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Robert N. Stavins's
Scholarly Papers
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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21 Dec 99
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18 May 04
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2,063 (1,340)
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Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics focuses exclusively on the second component, the means - the "instruments" - of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: charge systems; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Within charge systems, I consider: effluent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, insurance premium taxes, sales taxes, administrative charges, and tax differentiation. Within tradable permit systems, I consider both credit programs and cap-and-trade systems. Under the heading of reducing market frictions, I examine: market creation, liability rules, and information programs. Finally, under reducing government subsidies, I review a number of specific examples from around the world. By defining market-based instruments broadly, I cast a large net for this review of applications. As a consequence, the review is extensive. But this should not leave the impression that market-based instruments have replaced, or have come anywhere close to replacing, the conventional, command-and-control approach to environmental protection. Further, even where these approaches have been used in their purest form and with some success, such as in the case of tradable-permit systems in the United States, they have not always performed as anticipated. In the final part of the paper, I ask what lessons can be learned from our experiences. In particular, I consider normative lessons for: design and implementation; analysis of prospective and adopted systems; and identification of new applications.
Environmental Policy, Market-based Instruments, Economic-incentive Instruments
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Alexander Pfaff Duke University -- Policy, Economics, Environment
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09 Aug 99
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30 Nov 03
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This is the latest version of a document periodically produced since the early 1980's. It combines an outline of the field of natural resource and environmental economics with a bibliography of 945 references. In the past, this reading list has been used in a variety of ways: as a guide to the literature for graduate students in departments of economics which do not offer a Ph.D.-level survey course of the field; as a resource for Ph.D. students who wish to develop a directed readings course in the field; and as an aid to students at the masters and undergraduate levels who wish to explore selected areas in greater depth.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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09 Oct 00
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30 Nov 03
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Global climate change ? perhaps even more than other environmental problems ? can be addressed successfully only with a solid understanding of its economic dimensions. This paper, prepared as an introduction to the economics section of a forthcoming book from the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, provides a primer for non-economists on how economic analysis can be brought to bear on three broad questions: what will be the benefits of global climate policies; what will be their costs; and how can this information about alternative policies be assimilated in ways that are ultimately most useful for decision makers? Because of the magnitude of the anticipated benefits and costs of addressing the threat of global climate change, its great time horizons, massive uncertainties, and physical and economic irreversibilities, public policy in this area presents significant challenges to economic research. Nevertheless, a firm foundation is provided by the existing literature from nearly three decades of theoretical and empirical economic analysis.
global climate change, benefit-cost analysis, cost effectiveness, distributional equity, interngenerational equity
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Environmental Economics
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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03 Feb 05
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21 Jan 08
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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05 Nov 07
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21 Jan 08
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This article provides an overview of the economics of environmental policy, including the setting of goals and targets, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. Also reviewed are the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, featuring an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional command-and-control mechanisms and market-based instruments.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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03 Feb 05
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03 Feb 05
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This article, prepared for the forthcoming 2nd edition of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, provides an overview of the economics of environmental policy. Included are the setting of goals and targets, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. Also reviewed are the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, featuring an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional command-and-control mechanisms and market-based instruments.
environmental economics, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, benefit-cost analysis, market-based instruments, tradeable permits
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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03 Feb 05
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03 Feb 05
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This article, prepared for the forthcoming 2nd edition of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, provides an overview of the economics of environmental policy. Included are the setting of goals and targets, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. Also reviewed are the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, featuring an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional command-and-control mechanisms and market-based instruments.
environmental economics, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, benefit-cost analysis, market-based instruments, tradeable permits, pollution taxes
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Environmental Law and Policy
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Richard L. Revesz New York University - School of Law Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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27 May 04
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22 Jan 08
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Richard L. Revesz New York University - School of Law Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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05 Nov 07
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22 Jan 08
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This chapter for the Handbook of Law and Economics provides an economic perspective of environmental law and policy. We examine the ends of environmental policy, that is, the setting of goals and targets, beginning with normative issues, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. We examine this analytical method in detail, including its theoretical foundations and empirical methods of estimation of compliance costs and environmental benefits. We review critiques of benefit-cost analysis, and examine alternative approaches to analyzing the goals of environmental policies.
We examine the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, beginning with an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with particular focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional, command-and-control mechanisms, market-based instruments, and liability rules. Three cross-cutting issues receive attention: uncertainty; technological change; and distributional considerations. We identify normative lessons in regard to design, implementation, and the identification of new applications, and we examine positive issues: the historical dominance of command-and-control; the prevalence in new proposals of tradeable permits allocated without charge; and the relatively recent increase in attention given to market-based instruments.
We also examine the question of how environmental responsibility is and should be allocated among the various levels of government. We provide a positive review of the responsibilities of Federal, state, and local levels of government in the environmental realm, plus a normative assessment of this allocation of regulatory responsibility. We focus on three arguments that have been made for Federal environmental regulation: competition among political jurisdictions and the race to the bottom; transboundary environmental problems; and public choice and systematic bias.
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Richard L. Revesz New York University - School of Law Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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27 May 04
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16 Sep 04
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This paper provides an economic perspective of environmental law and policy with regard to both normative and positive dimensions. It begins with an examination of the central problem in environmental regulation: the tendency of pollution generators in an unconstrained market economy to externalize some of the costs of their production, leading to an inefficiently large amount of pollution. We examine the ends of environmental policy, that is, the setting of goals and targets, beginning with normative issues, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. We examine this analytical method in detail, including its theoretical foundations and empirical methods of estimation of compliance costs and environmental benefits. We include a review of critiques of benefit-cost analysis, briefly examine alternative approaches to analyzing the goals of environmental policies, and survey the efforts of the Federal governmental to employ these analytical methods. The paper also examines in detail the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, beginning with an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with particular focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional, command-and-control mechanisms, economic incentive or market-based instruments, and liability rules. In the economic-incentive category, we consider pollution charges, tradable permit systems, market friction reductions, and government subsidy reductions. Three cross-cutting issues receive attention: implications of uncertainty for instrument choice; effects of instrument choice on technological change; and distributional considerations. We identify a set of normative lessons in regard to design, implementation, and the identification of new applications, and we examine positive issues, including three phenomena: the historical dominance of command-and-control; the prevalence in new proposals of tradable permits allocated without charge; and the relatively recent increase in attention given to market-based instruments. Finally, the paper turns to the question of how environmental responsibility is and should be allocated among the various levels of government. We provide a positive review of the responsibilities of Federal, state, and local levels of government in the environmental realm, plus a normative assessment of this allocation of regulatory responsibility. We focus on three arguments that have been made for Federal environmental regulation: competition among political jurisdictions and the race to the bottom; transboundary environmental problems; and public choice and systematic bias.
environmental economics, environmental law, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, benefit-cost analysis, environmental federalism
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Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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10 Dec 99
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02 Jan 08
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792 (7,253)
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Enhanced energy efficiency occupies a central role in evaluating the efficacy and cost of climate change policies. Ultimately, total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the product of population, economic activity per capita, energy use per unit of economic activity, and the carbon intensity of energy used. Although greenhouse gas emissions can be limited by reducing economic activity, this option obviously has little appeal even to rich countries, let alone poor ones. Much attention has therefore been placed on the role that technological improvements can play in reducing carbon emissions and in lowering the cost of those reductions. In addition, the influence of technological changes on the emission, concentration, and cost of reducing GHGs will tend to overwhelm other factors, especially in the longer term. Understanding the process of technological change is therefore of utmost importance. Nonetheless, the task of measuring, modeling, and ultimately influencing the path of technological development is fraught with complexity and uncertainty?as are the technologies themselves. Although there is little debate over the importance of energy efficiency in limiting GHG emissions, there is intense debate about its cost-effectiveness and about the government policies that should be pursued to enhance energy efficiency. At the risk of excessive simplification, we can characterize "technologists" as believing that there are plentiful opportunities for low-cost, or even "negative-cost" improvements in energy efficiency, and that realizing these opportunities will require active intervention in markets for energy-using equipment to help overcome barriers to the use of more efficient technologies. Most economists, on the other hand, acknowledge that there are "market barriers" to the penetration of various technologies that enhance energy efficiency, but that only some of these barriers represent real "market failures" that reduce economic efficiency. In this essay, we examine what lies behind this dichotomy in perspectives. Ultimately, the veracity of different perspectives is an empirical question and reliable empirical evidence on the issues identified above is surprisingly limited. We review the evidence that is available, finding that although energy and technology markets certainly are not perfect (no markets are), the balance of evidence supports the view that there is not as much "free lunch" in energy efficiency as some would suggest. On the other hand, a case can be made for the existence of certain inefficiencies in energy technology markets, thus raising the possibility of some inexpensive GHG control through energy-efficiency enhancement. We conclude with some reflections on the role of appropriate energy efficiency policy in climate change mitigation.
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Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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14 Feb 02
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30 Nov 03
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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14 Feb 02
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19 Jun 02
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This paper reviews lessons from the two decades of experience in the United States with market-based instruments for environmental protection. Normative lessons are considered for design and implementation, for analysis of prospective and adopted systems, and for identification of new applications. Positive lessons are also considered.
Market-based instruments for environmental policy, cost-effectiveness
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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26 Feb 02
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30 Nov 03
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This paper draws on American experience with four categories of market-based instruments for environmental protection: charge systems; tradeable permits; market friction reduction; and government subsidy reduction. The paper examines normative and positive lessons that can be learned from these experiences.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Forest L. Reinhardt Harvard Business School Richard H. K. Vietor Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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23 Apr 08
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10 Jan 09
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Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing considerable attention on the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), particularly in the realm of environmental protection. Beyond complete compliance with environmental regulations, do firms have additional moral or social responsibilities to commit resources to environmental protection? How should we think about the notion of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest? May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? And finally, should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing activities (i.e., is this an efficient use of social resources)? We address these questions through the lens of economics, including insights from legal analysis and business scholarship.
corporate social responsibility, voluntary environmental performance, Business and Government Policy, Economics-Microeconomics, Environment and Natural Resources, Law and Legal Institutions, Regulation
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Joseph E. Aldy Resources for the Future Scott Barrett Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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27 Apr 03
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30 Nov 03
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We critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance. The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions. We identify several major themes among the alternative proposals: Kyoto is "too little, too fast"; developing countries should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.
Policy architecture, Kyoto Protocol, Efficiency, Cost effectiveness, Equity, Participation, Compliance
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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02 May 00
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02 Jan 08
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Over the past three decades, the study of environmental and resource economics has evolved from a relatively obscure application of welfare economics to a field of economics in its own right, combining elements from industrial organization, public finance, microeconomic theory, and many other areas of economics. When Edward Elgar Publishing recently invited me to collect some of my papers from the past ten years in an edited volume, it was suggested that I prepare a personal introduction in which I might reflect on the professional path that has led to my research and writing. This paper was prepared as that introduction. In it, I describe the path that took me from Northwestern University to the Peace Corps, then to Cornell, to the Environmental Defense Fund, and finally to Harvard. The book consists of 23 articles I selected from the 80 (published and unpublished) papers I produced ? frequently with co-authors ? from the time I received my Ph.D. in 1988 until the winter of 2000. Selecting the papers and organizing them has allowed me to step back and reflect on the set of research endeavors in which I have been engaged over this decade. This introductory chapter describes the background and major findings of the 23 included papers, and identifies common themes that emerge from this decade of research and writing.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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11 Feb 04
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This paper introduces a volume of collected papers on the political economy of environmental regulation: economic analyses of the processes through which political decisions regarding environmental regulation are made, principally in the institutional context found in the United States. Despite this geographic focus, many of the papers contain analytical models that are methodologically of interest and/or have lessons that are relevant in other parts of the world. In the environmental realm, questions of political economy emerge along three fundamental dimensions, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) the degree of government activity; (2) the form of government activity; and (3) the level of government that has responsibility. The first three parts of the book deal respectively with these three fundamental dimensions of inquiry. Part I features a set of six articles that examine how the targets and goals of individual environmental policies are established. Part II brings together nine articles that employ the analytical apparatus of positive political economy to address questions related to the choice of policy instruments for environmental regulation. Part III features four articles that examine, both positively and normatively, the level of government that is delegated responsibility for environmental protection. Finally, in Part IV, three articles are featured that assess the use of economic analysis in contemporary environmental policy.
Economics - economic and econometric theory, environment and natural resources, political science, regulation
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Technological Change and the Environment
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Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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13 Oct 00
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Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Environmental policy discussions increasingly focus on issues related to technological change. This is partly because the environmental consequences of social activity are frequently affected by the rate and direction of technological change, and partly because environmental policy interventions can themselves create constraints and incentives that have significant effects on the path of technological progress. This paper, prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics (North-Holland/Elsevier Science), summarizes current thinking on technological change in the broader economics literature, surveys the growing economic literature on the interaction between technology and the environment, and explores the normative implications of these analyses. We begin with a brief overview of the economics of technological change, and then examine theory and empirical evidence on invention, innovation, and diffusion and the related literature on the effects of environmental policy on the creation of new, environmentally friendly technology. We conclude with suggestions for further research on technological change and the environment.
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Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Environmental policy discussions increasingly focus on issues related to technological change. This is partly because the environmental consequences of social activity are frequently affected by the rate and direction of technological change, and partly because environmental policy interventions can themselves create constraints and incentives that have significant effects on the path of technological progress. This paper, prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics (North-Holland/Elsevier Science), summarizes for environmental economists current thinking on technological change in the broader economics literature, surveys the growing economic literature on the interaction between technology and the environment, and explores the normative implications of these analyses. We begin with a brief overview of the economics of technological change, and then examine three important areas where technology and the environment intersect: the theory and empirical evidence of induced innovation and the related literature on the effects of environmental policy on the creation of new, environmentally friendly technology; the theory and empirics of environmental issues related to technology diffusion; and analyses of the comparative technological impacts of alternative environmental policy instruments. We conclude with suggestions for further research on technological change and the environment.
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Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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28 Nov 00
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Environmental policy discussions increasingly focus on issues related to technological change. This is partly because the environmental consequences of social activity are frequently affected by the rate and direction of technological change, and partly because environmental policy interventions can themselves create constraints and incentives that have significant effects on the path of technological progress. This paper, prepared as a chapter draft for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics (North-Holland/Elsevier Science), summarizes for environmental economists current thinking on technological change in the broader economics literature, surveys the growing economic literature on the interaction between technology and the environment, and explores the normative implications of these analyses. We begin with a brief overview of the economics of technological change, and then examine three important areas where technology and the environment intersect: the theory and empirical evidence of induced innovation and the related literature on the effects of environmental policy on the creation of new, environmentally friendly technology; the theory and empirics of environmental issues related to technology diffusion; and analyses of the comparative technological impacts of alternative environmental policy instruments. We conclude with suggestions for further research on technological change and the environment.
technological change, environment, invention, innovation, diffusion
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Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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03 Mar 99
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30 Nov 03
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We investigate a central issue in the climate change debate associated with the Kyoto Protocol: the likely performance of international greenhouse gas trading mechanisms. Virtually all design studies and many projections of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets have assumed that an international trading program can be established that minimizes the costs of meeting overall goals. This conclusion rests on several simplifying assumptions. We focus on one important issue that has received little, if any, attention: the interaction between an international trading regime and a heterogeneous set of domestic greenhouse policy instruments. This is an important issue because the Protocol explicitly provides for domestic sovereignty regarding instrument choice, and because it is unlikely that most countries will choose tradeable permits as their primary domestic vehicle. It is true that costs can be minimized if all countries use domestic tradeable permit systems to meet their national targets (allocate permits to private parties) and allow for international trades. But when some countries use non trading approaches such as greenhouse-gas taxes or fixed quantity standards ? which seems likely in the light of previous experience ? cost minimization is hardly assured. In these cases, achieving the potential cost savings of international trading will require some form of project-by-project credit program, such as joint implementation. But theory and experience with such credit programs suggest that they are much less likely to facilitate major cost savings, because of large transactions costs, likely government participation, and absence of a well functioning market. Thus, individual nations' choices of domestic policy instruments to meet the Kyoto targets can limit substantially the cost-saving potential of an international trading program. There is an important trade-off between the degree of domestic sovereignty and the degree of cost effectiveness. Moreover, there is a need to analyze the likely cost-savings from feasible, as opposed to idealized, international policy approaches to reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.
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Kenneth J. Arrow Stanford University - Department of Economics William J. Baumol New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Jagdish Bhagwati Columbia University - Council on Foreign Relations Michael J. Boskin Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace Robert W. Crandall Brookings Institution Maureen L. Cropper World Bank Michael Greenstone Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School David Harrison NERA Economic Consulting R. Glenn Hubbard Columbia Business School Alfred E. Kahn National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Robert E. Litan AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Paul W. MacAvoy Yale School of Management James C. Miller III George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice Albert L. Nichols NERA Economic Consulting William A. Niskanen Cato Institute Roger G. Noll Stanford University - Department of Economics Wallace E. Oates University of Maryland - Department of Economics Peter Passell Milken Institute Sam Peltzman University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Paul R. Portney University of Arizona - Eller College of Management Harvey S. Rosen Princeton University - Department of Economics Milton Russell University of Tennessee, Knoxville Thomas C. Schelling University of Maryland Richard Schmalensee Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Charles L. Schultze Brookings Institution V. Kerry Kerry Smith Arizona State University - Economics Department Vernon L. Smith Chapman University - Economic Science Institute Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government W. Kip Viscusi Vanderbilt University - Law School Lawrence J. White New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business Richard J. Zeckhauser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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27 Jul 08
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27 Jul 08
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451 (16,448)
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As economists, we believe that the Second Circuit's ruling, by not allowing the consideration of important information about the relationships between the benefits and costs of alternatives, is economically unsound. In particular, we believe that, as a general principle, regulators cannot make rational decisions unless they are allowed to compare costs and benefits and to use the results, along with other factors as appropriate, to choose among alternatives.
To the extent permissible under the statute and case law, EPA should be allowed to consider benefits and costs in establishing rules for implementing s316(b). The Court's allowing EPA to consider benefits and costs would improve both the decision making process - by making it more transparent - and the regulatory decisions by allowing important relevant information to be considered explicitly.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future
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09 May 02
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09 May 02
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444 (16,772)
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30
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Abstract:
The relationship between technological change and environmental policy has received increasing attention from scholars and policy makers alike over the past ten years. This is partly because the environmental impacts of social activity are significantly affected by technological change, and partly because environmental policy interventions themselves create new constraints and incentives that affect the process of technological developments. Our central purpose in this article is to provide environmental economists with a useful guide to research on technological change and the analytical tools that can be used to explore further the interaction between technology and the environment. In Part 1 of the article, we provide an overview of analytical frameworks for investigating the economics of technological change, highlighting key issues for the researcher. In Part 2, we turn our attention to theoretical analysis of the effects of environmental policy on technological change, and in Part 3, we focus on issues related to the empirical analysis of technology innovation and diffusion. Finally, we conclude in Part 4 with some additional suggestions for research.
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16.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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02 Nov 07
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12 Nov 07
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429 (17,601)
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14
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The need for a domestic U.S. policy that seriously addresses climate change is increasingly apparent. A cap-and-trade system is the best approach in the short to medium term. Besides providing certainty about emissions levels, cap-and-trade offers an easy means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens imposed by climate policy; it is straightforward to harmonize with other countries' climate policies; it avoids the current political aversion in the United States to taxes; and it has a history of successful adoption in this country. The paper proposes a specific cap-and-trade system with several key features, including an upstream cap on CO2 emissions, with gradual inclusion of other greenhouse gases, a gradual downward trajectory of emissions ceilings over time, to minimize disruption and allow firms and households time to adapt, and mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the program's allowances would be allocated through auctioning and half through free distribution, primarily to those entities most burdened by the policy. This should help limit potential inequities while bolstering political support. The share distributed for free would phase out over twenty-five years. The auctioned allowances would generate revenue that could be used for a variety of worthwhile public purposes. The system would provide for linkage with international emissions reduction credit arrangements, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries, and appropriate linkage with other actions taken abroad that maintains a level playing field between imports and import-competing domestic products.
cap-and-trade system, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gas emissions, global climate change, carbon taxes
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17.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Scott Barrett Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
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30 Nov 02
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30 Nov 03
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409 (18,705)
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9
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Scientific and economic consensus increasingly points to the need for a credible and cost-effective approach to address the threat of global climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change appears incapable of inducing significant participation and compliance. We assess the Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures that have been proposed, with particular attention to their respective abilities to induce participation and compliance. We find that those approaches that offer cost-effective mitigation are unlikely to induce significant participation and compliance, while those approaches that are likely to enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states are sorely lacking in terms of their anticipated cost effectiveness. The feasible set of policy architectures is thus limited to second-best alternatives. Much more attention needs to be given - both by scholarly research and by international negotiations - to aspects of future international climate agreements that will affect the degrees of participation and compliance that can reasonably be expected to be forthcoming.
Compliance, Cost Effectiveness, Global Climate Change, International Agreements, Participation
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18.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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30 Jul 03
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30 Nov 03
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396 (19,445)
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8
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This paper reviews lessons that can be learned from U.S. experiences with market-based environmental policies and from related research. Highlights of U.S. experience are summarized with four categories of policy instruments: pollution charges; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Normative lessons are considered in three areas: design and implementation; analysis of prospective and adopted systems; and identification of new applications. Positive political economy lessons are also reviewed.
market-based instruments, cost-effectiveness, environment
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19.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Alexander F. Wagner University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB) Gernot Wagner Environmental Defense Fund
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27 Aug 02
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30 Nov 03
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386 (20,114)
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2
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Economists have expended considerable effort to develop economically meaningful definitions of the somewhat elusive concept of "sustainability." We relate such a definition of sustainability to well known concepts from neoclassical economics, in particular, potential Pareto improvements (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) and inter-personal compensation. In the inter-temporal realm, we find that dynamic efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a notion of sustainability that has normative standing as a goal for public policy. We define sustainability as dynamic efficiency plus intergenerational equity. Further, we argue that it is not unreasonable for economists to focus on the efficiency element, leaving equity considerations to the political process. The analogy to the relationship between potential Pareto improvements and (intragenerational) transfers can facilitate discussions about sustainability, both within the economics community and as part of an interdisciplinary discourse, and makes the basic concepts easier to operationalize.
Sustainability, Dynamic Efficiency, Intergenerational Equity
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20.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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10 Sep 03
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30 Nov 03
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352 (22,577)
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Abstract:
The organizers of an Aspen Institute conference have identified what they characterize as "the critical conundrum" - how business, government, and communications media balance the competing values of economic growth and a healthy environment. In this paper, prepared for discussion at the conference, I focus on government policy, and ask how government integrates economic concerns into its development of environmental policies. In addition, I ask whether and how government should carry out such integration of economic and environmental concerns. I consider two dimensions of environmental policy, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) what is the appropriate (and actual) degree of government activity; and (2) what form should (and does) government activity take. In this brief essay, I attempt to define the scope of these questions, and suggest criteria that can be used to evaluate responses.
Economic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, market-based instruments
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21.
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Andrew J. J. Plantinga Oregon State University - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Ruben N. Lubowski U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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02 Apr 02
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30 Nov 03
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334 (24,124)
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10
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Abstract:
We conduct a national-scale study of the determinants of agricultural land values to better understand how current farmland prices are influenced by the potential for future land development. The theoretical basis for the empirical analysis is a spatial city model with stochastic returns to future land development. From the theoretical model, we derive an expression for the current price of agricultural land in terms of annual returns to agricultural production, the price of recently developed land parcels, and expressions involving model parameters that are represented in the empirical model by nonlinear functions of observed variables and parameters to be estimated. We estimate the model of agricultural land values with a cross-section on approximately three thousand counties in the contiguous U.S. The results provide strong support for the model, and provide the first evidence that option values associated with irreversible and uncertain land development are capitalized into current farmland values. The empirical model is specified in a way that allows us to identify the contributions to land values of rents from near-term agricultural use and rents from potential development in the future. For each county in the contiguous U.S., we estimate the share of the current land value attributable to future development rents. These results give a clearer indication of the magnitude of land development pressures and yield insights into policies to preserve farmland and associated environmental benefits.
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22.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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21 May 04
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Last Revised:
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21 May 04
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322 (25,207)
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1
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Abstract:
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) may come into force without U.S. participation, but its effects on climate change will be virtually non-existent. At the same time, the economic and scientific consensus points to the need for a credible international approach. A reasonable starting point is the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which was signed by 161 nations and ratified by 50, including the United States, and entered into force in 1994. In this paper, I remain agnostic on the question of the Kyoto Protocol's viability. Some analysts see the agreement as deeply flawed, while others see it as an acceptable first step. But virtually everyone agrees that the Protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge, and that further, subsequent steps will be required. This is my starting point for proposing a three-part policy architecture: first, all nations would be involved through the use of economic trigger mechanisms, plus growth targets; second, long-term targets would be required - in the short-term, firm, but moderate targets, and in the long-term, flexible, but much more stringent targets; and third, market-based policy instruments would be part of the package - emissions trading, carbon taxes, or hybrids of the two. This overall approach can be made to be scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic.
Global climate change, global warming, policy architecture, Kyoto Protocol
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23.
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies W. Michael Hanemann University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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28 Oct 06
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Last Revised:
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27 Sep 07
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305 (26,873)
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4
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Abstract:
We estimate the price elasticity of water demand with household-level data, structurally modeling the piecewise-linear budget constraints imposed by increasing-block pricing. We develop a mathematical expression for the unconditional price elasticity of demand under increasing-block prices and compare conditional and unconditional elasticities analytically and empirically. We test the hypothesis that price elasticity may depend on price structure, beyond technical differences in elasticity concepts. Due to the possibility of endogenous utility price structure choice, observed differences in elasticity across price structures may be due either to a behavioral response to price structure, or to underlying heterogeneity among water utility service areas.
water demand, price elasticity, non-linear pricing
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24.
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Sheila M. Cavanagh Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government W. Michael Hanemann University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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17 Jul 02
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Last Revised:
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16 Mar 07
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298 (27,603)
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Abstract:
In many areas of the world, including large parts of the United States, scarce water supplies are a serious resource and environmental concern. The possibility exists that water is being used at rates that exceed what would be dictated by efficiency criteria, particularly when externalities are taken into account. Because of this, much attention has been paid by policy makers and others to the use of demand management techniques, including requirements for the adoption of specific technologies and restrictions on particular uses. A natural question for economists to ask is whether price would be a more cost-effective instrument to facilitate water demand management. As a first step in such an investigation, this paper draws upon a newly-available set of detailed data to estimate econometrically the demand function for household use of urban water supplies. We analyze cross-sectional time-series data that track 1,082 single-family households served by 16 water utilities in 11 urban areas in the United States and Canada. Because of the diverse multiple-block pricing structures that abound, estimating the effects of price and price structure on residential water demand poses some challenging and interesting problems. We find that the sensitivity of residential water demand to price is quite low, and that the effect of price structure may be more influential than the magnitude of marginal price itself. The household-level data we use allow us to assess the influences on residential water demand of climate, sociodemographic factors, and characteristics of housing stock, including home vintage. Our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in likely household responses to utility demand-management policies.
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25.
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Too Good to Be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assessments of California Climate Change Policy
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Hide Abstracts |
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hide multiple versions |
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Todd Schatzki Analysis Group, Inc.
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Posted:
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26 Mar 07
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Last Revised:
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23 Jan 08
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293 ( 28,172) |
2
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Todd Schatzki Analysis Group, Inc.
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| Posted: |
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14 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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23 Jan 08
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24
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2
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Abstract:
California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 limits California's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2020 to their 1990 level. Global climate change is a pressing environmental problem, and the best possible public policies will be required to address it. Therefore, analyses of prospective policies must themselves be of high quality, so that policymakers can reasonably rely on them when making the critical decisions they inevitably will face.
In 2006, three studies were released indicating that California can meet its 2020 target at no net economic cost - raising questions about whether opportunities truly exist to substantially reduce emissions at no cost, or whether studies reaching such conclusions may simply severely underestimate costs. This paper provides an evaluation of these three California studies.
We find that although opportunities may exist for some no-cost emission reductions, these California studies substantially underestimate the cost of meeting California's 2020 target. The studies underestimate costs by omitting important components of the costs of emission reduction efforts, and by overestimating offsetting savings that some of those efforts yield through improved energy efficiency. In some cases, the studies focus on the costs of particular actions to reduce emissions, but fail to consider the effectiveness and costs of policies that would be necessary to bring about such actions. While quantifying the full extent of the resulting cost underestimation is beyond the scope of our study, the underestimation is clearly economically significant. A few of the identified flaws individually lead to underestimation of annual costs on the order of billions of dollars. Hence, these studies do not offer reliable estimates of the cost of meeting California's 2020 target. Better analyses are needed to inform policymakers.
While the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 sets a 2020 emissions target, critical policy design decisions remain to be made that will fundamentally affect the cost of California's climate policy. For example, policymakers must determine emission targets for the years before and after 2020, the emission sources that will be regulated to meet those targets, and the policy instruments that will be employed. The California studies do not directly address the cost implications of these and other policy design decisions, and their overly optimistic findings may leave policymakers with an inadequate appreciation of the stakes associated with decisions that lie ahead. As such, California would benefit from studies that specifically assess the cost implications of alternative policy designs.
Nonetheless, a careful evaluation of the California studies highlights some important policy design lessons that apply regardless of the extent to which no-cost emission reduction opportunities actually exist. In particular, policies should be designed to account for uncertainty regarding emission reduction costs, much of which will not be resolved before policies must be enacted. Also, consideration of the different market failures that lead to excessive GHG emissions makes clear that to reduce emissions cost-effectively, policymakers should adopt a market-based policy (such as a cap-and-trade system) as the core policy instrument. The presence of specific market failures that may lead to some no-cost emission reduction opportunities suggests the potential value of additional policies that act as complements, rather than alternatives, to a market-based policy. However, to develop complementary policies that efficiently target such no-cost opportunities, policymakers need better information than currently exists regarding the specific market failures that bring about those opportunities.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Todd Schatzki Analysis Group, Inc.
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| Posted: |
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26 Mar 07
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Last Revised:
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12 Jun 07
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269
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2
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Abstract:
California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 limits California's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2020 to their 1990 level. In 2006, three studies were released indicating that California can meet its 2020 target at no net economic cost - raising questions about whether opportunities truly exist to substantially reduce emissions at no cost, or whether studies reaching such conclusions may simply severely underestimate costs. This paper provides an evaluation of these three California studies. We find that although opportunities may exist for some no-cost emission reductions, these studies substantially underestimate the cost of meeting California's 2020 target by omitting important components of the costs of emission reduction efforts and by overestimating offsetting savings that some of those efforts yield through improved energy efficiency. In some cases, the studies focus on the costs of particular actions to reduce emissions, but fail to consider the effectiveness and costs of policies that would be necessary to bring about such actions.
climate change, technological change
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26.
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Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School Sheila M. Cavanagh Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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13 Sep 01
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27 Sep 05
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271 (30,801)
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2
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Abstract:
We review major developments in national environmental policy during the Clinton Administration, defining environmental policy to include not only the statutes, regulations, and policies associated with reducing pollution, but also major issues of public lands management and species preservation. We adopt economic criteria for policy assessment - principally efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and distributional equity. While the paper is primarily descriptive, we highlight a set of themes that emerge in the economics of national environmental policy over the past decade.
Business and Government Policy, Economics - Microeconomics, Environment and Natural Resources, Political Science, Regulation
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27.
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Lori Snyder Bennear Duke University - Nicholas School for the Environment Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Alexander F. Wagner University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB)
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16 Apr 03
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14 Mar 05
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264 (31,699)
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1
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Abstract:
We develop and apply a new method for estimating the economic benefits of an environmental amenity. The method fits within the household production framework (Becker 1965), and is based upon the notion of estimating the derived demand for a privately traded option to utilize a freely-available public good. In particular, the demand for state fishing licenses is used to infer the benefits of recreational fishing. Using panel data on state fishing license sales and prices for the continental United States over a fifteen-year period, combined with data on substitute prices and demographic variables, a license demand function is estimated with instrumental variable procedures to allow for the potential endogeneity of administered prices. The econometric results lead to estimates of the benefits of a fishing license, and subsequently to the expected benefits of a recreational fishing day. In contrast with previous studies, which have utilized travel cost or hypothetical market methods, our approach provides estimates that are directly comparable across geographic areas. Further, our results suggest that the benefits of recreational fishing days are generally less than previously estimated.
Revealed Preference, Environmental Benefits, Fishing Licenses, Recreational Fishing Day
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28.
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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18 Jan 00
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Last Revised:
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30 Nov 03
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242 (34,944)
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1
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Abstract:
Policy makers and policy analysts in the environmental realm are frequently faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional command-and-control approaches. We develop some simple rules-of-thumb that can be employed with minimal amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings that can be anticipated from designing and implementing market-based policy instruments. Because our analytical models are simple, yet capture key properties of pollution abatement cost functions, they can be used to predict potential cost savings through simple formulae. Our hope is that these simple formulae can aid policy analysts and policy makers in the early stages of exploring alternative policy instruments by helping them identify approaches that merit greater attention and more detailed analysis.
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29.
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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12 Dec 00
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Last Revised:
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30 Nov 03
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222 (38,299)
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7
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Abstract:
The possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide has received considerable attention because of concerns about the threat of global climate change due to the greenhouse effect. In fact, this approach is an explicit element of both U.S. and international climate policies, partly because of evidence that growing trees to sequester carbon can be a relatively inexpensive means of combating climate change. But how sensitive are such estimates to specific conditions? We examine the sensitivity of carbon sequestration costs to changes in critical factors, including the nature of the management and deforestation regimes, silvicultural species, agricultural prices, and discount rates. We find, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the costs of carbon sequestration can be greater if trees are periodically harvested, rather than permanently established. In addition, higher discount rates imply higher marginal costs, and they imply non-monotonic changes in the amount of carbon sequestered. Importantly, retarded deforestation can sequester carbon at substantially lower costs than increased forestation. These results depend in part on the time profile of sequestration and the amount of carbon released upon harvest, both of which may vary by species, geographic location, and management regime, and are subject to scientific uncertainty.
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30.
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Kenneth J. Arrow Stanford University - Department of Economics William J. Baumol New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Elizabeth E. Bailey University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department Robert E. Litan AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Jagdish Bhagwati Columbia University - Council on Foreign Relations Michael J. Boskin Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace David F. Bradford Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School Robert W. Crandall Brookings Institution Maureen L. Cropper World Bank Christopher DeMuth American Enterprise Institute (AEI) George Eads Charles River Associates (CRA) Milton Friedman Mendocino College John D. Graham Canadian Investment Review - Rogers Media Wendy Gramm affiliation not provided to SSRN Robert W. Hahn University of Oxford, Smith School Paul L. Joskow Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Alfred E. Kahn National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) Paul R. Krugman Princeton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Lester B. Lave Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business Randall Lutter American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Paul W. MacAvoy Yale School of Management Paul W. McCracken University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business James C. Miller III George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice William A. Niskanen Cato Institute William D. Nordhaus Yale University - Department of Economics Wallace E. Oates University of Maryland - Department of Economics Peter Passell Milken Institute Sam Peltzman University of Chicago - Booth School of Business Paul R. Portney University of Arizona - Eller College of Management Alice Rivlin Brookings Institution Milton Russell University of Tennessee, Knoxville Richard Schmalensee Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management Charles L. Schultze Brookings Institution V. Kerry Kerry Smith Arizona State University - Economics Department Robert M. Solow Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Joseph E. Stiglitz Columbia University Laura D'Andrea Tyson London Business School W. Kip Viscusi Vanderbilt University - Law School Murray Weidenbaum Washington University, St. Louis - Murray Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy Janet L. Yellen University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group Richard J. Zeckhauser Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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17 Nov 06
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10 Mar 09
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192 (44,347)
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Abstract:
As we understand it, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the EPA to consider the costs of complying with ozone and PM NAAQS. As we further understand it, this legal ruling can be overturned only by this Court. As economists, we believe that the D.C. Circuit's ruling not allowing the EPA to consider important information relating to the consequences of its regulatory actions is economically unsound. Without delving into the legal aspects of the case, we present below why we think the Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in setting standards. In particular, we believe that, as a general principle, regulators should be allowed to consider explicitly the full consequences of their regulatory decisions. These consequences include the regulation's benefits, costs, and any other relevant factors.
EPA, D.C. Circuit, regulatory actions
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31.
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Lori Snyder Bennear Duke University - Nicholas School for the Environment Nolan H. Miller Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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29 Apr 03
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21 Aug 03
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190 (44,856)
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Abstract:
We use a hazard model to estimate the effect of environmental regulation on the diffusion of membrane cell production technology in the chlorine manufacturing industry. We estimate the effect of regulation on both the adoption of the membrane technology at existing plants and on the exit of existing plants using older technologies. We find that environmental regulation did affect the diffusion of the cleaner technology in the chlorine industry. However, it did so not by encouraging the adoption of membrane cells by existing facilities, but by reducing the demand for chlorine and hence encouraging the shutdown of facilities using the environmentally inferior options.
Regulation, Technological Change, Environment, Hazard Model
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32.
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Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Posted:
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10 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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13 Aug 09
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186 ( 45,866) |
5
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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04 Sep 08
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04 Sep 08
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63
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5
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Abstract:
There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyze an up- stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 percent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and appropriate linkage with actions taken in other countries, in order to establish a level playing field among domestically produced and imported products.
Cap-and-Trade System, Carbon Dioxide, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Global Climate Change, Carbon Taxes
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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10 Nov 07
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13 Aug 09
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123
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5
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Abstract:
There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyze an up-stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 percent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and appropriate linkage with actions taken in other countries, in order to establish a level playing field among domestically produced and imported products.
cap-and-trade system, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gas emissions, global climate change, carbon taxes
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33.
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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07 Jun 06
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Last Revised:
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07 Jun 06
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171 (49,867)
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4
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Abstract:
In February, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change came into force, but without participation by the United States. Its impacts on emissions of greenhouse gases - including carbon dioxide (CO2) , the primary anthropogenic driver of climate change - will be trivial; but scientific and economic analyses point to the need for a credible international approach. Because the Kyoto Protocol's ambitious targets apply only to the short term (2008-2012) and only to industrialized nations, the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate only modest short-term benefits while failing to provide a real solution. For these reasons, most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed, although some see it as an acceptable first step. Virtually all agree, however, that the Protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge. We describe the basic features of a post-Kyoto international global climate agreement, which addresses three crucial questions: who, when, and how. The respective elements are: first, a means to ensure that key nations - industrialized and developing - are involved; second, an emphasis on an extended time path of action (employing a cost-effective pattern over time); and third, inclusion of market-based policy instruments.
Business and Government Policy, Environment and Natural Resources, Intergovernmental Relations, International Affairs/Globalization, Regulation
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34.
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The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Posted:
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19 Jun 00
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Last Revised:
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20 Oct 08
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150 ( 56,496) |
57
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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19 Jun 00
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07 Apr 08
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24
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57
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Abstract:
It follows from Hicks' induced innovation hypothesis that rising energy prices in the last two decades should have induced energy-saving innovation. We formulate the hypothesis concretely using a product-characteristics model of energy-using consumer durables, augmenting Hicks' hypothesis to allow for the possibility that government efficiency standards also induce innovation. Through estimation of characteristics transformation surfaces, we find that technological change reduced the total capital and operating costs of air air conditioning by half and water heating by about one-fifth. Although the rate of overall innovation in these products appears to be independent of energy prices and regulations, the evidence suggests that the direction of innovation has been responsive to energy price changes. In particular, energy price increases induced innovation in a direction that lowered the capital cost tradeoffs inherent in producing more energy-efficiency products. In addition, energy price changes induced changes in the subset of technically feasible models that were offered for sale. Our estimates indicate that about one-quarter to one-half of the improvements in mean energy-efficiency of the menu of new models for these products over the last two decades were associated with rising energy prices since 1973. We also find that this responsiveness to price changes increased substantially after product labeling requirements came into effect, and that minimum efficiency standards had a significant positive effect on average efficiency levels. Nonetheless, a sizeable portion of efficiency improvements in these technologies appears to have been autonomous.
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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26 Jun 00
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02 Jan 08
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0
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Abstract:
We develop a methodology for testing Hick's induced innovation hypothesis by estimating a product-characteristics model of energy-using consumer durables, augmenting the hypothesis to allow for the influence of government regulations. For the products we explored, the evidence suggests: (i) that the rate of overall innovation was independent of energy prices and regulations, (ii) the direction of innovation was responsive to energy price changes for some products but not for others, (iii) energy price changes induced changes in the subset of technically feasible models that were offered for sale, (iv) this responsiveness increased substantially during the period after energy-efficiency product labeling was required, and (v) nonetheless, a sizeable portion of efficiency improvements were autonomous.
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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26 Jun 00
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Last Revised:
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20 Oct 08
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126
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57
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Abstract:
We develop a methodology for testing Hick?s induced innovation hypothesis by estimating a product-characteristics model of energy-using consumer durables, augmenting the hypothesis to allow for the influence of government regulations. For the products we explored, the evidence suggests: (i) that the rate of overall innovation was independent of energy prices and regulations, (ii) the direction of innovation was responsive to energy price changes for some products but not for others, (iii) energy price changes induced changes in the subset of technically feasible models that were offered for sale, (iv) this responsiveness increased substantially during the period after energy-efficiency product labeling was required, and (v) nonetheless, a sizeable portion of efficiency improvements were autonomous.
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35.
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Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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04 Feb 08
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Last Revised:
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30 Jun 09
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147 (57,573)
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2
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Abstract:
The long-run cost of a U.S. cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could be significantly reduced by linking that system with other existing and emerging tradable permit systems for GHG emissions. However, along with the cost savings that it offers, linking carries with it other implications. For example, linking has distributional consequences and, under some circumstances, linked systems collectively will not achieve the same level of emission reductions as they would absent linking. Also, linking can reduce a government's control over the impacts of its tradable permit system. Thus, in considering linkages, the United States and potential linking partners may have to weigh linking's implications for potentially competing policy objectives, much as will be required in developing other elements of their respective domestic climate policies. Because linking's implications depend on the type of link that is established and the specific characteristics and design of the linked systems, in the near-term, some links will be more attractive and easier to establish than others. Importantly, those links that may be the easiest to establish - links with emission reduction credit systems such as the Clean Development Mechanism - likely can provide much of the near-term cost-saving and risk-diversifying advantages that linking can offer. Given the implications of links with other cap-and-trade systems, to facilitate such links, it may be necessary to harmonize certain elements of the design of the U.S. system and any system(s) with which it links. In particular, agreement on a unified set of measures to address cost uncertainty likely will be a necessary pre-condition for an unrestricted link with another cap-and-trade system. Also, in order to link with other cap-and-trade systems, it may be necessary to establish broader international agreements governing aspects of the design of the U.S. and linked systems beyond simply mutual recognition of allowances.
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36.
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Ruben N. Lubowski U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) Andrew J. J. Plantinga Oregon State University - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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08 Jan 05
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13 May 05
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140 (60,132)
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10
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Abstract:
When and if the United States chooses to implement a greenhouse gas reduction program, it will be necessary to decide whether carbon sequestration policies - such as those that promote forestation and discourage deforestation - should be part of the domestic portfolio of compliance activities. We investigate the cost of forest-based carbon sequestration. In contrast with previous approaches, we econometrically examine micro-data on revealed landowner preferences, modeling six major private land uses in a comprehensive analysis of the contiguous United States. The econometric estimates are used to simulate landowner responses to sequestration policies. Key commodity prices are treated as endogenous and a carbon sink model is used to predict changes in carbon storage. Our estimated marginal costs of carbon sequestration are greater than those from previous engineering cost analyses and sectoral optimization models. Our estimated sequestration supply function is similar to the carbon abatement supply function from energy-based analyses, suggesting that forest-based carbon sequestration merits inclusion in a cost-effective portfolio of domestic U.S. climate change strategies.
abatement, carbon, climate change, costs, forestry, greenhouse gases, land use, land-use change, sequestration
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37.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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16 Nov 05
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16 Mar 07
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124 (66,651)
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7
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Abstract:
Vintage-differentiated regulation (VDR) is a common feature of many environmental and other regulatory policies, wherein standards for regulated units are fixed in terms of the units' respective dates of entry, with later entrants facing more stringent regulation. In the most common application, often referred to as grandfathering, units produced prior to a specific date are exempted from new regulation or face less stringent requirements. The vintage-differentiated approach appeals to many in the policy community, for reasons associated with efficiency, equity, and simple politics. First, it is frequently more cost-effective - in the short-term - to introduce new pollution-abatement technologies at the time that new plants are constructed than to retrofit older facilities. Second, it seems more fair to avoid changing the rules of the game in mid-stream, and hence to apply new standards only to new plants. Third, political pressures tend to favor easily-identified existing facilities rather than undefined potential facilities. On the other hand, VDRs can be expected - on the basis of standard investment theory - to retard turnover in the capital stock (of durable plants and equipment), and thereby to reduce the cost-effectiveness of regulation in the long-term, compared with equivalent undifferentiated regulations. A further irony is that when this slower turnover results in delayed adoption of new, cleaner technology, VDR can result in higher levels of pollutant emissions than would occur in the absence of regulation. In this paper, I survey previous applications and synthesize current thinking regarding VDRs in the environmental realm, and develop lessons for public policy and future research. I describe the ubiquitous nature of VDRs in U.S. regulatory policy; examine the reasons why VDRs are so common; establish a theoretical framework for analysis of the cost-effectiveness of alternative types of environmental policy instruments to provide a context for the analysis of VDRs; describe a general theory of the impacts of VDRs in terms of their effects on technology adoption, capital turnover, pollution abatement costs, and environmental performance; examine empirical analyses of the impacts of VDRs in two significant sectors - the U.S. auto industry and new source review in power generation and other sectors; and examine implications for policy and research.
vintage-differentiated regulation, new source review, cost-effective environmental regulation
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38.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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14 Oct 08
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14 Oct 08
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112 (72,459)
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9
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Abstract:
There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. In this article, I propose and analyze a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically feasible approach for the United States to reduce its contributions to the increase in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The proposal features an up-stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions over time, and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. I compare the proposed system with frequently discussed alternatives. In addition, I describe common objections to a cap-and-trade approach to the problem, and provide responses to these objections.
Cap-and-Trade System, Carbon Dioxide, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Global Climate Change, Carbon Taxes
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39.
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Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture
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Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Posted:
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20 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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14 Jan 09
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102 ( 77,793) |
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Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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27 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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27 Oct 08
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11
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Abstract:
Cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred national and regional instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism -- an international emission-reduction-credit system -- has developed a substantial constituency, despite some concerns about its performance. Because linkage between tradable permit systems can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems to each other, as well as to the CDM and other credit systems. We examine the benefits and concerns associated with various types of linkages, and analyze the near-term and long-term role that linkage may play in a future international climate policy architecture. In particular, we evaluate linkage in three potential roles: as an independent bottom-up architecture, as a step in the evolution of a top-down architecture, and as an ongoing element of a larger climate policy agreement. We also assess how the policy elements of climate negotiations can facilitate or impede linkages. Our analysis throughout is both positive and normative.
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Judson L. Jaffe Analysis Group, Inc. Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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20 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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14 Jan 09
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91
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Abstract:
Cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred national and regional instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases throughout the industrialized world, and the Clean Development Mechanism - an international emission-reduction-credit system - has developed a substantial constituency, despite some concerns about its performance. Because linkage between tradable permit systems can reduce compliance costs and improve market liquidity, there is great interest in linking cap-and-trade systems to each other, as well as to the CDM and other credit systems. We examine the benefits and concerns associated with various types of linkages, and analyze the near-term and long-term role that linkage may play in a future international climate policy architecture. In particular, we evaluate linkage in three potential roles: as an independent bottom-up architecture, as a step in the evolution of a top-down architecture, and as an ongoing element of a larger climate policy agreement. We also assess how the policy elements of climate negotiations can facilitate or impede linkages. Our analysis throughout is both positive and normative
linkage, cap-and-trade, tradable permits, global climate change, Business and Government Policy, International Economics, Environment and Natural Resources, Intergovernmental Relations, International Affairs,Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Regulation, Science, Technology
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40.
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Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future
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Posted:
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28 Aug 02
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Last Revised:
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18 May 04
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94 ( 82,472) |
11
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future
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28 Aug 02
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Last Revised:
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23 Sep 02
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0
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Abstract:
Policy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings associated with market-based policies, with an application to the environmental policy realm. These simple formula can identify instruments that merit more detailed investigation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to nitrogen oxides control by electric utilities in the United States.
Environment, Policy Instruments, Market-based, Tradable Permits, Pollution Taxes, Uniform Standards
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future
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| Posted: |
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01 Sep 02
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Last Revised:
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18 May 04
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94
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11
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Abstract:
Policy makers and analysts are often faced with situations where it is unclear whether market-based instruments hold real promise of reducing costs, relative to conventional uniform standards. We develop analytic expressions that can be employed with modest amounts of information to estimate the potential cost savings associated with market-based policies, with an application to the environmental policy realm. These simple formulae can help increase intuition and understanding of the sources of cost savings, and help identify and design instruments that merit more detailed investigation. We illustrate the use of these results with an application to nitrogen oxides control by electric utilities in the United States.
Environmental Policy, Market-based Instruments, Cost Heterogeneity, Cost Effectiveness
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41.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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14 Apr 05
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Last Revised:
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21 Apr 05
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85 (88,396)
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6
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Abstract:
Vintage-differentiated regulations (VDRs) are standards that are fixed with respect to the date of entry of regulated units, with later vintages facing more stringent standards. VDRs play prominent roles under major Federal, state, and local environmental laws. This paper synthesizes what is known about the effects of environmental VDRs, and develops lessons for public policy and for research. Economic theory suggests that such age-discriminatory regulations retard turnover of the capital stock, drive up the cost of environmental protection, and can increase pollution levels. Empirical studies validate theoretical predictions that VDRs delay replacement of durable goods, and thereby increase aggregate pollution abatement costs. In some cases, empirical studies also validate the perverse consequence that environmental progress is itself retarded.
vintage-differentiated regulation, new source review, cost-effective environmental regulation
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42.
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What Drives Land-Use Change in the United States? A National Analysis of Landowner Decisions
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hide multiple versions |
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|
Ruben N. Lubowski U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) Andrew J. J. Plantinga Oregon State University - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Posted:
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05 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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14 Oct 08
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84 ( 89,059) |
1
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Ruben N. Lubowski U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) Andrew J. J. Plantinga Oregon State University - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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14 Oct 08
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Last Revised:
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14 Oct 08
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57
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1
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Abstract:
Land-use changes involve important economic and environmental effects with implications for international trade, global climate change, wildlife, and other policy issues. We use an econometric model to identify factors driving land-use change in the United States between 1982 and 1997. We quantify the effects of net returns to alternative land uses on private landowners' decisions to allocate land among six major uses, drawing on detailed micro-data on land use and land quality that are comprehensive of the contiguous U.S. This analysis provides the first evidence of the relative historical importance of markets and Federal farm policies affecting land-use changes nationally.
Land Use, Land-Use Change, Econometric Analysis, Simulations
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Ruben N. Lubowski U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) - Economic Research Service (ERS) Andrew J. J. Plantinga Oregon State University - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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05 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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21 Jan 08
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27
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1
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Abstract:
Land-use changes involve important economic and environmental effects with implications for international trade, global climate change, wildlife, and other policy issues. We use an econometric model to identify factors driving land-use change in the United States between 1982 and 1997. We quantify the effects of net returns to alternative land uses on private landowners' decisions to allocate land among six major uses, drawing on detailed micro-data on land use and land quality that are comprehensive of the contiguous U.S. This analysis provides the first evidence of the relative historical importance of markets and Federal farm policies affecting land-use changes nationally.
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43.
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Comparing Price and Non-Price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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Posted:
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18 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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08 Sep 08
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64 (105,180) |
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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30 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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31 Jul 08
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6
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Abstract:
Urban water conservation is typically achieved through prescriptive regulations, including the rationing of water for particular uses and requirements for the installation of particular technologies. A significant shift has occurred in pollution control regulations toward market-based policies in recent decades. We offer an analysis of the relative merits of market-based and prescriptive approaches to water conservation, where prices have rarely been used to allocate scarce supplies. The analysis emphasizes the emerging theoretical and empirical evidence that using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than implementing non-price conservation programs, similar to results for pollution control in earlier decades. Price-based approaches also have advantages in terms of monitoring and enforcement. In terms of predictability and equity, neither policy instrument has an inherent advantage over the other. As in any policy context, political considerations are important.
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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18 Jun 08
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Last Revised:
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08 Sep 08
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58
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Abstract:
Urban water conservation is typically achieved through prescriptive regulations, including the rationing of water for particular uses and requirements for the installation of particular technologies. A significant shift has occurred in pollution control regulations toward market-based policies in recent decades. We offer an analysis of the relative merits of market-based and prescriptive approaches to water conservation, where prices have rarely been used to allocate scarce supplies. The analysis emphasizes the emerging theoretical and empirical evidence that using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than implementing non-price conservation programs, similar to results for pollution control in earlier decades. Price-based approaches also have advantages in terms of monitoring and enforcement. In terms of predictability and equity, neither policy instrument has an inherent advantage over the other. As in any policy context, political considerations are important.
Cost-effectiveness, Water Conservation, Market-based Approaches, Policy Instrument Choice, Water Price
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44.
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Sheila M. Olmstead Yale University - School of Forestry and Environmental Studies W. Michael Hanemann University of California, Berkeley - The Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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05 Nov 07
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Last Revised:
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21 Jan 08
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26 (151,377)
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3
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Abstract:
We estimate the price elasticity of water demand with household-level data, structurally modeling the piecewise-linear budget constraints imposed by increasing-block pricing. We develop a mathematical expression for the unconditional price elasticity of demand under increasing-block prices and compare conditional and unconditional elasticities analytically and empirically. We test the hypothesis that price elasticity may depend on price structure, beyond technical differences in elasticity concepts. Due to the possibility of endogenous utility price structure choice, observed differences in elasticity across price structures may be due either to a behavioral response to price structure, or to underlying heterogeneity among water utility service areas.
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45.
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Forest L. Reinhardt Harvard Business School Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Richard H. K. Vietor Harvard University - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit
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| Posted: |
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16 May 08
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Last Revised:
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16 May 08
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10 (195,905)
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1
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Abstract:
Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing considerable attention on the concept of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR), particularly in the realm of environmental protection. Beyond complete compliance with environmental regulations, do firms have additional moral or social responsibilities to commit resources to environmental protection? How should we think about the notion of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest? May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders? Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship? And finally, should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing activities (i.e., is this an efficient use of social resources)? We address these questions through the lens of economics, including insights from legal analysis and business scholarship.
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46.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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07 Nov 08
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Last Revised:
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23 Sep 09
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0 (0)
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4
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Abstract:
There is growing impetus for a domestic US climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide (CO) and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyse an up-stream, economy-wide CO cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 per cent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission-reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and appropriate linkage with actions taken in other countries, in order to establish a level playing field among domestically produced and imported products.
cap-and-trade system, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gas emissions, global climate change, carbon taxes, Q540, Q280, Q380, Q480, Q580
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47.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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18 May 04
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Last Revised:
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18 May 04
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Increased attention by policy makers to the threat of global climate change has brought with it considerable attention to the possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide. This approach has, in fact, become an explicit element of both U.S. and international climate policies. This paper develops a methodology whereby estimates of the costs of carbon sequestration can be developed on the basis of evidence from observations of landowners' behavior when confronted with the opportunity costs of alternative land uses. The analytical model takes account of silvicultural understanding of the intertemporal linkages between deforestation and carbon emissions, on the one hand and between forestation and carbon sequestration, on the other. The results support the efficacy and potential value of this analytical approach. The paper is intended to be illustrative of how econometric analyses of land use, which already exist for a number of countries, can be used to develop better region-specific estimates of the marginal costs of carbon sequestration.
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48.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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04 Oct 99
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Last Revised:
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02 Jan 08
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
The possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide has received considerable attention because of concerns about the threat of global climate change due to the greenhouse effect. Would this approach be as inexpensive as studies have suggested? We develop a method for estimating the costs of carbon sequestration by estimating the opportunity costs of land on the basis of econometric evidence of landowners' behavior. The model incorporates intertemporal linkages between deforestation and carbon emissions, and between forestation and carbon sequestration. We find that the marginal costs of carbon sequestration are highly non-linear and that those costs may be greater than previous studies have found, particularly at higher levels of sequestration. We estimate that U.S. marginal carbon sequestration costs will probably be somewhat greater than carbon abatement costs at low levels of control, and that the difference between the two will likely increase as targets increase.
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49.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government Bradley W. Whitehead McKinsey & Co. Inc.
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| Posted: |
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16 Sep 99
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Last Revised:
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30 Nov 03
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This draft paper, intended for a general audience interested in environmental policy, has been prepared for the Next Generation Project at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. We examine what will be required if market-based environmental policy instruments are to become a major force in U.S. environmental policy in the coming decades. We begin by defining market-based instruments, and contrast these with conventional command-and-control instruments. We specify five categories of market-based or economic- incentive instruments: pollution charges; tradeable permits; deposit refund systems; reducing market barriers; and eliminating government subsidies. We review major U.S. applications of these instruments, including: EPA's emissions trading program; the leaded gasoline phasedown; water quality permit trading; CFC trading; SO2 allowance trading; and the RECLAIM program. We first assess the U.S. experience in terms of the relatively limited use of these instruments. We examine: a stock-flow problem; the role of interest groups; ambivalence toward better regulation; and consumer experience. We also assess the U.S. experience in terms of a mixed record of performance of implemented market-based instruments. Here we examine the role of: inaccurate predictions; design problems; and limitations of firms' structure. Next, we ask how the next generation of market-based instruments can be advanced. We focus on four sets of approaches: improving program design; applying market-based instruments on the state level (waste management, land use, and air quality); implementing new Federal programs (hazardous waste deposit refund systems, and a revenue-neutral carbon tax); and addressing some long-term issues. We conclude with a brief prognosis of the likely future role of market-based instruments in U.S. environmental policy.
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50.
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Nathaniel O. Keohane Yale University - School of Management Richard L. Revesz New York University - School of Law Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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16 Sep 99
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02 Jan 08
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Abstract:
In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and- control instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the few instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of these other instruments. Fourth, the political attention given to market-based environmental policy instruments has increased dramatically in recent years. We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing upon intellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law. We find that all fit quite well within an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political market. In general, explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for environmental policy instruments, while explanations from political science refer to the supply side. Overall, we find that there are compelling theoretical explanations for the four apparent anomalies, although these theories have yet to be empirically verified.
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51.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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13 Sep 99
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30 Nov 03
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Abstract:
There continues to be great debate about the desirability of taking actions to limit carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions, but it is important to consider policy instruments that can be employed to meet targets that may eventually be forthcoming. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relative merits of the available instruments. The theoretical advantages of market-based instruments, such as carbon taxes and systems of tradeable carbon rights, are striking. In the U.S. domestic context, grandfathered tradeable permits will probably be the preferred approach (if any) in the short run, although revenue-neutral carbon taxes will hold greater promise in the long run. In the international context, a system of international tradeable permits could provide important advantages over alternative approaches, but it is difficult to imagine what existing international institution would administer such a system. Despite the great theoretical advantages of market-based approaches to addressing global climate change, neither domestic political barriers nor international institutional impediments to implementing these and other instruments should be underestimated.
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52.
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Richard G. Newell Resources for the Future Adam B. Jaffe Brandeis University Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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01 Sep 99
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02 Jan 08
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Abstract:
The determinants of energy-saving innovation, and particularly the roles of energy prices and efficiency standards in affecting the development of new energy-saving technologies, are exceptionally important considerations in modeling global climate change and evaluating alternative policy options. We analyze the effects of energy prices and energy-efficiency regulations on the menu of air conditioner and water heater models available on the market over approximately a 30-year period. By adapting the induced innovation model to a product characteristics framework, we develop econometric estimates that indicate that a large portion of the improvement in energy efficiency in these technologies has taken the form of neutral (equiproportional) improvement in all product characteristics, and that this neutral innovation does not appear to be responsive to energy prices or regulations. There is also a significant non-neutral component of innovation, which was tilted away from energy efficiency before 1970, but later shifted to favor energy efficiency. This non-neutral component of innovation was substantially and significantly influenced by energy prices, by product labeling requirements, and by mandatory efficiency standards. Looking forward, we estimate that if energy prices remain at current levels, declining rates of neutral innovation combined with a return to non-neutral innovation tilted away from energy efficiency will result in little further improvement in the energy-efficiency of new models. Energy taxes of 10 to 30 percent of retail prices could significantly change this prediction. We predict that such taxes would lead to further energy efficiency increases of 10 to 50 percent for air conditioners by the year 2025.
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53.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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07 Feb 98
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07 Feb 98
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Abstract:
Some eighty years ago, economists first proposed the use of corrective taxes to internalize environmental and other externalities. Fifty years later, the portfolio of potential economic-incentive instruments was expanded to include quantity-based mechanisms -- tradeable permits. Thus, economic-incentive approaches to environmental protection are clearly not a new policy idea, and over the past two decades, they have held varying degrees of prominence in environmental policy discussions. This paper summarizes U.S. experiences with such market-based policy instruments, including: pollution charges; deposit-refund systems; tradeable permits; market barrier reductions; and government subsidy reductions. No particular form of government intervention, no individual policy instrument -- whether market-based or conventional -- is appropriate for all environmental problems. Which instrument is best in any given situation depends upon a variety of characteristics of the environmental problem, and the social, political, and economic context in which it is being regulated. There is no policy panacea. Indeed, the real challenge for bureaucrats, elected officials, and other participants in the environmental policy process comes in analyzing and then selecting the best instrument for each situation that arises.
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54.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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30 Sep 97
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30 Nov 03
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Abstract:
Over the past twenty-five years, the political process has gradually become more receptive to market-based instruments. By far the most ambitious application of these instruments has been for the control of acid rain under Title IV of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, which established a sulfur dioxide (SO2) allowance trading program intended to cut nationwide electric utility emissions by 50 percent by the year 2000. This essay seeks to identify lessons that can be learned from this grand experiment in economically oriented environmental policy. We begin with a very brief description of the SO2 allowance trading system and its performance to date. We examine positive political economy lessons that can be learned from the program's enactment by addressing three questions. Why have conventional, command-and-control instruments been the dominant form of environmental regulation? When market-based approaches have been used, why has the chosen form always been freely distributed (grandfathered) tradeable rights? And why was allowance trading adopted for acid-rain control in 1990? We also consider normative lessons that can be learned from the program's design and performance, organizing these into four categories: lessons for environmental policy; for design and implementation of tradeable permit systems; for analysis of prospective and adopted systems; and for identifying new applications. In a final section, we offer some conclusions.
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55.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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09 Sep 97
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30 Nov 03
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Abstract:
The fundamental question that needs to be addressed by public policy in the area of environmental protection as we move into the next century is, "what is the appropriate role of government?" This question emerges along three fundamental dimensions in relation to environmental protection, which are closely interrelated but conceptually distinct: (1) what is the appropriate degree of government activity; (2) what form should government activity take; and (3) what level of government should be delegated responsibility? In this brief essay, I attempt to define the questions clearly, suggest criteria that can be used to evaluate responses, and provide outlines of some initial answers.
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56.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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13 Jun 97
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15 Feb 01
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Abstract:
This paper, prepared for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, provides a summary of the theory and the reality of economic-incentive approaches to environmental regulation. The paper begins with a derivation of the necessary and sufficient condition for a policy instrument to be cost effective, namely that the instrument induces all sources to abate emissions at the same marginal cost. Subsequent sections introduce economic-incentive policy instruments, including emission charges and tradeable permits, and show that these instruments, in theory, meet the specified condition. Then, six U.S. applications are described: EPA's emissions trading program; the leaded gasoline phasedown; water quality permit trading; the CFC phaseout; the SO2 allowance system; and the RECLAIM program. Reasons for the limited use of incentive-based instruments are examined, including the role of interest groups; ambivalence by regulated firms; and consumers' perspectives. Reasons for the mixed record of implemented instruments are also examined: inaccurate predictions; design problems; and limitations in firms' internal structures.
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57.
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Robert N. Stavins Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
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| Posted: |
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11 Mar 97
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Last Revised:
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02 Jan 08
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
This paper develops and applies a new method for estimating the economic benefits of an environmental amenity. The method fits within the household production framework and is based upon the notion of estimating the derived demand for a privately traded option to utilize a freely-available public good. In particular, the demand for state fishing licenses is used to infer the benefits of recreational fishing. Using panel data on state fishing license sales and prices for the continental United States over a fifteen-year period, combined with data on substitute prices and demographic variables, a license demand function is estimated with instrumental variable procedures to allow for the potential endogeneity of administered prices. The econometric results lead to estimates of the benefits of a fishing license and, subsequently, to the expected benefits of a recreational fishing day. These preliminary estimates are compared with results from previous studies using survey (contingent valuation) and travel cost approaches.
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