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Abstract: Using a unique data set based on factory audits of working conditions in over 800 of Nike's suppliers in 51 countries, this paper seeks to explore whether or not monitoring for compliance with corporate codes of conduct - currently the principal way both global corporations and labor rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address poor working conditions in global supply chain factories - actually lead to remediation in terms of improved working conditions and enforced labor rights. The evidence presented suggests that notwithstanding the significant efforts and investments by Nike and its staff to improve working conditions among its suppliers, monitoring alone appears to produce only limited results. Instead, our research indicates that when monitoring efforts are combined with other interventions focused on tackling some of the root causes of poor working conditions - by improving the ability of suppliers to better schedule their work and improve their quality and efficiency - working conditions appear to significantly improve. This suggests that the current (highly polarized) debates over monitoring and labor standards need to be recast and new, more systemic approaches towards tackling these problems need to be pursued.
labor standards, monitoring, globalization
Abstract: This paper presents a matched pair case study of two factories supplying Nike, the world's largest athletic footwear and apparel company. These two factories have many similarities - both are in Mexico, both are in the apparel industry, both produce more or less the same products for Nike (and other brands) and both are subject to the same code of conduct. On the surface, both factories appear to have similar employment (i.e., recruitment, training, remuneration) practices and they receive comparable scores when audited by Nike's compliance staff. However, underlying (and somewhat obscured by) these apparent similarities, significant differences in actual labor conditions exist between these two factories. What drives these differences in working conditions? What does this imply for traditional systems of monitoring and codes of conduct? Field research conducted at these two factories reveals that beyond the code of conduct and various monitoring efforts aimed at enforcing it, workplace conditions and labor standards are shaped by very different patterns of work organization and human resource management policies.
codes of conduct, labor standards, globalization
Abstract: This paper seeks to understand how US labor unions - once key institutions in American political and economic life - can re-emerge as important and viable organizations. Building on the extensive literature on the "social embeddedness" of economic activity as well as on union revitalization, we hypothesize that where local unions are able to rebuild linkages to other local groups, they should be successful at revitalizing themselves organizationally. Where unions fail to embed themselves in their broader communities - notwithstanding genuine efforts at launching new strategies and rebuilding their own organizations - they are likely to stagnate. The paper reports the results of two matched pair case studies of building trade locals in Boston, Massachusetts, and Portland, Oregon. One set of cases focuses on Pipetrades in the two cities. The other set of cases focuses on the cities' Carpenters unions. To gain more objective information on the unions' embeddedness in local networks we employed a survey that identified approximately 100 industry stakeholder organizations including builders, architects, engineers, major property owners, neighborhood and environmental groups, local and state governments, and banks and lenders. We received responses from 46% of the organizations we contacted from which we were able to conduct a series of network analyses that complement our qualitative research.
Abstract: Private, voluntary compliance programs, promoted by global corporations and non-governmental organizations alike, have produced only modest and uneven improvements in working conditions and labor rights in most global supply chains. Through a detailed study of a major global apparel company and its suppliers, this paper argues that this compliance model rests upon misguided theoretical and empirical assumptions concerning the power of multinational corporations in global supply chains; the role information (derived from factory audits) plays in shaping the behavior of key actors (i.e., global brands, transnational activist networks, suppliers, purchasing agents, etc.) in these production networks; and the appropriate incentives required to change behavior and promote improvements in labor standards in these emergent centers of global production. We argue that it is precisely these faulty assumptions and the way they have come to shape various labor compliance initiatives throughout the world - even more than a lack of commitment, resources, or transparency by global brands and their suppliers to these programs - that explains why this compliance-focused model of private voluntary regulation has not succeeded. In contrast, this paper documents that a more commitment-oriented approach to improving labor standards co-exists, and in many of the same factories, complements the traditional compliance model. This commitment-oriented approach, based upon joint problem solving, information exchange, and the diffusion of best-practices, is often obscured by the debates over traditional compliance programs but it exists in myriad factories throughout the world and has led to sustained improvements in working conditions and labor rights at these workplaces.
Abstract: What role can private voluntary regulation play in improving labor standards and working conditions in global supply chain factories? How does this system relate to and interact with other systems of labor regulation and work organization? This paper seeks to address these questions through a structured comparison of two factories supplying Nike, the world’s largest athletic footwear and apparel company. These two factories have many similarities - both are in Mexico, both are in the apparel industry, both produce more or less the same products for Nike (and other brands) and both are subject to the same code of conduct. On the surface, both factories appear to have similar employment (i.e., recruitment, training, remuneration) practices and they receive comparable scores when audited by Nike’s compliance staff. However, underlying (and somewhat obscured by) these apparent similarities, significant differences in actual labor conditions exist between these two factories. What drives these differences in working conditions? What does this imply for traditional systems of monitoring and codes of conduct? Field research conducted at these two factories reveals that beneath the code of conduct and various monitoring efforts aimed at enforcing it, workplace conditions and labor standards are shaped by very different patterns of work organization and human resource management policies.
codes of conduct, labor standards, globalization, work organization
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