Marina Halac

Columbia University

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

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174

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 16,553

in Total Papers Citations

73

CROSSREF CITATIONS

11

Scholarly Papers (8)

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1.

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

Downloads 66 (617,725)
Citation 5

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-34
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 03 Apr 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 45 (755,101)

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Policy Rules, Private Information, Delegation, Mechanism Design

Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

NBER Working Paper No. w24496
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 12 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 21 (961,601)
Citation 1

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Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12872
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 23 Apr 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
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delegation, mechanism design, Policy Rules, private information

2.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Self-Enforcement

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Citation 7

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Self-Enforcement

NBER Working Paper No. w23919
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 11 May 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 34 (840,276)
Citation 4

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Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Self-Enforcement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12571
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
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deficit bias, Fiscal policy, private information, Self-Enforcing Rules

3.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement

Columbia Business School Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 19 Jan 2019
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 32 (833,272)

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Private Information, Fiscal Policy, Deficit Bias, Enforcement Constraints

4.

Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification

Downloads 20 (941,312)
Citation 12

Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification

NBER Working Paper No. w22936
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 04 Mar 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 20 (972,168)
Citation 12

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Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12572
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
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costly verification, escape clause, optimal delegation

5.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy

NBER Working Paper No. w21492
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 25 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 24 Mar 2023
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
Downloads 20 (941,312)
Citation 7

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6.

Experimenting with Career Concerns

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12569
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer and Ilan Kremer
Columbia University and University of WarwickHebrew University of Jerusalem
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bad loans, banks, career concerns, Dynamic games, private learning, strategic experimentation

7.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14218
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 14 Jan 2020
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
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Citation 7
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deficit bias, Enforcement Constraints, Fiscal policy, private information

8.

Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12570
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 08 Jan 2018
Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
Columbia University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance
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Asymmetric and Private Information, institutions, Macroeconomic Policy, political economy, Structure of Government