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Abstract:
Every dictator dislikes free media. Yet, many non-democratic countries have partially free or almost free media. In this paper, we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory. In our model, free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government. The importance of this benefit varies with the natural-resource endowment. In resource-rich countries, bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator; hence, media freedom is less likely to emerge. Using panel data, we show that controlling for country fixed effects, media are less free in oil-rich economies, with the effect especially pronounced in non-democratic regimes. These results are robust to model specification and the inclusion of various controls, including economic development, democracy, country size, size of government, and others.

media freedom, non-democratic politics, bureaucracy, resource curse

Abstract:
We study the effect of earnings manipulation on incentives within the corporate hierarchy. When top management manipulates earnings, it must prevent information leakage from corporate insiders to the outside world. If an insider (e.g., a division manager) gains evidence about earnings manipulation, the threat to blow the whistle can provide them with an additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management's manipulations when the performance of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers' incentives to exert effort and destroys value. We show that earnings manipulation is more likely to occur in flatter hierarchies; we also discuss implications of the auditing and whistle-blowing regulations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.

Agency-costs, Sarbanes Oxley Act, whistleblowing, flat hierarchies

Abstract:
We show that earnings manipulation destroys incentives within the corporate hierarchy. In the model, top management has incentives to over-report earnings. An insider, for instance, a division manager may gain evidence about over-reporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have evidence, when the performance of her own division is low. Top management wants to prevent information leakage to the outside world. Hence, when the division manager threatens to blow the whistle, top management pays her a bribe. As this occurs when division output is low, the wedge between payments in high and low states of nature decreases. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines incentives to exert effort and destroys value. We show that earnings manipulation is more likely to occur in flatter hierarchies; we also discuss implications of the auditing and whistle-blowing regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Agency costs, Sarbanes Oxley Act, whistle-blowing, flat hierarchies

Abstract:
In this paper we study nationalizations in the oil industry around the world in 1960-2002. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that governments are more likely to nationalize when oil prices are high and when political institutions are weak. We consider a simple dynamic model of the interaction between a government and a foreign oil company. The government cannot commit to abstain from expropriation and the company cannot commit to pay high taxes. Even though nationalization is inefficient it does occur in equilibrium when oil prices are high. The model's predictions are consistent with the panel analysis of a comprehensive dataset on nationalizations in the oil industry since 1960. Nationalization is more likely to happen when oil prices are high and the quality of institutions is low even when controlling for country fixed effects.

oil, nationalization, property rights protection

Abstract:
In an economy with weak economic and political institutions, the major institutional choices are made strategically by oligarchs and dictators. The conventional wisdom presumes that as rent-seeking is harmful for oligarchs themselves, institutions such as property rights will emerge spontaneously. We explicitly model a dynamic game between the oligarchs and a dictator who can contain rent-seeking. The oligarchs choose either a weak dictator (who can be overthrown by an individual oligarch) or a strong dictator (who can only be replaced via a consensus of oligarchs). In equilibrium, no dictator can commit to both: (i) protecting the oligarchs' property rights from the other oligarchs and (ii) not expropriating oligarchs himself. We show that a weak dictator does not limit rent-seeking. A strong dictator does reduce rent-seeking but also expropriates individual oligarchs. We show that even though eliminating rent-seeking is Pareto optimal, weak dictators do get appointed in equilibrium and rent-seeking continues. This outcome is especially likely when economic environment is highly volatile.

property rights, oligarchs, non-democratic politics

Abstract:
We propose and investigate a new channel through which the resource curse - a stylized fact that countries rich in natural resources grow slower - operates. Predatory governments are more likely to expropriate corporate profits in natural resource industries when the price of resources is higher. Corporations whose profits are more dependent on the price of resources can mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing corporate transparency. Lower transparency, in turn, leads to inefficient capital allocation and slower economic growth. Using a panel of 72 industries from 51 countries over 16 years, we demonstrate that the negative effect of expropriation risk on corporate transparency is stronger for industries that are especially vulnerable to expropriation, in particular, for industries whose profits are highly correlated with oil prices. Controlling for country, year, and industry fixed effects, we find that corporate transparency is lower in more oil price-dependent industries when the price of oil is high and property rights are poorly protected. Furthermore, corporate growth is hampered in oil price-sensitive industries because of less efficient capital allocation driven by adverse effects of lower transparency.

Resource Curse, Expropriation, Politics and Finance, Corporate Transparency and Disclosure, Investment Efficiency, Industry Growth

Abstract:
We investigate a new channel through which the resource curse (a stylized fact that abundance of natural resources reduces economic growth) operates. In countries with insecure property rights, corporate profits in natural resource industries are at greater risk of expropriation when the prices of the resources are higher. Corporations can mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing corporate transparency. Lower transparency, in turn, leads to inefficient capital allocation and slower growth. We test our predictions using a difference-in-difference approach on a comprehensive panel of 32,000 listed companies from 84 countries. We find that transparency of oil and gas companies and oil-price-dependent companies is lower (compared to other companies in the same country) in countries with insecure property rights. This effect is stronger during periods of high oil prices. Furthermore, corporate growth is hampered in oil-price-sensitive industries because of less efficient capital allocation driven by adverse effects of lower transparency.

resource curse, expropriation, transparency, investment efficiency, growth

Abstract:
Based mostly on a unique dataset built for the Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) 2004 we discuss degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian 'oligarchs' do control a substantial part of the economy including natural resources industries. In the sectors covered by our sample (that account for 77% of total industrial output), 22 largest private owners control 39-42% of output and employment and seem to run their empires more efficiently than other Russian owners. Majority of Russian population believes that oligarchs acquired their assets in an illegitimate way which creates a fundamental problem for building a democratic and prosperous Russia. Comparing modern Russia to other countries that have faced high concentration of national wealth, we consider three possible scenarios of development.

Oligarchs, ownership concentration, property rights

Abstract:
Despite strong growth performance in transition economies in the last decade, residents of transition countries report abnormally low levels of life satisfaction. Using data from the World Values Survey and other sources, we study various explanations of this phenomenon. First, we document that the disparity in life satisfaction between residents of transition and non-transition countries is much larger among the elderly. Second, we find that deterioration in public goods provision, an increase in macroeconomic volatility, and a mismatch of human capital of residents educated before transition which disproportionately affected the aged population explain a great deal of the difference in life satisfaction between transition countries and other countries with similar income and other macroeconomic conditions. The rest of the gap is explained by the difference in the quality of the samples. As in other countries, life satisfaction in transition countries is strongly related to income; but, due to a higher non-response of high-income individuals in transition countries, the survey-data estimates of the recent increase in life satisfaction, driven by 10-year sustained economic growth in transition region, are biased downwards. The evidence suggests that if the region keeps growing at current rates, life satisfaction in transition countries will catch up with the "normal" level in the near future.

happiness, satisfaction, transition, unhappiness

Abstract:
We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms' growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.

Capital structure, pecking order theory of finance, oligopoly in financial markets, second degree price discrimination

Abstract:
The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.

interest groups, lobbying, inter-regional trade barriers, tariffs, multinationals, federalism

Abstract:
Railways restructuring takes place under very different circumstances and with very different goals in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia. Observed improvements in productivity associated with vertical access and vertical separation in Western Europe are not certain to be replicated following similar restructuring in transition economies, especially if one takes account of the much higher shadow price on government subsidies in the latter. This paper describes in detail the current and proposed reforms in the railways of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, analyzes the likely outcomes of reforms in the special economic, regulatory, and legal environments of these countries, and presents an alternative proposal for restructuring in Russia.

Rail, restructuring, access, vertical separation, deregulation, Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, transition

Abstract:
The theme of this paper is the microeconomics of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS) over the period 1950-2000. The key structural change in this region is the end of the socialist regime in 1989 and 1992, and the subsequent attempt at transition to a market economy. We begin the paper with an examination of the key legacies from the socialist period. We then examine the key microeconomic actors in transition economies: households, enterprises, and government officials. Although there are many common processes at work, differences in economic performance tend to coincide with the geographical divide. Legacies play an important part. We also argue that differences in openness also plays an important role in generating different outcomes. These factors, combined with defects in the political and legal system, have given rise to a vicious circle of resistance to reform in the NIS.

Abstract:
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labour contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly because of, for instance, stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.

Illegal migration, wealth constraints, indentured servitude, financial contracting

Abstract:
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.

Illegal migration, wealth constraints, indentured servitude, financial contracting

Abstract:
The paper shows how the time considerations - especially concerning contract duration - affect incomplete contract theory. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We show that incentives for efficient investment can be provided either through a chain of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof 'evergreen' contract - a contract of indefinite duration that includes an option of unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts.

incomplete contracts, renegotiation, optimal duration, evergreen contracts

Abstract:
We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovator's intellectual property rights. Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from his ability to prevent the upstream research unit from forming financial coalitions at the ex interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, either based on trade secrets or via patenting. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the financial structure of licensing fees and show that the innovator's financial constraint is more likely to bind when the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the flexibility of the upstream unit regarding her choice of the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research unit's payoffs in such contingencies. This incentivises the research unit to expend costly effort ex ante to generate more productive interim innovations. We show that such interim control rights can be renegotiation-proof.

control rights, intellectual property rights, corporate venturing

Abstract:
We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovator's intellectual property rights. Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from his ability to prevent the upstream research unit from forming financial coalitions at the ex-interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, either based on trade secrets or via patenting. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the financial structure of licensing fees and show that the innovator's financial constraint is more likely to bind when the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the flexibility of the upstream unit regarding her choice of the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research unit's payoffs in such contingencies. This incentivises the research unit to expend costly effort ex ante to generate more productive interim innovations. We show that such interim control rights can be renegotiation-proof.

control rights, intellectual property rights, corporate venturing

Abstract:
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an Open sale after patenting this interim knowledge, or a Closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU's post-invention revenues. Both models lead to partial leakage of RU's knowledge from it's description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU's incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining.

Abstract:
We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one Research Unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license her non-verifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing Development Units (DUs) via one of two alternative modes: an open sale after patenting this interim knowledge, or a closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU's post-invention revenues. Both modes lead to partial leakage of the RU's knowledge from its description, to the licensed DU alone in a closed sale, and to both DUs in an open sale. We find that higher levels of interim knowledge are more likely to be licensed via closed sales. If the extent of leakage is lower, more RUs choose open sales, generating a non-monotonic relationship between the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and aggregate R&D expenditures. We also develop a rationale for the ex ante acquisition of control rights over the RU by a DU, rooted in the RU's incentives to create knowledge under alternative modes of sale thereof, and her wealth constraint in ex interim bargaining.

Patents, research and development, corporate venturing, sequantial innovation

Abstract:
Why are some trade agreements concluded for a limited period of time while others have the form of evergreen contracts supplemented with an advance termination notice clause? We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to demonstrate that the time structure of the trade agreement is related to the nature of the underlying trade-related investments (or other types of irreversible resource adjustments). If these investments are lumpy and specialized to trade in a particular homogeneous good, the agreements with the fixed term of duration are more likely. The fixed-term agreement provides incentives for the initial investment but leaves the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment by resorting to renegotiation. If the agreement covers trade in goods requiring incremental investments with spillovers of the investment benefits across industries, the risk of overinvestment is more diversified. Therefore, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice or an escape clause). We show that these predictions are consistent with the econometric evidence on the trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party.

Abstract:
External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise "attachment" strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature. The article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. An analysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federation corroborates the theory.

tuberculosis, DOTS, direct observation, patient adherence, Pakistan

Abstract:
No abstract available.

Abstract:
We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best. Red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat. First, the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape. Second, the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape. Even though the former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape, we show that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social optimum.

Red tape, corruption, three-tier hierarchy

Abstract:
We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best. Red tape partially solves the problem. While imposing a cost on the agent, red tape also produces information about the agent's type. Therefore the socially optimal level of red tape is not trivial. It is hard, however, to implement the social optimum if the bureaucrat in charge of red tape is corrupt. We consider two types of corruption. First, the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape. Second, the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape. The former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape, while the latter provides incentives for excessive red tape: the more red tape, the more likely the bureaucrat can get the bribes ex post. We show that the latter effect prevails, and the equilibrium level of red tape is always above the social optimum.

Red tape, corruption, three-tier hierarchy

Abstract:
In this Paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence from two independent surveys is consistent with the model's predictions.

Barter, debt overhang, demonetization, renegotiation

Abstract:
In this Paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence from two independent surveys is consistent with the model's predictions.

Barter, debt overhang, demonetization, renegotiation

Abstract:
In this Paper we study, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between barter and the indebtedness of Russian firms. We build a model in which a firm uses barter to protect its working capital against outside creditors even when barter involves high transaction costs. The main innovation of our work is to allow renegotiation between the firm and its creditors. If the creditors are rational, they often agree to postpone debt payments in order to avoid destroying the firm's working capital. It turns out, however, that even if the firm cannot ensure it will not divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater the debt overhang, the more likely the use of barter, and although the possibility of debt restructuring reduces barter, it does not eliminate it altogether. We also discuss the role of the government bond market and weak bankruptcy legislation. The firm-level evidence from two independent surveys is consistent with the model's predictions.

Barter, debt overhang, demonetization, renegotiation

Abstract:
How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to be well-informed himself, and to gather information he may use either a secret service or the media. The danger of using a secret service is that it can collude with bureaucrats; overcoming collusion is costly. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. We endogenize the ruler's choice in a dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies where the ruler is less interested in providing incentives to his subordinates. We show that this prediction is consistent with both cross-section and panel data.

media freedom, non-democratic politics, bureaucracy, resource curse

Abstract:
The Paper studies determinants of internal migration in Russia. Using panel data on gross region-to-region migration flows in 1992-99, we estimate the effect of economic, political and social factors. Although overall migration is rather low, it turns out that its intensity does depend on economic factors even controlling for fixed effects for each origin-destination pair. People move from poorer and job-scarce regions with worse public good provision to ones that are richer and more prosperous both in terms of employment prospects and public goods. Migration is, however, constrained by the lack of liquidity; for the poorest regions, an increase in income raises rather than decreases emigration. Our estimates imply that up to a third of Russian regions are locked in poverty traps.

Internal migration, liquidity constraints, gravity model, Russia's transition

Abstract:
The paper studies determinants of internal migration in Russia. Using panel data on gross region-to-region migration flows in 1990-99, we estimate the effect of economic, political and social factors. Although overall migration is rather low, it turns out that its intensity does depend on economic factors even controlling for fixed effects for each origin-destination pair. People move from poorer and job scarce regions with poor public good provision to richer and prospering ones both in terms of employment prospects and public goods. Migration is however constrained by the lack of liquidity: for poorest regions, an increase in income raises rather than decreases outmigration. Geography is also important: elasticity of migration with regard to distance is close to one.

internal migration, liquidity constraints, gravity model, Russia's transition

Abstract:
The paper studies the determinants of internal migration in Russia. Using panel data on gross region-to-region migration flows in 1992-99, we estimate the effect of economic, political and social factors. Although overall migration is rather low, it turns out that its intensity does depend on economic factors even controlling for fixed effects for each origin-destination pair. People move from poorer and job scarce regions with worse public good provision to those which are richer and prospering better both in terms of employment prospects and public goods. Migration is, however, constrained by the lack of liquidity; for the poorest regions, an increase in income raises rather than decreases outmigration. Our estimates imply that up to a third of Russian regions are locked in poverty traps.

Abstract:
Despite strong growth performance in transition economies in the last decade, residents of transition countries report abnormally low levels of life satisfaction. Using data from the World Values Survey and other sources, we study various explanations of this phenomenon. First, we document that the disparity in life satisfaction between residents of transition and non-transition countries is much larger among the elderly. Second, we find that deterioration in public goods provision, an increase in macroeconomic volatility, and a mismatch of human capital of residents educated before transition which disproportionately affected the aged population explain a great deal of the difference in life satisfaction between transition countries and other countries with similar income and other macroeconomic conditions. The rest of the gap is explained by the difference in the quality of the samples. As in other countries, life satisfaction in transition countries is strongly related to income; but, due to a higher non-response of high-income individuals in transition countries, the survey-data estimates of the recent increase in life satisfaction, driven by 10-year sustained economic growth in transition region, are biased downwards. The evidence suggests that if the region keeps growing at current rates, life satisfaction in transition countries will catch up with the "normal" level in the near future.

happiness, satisfaction, transition, unhappiness

Abstract:
In this paper we study nationalizations in the oil industry around the world in 1960-2002. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that governments are more likely to nationalize when oil prices are high and when political institutions are weak. We consider a simple dynamic model of the interaction between a government and a foreign oil company. The government cannot commit to abstain from expropriation and the company cannot commit to pay high taxes. Even though nationalization is inefficient it does occur in equilibrium when oil prices are high. The model's predictions are consistent with the panel analysis of a comprehensive dataset on nationalizations in the oil industry since 1960. Nationalization is more likely to happen when oil prices are high and the quality of institutions is low even when controlling for country fixed effects.

nationalization, oil industry, property rights

Abstract:
The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighbouring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.

Federalism, Inter-jurisdictional externalities, Inter-state trade barriers, Interest groups, Multinational firms

Abstract:
We develop a theory of control rights in the context of licensing interim innovative knowledge for further development, which is consistent with the inalienability of initial innovator's intellectual property rights. Control rights of a downstream development unit, a buyer of the interim innovation, arise from its ability to prevent the upstream research unit from forming financial coalitions at the ex interim stage of bargaining, over the amount and structure of licensing fees as well as the mode of licensing, based either on trade secrets or on patents. We model explicitly the equilibrium choice of the temporal structure of licensing fees, and show that the innovator's ex interim financial constraint is more likely to bind when the value of her innovation is low. By constraining the financial flexibility of the upstream unit vis-a-vis her choice over the mode of licensing of her interim knowledge, the controlling development unit is able to reduce the research unit's payoff selectively in such contingencies. This serves to incentivise the research unit to expend more effort ex ante, to generate more promising interim innovations. We further show that such interim-inefficient control rights can nevertheless be renegotiation-proof.

control rights, corporate venturing, patents, trade secrets

Abstract:
We propose and investigate a new channel through which the resource curse - a stylized fact that countries rich in natural resources grow slower - operates. Predatory governments are more likely to expropriate corporate profits in natural-resource industries when the price of resources is higher. Corporations whose profits are more dependent on the price of resources can mitigate the risk of expropriation by reducing corporate transparency. Lower transparency, in turn, leads to inefficient capital allocation and slower economic growth. Using a panel of 72 industries from 51 countries over 16 years, we demonstrate that the negative effect of expropriation risk on corporate transparency is stronger for industries that are especially vulnerable to expropriation, in particular, for industries whose profits are highly correlated with oil prices. Controlling for country, year, and industry fixed effects, we find that corporate transparency is lower in more oil price-dependent industries when the price of oil is high and property rights are poorly protected. Furthermore, corporate growth is hampered in oil price-sensitive industries because of less efficient capital allocation driven by adverse effects of lower transparency.

Autocracy, Expropriation, Industry Growth, Investment Efficiency, Oil Reserves, Property rights, Resource Curse, Transparency and Disclosure

Abstract:
Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian 'oligarchs' do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

Abstract:
Unprecendented growth of barter is a striking phenomenon of Russia's transition. The explanations of barter include tight monetary policy, tax evasion and poor financial intermediation. We show that the market power may also be important. We build a model of imperfect competition in which firms use barter for price discrimination. The model predicts a positive relationship between the concentration of market power and the share of barter in sales. We also show that barter disappears at a certain level of competition. The model has multiple stable equilibria which may explain persistence of barter. Using a unique dataset on barter transactions in Russia, we show that empirical evidence is consistent with the model's predictions.