstract:
In this Paper, we suggest a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview under weak assumptions. The idea is to measure the program-effects by pre- and post-treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual. Our approach provides useful information on both average effects of the program, as well as information on potential differences in the effects of the program by type of vacancy or by individual.

Evaluation, active labor market program, correspondence testing, field experiments

Abstract:
In this paper, we suggest a novel approach to program evaluation that allows identification of the causal effect of a training program on the likelihood of being invited to a job interview under weak assumptions. The idea is to measure the program-effects by pre- and post-treatment data that are very close in time for the same individual. Our approach provides useful information on both, average effects of the program as well as information on potential differences in the effects of the program by type of vacancy or by individual.

evaluation, active labour market program, correspondence testing

Abstract:
This paper analyzes the impact of the Austrian Regional Extended Benefit Program (REBP) on the labor market outcomes for elderly workers in Austria. The REBP extended entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions. This policy change created a large-scale quasi-experimental situation from which a lot can be learned about the impact of unemployment insurance rules on the dynamics of employment, unemployment, and wages. We find that the REBP led to a tremendous increase in unemployment, which was due to both an increase in the inflow to and the outflow from unemployment. The REBP also induced a strong increase in early retirement and in many cases, particular for steel workers, entering unemployment meant withdrawal from the labor force. Finally, we show that there were also non-negligible effects of extended benefits on the level and the distribution of wages.

Quasi-experiments, Maximum Benefit Duration, Unemployment Inflow, Duration of Unemployment, Early Retirement, Earnings, Inequality

Abstract:
Swiss policy makers created a unique link between unemployment benefits and Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) by making benefit payments conditional on program attendance after 7 months of unemployment duration. We evaluate the effect of Active Labor Market Programs and benefit entitlement on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. In the evaluation we allow for selectivity affecting the inflow into programs. Our results indicate that

(i) After ALMP-participation the transition rate to jobs increases for Swiss women but not for Swiss men. However, the job hazard rate is strongly reduced during participation. Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that programs prolong unemployment duration for men, but tend to shorten durations for women.

(ii) Once the unemployment spell approaches the expiration of unconditional benefit entitlement the job-hazard rate increases strongly, both for women and for men.

(iii) There are important selectivity effects for Swiss females, but not for Swiss males.

Abstract:
This Paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labour market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter the duration of unemployment. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Unemployment duration, benefit sanctions, monitoring

Abstract:
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Unemployment Duration, Benefit Sanctions, Monitoring

Abstract:
Adam Smith's idea that wage differences reveal preferences for risk rests on firm theoretical foundations. This paper argues, however, that the standard approach to identify these differentials in practice may be flawed. Empirical practice usually identifies compensating wage differentials for risk by regressing individual wages on aggregate measures of risk, usually industry or occupation average risk. If jobs
differ within industries or occupations, the "aggregate approach" may identify arbitrary compensating differentials for risk. In a dataset with precise information on job risk as well as aggregate risk, I demonstrate that using aggregate risk identifies wage differentials that are two to five times larger than wage differentials based on job risk information. This result is robust to controlling for time constant unobserved individual or job heterogeneity.

Abstract:
Women earn less than men but are not less satisfied with life. This paper argues that norms on the appropriate pay for women compared to men explain these findings. We take citizens' approval of an equal rights amendment to the Swiss constitution as a proxy for the norm that women and men shall have the right to equal pay for work of equal value. We find that the gender wage gap narrows by one fifth due to an increase by one standard deviation in the approval. Rejecting an explanation in terms of discrimination, we find that employed women are less (not more) satisfied with life in liberal communities where the gender wage gap is smaller.

Equal rights, gender discrimination, gender wage gap, social norms, subjective well-being

Abstract:
The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This Paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions of Austria. In the evaluation, we explicitly account for the fact that the programme was an endogenous policy response to a crisis affecting individuals with severe labour market problems. The main results are: (i) REBP reduced the transition rate to jobs by 17%; (ii) accounting for endogenous policy adoption is important and quantitatively significant.

Quasi-experiments, policy endogeneity, benefit entitlement, maximum benefit duration, unemployment duration, unemployment insurance

Abstract:
The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions of Austria. In the evaluation, we explicitly account for the fact that the program was an endogenous policy response to a crisis affecting individuals with severe labor market problems. The main results are: (i) REBP reduced the transition rate to jobs by 17 %; (ii) accounting for endogenous policy adoption is important and quantitatively significant.

Quasi-experiments, Policy Endogeneity, Benefit Entitlement, Maximum Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration, Unemployment Insurance

Abstract:
This paper studies a program that extends the maximum duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks. Interestingly, this program is targeted to individuals aged 50 years or older, living in certain eligible regions in Austria. In the evaluation, I use sharp discontinuities in treatment assignment at age 50 and at the border between eligible regions and control regions to identify the effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration. Results indicate that the duration of job search is prolonged by at least .09 weeks per additional week of benefits among men, whereas unemployment duration increases by at least .32 weeks per additional week of benefits among women. The salient differences between men and women are consistent with the lower minimum age for early retirement applying to women.

benefit duration, unemployment duration, early retirement, regression

Abstract:
Firms are central to many theories of the labor market. However, the extent to which firms affect wages has only recently been explored using matched employer-employee data. This paper investigates (i) the importance of firms in explaining wage differences across individuals and industries, and (ii) how the nature of interfirm mobility - job-to-job vs. job-unemployment-job - affects the relative importance of firms and workers in wage determination. Results indicate that (i) firms are much more important in explaining the variance of average wages across industries rather than individuals, and (ii) using job-to-job transitions reduces the importance of firm wage policies in explaining differences.

interfirm mobility, wage determination, industry wage differentials, matched employer employee data

Abstract:
This paper studies the relevance of social interactions among the unemployed. Identification is based on a salient and selective extension of the potential duration of unemployment benefits. If social interactions are important, this policy change affects entitled individuals not only directly, but also indirectly by altering the duration of unemployment in the reference group. Moreover, this spillover effect of the policy should also be observed in the non-entitled group. Results indicate that there are strong indirect effects on the entitled, strong positive spillovers on the non-entitled, and the social interactions are about as important as the direct effects of the policy change.

Social Interactions, Social Multiplier, Unemployment, Quasi-experiment

Abstract:
Swiss policy makers created a unique link between unemployment benefits and Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs) by making benefit payments conditional on program attendance after 7 months of unemployment duration. We evaluate the effect of Active Labor Market Programs and benefit entitlement on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. In the evaluation we allow for selectivity affecting the inflow into programs. Our results indicate that (i) After ALMP-participation the transition rate to jobs increases for Swiss women but not for Swiss men. However, the job hazard rate is strongly reduced during participation. Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that programs prolong unemployment duration for men, but tend to shorten durations for women. (ii) Once the unemployment spell approaches the expiration of unconditional benefit entitlement the job-hazard rate increases strongly, both for women and for men. (iii) There are important selectivity effects for Swiss females, but not for Swiss males.

Active labor market policy, benefit entitlement, treatment effect, bivariate duration model

Abstract:
We conducted an experiment to describe how social learners use information about the relation between payoffs and behavior. Players chose between two technologies repeatedly. Payoffs were random, but one technology was better because its expected payoff was higher. Players were divided into two groups: 1) individual learners who knew their realized payoffs after each choice and 2) social learners, who had no private feedback about their own payoffs, but in each period could choose to learn which behavior had produced the lowest payoff among the individual learners or which behavior had produced the highest payoff. When social learners chose to know the behavior producing the highest payoff, a model of imitating this successful behavior matches the data very closely. When social learners chose to know the behavior producing the lowest payoff, they tended to choose the opposite behavior in early periods, while increasingly choosing the same behavior in late periods. This kind of rapid temporal heterogeneity in the use of social information has received little or no attention in the theoretical study of social learning.

social learning, payoff information, gene-culture coevolution, laboratory experiment

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of culture in shaping unemployment outcomes. The empirical analysis is based on local comparisons across a language barrier in Switzerland. This Röstigraben seperates cultural groups, but neither labor markets nor political jurisdictions. Local contrasts across the language border identify the role of culture for unemployment. Our findings indicate that differences in culture explain differences in unemployment duration on the order of 20 %. Moreover, we find that horizontal transmission of culture is more important than vertical transmission of culture and that culture is about as important as strong changes to the benefit duration.

cultural transmission, culture, regional unemployment, unemployment duration

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of culture in shaping unemployment outcomes. The empirical analysis is based on local comparisons across a language barrier in Switzerland. This Röstigraben separates cultural groups, but neither labor markets nor political jurisdictions. Local contrasts across the language border identify the role of culture for unemployment. Our findings indicate that differences in culture explain differences in unemployment duration on the order of 20%. Moreover, we find that horizontal transmission of culture is more important than vertical transmission of culture and that culture is about as important as strong changes to the benefit duration.

culture, cultural transmission, unemployment duration, regional unemployment

Abstract:
This paper studies the role of culture in shaping unemployment outcomes. The empirical analysis is based on local comparisons across a language barrier in Switzerland. This Röstigraben separates cultural groups, but neither labor markets nor political jurisdictions. Local contrasts across the language border identify the role of culture for unemployment. Our findings indicate that differences in culture explain differences in unemployment duration on the order of 20 %. Moreover, we find that horizontal transmission of culture is more important than vertical transmission of culture and that culture is about as important as strong changes to the benefit duration.

culture, cultural transmission, unemployment duration, regional unemployment

Abstract:
We study the short-run effect of involuntary job loss on comprehensive measures of public health costs. We focus on job loss induced by plant closure, thereby addressing the reverse causality problem of deteriorating health leading to job loss as job displacements due to plant closure are unlikely caused by workers' health status, but potentially have important effects on individual workers' health and associated public health costs. Our empirical analysis is based on a rich data set from Austria providing comprehensive information on various types of health care costs and day-by-day work history at the individual level. Our central findings are: (i) overall expenditures on medical treatments (hospitalizations, drug prescriptions, doctor visits) are not strongly affected by job displacement; (ii) job loss increases expenditures for antidepressants and related drugs, as well as for hospitalizations due to mental health problems for men (but not for women); and (iii) sickness benefits strongly increase due to job loss.

social cost of unemployment, health, job loss, plant closure

Abstract:
We study the short-run effect of involuntary job loss on comprehensive measures of public health costs. We focus on job loss induced by plant closure, thereby addressing the reverse causality problem of deteriorating health leading to job loss as job displacements due to plant closure are unlikely caused by workers' health status, but potentially have important effects on individual workers' health and associated public health costs. Our empirical analysis is based on a rich data set from Austria providing comprehensive information on various types of health care costs and day-by-day work history at the individual level. Our central findings are: (i) overall expenditures on medical treatments (hospitalizations, drug prescriptions, doctor visits) are not strongly affected by job displacement; (ii) job loss increases expenditures for antidepressants and related drugs, as well as for hospitalizations due to mental health problems for men (but not for women); and (iii) sickness benefits strongly increase due to job loss.

Health, Job loss, Plant closure, Social cost of unemployment

Abstract:
This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact of an increase in maximum benefit duration on the steady-state unemployment rate. We draw on policy changes in Austria that extended maximum benefit duration from 30 to 52 weeks for individuals above age 50 and from 30 to 39 weeks for individuals between ages 40 and 49. We use these changes to estimate the causal impact of benefit duration on labor market flows and find that (i) the policy changes lead to an increase in the steady-state unemployment rate between 20% and 50%; (ii) surprisingly, most of the increase is due to an increase in the inflow into unemployment, whereas the decrease in the outflow from unemployment is modest; (iii) the effects are stronger for women than for men, but are otherwise rather robust across population subgroups.

maximum benefit duration, unemployment duration, unemployment inflow, equilibrium unemployment

Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of introducing competition for local passenger railway markets in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. We compare the evolution of the frequency of service on lines that were exposed to competition for the market and lines that were not. Our results suggest that the competitively procured lines enjoyed a stronger growth of the frequency of service than those that were not procured competitively, even after controlling for various line characteristics that might have an independent influence on the frequency of service. Our results further suggest that the effects of competition may depend strongly on the operator.

Competition for the market, liberalization, passenger railways, procurement auctions

Abstract:
We study the short-run effect of involuntary job loss on comprehensive measures of public health costs. We focus on job loss induced by plant closure, thereby addressing the reverse causality problem of deteriorating health leading to job loss as job displacements due to plant closure are unlikely caused by workers' health status, but potentially have important effects on individual workers' health and associated public health costs. Our empirical analysis is based on a rich data set from Austria providing comprehensive information on various types of health care costs and day-by-day work history at the individual level. Our central findings are: (i) overall expenditures on medical treatments (hospitalizations, drug prescriptions, doctor visits) are not strongly affected by job displacement; (ii) job loss increases expenditures for antidepressants and related drugs, as well as for hospitalizations due to mental health problems for men (but not for women); and (iii) sickness benefits strongly increase due to job loss.

social cost of unemployment, health, job loss, plant closure

Abstract:
The Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD) is a matched firm-worker data set, which records the labor market history of almost 11 million individuals from January 1972 to April 2007. Moreover, more than 2.2 million firms can be identified. The individual labor market histories are described in the following dimensions: very detailed daily labor market states and yearly earnings at the firm-worker level, together with a limited set of demographic characteristics. Additionally the ASSD provides some firm related information, such as geographical location and industry affiliation. This paper is a short description of this huge data base and intended for people using this data in their own empirical work.

Matched firm-worker data

Abstract:
This article evaluates the effects of Swiss active labor market programs on the job chances of unemployed workers. The main innovation is a comparison of two important dynamic evaluation estimators: the matching estimator and the timing-of-events estimator. We find that both estimators generate different treatment effects. According to the matching estimator temporary subsidized jobs shorten unemployment duration whereas training programs and employment programs do not. In contrast, the timing-of-events estimator suggests that none of the Swiss active labor market programs shortens unemployment duration.

Abstract:
This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.

benefit sanctions, earnings effects, unemployment duration, competing-risk duration models

Abstract:
This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.

benefit sanctions, earnings effects, unemployment duration, competing-risk duration models

Abstract:
This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of benefit sanctions, i.e. temporary reductions in unemployment benefits as punishment for noncompliance with eligibility requirements. In addition to the effects on unemployment durations, we evaluate the effects on post-unemployment employment stability, on exits from the labor market and on earnings. In our analysis we use a rich set of Swiss register data which allow us to distinguish between ex ante effects, the effects of warnings and the effects of enforcement of benefit sanctions. Adopting a multivariate mixed proportional hazard approach to address selectivity, we find that both warnings and enforcement increase the job finding rate and the exit rate out of the labor force. Warnings do not affect subsequent employment stability but do reduce post-unemployment earnings. Actual benefit reductions lower the quality of post-unemployment jobs both in terms of job duration as well as in terms of earnings. The net effect of a benefit sanction on post-unemployment income is negative. Over a period of two years after leaving unemployment workers who got a benefit sanction imposed face a net income loss equivalent to 30 days of full pay due to the ex post effect. In addition to that, stricter monitoring may reduce net earnings by up to 4 days of pay for every unemployed worker due to the ex ante effect.

Benefit sanctions, competing-risk duration models, earnings effects, unemployment duration

Abstract:
We study the impact of employment quota on firms' demand for disabled workers. The Austrian Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA) requires firms to provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 non-disabled workers, a rule which is strictly enforced by non-compliance taxation. We find that, as a result of the discontinuous nature of the non-compliance tax, firms exactly at the quota threshold employ 0.05 (20 % in relative terms) more disabled workers than firms just below the threshold - an effect that is unlikely driven by purposeful selection below the threshold. The flat rate nature of the non-compliance tax generates strong employment effects for low-wage firms and weak effects for high-wage firms. We also find that growing firms passing the quota threshold react with a substantial time-lag but the magnitude of the long-run effect is similar to the one found in cross-section contrasts.

disability, discrimination, employment, employment quota, regression discontinuity

Abstract:
We conducted an experiment to describe precisely how social learners use information about the distribution of behaviors in a relevant social group. Players chose between two technologies repeatedly. Payoffs were random, but one technology was better in the sense that its expected payoff was higher. Players were divided into two groups: 1) individual learners who knew their realized payoffs after each choice and 2) social learners who had information about the relative frequencies of the two technologies among the individual learners but no private feedback about their own payoffs. For a subset of the social learners, a theoretical model of conformity matches the data very closely. The remaining social learners, however, made choices without responding to the social information provided. This kind of heterogeneity among social learners has received little theoretical attention with respect to aggregate behavioral dynamics.

social learning, conformity, gene-culture coevolution, laboratory experiment