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Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between state level anti-ticket scalping laws and online ticket scalping by examining transactions for National Football League tickets completed on eBay between 2002 and 2005. Despite limited enforcement of regulations in online marketplaces, the evidence suggests that ticket resale regulations do affect the structure of trade online. Stricter regulations were associated with fewer online transactions, a greater frequency of transactions that crossed state borders, as well as higher prices and markups in the secondary market. The evidence suggests that regulations may create significant opportunities for ticket scalpers to capture rents, and these opportunities seemed to be greatest in states that require resellers to be licensed. Over the time period studied, prices and quantities observed in states strictly prohibiting resale above face value became more similar to those observed in unregulated states. These observations are consistent with the idea that market participants updated their beliefs over time about the probability that scalping laws would be enforced online.

regulation, ticket scalping, e-commerce

Abstract:
This paper examines the structure of over 100 alliances by Internet portals from 1995 to 1999. These alliances were an attractive empirical testing ground because of the large number and heterogeneous nature of the contracts, the high standards for disclosure in the industry, and the careful delineation of ownership, control, exclusivity, and other provisions in the contracts. The division of ownership and allocation of control rights displayed patterns consistent with the predictions in the incomplete contracting literature. Similarly, the exclusivity
of the agreements appeared to vary, at least weakly, with the value of the product or service being made available to the portal, consistent with the licensing literature. In other cases, particularly in regard to the differing allocation of ownership and control and the varying completeness of the contracts, the empirical patterns indicated a more complex world than the one that theory led us to anticipate.

Abstract:
This paper examines the structure of over 100 alliances by Internet portals from 1995 to 1999. These alliances were an attractive empirical testing ground because of the large number and heterogeneous nature of the contracts, the high standards for disclosure in the industry, and the careful delineation of ownership, control, exclusivity, and other provisions in the contracts. The division of ownership and allocation of control rights displayed patterns consistent with the predictions in the incomplete contracting literature. Similarly, the exclusivity of the agreements appeared to vary, at least weakly, with the value of the product or service being made available to the portal, consistent with the licensing literature. In other cases, particularly in regard to the differing allocation of ownership and control and the varying completeness of the contracts, the empirical patterns indicated a more complex world than the one that theory led us to anticipate.

Abstract:
To study whether consumers will pay more for products that generate charitable donations, we analyze data from eBay on charity and non-charity auctions of otherwise identical products. Charity prices are 6% greater, on average, than non-charity prices. Bids below the closing price are also greater, as are bids by individuals bidding on identical charity and non-charity products. Bidders appear to value charity revenue at least partially as a public good, as they submit bids earlier in charity auctions, stimulating other bidders to bid more aggressively. Our results help explain why firms may pledge charitable donations, green production, or similar activities.

Charity auctions, cause-related marketing, online auctions, corporate philanthropy

Abstract:
Scientists and engineers in small firms are far more likely than their large firm counterparts to enter entrepreneurship, a phenomenon we label the small firm effect. We explore the origins of this small firm effect, identify four classes of explanations - preference sorting, ability sorting, opportunity cost, and the possibility that workers in small firms develop entrepreneurial human capital - and exploring these empirically, by examining the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and performance. We find that preference sorting plays a role in generating the small firm effect: small firms attract those with prior preferences for autonomy, who are similarly drawn into entrepreneurship. Similarly, ability sorting plays a role: those who ultimately become entrepreneurs may be drawn to small firms because the offer tighter pay-for-performance links and are drawn to entrepreneurship for the same reason, or because the skills required for success in small firms are also valuable in entrepreneurship. Evidence suggests that, while those with the very least to lose enter entrepreneurship with greater frequency, opportunity cost has at best a small role to play in explaining the small firm effect. Finally, we interpret evidence that prior experience in small firms predicts positive performance outcomes in the early stages of entrepreneurship as suggesting that employment in a small firm also appears to make these workers better entrepreneurs. This effect may be largest among those of high ability.

entrepreneurship, small firms, high-ability workers, science and engineering labor force

Abstract:
This paper takes as its unit of analysis the disclosure of an invention by an academic scientist to the university technology transfer office and examines the factors that lead some inventions to be licensed by firms while others are not. The analyses show that inventors' academic output, as measured by their publication records, is positively correlated with the likelihood of finding a license partner for the technology but is largely uncorrelated with the payments specified by the license contract and the returns of the technology to the university. This suggests that inventors' academic status plays a role in attracting the attention of licensing firms, but does not necessarily change their inferences about the quality of the technologies for sale. The analyses also show that patent grants significantly increase the rate at which technologies are licensed and are most important for inexperienced inventors and biomedical technologies. The timing of licenses with respect to patent grants suggests that patents may affect both the quality inferences of licensing firms and the incentives of inventors to disclose information or to participate more actively in locating a license partner.

Intellectual property rights, markets for technology, markets and prestige

Abstract:
We test theoretical propositions from the literature on information and control in interfirm agreements using a sample of over 100 Internet portal alliance contracts. The literature on information and control in alliances suggests that the use of verifiable performance measures to allocate state-contingent control rights depends (a) on the precision of the information about the realized state and (b) on the level of information asymmetry between the two parties regarding the preferences of each. We test these propositions by looking at how the timing of agreements (a proxy for environmental uncertainty) and exclusivity restrictions (a proxy for incentive conflict) impact the use of a subset of available performance measures. Consistent with a signaling model of the allocation of contingent control rights, we find that contracts involve fewer contingent control rights as industries have matured. Where incentive conflicts are potentially greater, more contingent control rights are used.

Incomplete contracts, alliances, control rights

Abstract:
Organization scholars have highlighted the value of relationships in supporting effective exchange, yet many have questioned the appropriateness of applying the economic concept of ‘capital’ to social relations embedded in exchange. Critics argue that to be a valuable construct ‘social capital’ must demonstrate properties consistent with physical capital, i.e., it must have measureable investments, calculable returns, and different value in different contexts. In this paper, we explore whether relational capital, the socially-embedded, relational assets that may form in an organizational dyad, displays these properties. We do so in a setting in which a buyer has undertaken active efforts to de-socialize exchange by organizing its purchases through reverse auctions. This setting permits us to focus more sharply on the anticipated benefits generated by relational capital, while minimizing the confounding influence on partner selection that these social attachments may generate. We construct a measure of relational capital between organizations and find that this measure is associated with greater exchange value, that its value depends predictably on the type of exchange, and that it exhibits diminishing marginal returns. Our results support the view that relational capital indeed satisfies economic definitions of capital.

relational capital, procurement, buyer-supplier relationships, social capital, relational governance

Abstract:
I examine the relationship between the payment structure of contracts and the likelihood of termination using a sample of patented technologies licensed by Harvard University to for-profit enterprises. For early stage technologies such as these, non-contractible effort and investment is typically required from both inventor and licensing firm to bring the technology to market. In this double-sided moral hazard setting, the payment structure stipulated in the contract affects the incentives of firms to invest in and of inventors to provide on-going support for the development of the technology. The analysis shows that for large licensees, the use of (larger) contingent payment terms is associated with lower hazard rates of termination, whereas for small licensees the positive and negative incentives generated by contingent payments cancel each other out. The difference in the impact of incentives between small and large firms is consistent with the literature that suggests that agency problems may be less severe in small firms. An instrumental variables approach is used to account for potentially endogenous relationship between contract structure and performance.

Technology Licensing, Contract Structure, Innovation, Incentives

Abstract:
We investigate the impact of charity tie-ins on transaction probabilities and sale prices using a large database of eBay auctions. We examine "natural experiments" of precisely matched clusters of charity and non-charity auctions with identical titles, subtitles, sellers, and start prices. We find a 6 to 14 percentage point increase in sale probability and a 2 to 6 percent greater maximum bid for charity items, depending on the fraction of auction proceeds that is donated to charity. The impact on sale probability and price is most pronounced among sellers without extensive eBay histories, suggesting that consumers view charity as a signal of seller quality and a substitute for reputation. We also find that charity-tied products by all sellers are more likely to sell (and at higher prices) immediately following Hurricane Katrina, implying that consumers derive direct utility from seller charity at times when charity is particularly salient.

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Abstract:
We examine the structure of more than 100 alliances by Internet portals and other firms between 1995 to 1999 from a contract-theory perspective. Models of incomplete contracts frequently invoke unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts in justifying the assumption of incompleteness. The setting in which Internet portals formed alliances was rife with these sorts of transaction costs. We argue that these alliances can be viewed as incomplete contracts and find that the division of ownership and the allocation of control rights are consistent with the incomplete-contracting literature.