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Abstract:
In this article we provide a comprehensive and original critique of the free speech theories of two of the most heralded scholars of all time, Alexander Meiklejohn and Robert Post, and in so doing employ their theories as a foil for the development of an entirely new theory of free expression, grounded in precepts of "adversary democracy." Both Post and Meiklejohn purport to ground their theories of free expression in democratic theory, but both misperceive the true normative and descriptive nature of American political theory, and in any event both fashion free speech theories that undermine even their own perceptions of democracy. While the two differ in important ways, they share a common theme: an appeal to notions of cooperative democracy and the common good. In this sense, both share the same flaw: the failure to recognize that the essence of democratic theory is recognition of the need to permit the peaceful resolution of adversarial interests grounded either in citizen self-interest or personal ideology.

The goal of free expression, then, should be to foster the resolution of these competing interests through citizens' strategic framing of arguments in an effort to convince others to share their interests. While our theory of expressive adversary democracy protects everything that both Meiklejohn and Post would protect, it goes further to also shield expression that fails to satisfy either the communitarian interests fostered by Meiklejohn or the collectivist interests fostered by Post.

Professor Post has expressed an interest in preparing a response to our article.

First Amendment, Democracy, Democratic Theory, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Expression, Constitutional Law, Public Law,

Abstract:
The Rules Enabling Act vests in the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules governing procedure in federal court litigation. The Act, moreover, prohibits the Court from promulgating rules affecting litigants' substantive rights. Courts and commentators have struggled for more than seven decades since the Act's passage to define the boundaries of what rules the Court can and cannot promulgate.

In this Article, we undertake to explain the lack of success in defining the contours of rulemaking under the Act and at the same time to glean from our analysis of the Act an important lesson in statutory interpretation. We offer two explanations, operating simultaneously, for why a definitive interpretation of the Act has eluded courts and scholars. First, and perhaps most importantly, the Act's sparse language is arguably susceptible to three alternative and textually plausible constructions. Second, previous constructions of the Act did not pay sufficient attention to statutory interpretation theories in applying one theory or another in interpreting the Act. We conclude that a proper understanding of the theory of statutory interpretation dictates adoption of only one of these constructions - what can be called the incidental effects approach. Under this interpretive model, identified most closely with the Supreme Court's often criticized decision in Burlington Northern, the Court is allowed to promulgate rules that do impact substantive rights, but do so only incidentally - in other words, when the primary goal of the rule is to regulate procedure.

We defend this interpretation of the Act by employing a theory of statutory interpretation that directs the interpreter to construe ambiguous text in light of objectively determined background purposes forming a foundation for a particular legislation. Drawing on the pioneering work of Professor Stephen Burbank, we recognize two purposes undergirding the passage of the Enabling Act. Our interpretation promotes both purposes, not elevates one at the expense of the other. In fact, this is where commentators (Professor Burbank among them) have gone astray in their suggested interpretations - they used statutory interpretation theories unmoored from the twin purposes of the Act.

In the end, the lesson for statutory interpretation theory largely parallels the lesson to be learned in construing the Rules Enabling Act. In both, when dealing with ambiguous legislation, it is common sense and an attempt to translate underlying purpose, objectively determined, into legal reality, rather than narrow, shortsighted adherence to textual literalism or legislative history, that more effectively further the goals of representative democracy.

Civil Procedure, Rules Enabling Act, Erie doctrine, Supreme Court, Statutory Interpretation, Procedural-Substantive Distinction, Federal Courts, Litigation

Abstract:
In this article, I seek to demonstrate that arguments made by scholars against First Amendment protection for commercial speech may be divided into three categories: (1) rationalist, (2) intuitionist, and (3) ideological. I argue that all three forms of opposition to commercial speech protection suffer, either directly or indirectly, from the same fundamental flaw: each constitutes or at the very least facilitates creation of a constitutionally destructive form of viewpoint discrimination. I show that all of the specific rationales for opposing First Amendment protection for commercial speech are fatally and illogically underinclusive: In each case the justification asserted to support reduced protection for commercial speech logically applies with equal force to one or more categories of fully protected non-commercial expression, yet those advocating reduced protection for commercial speech readily provide full protection to the categories of non-commercial expression that suffer from the very same defect. Thus, what superficially appears to constitute a plausible and principled rationale for reducing protection for commercial speech in reality is applied¿irrationally and unjustifiably¿to commercial but not to various forms of fully protected speech. Such irrational underinclusion represents a classic form of sub rosa viewpoint discrimination. In this case, the viewpoint being discriminated against, while not embodied directly in the commercial speech itself, is a belief in a capitalist system of which all commercial speech is a part. Ironically, then, speech which some say should be denied protection because it fails to deal with the political process, in reality is likely excluded from the First Amendment's scope by many for what amount to foundational ideological concerns.

first amendment, commercial speech, speech, viewpoint discrimination, expression

Abstract:
Up to now, the scholarly debate over the modern class action has focused largely on the comparative social and economic costs and benefits associated with the various possible roles that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may play. Use of such a truncated approach has perpetuated among many scholars the view of the class action as a legal device capable of serving as a free roaming device designed to implement whatever result those in charge consider to be just. In this Article, we explore the class action from the perspective of normative political theory, considering its implications for the theories of liberalism, utilitarianism, communitarianism, and civic republicanism. Whatever position one ultimately takes on the modern class action, we believe that one must first take into account the manner in which the various approaches necessarily implicate one or another controversial political theory. We find that the modern class action inherently gives rise to a collectivist-individualist tension that potentially leads to troubling results for the normative foundations of liberal democratic theory. We conclude that, as a matter of normative political theory, the class action should be employed¿absent substantive legislative revision to the contrary - when and only when it facilitates the individual claim holder's ability to vindicate his or her substantive rights.

Abstract:
Since the mid 1970s, federal courts have taken the doctrine of cy pres relief from the venerable law of trusts and adapted it for use in the modern class action proceeding. In its original context, cy pres was utilized as a means of judicially designating a charitable recipient when, for whatever reason, it was no longer possible to fulfill the original goal of the maker of the trust. The purpose of cy pres was to provide “the next best relief” by finding a recipient who would resemble the original donor’s recipient as much as possible. In the context of class actions, courts have utilized the doctrine as a means of disposing of unclaimed class wide relief. Where a substantial portion of the fund is likely to go unclaimed by absent class members, courts either order or authorize the payment of all or part of the remaining funds to a charitable interest that has some connection - however loose - to the subject matter of the suit. In recent years, use of cy pres in federal class actions has increased dramatically.

Use of cy pres in class actions has largely escaped either judicial or scholarly scrutiny or critique. This is unfortunate, since the doctrine’s use distorts the class action in a manner that undermines the inherently adversary nature of the federal adjudicatory process and the inherently compensatory nature of the underlying substantive law being enforced in the class proceeding. At the same time, resort to cy pres threatens the due process rights of both defendants and absent class members. It achieves these pathological ends by creating an illusion of victim compensation through adversary adjudication when in reality it transforms the underlying law into the forced payment of the equivalent of a civil fine to an entity that has no legitimate interest in the proceeding and has suffered no injury at the hands of the defendants.

In this article, we initially explore the history and current use of cy pres relief in the modern class action. We then explain - for the first time ever in legal scholarship - why the doctrine’s use so seriously undermines norms that are central both to our constitutional system and to American democracy. We then conduct a detailed empirical examination of the available data concerning the use of cy pres relief in class actions. Our empirical analysis underscores our normative critique of the doctrine by highlighting both its rapid expansion and the manner in which it has been abused.

cy pres, class actions, due process, separation of powers, case-or-controversy, Article III, constitutional law, civil procedure, remedies