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Abstract:
A series of United States Supreme Court decisions establishes that the First Amendment provides a qualified right to speak and publish anonymously, or under a pseudonym. But the Court has never clearly defined the scope of this right. As a result, lower courts have been left with little guidance when it comes to dealing both with the Internet-fueled growth of torts and crimes committed by anonymous speakers, and with the increasing number of lawsuits aimed at silencing legitimate anonymous speech. In this Article, we provide both positive and normative foundations for a comprehensive approach to anonymous speech. We first draw upon intellectual property theory, particularly as it relates to trademarks and copyright, to develop a positive analysis of the private and social costs and benefits of anonymous speech. Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence then supplies the missing normative component by providing two crucial presumptions that suggest how to weigh the relevant costs and benefits. The first is the anti-paternalism presumption. This assumes that audiences are capable of responding to anonymous speech in much the same way they respond to generic, nontrademarked products - by recognizing that the product, in this case speech, lacks an important quality indicator and should be evaluated accordingly. In this manner, audiences can minimize the potential social harm of many forms of anonymous speech. The second presumption, which we refer to as "more is better," favors more speech over less, and thus places considerable weight on anonymity as a tool for encouraging otherwise reluctant speakers to come forward - even at the risk of simultaneously encouraging more potentially harmful speech. These twin presumptions form the basis for the detailed guidance we supply for legislatures contemplating regulation of anonymous speech, and for courts seeking to balance the rights of anonymous speakers with other important interests.

anonymous, first amendment, trademarks

Abstract:
Assumptions about audiences shape the outcomes of First Amendment cases. Yet the Supreme Court rarely specifies what its assumptions about audiences are, much less attempts to justify them. Drawing on literary theory, this Article identifies and defends two critical assumptions that emerge from First Amendment cases involving so-called "core" speech. The first is that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech. The second is that more speech is generally preferable to less. These assumptions, which I refer to collectively as the rational audience model, lie at the heart of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, which has long been a target of criticism amongst First Amendment scholars. Now, however, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics provide empirical evidence that the assumptions of the rational audience model are demonstrably false in some commonplace settings. This Article nonetheless contends that behavioral economics has not yet made the case for jettisoning the rational audience model in the realm of core speech. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a legal test that looks at the "actual effects" of speech would be cumbersome and expensive to apply, and would therefore chill speech. But there are even more compelling reasons to adhere to a test focused on the "reasonable interpretation" of core speech. Because speech and expression are closely linked to individual autonomy, government constriction of core speech-particularly political speech-undermines the foundation of a self-governing democracy. Moreover, the rational audience model prevents public discourse from being reduced to the level of the least educated or least sophisticated audience member. The model calls on citizens to raise their cognitive capacities to meet the demands of public discourse, and it serves as a check on the government's increasingly powerful ability to drown out other speakers in that discourse. This Article concludes that the rational audience model represents a flawed but worthy ideal.

First Amendment, core speech, rational audience model, marketplace of ideas

Abstract:
Florida has been one of the most aggressive states in regulating attorney advertising. The Florida Supreme Court recently adopted new and more stringent rules regulating broadcast advertising by attorneys, and the court appears poised to adopt new and more stringent rules governing Internet advertising by attorneys. As this Article details, the problem is that Florida's new and proposed rules violate both the First Amendment and sound public policy principles. This Article provides guidance to states contemplating further regulation of attorney advertising, and it indirectly critiques current commercial speech doctrine.

attorney advertising, First Amendment, commercial speech, attorney regulation, Internet advertising, broadcast advertising, Internet regulation, attorney blogs, attorney websites

Abstract:
This article deals with defamation actions brought against John Doe defendants for anonymous speech on the Internet. These actions, sometimes denoted as cyberslapps, threaten to chill the vitality of Internet discourse. This Article articulates a theory that justifies protecting John Doe from the silencing effect of unfounded defamation actions and suggests steps that courts should take to adapt the First Amendment privilege for opinion to the unique context of cyberspace.

Internet, defamation, first amendment, opinion, hyperbole, satire, john doe, anonymous speech

Abstract:
This Article examines the evolution of the law governing libel suits against anonymous “John Doe” defendants based on Internet speech. Between 1999 and 2009, courts crafted new First Amendment doctrines to protect Internet speakers from having their anonymity automatically stripped away upon the filing of a libel action. Courts also adapted existing First Amendment protections for hyperbole, satire and other non-factual speech to protect the distinctive discourse of Internet message boards. Despite these positive developments, the current state of the law is unsatisfactory. Because the scope of protection for anonymous Internet speech varies greatly by jurisdiction, resourceful plaintiffs can make strategic use of libel law to silence their critics. Meanwhile, plaintiffs who are truly harmed by cybersmears will find little effective recourse in libel law. Though disheartening, the current state of the law may be a testament to the difficulty of balancing speech and reputation in the Internet age.

First Amendment, internet, defamation, John Doe, libel, cyberslapp, cybersmear, reputation, cyberspace

Abstract:
Why does the First Amendment accord a measure of protection to lies? Using Holocaust denial as an example of verifiably false speech, this essay poses the question of whether such speech poses a more serious danger than First Amendment jurisprudence typically has acknowledged. The essay also probes the potential unintended consequences of government attempts to punish lies.

First Amendment, Holocaust denial, lies, opinion, verfiability, falsity

Abstract:
The media's use of intrusive newsgathering techniques poses an increasing threat to individual privacy. Courts currently resolve the overwhelming majority of conflicts in favor of the media. This is not because the First Amendment bars the imposition of tort liability on the media for its newsgathering practices. It does not. Rather, tort law has failed to seize the opportunity to create meaninful privacy protection. After surveying the economic, philosophical, and practical obstacles to reform, this Article proposes to rejuvenate the tort of intrusion to tip the balance between privacy and the press back in privacy's direction. Working within the framework of traditional tort law, this Article advocates reform of intrusion's doctrinal flaws followed by the adoption of a newsgatherer's privilege to protect media intrusions that serve a significant public interest.

tort, privacy, intrusion, media, press, First Amendment, newsgathering, newsgatherer