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Robert S. Pindyck's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
4,092 |
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696 |
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William J. Baumol New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Martin E. Cave University of Warwick - Warwick Business School Robert E. Litan AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Peter C. Cramton University of Maryland - Department of Economics Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School Thomas W. Hazlett George Mason University School of Law Paul L. Joskow Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Alfred E. Kahn National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) John W. Mayo Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business Patrick A. A. Messerlin Groupe d'Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM Paris) Bruce M. Owen Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Vernon L. Smith Chapman University - Economic Science Institute Scott Wallsten Technology Policy Institute Leonard Waverman London Business School Lawrence J. White New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business Scott Savage University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics
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28 Mar 07
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07 Oct 09
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1,126 (4,047)
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Abstract:
Network neutrality is a policy proposal that would regulate how network providers manage and price the use of their networks. Congress has introduced several bills on network neutrality. Proposed legislation generally would mandate that Internet service providers exercise no control over the content that flows over their lines and would bar providers from charging more for preferentially faster access to the Internet. These proposals must be considered carefully in light of the underlying economics. Our basic concern is that most proposals aimed at implementing net neutrality are likely to do more harm than good.
network neutrality, legislation, economics
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Elizabeth E. Bailey University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department William J. Baumol New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Martin Neil Baily Institute for International Economics Robert E. Litan AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Peter C. Cramton University of Maryland - Department of Economics Gerald R. Faulhaber University of Pennsylvania - Management Department Kenneth Flamm University of Texas at Austin - Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs Richard J. Gilbert University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics Austan Goolsbee University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Shane M. Greenstein Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School Robert E. Hall Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace Thomas W. Hazlett George Mason University School of Law Alfred E. Kahn National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) John W. Mayo Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business Paul R. Milgrom Stanford University Janusz A. Ordover New York University - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Gregory L. Rosston Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Scott Savage University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics Richard Schmalensee Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Howard A. Shelanski University of California, Berkeley - School of Law Pablo T. Spiller University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group Hal R. Varian University of California, Berkeley - School of Information Scott Wallsten Technology Policy Institute Dennis Weisman Kansas State University - Department of Economics David J. Teece University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group
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23 Mar 06
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07 Oct 09
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550 (12,447)
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Broadband, or high-speed access to the Internet, has generated significant economic benefits. Certain regulations, however, are slowing investment and deterring entry into the broadband market. In this statement, we make two recommendations that would remedy these regulatory defects and thereby lower artificial barriers to competitive provision of broadband services.
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3.
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Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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30 Jan 04
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17 Jan 05
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465 ( 15,733) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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13 Feb 04
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17 Jan 05
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64
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This paper addresses the impact on investment incentives of the network sharing arrangements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with a focus on the implications of irreversible investment. Although the goal is to promote competition, the sharing rules now in place reduce incentives to build new networks or upgrade existing ones. Such investments are irreversible - they involve sunk costs. The basic framework adopted by regulators allows entrants to utilize such facilities at prices reflecting what it would cost a new, efficient, large-scale network to be built. Such sharing opportunities are extensive, covering virtually the entire suite of network services provided, and extremely flexible, as the entrant can rent facilities in small increments for short duration, with no long-term contracts required. Because the entrant does not bear the sunk costs, this leads to an asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not properly accounted for in the pricing of network services, which creates a significant investment disincentive.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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30 Jan 04
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17 Jan 05
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401
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Abstract:
This paper addresses the impact on investment incentives of the network sharing arrangements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with a focus on the implications of irreversible investment. Although the goal is to promote competition, the sharing rules now in place reduce incentives to build new networks or upgrade existing ones. Such investments are irreversible - they involve sunk costs. The basic framework adopted by regulators allows entrants to utilize such facilities at prices reflecting what it would cost a new, efficient, large-scale network to be built. Such sharing opportunities are extensive, covering virtually the entire suite of network services provided, and extremely flexible, as the entrant can rent facilities in small increments for short duration, with no long-term contracts required. Because the entrant does not bear the sunk costs, this leads to an asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not properly accounted for in the pricing of network services, which creates a significant investment disincentive. To encourage efficient deployment of communications networks and new technologies, regulation must be adjusted to account for the irreversible nature of investment.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, investment incentives
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4.
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Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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13 Jun 05
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20 Jul 09
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428 ( 17,567) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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07 Jul 05
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20 Jul 09
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Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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13 Jun 05
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07 Jul 05
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391
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Abstract:
Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.
Sunk costs, real options, investment decisions, antitrust, entry barriers, market power, mergers
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5.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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12 Apr 01
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05 Dec 03
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302 (27,137)
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The standard framework in which economists evaluate environmental policies is cost-benefit analysis, so policy debates usually focus on the expected flows of costs and benefits, or on the choice of discount rate. But this can be misleading when there is uncertainty over future outcomes, when there are reversibilities, and when policy adoption can be delayed. This paper shows how two kinds of uncertainty over the future costs and benefits of reduced environmental degradation, and over the evolution of an ecosystem interact with two kinds of irreversibilities - sunk costs associated with an environmental regulation, and "sunk benefits" of avoided environmental degradation - to affect optimal policy timing and design.
Environmental policy, irreversibilities, cost-benefit analysis, uncertainty, option value, global warming
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6.
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Governance, Issuance Restrictions, and Competition in Payment Card Networks
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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29 Jun 07
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16 Aug 07
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174 ( 48,914) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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03 Jul 07
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16 Aug 07
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I discuss the antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Visa and MasterCard in 1998. Banks that issue Visa cards are free to also issue MasterCard cards, and vice versa, and many banks issue the cards of both networks. However, both Visa and MasterCard had rules prohibiting member banks from also issuing the cards of other networks, in particular American Express and Discover. In addition, most banks are members of both the Visa and MasterCard networks, so governance is to some extent shared. The DOJ claimed that restrictions on issuance and shared governance were anticompetitive and should be prohibited. Visa and MasterCard argued that these practices were procompetitive. The case raised important questions: Given that many banks issue both Visa and MasterCard, and that most merchants that accept one also accept the other, do the two networks really compete, and if so, how? And do Visa and/or MasterCard have market power, if so, in what market, and how is it exercised?
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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29 Jun 07
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29 Jun 07
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150
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Abstract:
I discuss the antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Visa and MasterCard in 1998. Banks that issue Visa cards are free to also issue MasterCard cards, and vice versa, and many banks issue the cards of both networks. However, both Visa and MasterCard had rules prohibiting member banks from also issuing the cards of other networks, in particular American Express and Discover. In addition, most banks are members of both the Visa and MasterCard networks, so governance is to some extent shared. The DOJ claimed that restrictions on issuance and shared governance were anticompetitive and should be prohibited. Visa and MasterCard argued that these practices were procompetitive. The case raised important questions: Given that many banks issue both Visa and MasterCard, and that most merchants that accept one also accept the other, do the two networks really compete, and if so, how? And do Visa and/or MasterCard have market power, if so, in what market, and how is it exercised?
payment cards, credit cards, debit, card networks, membership restrictions, network competition, network governance
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7.
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Sunk Costs and Risk-Based Barriers to Entry
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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26 Feb 09
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28 Feb 09
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129 ( 64,363) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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28 Feb 09
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28 Feb 09
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107
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In merger analysis and other antitrust settings, risk is often cited as a potential barrier to entry. But there is little consensus as to the kinds of risk that matter- systematic versus non-systematic and industry-wide versus firm-specific - and the mechanisms through which they affect entry. I show how and to what extent different kinds of risk magnify the deterrent effect of exogenous sunk costs of entry, and thereby affect industry dynamics, concentration, and equilibrium market prices. To do this, I develop a measure of the full, i.e., risk-adjusted, sunk cost of entry. I show that for reasonable parameter values, the full sunk cost is far larger than the direct measure of sunk cost typically used to analyze markets.
entry barriers, sunk costs, investment decisions, risk, market power, antitrust
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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26 Feb 09
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27 Feb 09
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22
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In merger analysis and other antitrust settings, risk is often cited as a potential barrier to entry. But there is little consensus as to the kinds of risk that matter - systematic versus non-systematic and industry-wide versus firm-specific - and the mechanisms through which they affect entry. I show how and to what extent different kinds of risk magnify the deterrent effect of exogenous sunk costs of entry, and thereby affect industry dynamics, concentration, and equilibrium market prices. To do this, I develop a measure of the full, i.e., risk-adjusted, sunk cost of entry. I show that for reasonable parameter values, the full sunk cost is far larger than the direct measure of sunk cost typically used to analyze markets.
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Saman Majd University of Pennsylvania Wharton School Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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27 Apr 00
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16 Jan 02
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90 (84,851)
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54
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Many investment projects have the following characteristics: (i) spending decisions and cash outlays occur sequentially over time, (ii) there is a maximum rate at which outlays and construction can proceed - it takes "time to build," and (iii) the project yields no cash return until it usually flexible, and can be adjusted as new information arrives. For such projects traditional discounted cash flow criteria, which treat the spending pattern as fixed, are inadequate as a guide for project evaluation. This paper develops an explicit model of investment projects with these characteristics, and uses option pricing methods to derive optimal decision rules for investment outlays over the entire construction program. Numerical solutions are used to demonstrate how time to build, opportunity cost, and uncertainty interact in affecting the investment decision. We show that with moderate levels of uncertainty over the future value of the completed project, a simple NPV rule could lead to gross over-investment. Also, we show how the contingent nature of the investment program magnifies the depressive effect of increased uncertainty on investment spending.
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Consumption Externalities and Diffusion in Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs
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Ernst R. Berndt Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Pierre Azoulay MIT Sloan School of Management
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17 Jul 00
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16 Jan 02
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54 ( 87,535) |
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Ernst R. Berndt Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Pierre Azoulay MIT Sloan School of Management
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17 Jul 00
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16 Jan 02
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54
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We examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs. These effects emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value, and/or conveys information abut efficacy and safety to patients and physicians. This can affect that rate of market diffusion for a new entrant, and can lead to herb behavior whereby a particular drug can dominate the market despite the availability of close substitutes. We use data for H2-antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects. The model has three components: an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug, as well as conventional attributes, affect brand valuation; equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality-adjusted prices and marketing levels; and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process. We find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion, but that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level.
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Ernst R. Berndt Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Pierre Azoulay MIT Sloan School of Management
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07 Jul 99
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18 May 01
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65 (104,097)
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We examine the role of network effects in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and for a therapeutic class of drugs. These effects emerge when use of a drug by others conveys information about its efficacy and safety to patients and physicians. This can lead to herd behavior where a particular drug -- not necessarily the most efficacious or safest -- can come to dominate the market despite the availability of close substitutes, and can also affect the rate of market diffusion. Using data for H2-antagonist antiulcer drugs, we examine two aspects of these effects. First, we use hedonic price procedures to estimate how the aggregate usage of a drug affects brand valuation. Second, we estimate discrete-time diffusion models at both the industry and brand levels to measure the impact on rates of diffusion and market saturation.
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Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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16 Aug 09
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02 Oct 09
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59 (109,555) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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18 Aug 09
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28 Sep 09
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Focusing on tail effects, I incorporate distributions for temperature change and its economic impact in an analysis of climate change policy. I estimate the fraction of consumption w*(tau) that society would be willing to sacrifice to ensure that any increase in temperature at a future point is limited to tau. Using information on the distributions for temperature change and economic impact from studies assembled by the IPCC and from "integrated assessment models" (IAMs), I fit displaced gamma distributions for these variables. Unlike existing IAMs, I model economic impact as a relationship between temperature change and the growth rate of GDP as opposed to its level, so that warming has a permanent impact on future GDP. The fitted distributions for temperature change and economic impact generally yield values of w*(tau) below 2%, even for small values of tau, unless one assumes extreme parameter values and/or substantial shifts in the temperature distribution. These results are consistent with moderate abatement policies.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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16 Aug 09
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02 Oct 09
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51
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Abstract:
Focusing on tail effects, I incorporate distributions for temperature change and its economic impact in an analysis of climate change policy. I estimate the fraction of consumption w*(τ) that society would be willing to sacrifice to ensure that any increase in temperature at a future point is limited to τ. Using information on the distributions for temperature change and economic impact from studies assembled by the IPCC and from “integrated assessment models” (IAMs), I fit displaced gamma distributions for these variables. Unlike existing IAMs, I model economic impact as a relationship between temperature change and the growth rate of GDP as opposed to its level, so that warming has a permanent impact on future GDP. The fitted distributions for temperature change and economic impact generally yield values of w*(τ) below 2%, even for small values of τ, unless one assumes extreme parameter values and/or substantial shifts in the temperature distribution. These results are consistent with moderate abatement policies.
Environmental policy, climate change, global warming, uncertainty, catastrophic outcomes
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The Economic and Policy Consequences of Catastrophes
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Neng Wang Columbia University - Columbia Business School
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18 Sep 09
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26 Oct 09
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57 (116,464) |
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Neng Wang Columbia University - Columbia Business School
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28 Sep 09
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26 Oct 09
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What is the likelihood that the U.S. will experience a devastating catastrophic event over the next few decades -- something that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP and wealth? What does the possibility of such an event imply for the behavior of economic variables such as investment, interest rates, and equity prices? And how much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of such an event? We address these questions using a general equilibrium model that describes production, capital accumulation, and household preferences, and includes as an integral part the possible arrival of catastrophic shocks. Calibrating the model to average values of economic and financial variables yields estimates of the implied expected mean arrival rate and impact distribution of catastrophic shocks. We also use the model to calculate the tax on consumption society would accept to reduce the probability or impact of a shock.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Neng Wang Columbia University - Columbia Business School
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18 Sep 09
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15 Oct 09
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41
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What is the likelihood that the U.S. will experience a devastating catastrophic event over the next few decades – something that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP and wealth? What does the possibility of such an event imply for the behavior of economic variables such as investment, interest rates, and equity prices? And how much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or likely impact of such an event? We address these questions using a general equilibrium model that describes production, capital accumulation, and household preferences, and includes as an integral part the possible arrival of catastrophic shocks. Calibrating the model to average values of economic and financial variables yields estimates of the implied expected mean arrival rate and impact distribution of catastrophic shocks. We also use the model to calculate the tax on consumption society would accept to reduce the probability or impact of a shock.
Catastrophes, disasters, rare events, economic uncertainty, consumption tax, national security
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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27 Apr 00
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16 Jan 02
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57 (111,532)
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85
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A model of capacity choice and utilization is developed consistent with value maximization when investment is irreversible and future demand is uncertain. Investment requires the full value of a marginal unit of capacity to be at least as large as its full cost. The former includes the value of the firm's option not to utilize the unit, and the latter includes the opportunity cost of exercising the investment option. We show that for moderate amounts of uncertainty, the firm's optimal capacity is much smaller than it would be if investment were reversible, and a large fraction of the firm's value is due to the possibility of future growth. We also characterize the behavior of capacity and capacity utilization, and discuss implications for the measurement of marginal cost and Tobin's q.
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Options, the Value of Capital, and Investment
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Posted:
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24 Aug 98
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17 Mar 08
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57 (111,532) |
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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19 Jul 00
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17 Mar 08
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57
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Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability later to sell off or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how this valuation relates to the q-theory of investment, and how these options affect the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options interact to determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how these option values change in response to shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches to investment are related.
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Andrew B. Abel University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Janice C. Eberly Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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24 Aug 98
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24 Aug 98
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Abstract:
Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability to later sell off or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how this valuation relates to the q-theory of investment, and how these options affect the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options interact to determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how these option values change in response to shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches to investment are related.
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15.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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04 May 05
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04 May 05
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54 (114,459)
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7
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Abstract:
The regulation of telecommunications, railroads, and other network industries has been based on mandatory unbundling and facilities sharing - entrants have the option to lease part or all of incumbents' facilities if and when they desire, at rates determined by regulators. This flexibility is of great value to entrants, but because investments are largely irreversible, it is costly to supply by incumbents. However, pricing formulas used by regulators to set lease rates for capital do not compensate incumbents for this flexibility, so that incumbents are effectively forced to subsidized entrants, discouraging further investments. This paper shows how pricing formulas used to set lease rates can be adjusted to account for the transfer of option value from incumbents to entrants, and estimates the average size of the adjustment for land-based local voice telecommunications in the U.S.
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16.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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22 Nov 01
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15 Dec 08
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46 (122,958)
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9
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Abstract:
The present value mode relates an asset's price to the sum of its discounted expected future payoffs. I explore the limits of the model by testing its ability to explain the pricing of storable commodities. For commodities the payoff stream is the convenience yield that accrues from holding inventories, and it can be measured directly from spot and futures prices. Hence the model imposes restrictions on the joint dynamics of spot and futures prices, which I test for four commodities. I find close conformance to the model for heating oil, but not for copper or lumber, and especially not for gold. The pattern is the same for the serial dependence of excess returns. These results suggest that for three of the four commodities, prices at least temporarily deviate from fundamentals.
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17.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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13 Dec 06
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16 May 07
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39 (131,222)
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10
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Abstract:
In a world of certainty, the design of environmental policy is relatively straightforward, and boils down to maximizing the present value of the flow of social benefits minus costs. But the real world is one of considerable uncertainty - over the physical and ecological impact of pollution, over the economic costs and benefits of reducing it, and over the discount rates that should be used to compute present values. The implications of uncertainty are complicated by the fact that most environmental policy problems involve highly nonlinear damage functions, important irreversibilities, and long time horizons. Correctly incorporating uncertainty in policy design is therefore one of the more interesting and important research areas in environmental economics. This paper offers no easy formulas or solutions for treating uncertainty - to my knowledge, none exist. Instead, I try to clarify the ways in which various kinds of uncertainties will affect optimal policy design, and summarize what we know and don`t know about the problem.
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18.
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Ricardo J. Caballero Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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16 Nov 01
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16 Jan 02
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36 (135,057)
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36
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Abstract:
We study the effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty on the entry of firms, total investment, and prices in a competitive industry with irreversible investment. We first use standard dynamic programming methods to determine firms' entry decisions, and we describe the resulting industry equilibrium and its characteristics, emphasizing the effects of different sources of uncertainty. We then show how the conditional distribution of prices can be used as an alternative means of determining and understanding the behavior of firms and the resulting industry equilibrium. Finally, we use four-digit U.S. manufacturing data to examine some implications of the model.
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19.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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27 Apr 00
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Last Revised:
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10 Jun 08
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36 (135,057)
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132
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Abstract:
Most investment expenditures have two important characteristics: First, they are largely irreversible; the firm cannot disinvest, so the expenditures are sunk costs. Second, they can be delayed, allowing the firm to wait for new information about prices, costs, and other market conditions before committing resources. An emerging literature has shown that this has important implications for investment decisions, and for the determinants of investment spending. Irreversible investment is especially sensitive to risk, whether with respect to future cash flows, interest rates, or the ultimate cost of the investment. Thus if a policy goal is to stimulate investment, stability and credibility may be more important than tax incentives or interest rates. This paper presents some simple models of irreversible investment, and shows how optimal investment rules and the valuation of projects and firms can be obtained from contingent claims analysis, or alternatively from dynamic programming. It demonstrates some strengths and limitations of the methodology, and shows how the resulting investment rules depend on various parameters that come from the market environment. It also reviews a number of results and insights that have appeared in the literature recently, and discusses possible policy implications.
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20.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Andres Solimano World Bank
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29 Dec 00
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Last Revised:
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29 Dec 00
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35 (136,367)
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30
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Abstract:
A recent literature suggests that because investment expenditures are irreversible and can be delayed they may be highly sensitive to uncertainty. We briefly summarize the theory, stressing its empirical implications. We then use cross-section and time-series data for a set of developing and industrialized countries to explore the relevance of the theory for aggregate investment. We find that the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital -- a summary measure of uncertainty -- affects investment as the theory suggests, but the size of the effect is moderate, and is greatest for developing countries. We also find that this volatility has little correlation with indicia of political instability used in recent studies of growth, as well as several indicia of economic instability. Only inflation is highly correlated with this volatility, and is also a robust explanator of investment.
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21.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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08 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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29 Nov 08
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34 (137,736)
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22
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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22.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Julio J. Rotemberg Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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09 Jul 04
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Last Revised:
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09 Jul 04
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29 (145,319)
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36
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Abstract:
This paper tests and confirms the existence of a puzzling phenomenon - the prices of largely unrelated raw commodities have a persistent tendency to move together. We show that this comovement of prices is well in excess of anything that can be explained by the common effects of past, current, or expected future values of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, industrial production, interest rates, and exchange rates. These results are a rejection of the standard competitive model of commodity price formation with storage.
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23.
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Saman Majd University of Pennsylvania Wharton School Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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27 Apr 00
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Last Revised:
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16 Jan 02
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28 (147,074)
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10
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Abstract:
This paper examines the implications of the learning curve in a world of uncertainty. We consider a competitive firm whose costs decline with cumulative output. Because the price of the firm`s output evolves stochastically, future production and cumulative output are unknown, and are contingent on future prices and costs. We derive an optimal decision rule that maximizes the firm`s market value: produce when price exceeds a critical level, which is a declining function of cumulative output. We show how the shadow value of cumulative production, as well as the total value of the firm, depend on the volatility of price and other parameters. Over the relevant range of prices, uncertainty reduces the shadow value of cumulative production, and therefore increases the critical price required for the firm to begin producing.
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24.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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14 Jul 00
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Last Revised:
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06 Jun 02
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27 (149,036)
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8
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Abstract:
We develop continuous-time models of capacity choice when demand fluctuates stochastically, and the firm's opportunities to expand or contract are limited. Specifically consider costs of investing or disinvesting that vary with time, or with the amount of capacity already installed. The firm's limited opportunities to expand or contract create call and put options on incremental units of capital; we show how the values of these options affect the firm's investment decisions.
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25.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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13 Feb 07
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Last Revised:
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13 Feb 07
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25 (153,405)
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13
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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26.
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Avinash K. Dixit Princeton University - Department of Economics Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Sigbjorn Sodal Agder University College
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08 Jul 00
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Last Revised:
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03 Apr 08
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23 (158,402)
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12
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Abstract:
We re-examine the basic investment problem of deciding when to incur a sunk cost to obtain a stochastically fluctuating benefit. The optimal investment rule satisfies a trade-off between a larger versus a later net benefit; we show that this trade-off is closely analogous to the standard trade-off for the pricing decision of a firm that faces a downward sloping demand curve. We reinterpret the optimal investment rule as a markup formula involving an elasticity that has exactly the same form as the formula for a firm's optimal markup of price over marginal cost. This is illustrated with several examples.
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27.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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28 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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07 Sep 08
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18 (172,515)
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36
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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28.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Julio J. Rotemberg Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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| Posted: |
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03 Jan 02
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Last Revised:
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03 Jan 02
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14 (184,045)
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5
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Abstract:
Under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, a domestic industry can obtain temporary protection against imports by demonstrating before the International Trade Commission that it has been injured, and that imports have been the "substantial cause" of injury - i.e., "a cause which is important and not less than any other cause." To date, the ITC lacks a coherent framework for selecting a menu of other factors which might be considered as causes of injury, and for weighing the effects of these other factors against those of imports. This paper sets forth a straightforward economic and statistical framework for use in Section 201 cases. This framework is based on the fact that if the domestic industry is competitive, injury can arise from one or more of three broad sources: adverse shifts in market demand, adverse shifts in domestic supply, or increased imports. We show how these sources of injury can be distinguished in theory, and statistically evaluated in practice. As an illustrative example, we apply the framework to the case of the copper industry, which petitioned the ITC for relief in 1984. Although that industry has indeed suffered injury, we show that the "substantial cause" was not imports, but instead increasing costs and decreasing demand.
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29.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Julio J. Rotemberg Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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| Posted: |
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03 Jan 07
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Last Revised:
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21 May 08
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13 (186,934)
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Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.
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30.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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| Posted: |
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28 Jun 04
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Last Revised:
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22 Sep 08
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11 (192,734)
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48
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Abstract:
Most explanations for the decline in share values over the past two decades have focused on the concurrent increase in inflation.This paper considers an alternative explanation: a substantial increase in the riskiness of capital investments. We show that the variance of firms` real gross marginal return on capital has increased significantly, increasing the relative riskiness of investors` returns on equity, and that this can explain a large part of the market decline. We also assess the effects of increase in the mean and variance of the inflation rate, and a decline in firms` expected return on capital.
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31.
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Robert S. Pindyck Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Julio J. Rotemberg Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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| Posted: |
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12 Apr 04
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Last Revised:
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12 Apr 04
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11 (192,734)
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12
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Abstract:
This paper presents a dynamic model of the industrial demands for structures, equipment, and blue- and white-collar labor. Our approach is consistent with producers holding rational expectations and optimizing dynamically in the presence of adjustment costs, yet it permits generality of functional form regarding the technology. We represent the technology by atranslog input requirement function that specifies the amount of blue-collar labor (a flexible factor) the firm must hire to produce a level of output given its quantities of three quasi-fixed factors that are subject to adjustment costs: non-production (white-collar) workers, equipment, and structures.A complete description of the production structure is obtained by simultaneously estimating the input requirement function and three stochastic Euler equations.We apply an instrumental variable technique to estimate these equations using aggregate data for U.S. manufacturing. We find that as a fraction of total expenditures, adjustment costs are small in total hut large on the margin,and that they differ considerably across quasi-fixed factors. We also present short- and long-run elasticities of factor demands.
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