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Abstract:
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).

Abstract:
This paper considers a simple quantitative model of output, interest rate and inflation determination in the United States, and uses it to evaluate alternative rules by which the Fed may set interest rates. The model is derived from optimizing behavior under rational expectations, both on the part of the purchasers of goods and upon that of the sellers. The model matches the estimates responses to a monetary policy shock quite well and, once due account is taken of other disturbances, can account for our data nearly as well as an unrestricted VAR. The monetary policy rule that most reduces inflation variability (and is best on this account) requires very variable interest rates, which in turn is possible only in the case of a high average inflation rate. But even in the case of a constrained-optimal policy, that takes into account some of the costs of average inflation and constrains the variability of interest rates so as to keep average inflation low, inflation would be stabilized considerably more and output stabilized considerably less than under our estimates of current policy. Moreover, this constrained-optimal policy also allows average inflation to be much smaller. This version contains additional details of our derivations and calculations, including three technical appendices, not included in the version published in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997.

Abstract:
A new instrument (the Mutual Inheritance Fund or MIF) is proposed whose purpose is to help people carry their savings forward from the moment they retire into their old age. Like annuities, this instrument requires an up-front payment before people receive any benefits while also protecting people from the risk that they will live a long time. The funds that individuals contribute to a MIF are invested in a mutual fund. The proceeds from the fund's underlying assets are reinvested until the contributor dies or he turns an age specified in advance. If a contributor dies before this pre-specified age, his shares are liquidated and the proceeds are distributed to the other contributors to the MIF. Contributors who are alive at the pre-specified age are also paid the value of their accumulated shares. Like tontines, of which MIF is a variant, this instrument has returns that are more tilted towards old age than annuities. Several advantages of this are discussed, including some that may explain why tontines have proven popular with consumers in the past.

Abstract:
Because inputs are scarce, marginal cost should be an increasing function of output. Without changes in this real marginal cost schedule, aggregate output can vary if and only if the markup of price over marginal cost varies. In this review, we discuss the extent to which observed fluctuations in aggregate economic activity depend upon such variations in average markups. We first study whether, empirically, real marginal cost rises in cyclical expansions. Average real labor cost is not very procyclical, but, for reasons such as overhead labor and adjustment costs, marginal labor cost should be more procyclical. Measures of marginal cost based on materials costs and inventories also appear procyclical. We next show that countercyclical markup variation may, depending upon how costs are modeled, account for a substantial fraction of cyclical output movements. We also show that the observed procyclical variations in productivity and profits are consistent with the hypothesis that cyclical variations in output are primarily due to markup variations than to shifts in the real marginal cost schedule. Finally, we survey theories of endogenous markup variation. These include both models of sticky and models in which firms' desired markup varies over time.

Abstract:
This paper studies implicitly colluding oligopolists facing fluctuating demand. The credible threat of future punishments provides the discipline that facilitates collusion. However, we find that the temptation to unilaterally deflate from the collusive outcome is often greater when demand is high. To moderate this temptation,the optimizing oligopoly reduces its profitability at such times,resulting in lower prices. If the oligopolists` output is an input to other sectors, their output may increase too. This explains the co-movements of outputs which characterize business cycles. The behavior of the railroads in the 1880`s, the automobile industry in the 1950`s and the cyclical behavior of cement prices and price-cost margins support our theory. (J.E.L. Classification numbers:020, 130, 610).

Abstract:
I suppose that consumers see a firm as fair if they cannot reject the hypothesis that the firm is somewhat benevolent towards them. Consumers that can reject this hypothesis become angry, which is costly to the firm. I show that firms that wish to avoid this anger will keep their prices rigid under some circumstances when prices would vary under more standard assumptions. The desire to appear benevolent can also lead firms to practice both third-degree and intertemporal price discrimination. Thus, the observation of temporary sales is consistent with my model of fair prices. The model can also explain why prices seem to be more responsive to changes in factor costs than to changes in demand that have the same effect on marginal cost, why increases in inflation seem to affect mostly the frequency of price adjustment without having sizeable effects on the size of price increases and why firms often announce their intent to increase prices in advance of actually doing so.

Abstract:
This paper presents a complete general equilibrium model with flexible wages where the degree to which wages and productivity change when cyclical employment changes is roughly consistent with postwar U.S. data. Firms with market power are assumed to bargain simultaneously with many employees, each of whom finds himself matched with a firm only after a process of search. When employment increases as a result of reductions in market power, the marginal product of labor falls. This fall tempers the bargaining power of workers and thus dampens the increase in their real wages. The procyclical movement of wages is dampened further if the posting of vacancies is subject to increasing returns.

Cyclical wages, matching models

Abstract:
This paper presents a complete general equilibrium model with flexible wages where the degree to which wages and productivity change when cyclical employment changes is roughly consistent with postwar U.S. data. Firms with market power are assumed to bargain simultaneously with many employees, each of whom finds himself matched with a firm only after a process of search. When employment increases as a result of reductions in market power, the marginal product of labor falls. This fall tempers the bargaining power of workers and thus dampens the increase in their real wages. The procyclical movement of wages is dampened further if the posting of vacancies is subject to increasing returns.

Abstract:
This paper presents a complete general equilibrium model with flexible wages, where the degree to which wages and productivity change when cyclical employment changes is roughly consistent with postwar U.S. data. Firms with market power are assumed to bargain simultaneously with many employees, each of whom finds himself matched with a firm only after a process of search. When employment increases as a result of reductions in market power, the marginal product of labor falls. This fall tempers the bargaining power of workers and thus dampens the increase in their real wages. The procyclical movement of wages is dampened further if the posting of vacancies is subject to increasing returns.

Abstract:
This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers by posting vacancies. Firms act monopsonistically and set wages to retain their existing workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in that its assumptions ensure that there is an equilibrium where all firms pay the same wage. The paper analyzes the response of this wage to exogenous changes in the marginal revenue product of labor. The paper finds parameters for which the response of wages is modest relative to the response of employment, as appears to be the case in U.S. data and shows that the insistence by workers that firms act with a minimal level of altruism can be a source of dampened wage responses. The paper also considers a setting where this minimal level of altruism is subject to fluctuations and shows that, for certain parameters, the model can explain both the standard deviations of employment and wages and the correlation between these two series over time.

Abstract:
This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers by posting vacancies. Firms act monopsonistically and set wages to retain their existing workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in that its assumptions ensure that there is an equilibrium where all firms pay the same wage. The paper analyzes the response of this wage to exogenous changes in the marginal revenue product of labor. The paper finds parameters for which the response of wages is modest relative to the response of employment, as appears to be the case in U.S. data and shows that the insistence by workers that firms act with a minimal level of altruism can be a source of dampened wage responses. The paper also considers a setting where this minimal level of altruism is subject to fluctuations and shows that, for certain parameters, the model can explain both the standard deviations of employment and wages and the correlation between these two series over time.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
We show that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming that competition is imperfect makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Plausibly parameterized models of this type are able to mimic the response of output and real wages in the United States. The responses are particularly consistent with a model of implicit collusion where markups depend positively on the ratio of the expected present value of future profits to the current level of output.

Abstract:
We show that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming that competition is imperfect makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Plausibly parameterized models of this type are able to mimic the response of output and real wages in the United States. The responses are particularly consistent with a model of implicit collusion where markups depend positively on the ratio of the expected present value of future profits to the current level of output.

Abstract:
This paper tests and confirms the existence of a puzzling phenomenon - the prices of largely unrelated raw commodities have a persistent tendency to move together. We show that this comovement of prices is well in excess of anything that can be explained by the common effects of past, current, or expected future values of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, industrial production, interest rates, and exchange rates. These results are a rejection of the standard competitive model of commodity price formation with storage.

Abstract:
This paper discusses the consequences of introducing imperfectly competitive product markets into an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. We pay particular attention to the consequences of imperfect competition for the explanation of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. Market structures considered include monopolistic competition, the 'customer market' model of Phelps and Winter, and the implicit collusion model of Rotemberg and Saloner. Empirical evidence relevant to the numerical calibration of imperfectly competitive models is reviewed. The paper then analyzes the effects of imperfect competition upon the economy's response to several kinds of real shocks, including technology shocks, shocks to the level of government purchases, and shocks that change individual producers' degree of market power. It also discusses the role of imperfect competition in allowing for fluctuations due solely to self-fulfilling expectations.

Abstract:
This paper proposes a method for separating economic time series into a smooth component whose mean varies over time (the trend') and a stationary component (the cycle'). The aim is to make the trends as smooth as possible while also producing cycles with plausible properties. While the main justification for the method is intuitive, the method does a good job of separating these two components in some artificial examples where the constructed series are indeed the sum of smooth (possibly stochastic) functions of time and a low order autoregressive process. When the true trends consist of low order polynomials, the proposed method obtains trends that are of similar accuracy than fitted polynomial trends. In other cases, the MSE of the proposed trends is much lower. Similarly, except in quite special cases, the MSE of the proposed trend is considerably smaller than that obtained by the HP filter. VARs that involve the cyclical variables constructed by this method yield accurate representations of the behavior of the underlying cycles of several variables. By contrast, VARs with the series in differences give poor descriptions of the effect of cyclical shocks, even though Dickey-Fuller tests do not reject the hypotheses that the artificial series have unit roots. I apply the method to some well known aggregate time series. The results suggest that real wages in the U.S. are strongly positively correlated with military purchases and that the reduction in the growth of trend GDP in the U.S. started well before 1973.

Abstract:
This paper presents a goal-oriented model of political participation based on two psychological assumptions. The first is that people are more altruistic towards individuals that agree with them and the second is that people's well-being rises when other people share their personal opinions. The act of voting is then a source of vicarious utility because it raises the well-being of individuals that agree with the voter. Substantial equilibrium turnout emerges with nontrivial voting costs and modest altruism. The model can explain higher turnout in close elections as well as votes for third-party candidates with no prospect of victory. For certain parameters, these third party candidates lose votes to more popular candidates, a phenomenon often called strategic voting. For other parameters, the model predicts vote-stealing where the addition of a third candidate robs a viable major candidate of electoral support.

Abstract:
This paper presents a goal-oriented model of political participation based on two psychological assumptions. The first is that people are more altruistic towards individuals that agree with them and the second is that people's well being rises when other people share their personal opinions. By conveying credible information on attitudes, votes give pleasure to individuals who agree with them and thereby confer vicarious utility on voters. Substantial equilibrium turnout emerges with nontrivial voting costs and modest altruism. The model can explain higher turnout in close elections as well as higher turnout by more informed and more educated individuals. For certain parameters, the model predicts that third party candidates will lose votes to more popular candidates, a phenomenon often called strategic voting. For other parameters, the model predicts 'vote-stealing' where the addition of a third candidate robs a major candidate of electoral support.

Voting, elections, turnout, altruism

Abstract:
While much evidence suggests that price rigidity is due to a concern with the reaction of customers, price increases do not seem to be typically associated with drastic reduction in purchases. To explain this apparent inconsistency, this paper develops a model where consumers care about the fairness of prices and react negatively only when they become convinced that prices are unfair. This leads to price rigidity, though the implications of the model are not identical to those of existing models of costly price adjustment. In particular, the frequency of price adjustment ought to depend on economy-wide variables observed by consumers. As I show, this has implications for the effects of monetary policy. It can, in particular, explain why inflation does not fall immediately after a monetary tightening.

Abstract:
This paper starts by discussing consumers' cognitive and emotional reaction to posted prices. Cognitively, some consumers do not appear to make effective use of price information to maximize their consumption-based utility. Emotionally, prices can induce regret and anger among consumers. The optimal responses of firm's prices to these reactions can explain why firms charge prices below marginal cost for many goods and why they keep their prices rigid. This explanation of price rigidity has the advantage of being consistent with the observation that the typical size of price increases is nearly invariant to inflation. Lastly, the paper turns to some government policies regarding prices that appear to have some consumer support. It argues that both laws against price gouging and laws regulating the terms of mortgages may have support because consumers recognize that many people do not optimize their consumption effectively and because they are angry at firms that take advantage of this. These attitudes can also explain consumer support for monetary policies that maintain a low level of average inflation.

Abstract:
This paper seeks to explain why monopolies keep their nominal prices constant for longer periods than do tight oligopolies. We provide two possible explanations. The first is based on the presence of a small fixed cost of changing prices. The second, on small costs of discovering the optimal price. The incentive to change price for duopolists producing differentiated products exceeds that of a single monopolistic firm which produced the same tange of products as the duopoly.

Abstract:
This paper evaluates alternative rules by which the Fed may set interest rates using the small model of the U.S. economy estimated in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Our main substantive finding is that low and stable inflation together with stable interest rates can be achieved by letting the funds rate respond positively to inflation while also responding, with a coefficient bigger than one, to the lagged funds rate itself. A rule in which the interest rate is set in this extremely simple way does almost as well as a more complicated rule which is optimal in our setting, in the sense of maximizing expected utility to the representative household. Furthermore, when the funds rate responds to inflation only with a delay, due to delay in the availability of inflation data, performance under the rule is only slightly reduced.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
Like a fixed exchange rate, a target zone system may be subject to spectulative attacks when the reserves of the central bank are limited. This paper analyzes such speculative attacks and their implications; it shows that the recently developed "smooth pasting" model of target zones should be viewed as a special case that emerges only when reserves are sufficiently large. The paper than uses the target zone framework to resolve a seeming paradox in predicting speculative attacks on a gold standard, arguing that such a standard may best be viewed as the boundary between one-sided target zones.

Abstract:
This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat of reversion to more competitive pricing. We consider both prices and quantities as the strategic variables and study competition both in the domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets taken together.

Abstract:
In public discussions of policy, evidence that import-competing sectors earn low or falling incomes is often used to argue for protection. This paper rationalizes the apparent effectiveness of this argument in both direct and indirect democracies. In direct democracies, a small degree of voter altruism leads to protection in the specific factors model when the import-competing sector earns little. Similarly, voter altruism creates an incentive in representative democracies for self-interested parties to present evidence to legislators on the income of import-competing factors. This leads to a theory in which campaign contributions buy access to legislators rather than buy votes.

Abstract:
This paper considers a specific factor model with two sectors in which agents are altruistic towards domestic residents. I show that, even if the degree of altruism is small, direct democracy leads to commercial policies that are biased against trade as long as the mobile factor is unbiased in the sense of Jones and Ruffin (1977) and the income of the owners of the factor which is specific to the import competing sector is lower than the income of the owners of the other specific factor. Tariffs may be preferred to subsidies by the median voter if subsidies require that beneficiaries spend a fixed cost to demonstrate that they are entitled to these subsidies and there is heterogeneity in the size of producers. Lastly, I construct a model of indirect democracy where legislators can receive campaign contributions from potential lobbyists. Even if campaign contributions are positive in equilibrium, the tariffs that emerge from votes taken after lobbying can represent the wishes of the median voter. In this model, campaign contributions do not buy votes. Instead, consistent with what is claimed in the qualitative literature, they buy access to legislators' time. The model is also consistent with the evidence showing that campaign contributions and lobbying activity are directed mainly at legislators who already agree with their contributors and their lobbyists.

Abstract:
I show that a simple sticky price model based on Rotemberg (1982) is consistent with a variety of facts concerning the correlation of prices, hours and output. In particular, I show that it is consistent with a negative correlation between the detrended levels of output and prices when the Beveridge-Nelson method is used to detrend both the price and output data. Such a correlation, i.e., a negative correlation between the predictable movements in output and the predictable movements in prices is present (and very strong) in U.S. data. Consistent with the model, this correlation is stronger than correlations between prices and hours of work. I also study the size of the predictable price movements that are associated with predictable output movements as well as the degree to which there are predictable movements in monetary aggregates associated with predictable movements in output. These facts are used to shed light on the degree to which the Federal Reserve has pursued a policy designed to stabilize expected inflation.

Abstract:
I develop two models in which debt repurchases by highly indebted sovereign nations are advantageous for all parties. The models are based on the idea that when sovereign debts are large, bargaining costs are large. Creditors spend more resources convincing the debtor that they are tough when they have more at stake. Also, the sanctions which are sometimes triggered when bargaining fails to produce an agreement are larger when debts are larger. For both these reasons buybacks, which reduce the face value of the outstanding debt, can be beneficial. The resulting equilibria are constrained Pareto Optima. But, donors who subsidize buybacks increase overall welfare more than donors who make direct gifts. I also argue that Bulow and Rogoff (1988)'s empirical evidence on buybacks is consistent with my models.

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether it is possible to entertain simultaneously two attractive views about US GDP. The first is that long term growth in US GDP is attributable to an empirically plausible specification of random technical progress. The second is that deviations of GDP from a fitted smooth 'trend' are mostly attributable to shocks that have only temporary effects, so that they are unrelated to the shocks to technical progress that lead to long term growth. The paper shows that these two views are not incompatible by constructing a model where stochastic technical progress (whose properties are calibrated to fit some features of US data) has essentially no effect on suitably detrended time series of GDP. The paper also studies variations in wedges between price and marginal cost that are capable of giving rise to these transitory movements.

Abstract:
Under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, a domestic industry can obtain temporary protection against imports by demonstrating before the International Trade Commission that it has been injured, and that imports have been the "substantial cause" of injury - i.e., "a cause which is important and not less than any other cause." To date, the ITC lacks a coherent framework for selecting a menu of other factors which might be considered as causes of injury, and for weighing the effects of these other factors against those of imports.

This paper sets forth a straightforward economic and statistical framework for use in Section 201 cases. This framework is based on the fact that if the domestic industry is competitive, injury can arise from one or more of three broad sources: adverse shifts in market demand, adverse shifts in domestic supply, or increased imports. We show how these sources of injury can be distinguished in theory, and statistically evaluated in practice. As an illustrative example, we apply the framework to the case of the copper industry, which petitioned the ITC for relief in 1984. Although that industry has indeed suffered injury, we show that the "substantial cause" was not imports, but instead increasing costs and decreasing demand.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
This paper examines the connection between money and the terms of trade in the context of a simple monetary equilibrium model with flexible prices. Money is held for transactions purposes. Because carrying out financial transactions is costly, households visit their financial intermediaries only occasionally. An important feature of the model is that different households visit the financial intermediaries at different times. This is sufficient to ensure that even though the model features perfect foresight and competitive markets, monetary policies affect output under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. Moreover, in the latter regime expansionary monetary policies tend to worsen the terms of trade while this is not the case under fixed exchange rates.

Abstract:
This paper estimates simultaneously dynamic equations for the Deutsche Mark/Dollar exchange rate and the German wholesale price index, which emerge from a model in which German prices are sticky. This stickiness is due to price adjustment costs which take the form posited by Rotemberg(1982).The main results of the empirical analysis are two: First, the version of the model where prices are perfectly flexible is rejected. Second, real exchange rate variability is mostly accounted for by nominal exchange rate variability. We find substantial overshooting of the exchange rate to monetary innovations like those which appear to be typical in Germany.

Abstract:
This paper presents a dynamic model of the industrial demands for structures, equipment, and blue- and white-collar labor. Our approach is consistent with producers holding rational expectations and optimizing dynamically in the presence of adjustment costs, yet it permits generality of functional form regarding the technology. We represent the technology by atranslog input requirement function that specifies the amount of blue-collar labor (a flexible factor) the firm must hire to produce a level of output given its quantities of three quasi-fixed factors that are subject to adjustment costs: non-production (white-collar) workers, equipment, and structures.A complete description of the production structure is obtained by simultaneously estimating the input requirement function and three stochastic Euler equations.We apply an instrumental variable technique to estimate these equations using aggregate data for U.S. manufacturing. We find that as a fraction of total expenditures, adjustment costs are small in total hut large on the margin,and that they differ considerably across quasi-fixed factors. We also present short- and long-run elasticities of factor demands.

Abstract:
We consider a model with several regions whose technological ability and factor endowments are identical and in which transport costs between regions are nonnegligible. Nonetheless, certain goods are sometimes produced by multiple firms all of which are located in the same region. These goods are then exported from the regions in which their production is agglomerated. Regional agglomeration of production and trade stem from two forces. First, competition between firms for the services of trained workers is necessary for the workers to recoup the cost of acquiring industry-specific human capital. Second, the technology of production is more efficient when plants are larger than a minimum efficient scale and local demand is insufficient to support several firms of that scale. We also study the policy implications of our model.

Abstract:
The quick brown fox.

Abstract:
This paper shows that the output losses from energy taxes are significantly larger than usually computed when due account is taken of imperfect competition among energy using firms. Even with perfect competition among these firms, the loss in GNP is of the same order of magnitude as the revenue raised by these taxes. However, in the presence of imperfect competition the output losses are much higher. There are particularly large transitory losses in the immediate aftermath of energy price increases when firms act as implicitly colluding oligopolists. These losses become considerably smaller if energy taxes are phased-in. We also show that taxes that affect only household consumption of energy have much smaller effects. In particular, for the empirically plausible parameter values we consider, such taxes have no effect on employment or output in the non-energy sector.

Abstract:
This paper considers a model where individual workers bargain with firms over their wages and where their bargaining power is so strong that some workers are unemployed. The result is that an increase in the elasticity of demand facing individual firms raises employment (as in the case where the labor market clears) but that wages rise only modestly. In fact, consistent with the findings of Wilson (1997), some job-specific wages actually fall. Nonetheless, average wages may rise either because wages of non-rationed workers rise or because there is cyclical upgrading of jobs. Assuming that workers are also rationed in financial markets, the increase in employment that accompanies the increase in the demand elasticity for individual products also increases consumption substantially. Thus, the model rationalizes the finding that real wages rise less in booms than does consumption. At the same time, the model is consistent with a lack of secular movements in hours and unemployment as well as a secular proportionality of consumption and real wages.

Abstract:
We compute the forecastable changes in output, consumption, and hours implied by a VAR that includes the growth rate of private value added, the share of output that is consumed, and the detrended level of private hours. We show that the size of the forecastable changes in output greatly exceeds that predicted by a standard stochastic growth model, of the kind studied by real business cycle theorists. Contrary to the model's implications, forecastable movements in labor productivity are small and only weakly related to forecasted changes in output. Also, forecasted movements in investment and hours are positively correlated with forecasted movements in output. Finally, and again in contrast to what the growth model implies, forecasted output movements are positively related to the current level of the consumption share and negatively related to the level of hours. We also show that these contrasts between the model and the observations are robust to allowance for measurement error and a variety of other types of transitory disturbances.

Abstract:
A model is considered where firms internalize the regret costs that consumers experience when they see an unexpected price change. Regret costs are assumed to be increasing in the size of price changes and this can explain why the size of price increases is less sensitive to inflation than in models with fixed costs of changing prices. The latter predict unrealistically large responses of price changes to inflation for firms that do not frequently reduce their prices. Adjustment costs that depend on the size of price changes also raise the variability on the size of price increases. Lastly, it is argued that the common practice of announcing price increases in advance is much easier to rationalize with regret concerns by consumers than with more standard approaches to price rigidity.

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Abstract:
A model is developed where firms in a financial system have to settle their debts to each other by using a liquid asset. The question that is studied is how many firms must obtain how much of this asset from outside the financial system to make sure that all debts within the system are settled. The main result is that these liquidity needs are larger when these firms are more interconnected through their debts, i.e. when they borrow from and lend to more firms. Two pecuniary externalities are discussed. One involves the choice of paying one creditor first rather than another. The second involves the extent to which firms borrow and acquire claims on other firms with the proceeds. When a group of firms raises their involvement in this activity, firms outside the group may face more difficulties in settling their debts.

Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Market failures, Market structure, Monetary policy, Mortgages.

This case focuses on the financial difficulties faced in the US from August to December 2006 as well as their roots in subprime lending. After briefly discussing how mortgages were structured and traded in the pre-1990 period, it describes subprime mortgage lending, as well as other innovative mortgages issued in the 1990s. It also discusses how these mortgages were packaged into securities, and who ultimately came to own these claims and their attendant risk. The case then describes the pain inflicted by raising foreclosures, as well as the financial market ramifications of the rise in mortgage delinquencies. It also chronicles the response of the US and European central banks to the unfolding financial difficulties. Lastly, the case lays policies that have been proposed to deal with either the consequences or the causes of the crisis. These include policies for reforming the supervision of the financial system, changing bankruptcy rules and regulating mortgage finance. Some attention is paid to the role of credit rating agencies in the crisis, and in the financial system as a whole.

Abstract:
Incentives for profitable innovation may be enhanced by employing a "visionary" CEO whose "vision" biases him in favor of certain projects. CEO vision changes which projects get implemented and thus affects the incentives of employees who can be compensated for their innovative ideas only when they become embodied in implemented projects. Profits may be enhanced further by letting objective managers decide which projects to investigate even though their decisions can depart from the firm's "strategy" by differing from those the CEO would have made.