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Abstract:
We document that investment in private equity is extremely concentrated. Yet despite the very poor diversification of entrepreneurs' portfolios, we find that the returns to private equity are surprisingly low. Given the large premium required by investors in public equity, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a far worse risk-return tradeoff. We examine various explanations and conclude that private nonpecuniary benefits of control must be large and/or entrepreneurs must greatly overestimate their probability of success in order to explain the observed concentration of wealth in private equity.

Abstract:
The paper discusses the current state of the behavioral finance literature. I argue that more direct evidence on investors' actions and expectations would make existing theories more convincing to outsiders and would help sort among behavioral theories for a given asset pricing phenomenon. Furthermore, evidence on the dependence of a given bias on investor wealth/sophistication would be useful for determining if the bias could be due to (fixed) information or transactions costs or is likely to require a behavioral explanation, and for determining which biases are likely to be most important for asset prices.

I analyze a novel data set on investor expectations and actions obtained from UBS PaineWebber/Gallup. The data suggest that, even for high wealth investors, expected returns were high at the peak of the market, many investors thought the market was overvalued but would not correct quickly, and investors' beliefs depend strongly on their own investment experience. I then review evidence on the dependence of a series of "irrational" investor behaviors on investor wealth and conclude that many such behaviors diminish substantially with wealth. As an example of the cost needed to explain a particular type of "irrational" behavior, I consider the cost needed to rationalize why many households do not invest in the stock market.

Behavioral finance, expectations

Abstract:
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that the OTC firms most affected by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into force. These returns are adjusted for the standard four factors and are relative to NYSE/AMEX firms, matched on size and book-to-market equity, that were unaffected by the legislation. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders' gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to focus more narrowly on maximizing shareholder value.

disclosure, SEC, securities market regulation

Abstract:
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that OTC firms most impacted by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went it went into force, relative to unaffected listed firms and after adjustment for the standard four-factor model. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders' gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to more narrowly focus on the maximization of shareholder value.

Abstract:
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that OTC firms most impacted by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went it went into force, relative to unaffected listed firms and after adjustment for the standard four-factor model. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders' gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to more narrowly focus on the maximization of shareholder value.

disclosure, SEC, securities market regulation

Abstract:
We augment the standard principal-agent model to accommodate an entrepreneurial setting, where effort, ownership, and firm size are determined endogenously. We test the model's predictions (some novel) using new data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth. Accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental variables, we find entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth, decrease with firm risk, and decrease with firm size; effort increases with ownership and size; and both ownership and effort increase firm performance. The magnitutde of the effects in the cross-section of firms suggests that agency theory is important for explaining the large average ownership shares of entrepreneurs.

Abstract:
We evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders in order to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Such firms appear to be characterized by agency problems, rather than motivated by concerns over compliance costs. Cumulative stock returns during the five and a half months leading up to SOX passage were approximately 7 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms, consistent with an expectation that SOX would reduce agency problems. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period suggests that investors’ positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions were warranted.

Abstract:
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behaviour of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX.

Corporate Governance, Sarbanes Oxley Act

Abstract:
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms.

Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Lobbying, Event Study

Abstract:
We propose and test a theory of learning and informational hold-up in the venture capital market. The model predicts that higher returns on the current fund increase the probability that a VC will raise a follow-on fund, the size of the follow-on fund, and the performance fee investors are charged in the follow-on fund. If learning is asymmetric, such that incumbent investors learn more about fund manager skill than potential new investors, the model also predicts persistence in returns, poor performance among first-time funds, persistence in investors from fund to fund, and over-subscription in follow-on funds raised by successful fund managers. Our empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions. The model provides a unified framework for understanding a series of empirical facts about the venture capital industry.

Venture Capital, Performance Persistence, Learning, Hold-up

Abstract:
We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting micro-level household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or non-stockholder consumption risk, and provides more plausible economic magnitudes. We find that risk aversion estimates around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French size and value portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.

Abstract:
Investment in private equity is extremelyconcentrated.Even though private equity returns are generally no higherthan the market return on all publicly traded equity, entrepreneurialhouseholds invest more than 70 percent of their private holdings in a singleprivate company in which they have an active managementinterest.Considering that the returns to private equity investment aretoo low given their risk, it is hard to understand why households continue tohold 75 percent of all private equity. Data from the 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, theFlow of Funds Accounts (1952-1999), and the National Income and ProductAccounts (1952-1999) suggest that the diversified portfolio of public equityoffers a far more attractive risk-return tradeoff than that achieved by mostentrepreneurs.There are several possible explanations for entrepreneurs'insistence upon concentrating their investments in private equity.Theseinclude high entrepreneur risk tolerance, large additional pecuniary benefits,non-pecuniary benefits (such as the autonomy of self-employment), a preferencefor skewness, and misperceived risk.(SAA)

Survey of Consumer Finances, Flow of Funds Accounts, National Income & Product Accounts (U.S. Dept of Commerce), Equity financing, Risk orientation, Return on investment, Venture capital

Abstract:
We document the return to investing in U.S. nonpublicly traded equity. Entrepreneurial investment is extremely concentrated, yet despite its poor diversification, we find that the returns to private equity are no higher than the returns to public equity. Given the large public equity premium, it is puzzling why households willingly invest substantial amounts in a single privately held firm with a seemingly far worse risk-return tradeoff. We briefly discuss how large nonpecuniary benefits, a preference for skewness, or overestimates of the probability of survival could potentially explain investment in private equity despite these findings.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We analyzed the last major imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements in U.S. equity markets. The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended several disclosure requirements to large firms traded over-the-counter that had applied to listed firms since 1934. We presented four pieces of evidence that investors valued the new disclosure requirements. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure laws can cause managers to focus more narrowly on the maximization of shareholder value.

Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer, Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, mandatory disclosure requirements, equity markets, 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, trade, investing, mandatory disclosure laws, maximization of shareholder value, diversion, equity markets

Abstract:
The paper uses micro data on income and asset holdings from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and other US household level data sets to analyze reasons for nonparticipation in the stock market and for heterogeneity in portfolio choice within the set of stock market participants. I find evidence of a positive effect of mean nonfinancial income on the probability of stock market participation and on the proportion of wealth invested in stocks conditional on being a participant. The volatility of nonfinancial income is found to have a negative impact on these two quantities. However, there is no evidence of an effect of the correlation of nonfinancial income with the stock market return on portfolio choice. Three different costs of stock market participation are considered, a fixed transactions cost, a proportional transactions cost, and a per period participation cost. I find evidence of structural state dependence in the stock market participation decision supporting the importance of fixed transactions costs. This is supported by findings of higher trading frequencies for high wealth households. Based on a simple model of the benefits of stock market participation I estimate that a per period stock market participation cost of just 50 dollars is sufficient to explain the choices of half of stock market nonparticipants.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
We show that the US Debt/GDP ratio is negatively correlated with the spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury bond yields. The result holds even when controlling for the default risk on corporate bonds. We argue that the corporate bond spread reflects a convenience yield that investors attribute to Treasury debt. Changes in the supply of Treasury debt trace out the demand for convenience by investors. We show that the aggregate demand curve for the convenience provided by Treasury debt is downward sloping and provide estimates of the elasticity of demand. We analyze disaggregated data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve and show that individual groups of Treasury holders also have downward sloping demand curves. Even groups with the most elastic demand curves have demand curves that are far from flat. The results have bearing for important questions in finance and macroeconomics. We discuss implications for the behavior of corporate bond spreads, interest rate swap spreads, the riskless interest rate, and the value of aggregate liquidity. We also discuss the implications of our results for the financing of the US deficit, Ricardian equivalence, and the effects of foreign central bank demand on Treasury yields.

Abstract:
Why don't successful venture capitalists eliminate excess demand for their follow-on funds by aggressively raising their fees? We propose and test a theory of learning that leads to informational hold-up in the VC market. Investors in a fund learn whether the VC has skill or was lucky, whereas potential outside investors only observe returns. This gives the VC's current investors hold-up power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, he cannot persuade anyone else to fund him, since outside investors would interpret the lack of backing as a sign that his skill is low. This hold-up power diminishes the VC's ability to increase fees in line with performance. The model provides a rationale for the persistence in after-fee returns documented by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and predicts low expected returns among first-time funds, persistence in investors from fund to fund, and over-subscription in follow-on funds raised by successful VCs. Our empirical evidence from a large sample of U.S. VC funds raised between 1980 and 2006 is consistent with these predictions.

Abstract:
The consumption of high-consumption households is more exposed to fluctuations in aggregate consumption and income than that of low-consumption households in the Consumer Expenditure (CEX) Survey. The exposure to aggregate consumption growth of households in the top 10 percent of the consumption distribution in the CEX is about five times that of households in the bottom 80 percent. Given real aggregate per capita consumption growth about 3 percentage points less than its historical mean during the past year, these figures predict that the ratio of consumption of the top 10 percent to the bottom 80 percent has fallen by about 15 percentage points (relative to trend). Using income data from Piketty and Saez (2003), we show that the income (especially the wage income) of rich households is more exposed to aggregate fluctuations, so their higher income exposure is a likely contributor to their higher consumption exposure. Finally, we find a striking change in the exposure of the incomes of high-income households: prior to the early 1980's, the incomes of high-income households were not more exposed to aggregate fluctuations. Thus, while high-income households currently bear an inordinately large share of aggregate fluctuations, this is a recent occurrence.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
The paper presents empirical evidence based on the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey that accounting for limited asset market participation is important for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Differences in estimates of the EIS between asset holders and non-asset holders are large and statistically significant. This is the case whether estimating the EIS on the basis of the Euler equation for stock index returns or the Euler equation for Treasury bills, in each case distinguishing between asset holders and non-asset holders as best as possible. Estimates of the EIS are around 0.3-0.4 for stockholders and around 0.8-1 for bondholders and are larger for households with larger asset holdings within these two groups.

Abstract:
The paper presents empirical evidence based on the US Consumer Expenditure Survey that accounting for limited asset market participation is important for estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Differences in estimates of the EIS between assetholders and non-assetholders are large and statistically significant. This is the case whether estimating the EIS based on the Euler equation for stock index returns or the Euler equation for T-bills, in each case distinguishing between assetholders and non-assetholders as best possible. Estimates of the EIS are around 0.3-0.4 for stockholders and around 0.8-1 for bondholders, and are larger for households with larger asset holdings within these two groups.

Abstract:
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors' positive expectations with regards to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX.

Abstract:
A principal agent model in an entrepreneurial settingis developed and tested using Federal Reserve Board data on entrepreneurialeffort and wealth in privately held firms. The implications of agency theoryare tested based on three questions: (1) What determines the entrepreneur'sequity share? (2) How does the entrepreneur respond to the incentives providedby the contract?(3) How is firm performance related to the response ofthe entrepreneur? The study develops a model of optimal contracting applied to anentrepreneurial setting, describes the data on private firms and entrepreneurs(from the Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business Finances,Survey of Small Business Finances, and Survey of Consumer Finances), andpresents summary statistics.The study then presents empirical resultsfrom the three-stage analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurial ownershipshare, the response to the contract by way of effort, and the effect of theeffort on firm performance. Using instrumental variables techniques, it was found that entrepreneurialownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk;effort increases with ownership; and effort increases firmperformance.The extensive effects in the sample of firms studied suggestthat agency costs may assist in understanding why entrepreneurs concentratelarge portions of their wealth in firm equity. (JSD)

Risks, Survey of Small Business Finances (Federal Reserve Board), Principal agent model, Survey of Consumer Finances, National Survey of Small Business Finances (Federal Reserve Board), Firm performance, Wealth, Agency theory, Private firms, Firm ownership, Equity, Contracts & agreements, Incentives