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Abstract:
Timing is everything. Even the most meritorious lawsuit will be dismissed if the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff's claim. In class action litigation, this hurdle is particularly daunting. Supreme Court precedent makes clear that if a class action complaint is timely filed, then the claims of all class members are deemed timely. Likewise, if a motion to certify the class is denied, absent class members may seek to intervene in the pending action or to file individual actions and either way, the statute of limitations is tolled from the date of filing of the class action complaint until denial of the motion to certify. But what if the absent class members seek to present their claims collectively in the context of a successive class action? Is the statute of limitations tolled in this context as well?

Intuitively, one might think that the same policies that justify tolling in the first two situations also justify tolling in the successive class action context. Yet a majority of the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue have denied tolling in the successive class action context. Given the volume of class action litigation, the lack of control that absent class members have over the timing of the certification decision, and the devastating effect the statute of limitations may have on their claims, it behooves us to understand why the courts have resolved the tolling issue for successive class actions differently and whether such differential treatment is justified.

This Article analyzes three sets of policies that have influenced the courts in this context: the policies underlying statutes of limitations; the policies underlying Rule 23; and the policies underlying preclusion doctrine. A careful analysis of these competing policies calls the majority rule into question in two common circumstances: where certification initially was denied because of a problem with the class representative or because of a problem with the class itself that the successive class action seeks to remedy. Only where there is a problem with the class itself and the successive class action fails to address that problem does the combination of relevant policies counsel against tolling.

class actions, statutes of limitations, tolling, successive class actions, aggregate litigation

Abstract:
Parents and their biological children routinely cross state borders safe in the assumption that the parent-child relationship will be recognized wherever they go. The central issue raised in this Article is whether the law guarantees parents and their adopted children the same security if the parents are gay. This question is part of a broader debate about the obligation of states to recognize changes in family status effected under the laws of other states, such as same-sex marriages and migratory divorces. The debate is divisive because it pits the family against the state; one state against another; and the needs of the federal union against the interests of individual states.

This rancorous debate is moderated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Article explains why the Clause imposes a more rigorous obligation on states to recognize judgments, such as adoption decrees and divorces, than marriages and laws. The Article also unpacks and refutes the rationales submitted by the state of Oklahoma, which enacted a statute barring recognition of adoptions by same-sex couples, and Professor Lynn Wardle, who argued that "nonrecognition of lesbigay adoption decrees would be proper and permissible." The Article concludes that the Full Faith and Credit Clause commands interstate recognition of sister state adoption decrees regardless of the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents.

full faith and credit, interstate recognition, adoption, jurisdiction, family law, conflict of laws

Abstract:
Class action litigation seeks to mediate pressing conflicts between individual autonomy and collective justice; federal supervision and local control; self-interested class counsel and the represented class. These conflicts are exacerbated when a federal court that approves a class action settlement later seeks to enjoin state court litigants from violating its terms. Yet the demand for such injunctions has increased in light of the advent of back-end opt-out rights. In recent years, class members have been afforded back-end, or delayed, opportunities to opt out of a class action once the terms of the settlement are disclosed. These back-end opt-out rights may afford only limited rights to sue outside the confines of the class action - for example, class members may be permitted to seek compensatory but not punitive damages. Does the federal court that approved the settlement have authority to enjoin back-end opt-out plaintiffs from seeking relief in state court that exceeds the limits built into the back-end opt-out right?

Three sets of curious complications may arise if the federal court seeks to enter such an injunction. First, if diversity is lacking between the opt-out plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff sues on only state-law claims, the federal court may lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant an injunction. It also may lack personal jurisdiction over an opt-out plaintiff who has no contacts with the state in which the federal court sits. Second, federalism complications are likely to crop up. Both the Anti-Injunction Act and the Younger abstention doctrine limit the authority of federal courts to issue injunctions against pending state court proceedings. Finally, equitable and practical considerations may counsel against micro-management of state court litigation by a federal judge.

The objective in identifying these complications is not to question the wisdom of back-end opt-out rights, but rather to encourage their use by suggesting a variety of steps that courts and counsel can take to enforce the limits built into back-end opt-out rights without unnecessarily intruding upon the prerogatives of state court judges, exposing back-end opt-out plaintiffs to onerous litigation in fora with which they have no contact, or rendering their preserved rights meaningless. Among other recommendations, the article urges federal and state courts to collaborate in the enforcement of back-end opt-out rights.

class actions, injunctions, anti-injunction act, abstention, younger, personal jurisdiction

Abstract:
When multiple class action suits are filed on behalf of the same class members, numerous problems ensue. Dueling class actions are confusing to class members, wasteful of judicial resources, conducive to unfair settlements, and laden with complex preclusion problems. The article creates a typology of different kinds of dueling class actions; explores the problems that plague each type; considers the effect the Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), has had on these problems; evaluates the efficacy of existing judicial tools to curb them; and proposes an array of possible solutions. The more modest quick fixes include: (1) creation of a registry of all class actions filed; (2) amendment of Rule 23 and state class action rules to bar the certification of dueling class actions and to require the appointment of a class action advocate; (3) amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act to enlarge the authority of federal courts to enjoin dueling class actions; (4) amendment of the multidistrict litigation statute to permit transferee courts entertaining consolidated dueling class actions to retain the cases for trial; and (5) enactment of legislation requiring better notice to absent class members in dueling class actions. The article also explores more dramatic legislative solutions to permit the consolidation of all dueling class actions in a single forum.

class action, Rule 23