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Abstract:
Sovereign wealth funds have emerged as an important investor of global equity, attracting growing attention. Despite frequently voiced concerns that sovereign wealth funds serve political objectives, little is known about their investment allocation. We collect new data on close to 30,000 equity investments by sovereign wealth funds and using both a country-level and firm-level analysis find that they tend to invest in countries with common cultural traits. This cultural bias indicates that sovereign wealth funds prefer to invest in the familiar. While other global investors show similar aptitude to investing in the familiar, the cultural bias of sovereign wealth fund investment is particularly pronounced.

Sovereign wealth funds, Asset allocation, Culture, Information

Abstract:
This paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying market structure mattered, with entry of new, large lenders triggering declines in lending standards. Finally, lending standards declined more in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator models based on asymmetric information, and shed light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability.

credit boom, lending standards, mortgages, subprime loans, moral hazard, financial accelerators

Abstract:
We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance attributes that are adopted at the firm level. Despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, we find that many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond those that are adopted by all firms in the country, and that these improvements in corporate governance are positively associated with firm valuation. Firms that choose not to adopt sound governance mechanisms tend to have concentrated ownership and free cash flow consistent with agency theories based on self interested managers and controlling shareholders. Our results indicate that the market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt governance attributes beyond those required by laws and common corporate practices in the home country.

Abstract:
We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance attributes that are adopted at the firm level. This approach allows us to differentiate between firm-level and country-level corporate governance. Despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, we find that many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond those that are adopted by all firms in the country, and that these improvements in corporate governance are positively associated with firm valuation. Our results indicate that the market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt governance attributes beyond those required by laws and common corporate practices in the home country.

Corporate governance, Firm valuation, Minimum standards

Abstract:
Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks.

Abstract:
Which public policies and ownership structures enhance the governance of banks? Is the governance of banks different from other corporations? This paper constructs a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assesses the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory/regulatory policies on bank valuations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held, but rather families or the State tend to control banks. We find that (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boosts valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on bank valuations. These results are consistent with the views that expropriation of minority shareholders is important internationally, that laws can restrain this expropriation, and concentrated cash-flow rights represent an important mechanism for governing banks. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that empowering official supervisory and regulatory agencies will increase the market valuation of banks.

Abstract:
The authors examine whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. They define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industrial specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

This paper - a product of the Finance Group, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the growth finance link.

Firm Size, Financial Development, Economic Growth

Abstract:
This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industry specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, market structure, and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures. Thus, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation; they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

banks, regulation, policies, institutions, concentration, interest margins

Abstract:
Using bank-level data, Claessens and Laeven apply the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology to estimate the extent to which changes in input prices are reflected in revenues earned by specific banks in 50 countries' banking systems. They then relate this competitiveness measure to indicators of countries' banking system structures and regulatory regimes. The authors find systems with greater foreign bank entry and fewer entry and activity restrictions to be more competitive. They find no evidence that the competitiveness measure negatively relates to banking system concentration. Their findings confirm that contestability determines effective competition, especially by allowing (foreign) bank entry and reducing activity restrictions on banks.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study competition in the financial sector.

Banking, competition, contestability, Panzar and Rosse

Abstract:
This paper investigates how different legal frameworks not only affect the amount of external financing available, but also the allocation of resources among different type of assets. Using a simple model, we show that a firm will get less financing, and thus invest less, in a weak law and order environment. We also show that weaker property rights can lead to an asset substitution effect with firms investing less in intangible assets. Empirically, these two effects appear to be equally important drivers of growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. Using individual firm data, we also show that weaker legal frameworks are associated with relatively more fixed assets, but less long-term financing for a given amount of fixed assets.

Abstract:
This paper presents a new database on the timing of systemic banking crises and policy responses to resolve them. The database covers the universe of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2007, with detailed data on crisis containment and resolution policies for 42 crisis episodes, and also includes data on the timing of currency crises and sovereign debt crises. The database extends and builds on the Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005) banking crisis database, and is the most complete and detailed database on banking crises to date.

Financial crisis, Banking sector, Banking crisis, Sovereign debt, Databases, Currencies, Spillovers, Economic recovery, Fiscal sustainability, Working Paper

Abstract:
The relationships among competition in the financial sector, access of firms to external financing, and associated economic growth are ambiguous in theory. Moreover, measuring competition in the financial sector can be complex. In this paper Claessens and Laeven first estimate for 16 countries a measure of banking system competition based on industrial organization theory. They then relate this competition measure to growth of industries and find that greater competition in countries' banking systems allows financially dependent industries to grow faster. These results are robust under a variety of tests. The results suggest that the degree of competition is an important aspect of financial sector funding.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study competition in banking.

Banking, competition, contestability, economic growth

Abstract:
This paper updates the Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2001) cross-country deposit insurance database and extends it in several important dimensions. This new dataset identifies both recent adopters and the ones that were not covered earlier due to a lack of data. Moreover, for the first time, it provides historical time series for several variables and adds new ones. The data were collected by surveying deposit insurance institutions and related agencies as well as through the use of various other country sources.

Deposit insurance, deposit protection, deposit coverage, banking

Abstract:
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don't around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of GDP per annum.

Campaign Contributions, Elections, Rent-seeking, Preferential Lending

Abstract:
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific rather than ideological basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank leverage relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of these political connections over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of GDP per annum.

Campaign Contributions, Elections, Corruption, Preferential Lending

Abstract:
Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

G3, G23

Abstract:
Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the microeconomic effects of institutionalized saving on ownership structure, corporate governance and performance of listed companies. First, the Swedish pension reform increased the participation of pension funds in the domestic stock market and caused a significant reshuffling in the ownership of the existing pension funds. Second, the availability of detailed data on firm ownership allows us to document the effects of the pension reform. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. In particular, we find that firm valuation improves if large independent private pension funds and public pension funds increase their equity stakes in the firm, but not if smaller pension funds and pension funds related to financial institutions and industrial groups increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

Pension funds, corporate governance, ownership, controlling shareholders, control premium, shareholder activism

Abstract:
Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the microeconomic effects of institutionalized saving on ownership structure, corporate governance and performance of listed companies. First, the Swedish pension reform increased the participation of pension funds in the domestic stock market and caused a significant reshuffling in the ownership of the existing pension funds. Second, the availability of detailed data on firm ownership allows us to document the effects of the pension reform. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. In particular, we find that firm valuation improves if large independent private pension funds and public pension funds increase their equity stakes in the firm, but not if smaller pension funds and pension funds related to financial institutions and industrial groups increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

Pension funds, control premium, dual class shares, controlling shareholders

Abstract:
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.

Abstract:
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning relationships among risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings have important policy implications as they imply that the same regulation will have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.

financial economics, corporate finance, financial institutions, government policy

Abstract:
This paper constructs a composite index of corporate governance quality, documents its evolution from 1994 through 2003 in selected emerging and developed economies, and assesses its impact on aggregate and corporate growth and productivity. Our investigation yields three main findings. First, corporate governance quality in most countries has overall improved, although to varying degrees and with a few notable exceptions. Second, the data exhibit cross-country convergence in corporate governance quality with countries that score poorly initially catching up with countries with high corporate governance scores. Third, the impact of improvements in corporate governance quality on traditional measures of real economic activity-GDP growth, productivity growth, and the ratio of investment to GDP - is positive, significant, and quantitatively relevant, and the growth effect is particularly pronounced for industries that are most dependent on external finance.

Governance, Transparency, Economic growth, Gross domestic product, Productivity, Investment

Abstract:
Investor confidence is a necessary condition for the development of emerging markets. Investors recognize that since market-oriented reform policies may be reversed or hindered, they face the risk of ex post policy changes with redistributive impact on investment returns. We argue that a sustained privatization or liberalization program represents a major test of political commitment, and contributes to reduced policy risk. The evidence from our panel study suggests that progress in privatization gradually leads to increased confidence. Moreover, increased confidence has a strong effect on local market development and is a significant determinant of excess returns. We conclude that, just as financial liberalization, the resolution of policy risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the broadening and deepening of emerging stock markets.

International financial markets, privatisation, financial liberalization

Abstract:
This paper links the current sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the rapid expansion of this market. We show that lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house price increases. We also find that the underlying market structure mattered, with entry of new, large lenders triggering declines in lending standards by incumbent banks. Finally, lending standards declined more in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator models based on asymmetric information, and shed light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability.

Working Paper, Credit expansion, Loans, Housing, Industrial structure, Financial instruments, Moral hazard

Abstract:
The goals of financial restructuring are to reestablish the creditor-debtor relationships on which the economy depends for an efficient allocation of capital, and to accomplish that objective at minimal cost. Costs include direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance and the indirect costs to the economy that result from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven review cases in which countries used alternative mechanisms to restructure their financial and corporate sectors. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market-based mechanisms, and government-managed programs. Market-based strategies seek to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers to enable them to renegotiate debt and resume new credit supply. Government-led restructuring strategies often include the establishment of an entity to which nonperforming loans are transferred or the government's sale of financial institutions, sometimes to foreign entrants. Market-based mechanisms can, in principle, resolve coordination problems that countries face in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, with acceptably low direct and indirect costs, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity. However, these mechanisms depend for their success on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and a lack of corruption in implementation. Government-managed programs may not seem to depend as much on efficient legal and supervisory institutions for their success, but in fact these approaches, in particular the transfer of assets to government-owned asset management companies, also depend on effective legal, regulatory, and political institutions for their success. Further, a lack of attention to incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. These results suggest that policymakers in emerging market economies with weak institutions should not expect to achieve the same level of success in financial restructuring as other countries, and that they should design resolution mechanisms accordingly. Despite the theoretical attraction of some complex market-based mechanisms, simpler mechanisms that afford quick resolution of outstanding debts that improve financial system competitiveness, and that offer little discretion to governments, are most effective.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector and Operations Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the containment and resolution of financial crises.

Abstract:
I use panel data on a large number of firms in 13 developing countries to find out whether financial liberalization relaxes financing constraints of firms. I find that liberalization affects small and large firms differently. Small firms are financially constrained before the start of the liberalization process, but become less so after liberalization. Financing constraints of large firms, however, are low before financial liberalization, but become higher as financial liberalization proceeds. I hypothesize that financial liberalization has adverse effects on the financing constraints of large firms, because these firms had better access to preferential directed credit during the period before financial liberalization.

Abstract:
This paper uses panel data on a large number of firms in 13 developing countries to find out whether financial liberalization relaxes financing constraints of firms. We find that liberalization affects small and large firms differently. Small firms are financially constrained before the start of the liberalization process, but become less so after liberalization. Financing constraints of large firms, however, are low before financial liberalization, but become higher as financial liberalization proceeds. We hypothesize that financial liberalization has adverse effects on the financing constraints of large firms, because these firms had better access to preferential directed credit during the period before financial liberalization.

Abstract:
Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, we offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. We identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, we also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.

Transition economies, institutions, economic development

Abstract:
Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, the authors offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. They identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition by influencing the political structure and process during the initial years. Their empirical analysis shows that countries that are more reliant on natural resources and spent a longer time under socialist governments are more likely to see former communists remain in power and to start the transition process with less open political systems, with negative repercussions for the development of market-compatible institutions. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, the authors also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.

Transition economies, Institutions, economic development

Abstract:
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally "high entry" industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. The consequences of more restrictive entry barriers are seen, not in young firms, but in older firms, who grow more slowly and to a smaller size. Thus the absence of the disciplining effect of entry has real adverse effects. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse effect on entry in corrupt countries, only in less corrupt ones. Taken together, the evidence suggests bureaucratic entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. However, not all regulations inhibit entry. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do more R&D or industries that need more external finance.

Entry, Regulations

Abstract:
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value-added per employee in naturally 'high entry' industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse effect on entry in corrupt countries, only in less corrupt ones. Taken together, the evidence suggests bureaucratic entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. Not all regulations inhibit entry, however. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do more R&D or industries that need more external finance.

Business entry, regulation

Abstract:
Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value added per employee in naturally "high entry" industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse effect on entry in corrupt countries, only in less corrupt ones. Taken together, the evidence suggests bureaucratic entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. However, not all regulations inhibit entry. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do more R&D or industries that need more external finance.

Abstract:
This paper identifies factors that influence decisions about a country`s financial safety net, using a comprehensive dataset covering 180 countries during the 1960-2003 period. Our analysis focuses on how private interest-group pressures, outside influences, and political-institutional factors affect deposit-insurance adoption and design. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks, quality of bank regulations, and institutional development, we find that both private and public interests, as well as outside influences to emulate developed-country regulatory schemes, can explain the timing of adoption decisions and the rigor of loss-control arrangements. Controlling for other factors, political systems that facilitate intersectoral power sharing dispose a country toward design features that accommodate risk-shifting by banks.

Abstract:
The authors seek to identify factors that influence decisions about a country's financial safety net, using a new dataset on 170 countries covering the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, they focus on how outside influences, economic development, crisis pressures, and political institutions affect deposit insurance adoption and design. Controlling for the influence of economic characteristics and events such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development, they find that pressure to emulate developed-country regulatory frameworks and power-sharing political institutions dispose a country toward adopting design features that inadequately control risk-shifting.

Banks & Banking Reform, Economic Theory & Research, Financial Intermediation, Insurance & Risk Mitigation, Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring

Abstract:
This paper investigates the factors that determine a country's decision to adopt explicit deposit insurance using data on 170 countries over the 1960-2003 period. Specifically, we focus on the role played by outside influences and internal political factors both in adopting deposit insurance and crafting its design. Our results indicate that the desire to emulate developed-country regulatory brameworks, and having a more-democratic political system make adoption and generous design more likely, even after we control for a large number of country characteristics and events, such as macroeconomic shocks, occurrence and severity of crises, and institutional development.

Deposit Insurance, Bank Regulation, Political Economy, Institutions

Abstract:
This paper examines whether financial development boosts the growth of small firms more than large firms and hence provides information on the mechanisms through which financial development fosters aggregate economic growth. We define an industry's technological firm size as the firm size implied by industry specific production technologies, including capital intensities and scale economies. Using cross-industry, cross-country data, the results indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately large effect on the growth of industries that are technologically more dependent on small firms. This suggests that financial development accelerates economic growth by removing growth constraints on small firms and also implies that financial development has sectoral as well as aggregate growth ramifications.

Firm size, financial development, economic growth

Abstract:
This paper presents evidence of banks using accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. In particular, we show that the stock market applies far greater discounts to a bank's real estate loans and mortgage-backed securities than are implicit in the book values of these assets, especially following the onset of the U.S. mortgage crisis. This suggests that bank balance sheets overvalue real estate related assets during economic slowdowns. Estimated discounts are smaller for distressed banks, as these banks derive relatively large benefits from the financial safety net to offset asset impairment. We also find that bank share prices, especially for banks with large exposures to mortgage-backed securities, react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair value accounting. Banks with large exposures to mortgage-backed securities are also found to provision less for bad loans. Finally, we find that banks, and especially distressed banks, use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities so as to inflate the book value of these securities. Our results provide several pieces of compelling evidence that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks, especially for banks with large exposures to real estate loans and mortgage-backed securities, and suggest that recent changes that relax fair value accounting may further distort this picture.

accounting standards, bank regulation, fair value accounting, financial crisis, mortgage-backed securities, real estate loans

Abstract:
This paper presents evidence of banks using accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. In particular, we show that the stock market applies far greater discounts to a bank’s real estate loans and mortgage-backed securities than are implicit in the book values of these assets, especially following the onset of the U.S. mortgage crisis. This suggests that bank balance sheets overvalue real estate related assets during economic slowdowns. Estimated discounts are smaller for distressed banks, as these banks derive relatively large benefits from the financial safety net to offset asset impairment. We also find that bank share prices, especially for banks with large exposures to mortgage-backed securities, react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair value accounting. Banks with large exposures to mortgage-backed securities are also found to provision less for bad loans. Finally, we find that banks, and especially distressed banks, use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities so as to inflate the book value of these securities. Our results provide several pieces of compelling evidence that banks’ balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks, especially for banks with large exposures to real estate loans and mortgage-backed securities, and suggest that recent changes that relax fair value accounting may further distort this picture.

bank regulation, accounting standards, fair value accounting, real estate loans, mortgage-backed securities, financial crisis

Abstract:
We study differences in the use of two corporate governance provisions - cumulative voting and proxy by mail voting - in a sample of 224 firms located in four Eastern European countries. We find a significant relationship between ownership structure and the use of corporate governance provisions. Firms with a controlling owner (owning more than 50% of shares) are less likely to adopt either of the two provisions.

However, firms that have large, minority shareholders are more likely to adopt these provisions. We do not find any significant relationship between the use of these provisions and foreign ownership. Our results suggest that the decision to adopt these corporate governance provisions is influenced by large, minority shareholders in their battle for representation on the board and in managerial decisions.

Abstract:
Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner investigate the link between financial crises and industry growth. They analyze data from 19 industrial and developing countries that have experienced financial crises during the past 30 years to investigate how financial crises affect sectors dependent on external sources of finance. Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of a financial crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the depth of the financial system. They find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a greater contraction of value added during a crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. They hypothesize that the deepening of the financial system allows sectors dependent on external finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal periods, so a crisis in such countries would have a disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent sectors. In contrast, since externally dependent firms tend to obtain relatively less external financing in shallower financial systems (and hence have relatively lower growth rates in such countries during normal times), a crisis in such countries has less of a disproportionately negative effect on the growth of externally dependent sectors.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between financial development and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org, dklingebiel@worldbank.org, or randy.kroszner@gsb.uchicago.edu.

Abstract:
Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven analyze the role of institutions in resolving systemic banking crises for a broad sample of countries. Banking crises are fiscally costly, especially when policies like substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantees on financial institutions' liabilities, and forbearance from prudential regulations are used. Higher fiscal outlays do not, however, accelerate the recovery from a crisis. Better institutions - less corruption, improved law and order, legal system, and bureaucracy - do. The authors find these results to be relatively robust to estimation techniques, including controlling for the effects of a poor institutional environment on the likelihood of financial crisis and the size of fiscal costs. Their results suggest that countries should use strict policies to resolve a crisis and use the crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also help avoid future systemic crises.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study financial crisis resolution.

Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of bank regulations, concentration, inflation, and national institutions on bank net interest margins using data from over 1,400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bank-specific characteristics. The data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost net interest margins. Inflation also exerts a robust, positive impact on bank margins. While concentration is positively associated with net interest margins, this relationship breaks down when controlling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation. Furthermore, bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection, while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross-bank net interest margins. So, bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation. They reflect broad, national approaches to private property and competition.

This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the impact of bank concentration and competition.

Abstract:
Banks restructured after East Asia's crisis of 1997 - most of them family-owned or company-owned and almost never foreign-owned - tended to be heavy risk takers. Most of them had excessive credit growth.

Laeven uses a linear programming technique (data envelopment analysis) to estimate the inefficiencies of banks in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. He applies this technique to the
precrisis period 1992-96.

Assessing a bank's overall performance requires assessing both efficiency and risk factors, so Laeven also introduces a measure of risk taking.

This risk measure helps predict which banks were restructured after the crisis of 1997.

Laeven finds that foreign-owned banks took little risk relative to other banks in East Asia, and that family-owned and company-owned banks were among the highest risk takers.

Banks restructured after the 1997 crisis had excessive credit growth, were mostly family-owned or company-owned, and were almost never foreign-owned.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the causes and resolution of financial distress. The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Working Paper, Corporate governance

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Abstract:
During a crisis of confidence, announcements of deposit guarantees may give market participants short-term comfort. But stock market responses show that using public funds for bank bailouts is not a credible way to restore the health of the financial sector.

The East Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997 when an ailing financial sector, a slowdown in exports, and large increases in central bank credit to weak financial institutions triggered a run on the baht. Then the crisis spread to other countries in the region as common vulnerabilities and revaluations of risk in emerging markets triggered large capital outflows.

To better understand the impact of different policy responses to financial crises, Klingebiel, Kroszner, Laeven, and van Oijen investigate how stock markets in East Asian countries reacted to the initial policy announcements of bank and financial restructuring - especially how banking and nonfinancial sectors in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand fared in response to announcements of different restructuring measures.

They find that prices of bank stocks responded positively to announcements about government guarantees of bank liabilities. Nonfinancial companies gained in value when guarantees were announced, but their stock prices were negatively affected by announcements favoring public recapitalization schemes and generous liquidity support programs.

Possibly the market was concerned that public funds per se would not restore the health of the financial sector - that they would not be sufficient or would not be used to restructure bank balance sheets and operations and allow banks to engage in meaningful corporate restructuring. The announcements of increased public support may have been viewed as a signal that the financial institutions were in a financially weaker position than previously thought.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to better understand the costs and benefits of different measures for resolving financial crisies. The authors may be contacted at dklingebiel@worldbank.org or llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.

G21, L11, L14

Abstract:
Recent theoretical models argue that a bank's organizational structure reflects its lending technology. A hierarchically organized bank will employ mainly hard information, whereas a decentralized bank will rely more on soft information. We investigate theoretically and empirically how bank organization shapes banking competition. Our theoretical model illustrates how a lending bank's geographical reach and loan pricing strategy is determined not only by its own organizational structure but also by organizational choices made by its rivals. We take our model to the data by estimating the impact of the lending and rival banks' organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a singular, large bank in Belgium. We employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans granted to small firms, comprising the entire loan portfolio of this large bank, and information on the organizational structure of all rival banks located in the vicinity of the borrower. We find that the organizational structures of both the rival banks and the lending bank matter for branch reach and loan pricing. The geographical footprint of the lending bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized. Such rival banks may rely more on hard information. Geographical reach increases when rival banks have inferior communication technology, have a wider span of organization, and are further removed from a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks' size and the number of layers to a decision unit also soften spatial pricing. We conclude that the organizational structure and technology of rival banks in the vicinity influence local banking competition.

banking sector, bank size, competition, mode of organization, hierarchies, authority, technology

Abstract:
Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.

deposit insurance, risk shifting

Abstract:
The degree of risk taking by a bank is related to the size of the gross subsidy that has been extended to the bank by the safety net. This subsidy can be calculated by applying a technique that models deposit insurance as a put option on the bank's assets.

Laeven calculates gross safety net subsidies for a large sample of banks in 12 countries to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and certain bank characteristics. He finds that gross safety net subsidies are higher for banks that have concentrated ownership, that are affiliated with a business group, that are small, or that have high credit growth, and for banks in countries with low GDP per capita, high inflation, or poor quality and enforcement of the legal system. These findings suggest that the moral hazard behavior of a bank depends on its institutional environment and its corporate governance structure.

Laeven also presents a matrix that shows estimates of safety net subsidies for a range of given combinations of equity volatilities and equity-to-deposit ratios. These figures could be used as input to an early warning system for both individual and systemic banking problems.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the performance and risks of banks. The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

G32, G34

Abstract:
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Corporate Governance, Large shareholders, Blockholders

Abstract:
Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. We examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the legal system using data from Mexico. We combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Our data allow us to focus on the differential impact of the legal system on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of legal verdicts. We find that Mexican states with more effective legal systems have larger firms. A one standard deviation improvement in the quality of the legal system increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the legal system is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better legal systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk faced by owners. All of these findings are upheld when we instrument for the institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

Abstract:
This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-country differences in design, and synthesizes the policy messages from cross-country empirical work as well as individual country experiences. The paper develops practical lessons from this work and distills the evidence into a set of principles of good design. Cross-country empirical research and individual-country experience confirm that, for at least the time being, officials in many countries would do well to delay the installation of a deposit insurance system.

Banks & Banking Reform, Financial Intermediation, Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring, Insurance & Risk Mitigation, Non Bank Financial Institutions

Abstract:
In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.

Banking crisis, Loan guarantees, Risk management, Liquidity, Bank credit, Financial systems, Moral hazard

Abstract:
Laeven aims to provide guidelines for the pricing of deposit insurance in different countries. He presents several methodologies that can be used to set benchmarks for the pricing level of deposit insurance in a country, and quantifies how specific design features affect the cost of deposit insurance.

The author makes several contributions to our understanding of what drives the price of deposit insurance. For example, he shows how risk diversification and risk differentiation within a deposit insurance system can reduce the price of deposit insurance. Laeven also finds that deposit insurance is underpriced in many countries around the world, notably in several developing countries. More important, his estimates suggest that many countries cannot afford deposit insurance.

Deposit insurance is unlikely to be a viable option in a country with weak banks and institutions. The author does not recommend a funded deposit insurance scheme, but rather he argues that for countries that have adopted or are adopting deposit insurance and have decided to pre-fund it, pricing it as accurately as possible is important.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the costs and benefits of deposit insurance. The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
There is a wide cross-country variation in the institutional structure of bank failure resolution, including the role of the deposit insurer. The authors use quantitative analysis for 57 countries and discuss specific country cases to illustrate this variation. Using data for over 1,700 banks across 57 countries, they show that banks in countries where the deposit insurer has the responsibility of intervening failed banks and the power to revoke membership in the deposit insurance scheme are more stable and less likely to become insolvent. Involvement of the deposit insurer in bank failure resolution thus dampens the negative effect that deposit insurance has on banks' risk taking.

Banks & Banking Reform, Financial Crisis Management & Restructuring, Financial Intermediation, Corporate Law, Insurance & Risk Mitigation

Abstract:
This paper presents a model of a multinational firm's optimal debt policy that incorporates international taxation factors. The model yields the prediction that a multinational firm's indebtedness in a country depends on a weighted average of national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter because multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested using a novel firm-level dataset for European multinationals and their subsidiaries, combined with newly collected data on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Our empirical results show that corporate debt policy indeed not only reflects domestic corporate tax rates but also differences in international tax systems. These findings contribute to our understanding of how corporate debt policy is set in an international context.

Debt, Tax rates, Tax policy, Capital, Economic models

Abstract:
This paper presents a model that relates a multinational firm's optimal debt policy to taxation and to non-tax factors such as the desire to prevent bankruptcy. The model yields the predictions that a multinational's indebtedness in a country depends on national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested with the aid of a broad European data set combining firm-level data and information on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Corporate debt policy indeed appears to reflect national corporate tax rates and international corporate tax rate differences but not non-resident dividend withholding taxes.

Corporate taxation, financial structure, debt shifting

Abstract:
This paper presents a model that relates a multinational firm's optimal debt policy to taxation and to non-tax factors such as the desire to prevent bankruptcy. The model yields the predictions that a multinational's indebtedness in a country depends on national tax rates and differences between national and foreign tax rates. These differences matter as multinationals have an incentive to shift debt to high-tax countries. The predictions of the model are tested with the aid of a broad European data set combining firm-level data and information on the international tax treatment of dividend and interest streams. Corporate debt policy indeed appears to reflect national corporate tax rates and international corporate tax rate differences but not nonresident dividend withholding taxes.

corporate taxation, financial structure, debt shifting

Abstract:
Claessens and Laeven analyze how property rights affect the allocation of firms' available resources among different types of assets. In particular, they investigate empirically for a large number of countries whether firms in environments with more secure property rights allocate available resources more toward intangible assets and consequentially grow faster.

The authors find that improved asset allocation due to better property rights has an effect on growth in sectoral value added equal to improved access to financing arising from greater financial development. The results are robust, using various samples and specifications, including controlling for growth opportunities.

This paper - a product of the Policy Division, Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between finance and growth.

Abstract:
In countries with more secure property rights, firms might allocate resources better and consequentially grow faster as the returns on different types of assets are more protected against competitors' actions. Using data on sectoral value added for a large number of countries, we find evidence consistent with better property rights leading to higher growth through improved asset allocation. Quantitatively, the growth effect is as large as that of improved access to financing due to greater financial development. Our results are robust using various samples and specifications, including controlling for growth opportunities.

Abstract:
Employment in developing countries is disproportionately concentrated in very small firms. Laeven and Woodruff examine the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the legal system using data from Mexico. They combine Lucas' (1978) model of firm size with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love's (2001) consideration of idiosyncratic risk in a framework in which the distribution of entrepreneurial talent and aversion to idiosyncratic risk combine to determine the optimal size of firms. Their data allows them to focus on the differential impact of the legal system on proprietorships and corporations. Moreover, by focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of variation in the administration of justice and the enforcement of legal verdicts. The authors find that Mexican states with more effective legal systems have larger firms. A one-standard deviation improvement in the quality of the legal system increases the average firm size by about 10-15 percent. The impact of the legal system is greatest in sectors in which proprietorships dominate. This pattern is consistent with better legal systems increasing the investment of firm owners by reducing the idiosyncratic risk they face. All of these findings are upheld when the authors instrument for institutional variables using the log of indigenous population in 1900 and the active presence of the drug trade in the state.

This paper - a product of Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the governance of firms.

Abstract:
This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.

Accounting, Asset management, Asset prices, Bank accounting, Bank regulations, Banks, Financial crisis, Housing prices, Investment, Liquidity management, Real estate prices

Abstract:
Financial liberalization reduces imperfections in financial markets by reducing the agency costs of financial leverage. Small firms gain most from liberalization, because the favoritism of preferential credit directed to large firms tends to disappear under liberalization.

Laeven uses panel data on 394 firms in 13 developing countries for the years 1988-98 to learn whether financial liberalization relaxes financing constraints on firms. He finds that liberalization affects small and large firms differently.

Small firms are financially constrained before liberalization begins but become less so after liberalization. The financing constraints on large firms, however, are low both before and after liberalization. The initial difference between small and large firms disappears over time.

Laeven hypothesizes that financial liberalization has little effect on the financing constraints of large firms because they have better access to preferential directed credit in the period before liberalization.

Financial liberalization also reduces imperfections in financial markets, especially the asymmetric information costs of firms' financial leverage.

Countries that liberalize their financial sectors tend to see dramatic improvements in political climate as well. Successful financial liberalization seems to require both the political will and the ability to stop the preferential treatment of well-connected, usually large, firms.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the benefits and risks of financial liberalization. The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
During a crisis of confidence, announcements of deposit guarantees may give market participants short-term comfort. But stock market responses show that using public funds for bank bailouts is not a credible way to restore the health of the financial sector.
The East Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997 when an ailing financial sector, a slowdown in exports, and large increases in central bank credit to weak financial institutions triggered a run on the baht. Then the crisis spread to other countries in the region as common vulnerabilities and revaluations of risk in emerging markets triggered large capital outflows.
To better understand the impact of different policy responses to financial crises, Klingebiel, Kroszner, Laeven, and van Oijen investigate how stock markets in East Asian countries reacted to the initial policy announcements of bank and financial restructuring—especially how banking and nonfinancial sectors in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand fared in response to announcements of different restructuring measures.
They find that prices of bank stocks responded positively to announcements about government guarantees of bank liabilities. Nonfinancial companies gained in value when guarantees were announced, but their stock prices were negatively affected by announcements favoring public recapitalization schemes and generous liquidity support programs.
Possibly the market was concerned that public funds per se would not restore the health of the financial sector—that they would not be sufficient or would not be used to restructure bank balance sheets and operations and allow banks to engage in meaningful corporate restructuring. The announcements of increased public support may have been viewed as a signal that the financial institutions were in a financially weaker position than previously thought.
This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to better understand the costs and benefits of different measures for resolving financial crisies. The authors may be contacted at dklingebiel@worldbank.org or llaeven@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
Laeven uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study deposit insurance systems.

Abstract:
Laeven and Majnoni investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks' lending spreads for a large cross section of countries. They measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at an aggregate level, and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks. The authors find that - after controlling for a number of other country characteristics - judicial efficiency, in addition to inflation, is the main driver of interest rate spreads across countries. This suggests that in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in a country, judicial reforms, through a better enforcement of legal contracts, are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms.

This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the determinants of access to finance and the cost of credit.

Abstract:
Using a large international firm-level data set, we estimate separate effects of host and parent country taxation on the location decisions of multinational firms. Both types of taxation are estimated to have a negative impact on the location of new foreign subsidiaries. In fact, the impact of parent country taxation is estimated to be relatively large, possibly reflecting its international discriminatory nature. For the cross-section of multinational firms, we find that parent firms tend to be located in countries with a relatively low taxation of foreign-source income. Overall, our results show that parent-country taxation - despite the general possibility of deferral of taxation until income repatriation - is instrumental in shaping the structure of multinational enterprise.

corporate taxation, dividend withholding taxation, location decisions

Abstract:
We model technological and financial innovation as reflecting the decisions of profit maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs earn monopoly profits by inventing better goods and financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the model is that financiers also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially profitable process of innovation: Financiers can invent more effective processes for screening entrepreneurs. Every existing screening process, however, becomes less effective as technology advances. Consequently, technological innovation and, thus, economic growth stop unless financiers continually innovate. Historical observations and empirical evidence are more consistent with this dynamic model of financial innovation and endogenous growth than with existing models of financial development and growth.

Invention, Economic Growth, Corporate Finance, Financial Institutions, Technological Change, Entrepreneurship

Abstract:
We review the literature on resolving bank and corporate sector crises to identify government policies that affect the depth of a crisis and the ease and sustainability of recovery, and to analyze their fiscal cost. A consistent framework - including sufficient resources for loss-absorption and private agents facing the right framework of sticks and carrots - is the, although often missing key to successful bank and corporate restructuring. Sustainability of restructuring calls for deeper structural reforms, which often requires dealing with political economy factors up-front. Using data for 687 corporations from eight crisis countries, we find empirically that a package of specific resolution measures can help accelerate the recovery from a crisis. These policies, however, come with significant fiscal costs.

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities and indicate that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium.

Abstract:
This Paper investigates how the legal framework not only affects the amount of external financing available, but also firms' resource allocation among different types of assets. Using a simple model, we show that in a weaker legal environment a firm will get less financing, and thus invest less, but also invest less in intangible assets. Empirically, these two effects appear to be equally important drivers of growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries and using a number of robustness tests. Using individual firm data, we find further supporting evidence as weaker legal frameworks are associated with relatively more fixed assets, but less long-term financing for a given amount of fixed assets.

Economic growth, intangible assets, financial development, property rights

Abstract:
This paper investigates the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external sources of finance to analyze the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. If the banking system is the key element allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system where such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. On average, in a country experiencing a banking crisis, a sector at the 75th percentile of external dependence and located in a country at the 75th percentile of private credit to GDP would experience a 1.6 percent greater contraction in growth in value added between the crisis and pre-crisis period than a sector at the 25th percentile of external dependence and private credit to GDP. This effect is sizeable compared with an overall mean decline in growth of 3.5 percent between these two periods. Our results, however, do not suggest that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.

banking and financial crises, financing constraints, financial development, credit channel

Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities and indicate that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium.

Corporate diversification, banking, economies of scope, agency costs

Abstract:
Investor confidence in reliable property rights and stable, market-oriented policies are a necessary condition for financial integration and the development of emerging stock markets. Announced market-oriented policies may be reversed, however, and are initially not fully credible. We argue that sustained privatization and liberalization programmes represent a major test of political commitment to safer private property rights. We investigate whether successful privatization has a significant effect on emerging stock market development through the resolution of policy risk, i.e. the risk of ex post policy changes with redistributive impact on investment returns. The evidence from our panel study suggests that progress in privatization gradually leads to increased confidence. Moreover, increased confidence has a strong effect on local market development and is a significant determinant of excess returns. We conclude that financial liberalization and the resolution of policy risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the broadening and deepening of emerging stock markets.

Financial integration, liberalization, stock market development, political risk, privatization, emerging market

Abstract:
This paper studies the relationship between the recent boom and current delinquencies in the subprime mortgage market. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which this relationship can be explained by a decrease in lending standards that is unrelated to improvements in underlying economic fundamentals. We find evidence of a decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the number of loan applications. We also find that the underlying market structure of the mortgage industry mattered, with larger declines in lending standards being associated with increases in the number of competing lenders. Finally, increased ability to securitize mortgages appears to have affected lender behaviour, with lending standards experiencing greater declines in areas with higher mortgage securitization rates. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions from recent financial accelerator models based on asymmetric information, and shed some light on the underlying causes and characteristics of the current crisis in the subprime mortgage market.

credit boom, financial accelerators, lending standards, moral hazard, mortgages, subprime loans

Abstract:
We model technological and financial innovation as reflecting the decisions of profit maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs earn monopoly profits by inventing better goods and financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the model is that financiers also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially profitable process of innovation: Financiers can invent more effective processes for screening entrepreneurs. Every existing screening process, however, becomes less effective as technology advances. Consequently, technological innovation and, thus, economic growth stop unless financiers continually innovate. Historical observations and empirical evidence are more consistent with this dynamic model of financial innovation and endogenous growth than with existing models of financial development and growth.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Abstract:
Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.

Abstract:
Sovereign wealth funds have emerged as an important investor of global equity, attracting growing attention. Despite concerns that sovereign wealth fund investments may serve political objectives and be in conflict with national interests, little is known about the investment objectives and performance of sovereign wealth funds. We collect new data on foreign equity investments by sovereign wealth funds. We find that sovereign wealth funds largely invest to diversify away from industries at home but that they do so predominantly in countries that share the same culture, suggesting their investment rules are not entirely driven by profit maximizing objectives. Share prices of firms respond favorably when sovereign investment funds acquire stakes, in part because these investments often take place when firms are in financial distress. However, the long-run performance of equity investments by sovereign wealth funds tends to be poor, consistent with imperfect portfolio diversification and poor corporate governance.

Asset allocation, Corporate governance, Sovereign wealth funds

Abstract:
The conduct of business activities in two or more countries creates opportunities for international profit shifting, while international tax rate differences create incentives. Using detailed information on both multinational firm structure and the international tax system, this paper examines the extent of intra-European profit shifting by European multinationals. Firm-level estimates of profit shifting can be aggregated to arrive at macro measures of international profit shifting. On average, we find a macro semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate of 1.43 in Europe, while shifting costs are estimated to be 1.6 percent of the tax base. International profit shifting leads to a substantial redistribution of national corporate tax revenues. Many European nations appear to gain revenues from intra-European profit shifting by multinationals largely at the expense of Germany.

Corporate taxation, international profit shifting

Abstract:
Using a large international firm-level data set, we estimate separate effects of host and parent country taxation on the location decisions of multinational firms. Both types of taxation are estimated to have a negative impact on the location of new foreign subsidiaries. In fact, the impact of parent country taxation is estimated to be relatively large, possibly reflecting its international discriminatory nature. For the cross-section of multinational firms, we find that parent firms tend to be located in countries with a relatively low taxation of foreign-source income. Overall, our results show that parent-country taxation - despite the general possibility of deferral of taxation until income repatriation - is instrumental in shaping the structure of multinational enterprise.

corporate taxation, dividend withholding taxation, location decisions

Abstract:
We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we distinguish between governance provisions that are set at the country-level and those that are adopted at the firm-level. We find that governance provisions adopted by firms beyond those imposed by regulations and common practices among firms in the country have a strong, positive effect on firm valuation. Our results indicate that, despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond what can be considered the norm in the country, and these improvements in corporate governance have a positive effect on firm valuation. These findings contribute to the current debate on the extent to which corporate governance reform can be left to the "invisible hand" of the market or requires government interference.

corporate governance, firm valuation, government policy, laissez faire

Abstract:
Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the microeconomic effects of institutionalized saving on ownership structure, corporate governance and performance of listed companies. First, the Swedish pension reform increased the participation of pension funds in the domestic stock market and caused a significant reshuffling in the ownership of the existing pension funds. Second, the availability of detailed data on firm ownership allows us to document the effects of the pension reform. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. In particular, we find that firm performance improves if large independent private pension funds and public pension funds increase their equity stakes in the firm, but not if smaller pension funds and pension funds related to financial institutions and industrial groups increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.

Control premium, Controlling shareholders, Dual class shares, Pension funds

Abstract:
Recent theoretical models argue that a bank's organizational structure reflects its lending technology. A hierarchically organized bank will employ mainly hard information, whereas a decentralized bank will rely more on soft information. We investigate theoretically and empirically how bank organization shapes banking competition. Our theoretical model illustrates how a lending bank's geographical reach and loan pricing strategy is determined not only by its own organizational structure but also by organizational choices made by its rivals. We take our model to the data by estimating the impact of the lending and rival banks' organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a singular, large bank in Belgium. We employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans granted to small firms, comprising the entire loan portfolio of this large bank, and information on the organizational structure of all rival banks located in the vicinity of the borrower. We find that the organizational structures of both the rival banks and the lending bank matter for branch reach and loan pricing. The geographical footprint of the lending bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized. Such rival banks may rely more on hard information. Geographical reach increases when rival banks have inferior communication technology, have a wider span of organization, and are further removed from a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks' size and the number of layers to a decision unit also soften spatial pricing. We conclude that the organizational structure and technology of rival banks in the vicinity influence local banking competition.

authority, banking sector, competition, hierarchies, technology

Abstract:
We model technological and financial innovation as reflecting the decisions of profit maximizing agents and explore the implications for economic growth. We start with a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs earn monopoly profits by inventing better goods and financiers arise to screen entrepreneurs. A novel feature of the model is that financiers also engage in the costly, risky, and potentially profitable process of innovation: Financiers can invent more effective processes for screening entrepreneurs. Every existing screening process, however, becomes less effective as technology advances. Consequently, technological innovation and, thus, economic growth stop unless financiers continually innovate. Historical observations and empirical evidence are more consistent with this dynamic model of financial innovation and endogenous growth than with existing models of financial development and growth.

Corporate Finance, Economic Growth, Entrepreneurship, Financial Institutions, Invention, Technological change

Abstract:
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don't around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of GDP per annum.

Campaign Contributions, Elections, Rent-seeking, Preferential Lending

Abstract:
We develop a model of insider lending in which a borrower can give incentives to a bank manager to misuse his right of control by extending a loan at favorable rates to the borrower at the expense of the equity value of the bank. The model explains why insider loans often occur to borrowing firms that are also large shareholders of the bank. The reason is that, although in principal every borrower could bribe the bank manager for insider loans, large shareholders have the power to fire the bank manager, and will use this power if the bank manager extends insider loans to others. Therefore, a bank manager has a reason to favor large shareholders if engaging into insider lending. Using a World Bank survey of Russian enterprises we provide evidence of our model. We find that Russian firms and banks engaged into insider lending on the basis of loan volume. To limit insider lending we propose to give proper incentives to bank managers, such as high penalties or equity incentive schemes.

Insider lending, bank ownership