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Abstract:
This paper examines the relation between Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs') incentive levels and their firms' risk characteristics. I show theoretically that, when CEOs cannot trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with firm's nonsystematic risk but is ambiguously affected by firm's systematic risk; when CEOs can trade the market portfolio, optimal incentive level decreases with nonsystematic risk but is unaffected by systematic risk. Empirically I find support for these predictions. Furthermore, I find that incentives for CEOs likely facing binding short-selling constraints decrease with systematic as well as nonsystematic risk, as predicted by theory. Thus, compensation practice is consistent with predictions of theory.

Executive Compensation, Diversification, Firm-Specific Risk, Incentives, Pay-Performance Sensitivities

Abstract:
This paper studies how firms tie CEO compensation to firms' stock market performance. I demonstrate that in theory and in practice there is a tradeoff between giving CEOs incentives and forcing them to hold an un-diversified position in the firm. Unlike the results of the existing literature, market risk is not necessarily a cost of providing incentives. The cost of giving incentives is the potential loss of diversification for the CEO. As a result, CEO incentive decreases with firm-specific risk, but may not decrease with market risk. This paper also incorporates the recent critique by Prendergast (2000), which argues that the relation between risk and incentive level is unreliably estimated when we fail to consider the effect of risk on the benefit of giving incentives. I study both sides of the incentive-diversification tradeoff simultaneously. I am able to show that after controlling for the other side of the tradeoff, higher incentive is observed when CEOs' efforts have higher productivity, or when firm has lower firm-specific risk level.

Executive Compensation, Diversification, Firm-Specific Risk, Incentives, Pay-performance sensitivities

Abstract:
This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of U.S. firms as measured by beta from the Capital Asset Pricing Model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet, and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation further clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment will typically bias upwards estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known U.S. companies. This bias can result in positive net-present-value projects being rejected.

Abstract:
This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.

Defined Benefit Pension Plan, Market Efficiency, Cost of Capital, Capital Budgeting

Abstract:
Morck, Yeung and Yu show that R2 is higher in countries with less developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. We show how control rights and information affect the division of risk bearing between managers and investors. Lack of transparency increases R2 by shifting firm-specific risk to managers. Opaque stocks with high R2s are also more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Using stock returns from 40 stock markets from 1990 to 2001, we find strong positive relations between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. These measures also explain the frequency of crashes.

corporate control, international financial markets, firm-specific risks, information and market efficiency, crashes

Abstract:
Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY, 2000) show that R2 and other measures of stock market synchronicity are higher in countries with less developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. MYY and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) also find a secular decline in R2 in the United States over the last century. We develop a model that explains these results and generates additional testable hypotheses. The model shows how control rights and information affect the division of risk-bearing between inside managers and outside investors. Insiders capture part of the firm's operating cash flows. The limits to capture are based on outside investors' perception of the value of the firm. The firm is not completely transparent, however. Lack of transparency shifts firm-specific risk to insiders and reduces the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside investors. Our model also predicts that 'opaque' stocks are more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Crashes occur when insiders have to absorb too much firm-specific bad news and decide to 'give up'. We test these predictions using stock returns from all major stock markets from 1990 to 2001. We find strong positive relationships between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. These measures also explain the frequency of large negative returns.

Abstract:
Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY, 2000) show that R2 and other measures of stock market synchronicity are higher in countries with less developed financial systems and poorer corporate governance. MYY and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) also find a secular decline in R2 in the United States over the last century. We develop a model that explains these results and generates additional testable hypotheses.

The model shows how control rights and information affect the division of risk-bearing between inside managers and outside investors. Insiders capture part of the firm's operating cash flows. The limits to capture are based on outside investors' perception of the value of the firm. The firm is not completely transparent, however. Lack of transparency shifts firm-specific risk to insiders and reduces the amount of firm-specific risk absorbed by outside investors. Our model also predicts that opaque stocks are more likely to crash, that is, to deliver large negative returns. Crashes occur when insiders have to absorb too much firm-specific bad news and decide to give up.

We test these predictions using stock returns from all major stock markets from 1990 to 2001. We find strong positive relationships between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. These measures also explain the frequency of large negative returns.

Corporate control, international financial markets, firm-specific risks, information and market efficiency, crashes

Abstract:
The concern that out-of-the-money stock options are not an effective way to motivate managers has led boards of directors to consider measures such as lowering the exercise price of underwater options, or issuing new option grants, to restore the incentive managers have to increase shareholder value. This paper explores whether such measures are needed: do out-of-the-money options lose their power to align incentives? We address this question by estimating how the incentive-alignment power of options changed over the course of the year 2000, a year that for many firms marked the derailment of the long-running bull stock market. Examining the sensitivity in the value of the manager's stock option to changes in the firm's stock price (one metric for incentive-alignment power), we find that in general the ability of options to align incentives remained remarkably intact. This resilience in incentive-alignment power stems from the long maturity of executive stock options, the relatively high stock price volatility of firms that experienced stock price declines, and to a lesser extent, the increase in volatility levels that accompanied weakening stock prices. We test the robustness of these results to the metric of incentive-alignment power, replacing market values with the value that managers place on their stock and option holdings, adjusting for managers' inability to fully diversify their portfolios. We also test how sensitive our results are to volatility assumptions. We conclude that even a steep decline in stock price can leave incentive levels intact, so restoring incentive-alignment is seldom a good justification for resetting the stock price or issuing new option grants. Before rejecting such measures, however, boards must examine whether the ability of stock and option holdings to retain key managerial talent deteriorated as the stock price declined, for our findings suggest that in selected firms or industries, the value of those holdings declined substantially.

Executive compensation, Stock options, Incentives, Underwater options

Abstract:
Capital gains tax can impose a potentially large cost on investors selling stocks. This cost can sometimes be an order of magnitude larger than conventional transaction costs. This paper addresses the question of whether capital gains tax serves as an impediment to selling and if so, to what degree this delayed selling by investors subsequently affects stock prices. Using a database of large U.S. institutions' stock holdings with data on institutions' client profiles, two main results are obtained. First, selling decisions by institutions serving tax-sensitive clients are shown to be sensitive to their cumulative capital gains, a pattern not observed for institutions with predominantly tax-exempt clients. In particular, both the likelihood and magnitude of selling by institutions that serve tax-sensitive clients are negatively related to cumulative capital gains. Second, tax-related underselling appears to significantly impact stock prices during large earnings announcements. Specifically, following a large quarterly earnings surprise, tax-sensitive investors sell less aggressively a stock that has large capital gains; thus for a stock held primarily by tax-sensitive investors, the corresponding price reaction is less negative (or more positive) if it has accumulated large capital gains. Further analysis shows that the price reaction pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly.

Capital gain tax, price pressure, institutional investor, earnings announcement, limits to arbitrage

Abstract:
Capital gains tax can impose potentially large cost on investors selling stocks. This cost can sometimes be an order of magnitude larger than conventional transaction costs. This paper addresses the question of whether capital gains taxes serve as an impediment to selling and if so, to what degree this delayed selling by investors correspondingly affects stock prices. Using a database of large U.S. institutions' stock holdings with data on institutions' client profiles, two main results are obtained. First, selling decisions by institutions serving tax-sensitive clients are shown to be sensitive to their cumulative capital gains, which is not the case for institutions with predominantly tax-exempt clients. In particular, both the likelihood and magnitude of selling by institutions that serve taxsensitive clients are negatively related to the cumulative capital gains. Second, tax-related underselling appears to significantly impact stock prices during negative earnings announcements, for stocks held by a large number of tax-sensitive investors. Specifically, following a negative quarterly earnings surprise, tax-sensitive investors sell less aggressively a stock that has large capital gains; thus for a stock held primarily by taxsensitive investors, the corresponding price reaction is less negative if it has accumulated large capital gains. Further analysis shows that the price reaction pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly.

Capital gain tax, price pressure, institutional investor, earnings announcement, limits to arbitrage

Abstract:
We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios typically proceed to sell off inherited momentum losers. They sell losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior persists even when managers take over well-performing funds and funds with positive fund flows where it is unlikely that they are expected to change fund strategy or sell holdings to meet redemption demand. We conjecture that continuing fund managers tend to hold on to losers because of their inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance. Furthermore, we present evidence that the sell-off creates price pressure in the market by showing that the losers inherited in high quantities by new managers experience negative abnormal returns in up to two weeks following the completion of managerial change.

Sunk-Cost Fallacy, Price Pressure, Managerial Turnover

Abstract:
We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios typically proceed to sell off inherited momentum losers. They sell losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior persists even when managers take over well-performing funds and funds with positive fund flows where it is unlikely that they are expected to change fund strategy or sell holdings to meet redemption demand. We conjecture that continuing fund managers tend to hold on to losers because of their inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance. Furthermore, we present evidence that the sell-off creates price pressure in the market by showing that the losers inherited in high quantities by new managers experience negative abnormal returns in up to two weeks following the completion of managerial change.

Sunk-Cost Fallacy, Price Pressure, Managerial Turnover

Abstract:
Using a comprehensive sample of all FDI firms in China, we explore the question whether ethnicity enhances operating performance. While there has been a sizable theoretical literature studying ethnicity and foreign investments, the prediction of the impact of ethnicity on firm profitability is far from clear. We demonstrate empirically that ethnic firms do not command an operational advantage over non-ethnic firms in the overall sample. Further tests suggest that while ethnic firms command an operational advantage over nonethnic firms initially, such advantage declines over time. We then explore what might have caused the decline of the ethnic advantage, and our results suggest that lack of investment in intangible and human capital by ethnic firms is driving the pattern we observe. Overall, our results suggest that ethnicity does not pay or that ethnicity does not confer a permanent operating advantage on a firm.

China, FDI, ethnicity

Abstract:
We document frequent and large selling of equity by CEOs. Such selling is designed not simply to offset the current year grant of options and stock. We find that the tax burden associated with the sale and (various measures of CEO) overconfidence both decrease CEOs' propensity to sell their vested equity. However, the effect of taxes on a CEO's decision to sell equity is far more pronounced than overconfidence. We also find that taxable institutional investors and CEOs both respond to taxes, although the CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Other determinants affect the selling decisions largely as predicted in the existing literature.

Executive compensation, taxation, overconfidence, behavioral finance, institutional investors

Abstract:
We examine how personal taxes affect CEOs' decision to sell their vested equity and compare it against diversification, managerial overconfidence and other determinants of CEOs' sale of equity. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, we find that the tax burden associated with the sale deters CEOs from selling their equity. The effect of taxes remains significant even after controlling for other determinants of CEOs' sale of equity. We also find that taxable institutional investors and CEOs both respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although the CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Other determinants affect CEOs' selling decisions largely as predicted in the existing literature.

Executive Compensation, Taxation, Overconfidence, Behavioral Finance, Institutional investors

Abstract:
This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that dividend-averse institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relationship between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy could reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating to low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Instrumental variables analysis indicates that plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax code indicate that as the tax cost of paying dividends changes, managers alter their dividend policy to serve their institutional shareholders.

Abstract:
Weijian Shan, Managing Partner of Newbridge Capital, faces a tough call in regard to his firm's investment in Shenzhen Development Bank, China's fifteenth largest commercial bank listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Due to the aggressive lobby of the existing management at the bank, the Shenzhen government didn't receive central government's support on Newbridge's investment, and had to back out of the deal with Newbridge. Weijian Shan has to make a choice between two alternatives: 1) Give up pursuing the deal given huge political risk out of his control; 2) Work out an action plan and re-negotiate the deal.

Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Capital costs, Financial instruments, Financial strategy, International finance, Base-of-the-pyramid markets, Emerging markets, Expansion, Assembly lines, Manufacturing.

A well-performing Chinese manufacturer faces major impediments raising funding to grow. Highlights various imperfections that shape the financing decision.

Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Antitrust laws, Consolidations, Emerging markets, Mergers & Acquisitions, Regulated industries, Valuation, Venture capital.

Examines an acquisition in the highly competitive new media advertising industry in China in late 2005. The transaction leads to eventual consolidation of the industry and a positive stock market reaction. Discusses valuation in the context of an M&A transaction in an emerging economy and the role of private equity and venture capital in the development and the eventual consolidation of the new media advertising industry. Provides a context in which to discuss antitrust regulation, or lack thereof, on an industrial organization in China.

Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Antitrust laws, Consolidations, Emerging markets, Mergers & Acquisitions, Regulated industries, Valuation, Venture capital.

No abstract available.