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Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet's
Scholarly Papers
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Claude d'Aspremont
Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira
National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA) Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet
National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
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28 Mar 07
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14 May 08
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Abstract:
We develop an overlapping generations model, where firms (as consumers) have a two-period life, investing in R&D during the first period and competing in the product market in the second period. The number of firms is endogenously determined and the set of successful firms by a Bernoullian random process. We show the possibility of an inverted-U relationship between innovation and product market competition for an individual industry, based on the possibility for non-successful firms to remain productive. When the relative cost advantage of successful firms is large (large innovation step or small spillovers) this possibility results from the probabilistic nature of the model.
competitive toughness, R&D incentives, strategic investment
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2.
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Claude d'Aspremont
Catholic University of Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Sudipto Bhattacharya
London School of Economics Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet
National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
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09 Aug 00
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14 May 08
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Abstract:
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed, by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.
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