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Abstract:
Two different theories attempt to reconcile problems of application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict, to the extent that there is a potential conflict with norms set out in international humanitarian law. One, posited by the International Court of Justice, presents international humanitarian law as the lex specialis, a kind of prism through which the concept of "arbitrary deprivation of life" (Article 6(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) is to be understood in time of armed conflict. In effect, international humanitarian law supplants international human rights law during armed conflict. The other theory, advanced by the Human Rights Committee, views the two bodies of law as additive in effect. Both regimes apply, and the individual benefits from the more favorable one ("belt and suspenders" approach). Both theories profess the fundamental compatibility of the two different legal systems, yet they are predicated upon a method for resolving conflicts between them. Both theories encounter serious problems in their application. The author submits that the difficulty with these attempts to reconcile human rights law and humanitarian law lies with the failure to grasp an underlying distinction: international humanitarian law is built upon neutrality or indifference as to the legality of the war itself. Human rights law, on the other hand, law views war itself as a violation. There is a human right to peace. Because of this fundamental incompatibility of perspective with regard to jus ad bellum, human rights law and international humanitarian law can only be reconciled, as both the International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Committee desire, if human rights law abandons the right to peace and develops an indifference to the jus ad bellum. It too must accept the idea of the acceptability of "collateral" killing of civilians in war, even if the war itself is illegal. The author argues that it is preferable not to attempt to find a neat and seamless relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in the interests of preserving the pacifist strain within international human rights law.

LEX SPECIALIS, human rights law, humanitarian law, condrum, jus ad, armed conflict, belt and suspenders,

Abstract:
The now abundant literature on the hostility of the United States towards the International Criminal Court speaks to the litany of criticisms invoked by Washington, from the vulnerability of American nationals to prosecution to such issues as the lack of trial by jury. But these so-called shortcomings are also features of the international tribunals to which the United States has accorded enthusiastic support, from Nuremberg and Tokyo to the more recent generation. Had the 1994 draft of the International Law Commission remained more or less intact, it is likely that today the United States would be a keen supporter of the Court. The distinctions between the 1994 draft and the final version of the Rome Statute unlock the mystery of United States opposition. At the heart of the changes during the four-year drafting process is the relationship between the Court and Security Council. The ILC had conceived of what was in effect a permanent ad hoc tribunal, perfectly subordinate to the Security Council and interlocked with the Charter of the United Nations. But the drafters adjusted this conception, with the result that the Court has significant independence from the Security Council, notably with respect to the triggering of prosecutions, the deferral of cases and the definition of aggression.

Abstract:
After many decades of impunity, Rwanda has embarked upon a course of transitional justice committed to prosecuting all who are suspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide. The first phase, which began in 1997 and is still continuing, targets the most serious offenders. Some 10,000 have been tried under the system. Confronted with its limitations, Rwanda has devised a second approach, known as gacaca, which focuses on a lower and less heinous level of participation in genocide, and which is inspired by traditional models of local justice. Acting upon legislation adopted in 2001, a pilot phase convinced Rwandan justice officials of the viability of the process throughout the country. The institutions have been fine-tuned, and become fully operational in the course of 2005. Because the pilot phase encouraged denunciation, instead of offering `closure`, the process has actually revealed a much broader popular participation in the atrocities of 1994. Rwandan authorities now say the gacaca process will prosecute more than 1,000,000 suspects.

adolescents, psychological symptoms, psychosocial factors, school, sexual harassment

Abstract:
Books Reviwed In This Article:

Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law. By Martha Nussbaum

Law As A Social System. By Niklas Luhmann, Trans, by K.A. Ziegert

Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes. By Frederick Schauer

Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials. By David Hirsh

Abstract:
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has exercised broad prosecutorial discretion in the selection of situations and cases to be heard by the Court. It is difficult to explain the exercise of this discretion by reference to the criteria purportedly used by the Prosecutor of ‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice’ under Articles 17 and 53 of the ICC Statute, respectively. Unlike the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, it appears more the norm that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court acts in accordance with the wishes of the State parties, and with respect to the availability of an individual to be prosecuted. For its part, the Court has encountered difficulties in reviewing the Prosecutor's exercise of discretion as it has been unable to effectively access the criteria of ‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice’. In relation to the charges faced by an accused, the Court has been more active, and has even been willing to add the criterion of ‘inactive’ to Article 17 ICC Statute. The Court's impatience with the slow pace of prosecutions in Darfur has created tension with the Prosecutor.