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Abstract: This paper develops a broad concept of systemic risk, the basic economic concept for the understanding of financial crises. It is claimed that any such concept must integrate systemic events in banking and financial markets as well as in the related payment and settlement systems. At the heart of systemic risk are contagion effects, various forms of external effects. The concept also includes simultaneous financial instabilities following aggregate shocks. The quantitative literature on systemic risk, which was evolving swiftly in the last couple of years, is surveyed in the light of this concept. Various rigorous models of bank and payment system contagion have now been developed, although a general theoretical paradigm is still missing. Direct econometric tests of bank contagion effects seem to be mainly limited to the United States. Empirical studies of systemic risk in foreign exchange and security settlement systems appear to be non-existent. Moreover, the literature surveyed reflects the general difficulty to develop empirical tests that can make a clear distinction between contagion in the proper sense and joint crises caused by common shocks, rational revisions of depositor or investor expectations when information is asymmetric ("information-based" contagion) and "pure" contagion as well as between "efficient" and "inefficient" systemic events. currency crises
Systemic risk, financial stability, banking crises, contagion, financial markets, payment and settlement systems,
Abstract: This Paper develops a broad concept of systemic risk, the basic economic concept for the understanding of financial crises. It is claimed that any such concept must integrate systemic events in banking and financial markets as well as in the related payment and settlement systems. At the heart of systemic risk are contagion effects, various forms of external effects. The concept also includes simultaneous financial instabilities following aggregate shocks. The quantitative literature on systemic risk, which has evolved swiftly in the last couple of years, is surveyed in the light of this concept. Various rigorous models of bank and payment system contagion have now been developed, although a general theoretical paradigm is still missing. Direct econometric tests of bank contagion effects seem to be mainly limited to the United States. Empirical studies of systemic risk in foreign exchange and security settlement systems appear to be non-existent. Moreover, the literature surveyed reflects the general difficulty in developing empirical tests that can make a clear distinction between contagion in the proper sense and joint crises caused by common shocks, rational revisions of depositor or investor expectations when information is asymmetric ('information-based' contagion) and 'pure' contagion as well as between 'efficient' and 'inefficient' systemic events.
Banking crises, contagion, currency crises, financial markets, financial stability, payment and settlement systems, systemic risk
Abstract: In order to assess the effect of EMU on market conditions for banks based in countries which adopt the Single Currency, we use the H indicator suggested by Panzar and Rosse (1987). Our contribution is to assess results separately for large and small banks, and for interest income and total income as a dependent variable. From a panel of banks over the period 1992-1996, we provide evidence that European banking markets for large banks in the mid-1990s were still characterised by monopolistic competition, as compared to the United States. Regarding small banks, the level of competition appears to be even lower, especially in France and Germany. EMU would therefore imply a notable rise in competition for small banks in France and Germany, as well as an increase in competition for large banks, especially in Italy.
Banking, Competition, EMU, Panel Data Analysis, Contestability
Abstract: This paper aims at determining whether economic, financial and monetary integration on the one hand, and institutional factors on the other, may have led to gradual convergence in key fiscal variables across the euro area over the recent period, bringing fiscal positions closer together. The Maastricht convergence criteria have facilitated this process but we investigate here whether the structural factors bringing fiscal positions closer together have been a feature of European integration starting already in the 1970s. The alternative scenario is that the euro zone is still characterised by largely idiosyncratic national fiscal policies. Over the 1970-1998 period we run contemporaneous cross-correlation, dispersion and cointegration tests using annual data for government net lending, and total current revenue and expenditure to uncover common trends, as measures of fiscal convergence. We also investigate whether the short term fiscal position in a given country shares both a common euro area component and national features (i.e., idiosyncratic national cycles) using a dynamic factor analysis on quarterly data for the four largest euro area countries since 1985. We find convincing evidence that for euro area countries cross-correlation has increased steadily over the sample period and that fiscal dispersion has been declining at a sustained pace among all countries in the sample. There is evidence of cointegration across the euro area for several countries on the basis of total current revenue, and also for total current expenditure. However, when the series are corrected for the business cycle, cointegration is only accepted for net lending. There is clearly common fiscal cycles for net lending across the euro area that do not only express common business cycles. However, while countries have followed more similar policies in the 1990s in particular during the run-up to EMU, the timing of fiscal adjustment differed across countries. In addition, idiosyncratic components still contribute to a significant share of the variability of individual countries.
Fiscal Policy, Euro Area, Convergence, Cointegration, Dynamic Factor Analysis
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