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Robin Greenwood's
Scholarly Papers
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5,786 |
Total
Citations
116 |
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1.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Michael Schor Morgan Stanley
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31 Jul 07
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22 Jan 09
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1,461 (2,548)
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8
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Abstract:
Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns around the time that a hedge fund announces its activist intentions with a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover: In a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, we find that announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for the subset of targets that are acquired ex-post, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent eighteen months after the initial filing. We show that firms that are targeted by activists are more likely to get acquired than those in a control sample. Finally, we show that the portfolios managed by activist investors perform poorly during a period in which market-wide takeover interest declined.
Corporate Governance, Hedge Funds, Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions
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2.
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Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Stefan Nagel Stanford Graduate School of Business
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15 Feb 07
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22 Jan 09
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619 ( 10,536) |
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Stefan Nagel Stanford Graduate School of Business
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22 Jun 08
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18 Jul 08
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We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers' investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers' actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Stefan Nagel Stanford Graduate School of Business
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15 Feb 07
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22 Jan 09
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611
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Abstract:
We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers' investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers' actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices..
Mutual Funds, Behavioral Finance, Experience, Learning, Asset Pricing, Stock Price Bubble
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3.
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The Maturity of Debt Issues and Predictable Variation in Bond Returns
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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15 Aug 01
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13 Jan 09
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570 ( 11,831) |
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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09 Sep 02
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13 Aug 08
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The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.
bond, maturity, return, corporate, debt, issue, predictability, cost of capital, cost of debt
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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15 Aug 01
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13 Jan 09
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570
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The maturity of new debt issues predicts excess bond returns. When the share of longterm debt issues in total debt issues is high, future excess bond returns are low. This predictive power comes in two parts. First, inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread predict excess bond returns. Second, these same variables explain the long-term share, and together account for much of its own ability to predict excess bond returns. The results are consistent with survey evidence that firms use debt market conditions in an effort to determine the lowest-cost maturity at which to borrow.
Bond, Maturity, Return, Corporate, Debt, Issue, Predictability, Cost of Capital
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4.
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C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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04 Oct 07
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22 Jan 09
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477 (15,245)
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Abstract:
Recent research documents that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weak investor protection. However, drawing on panel data on corporate ownership in 34 countries between 1995 and 2006, we show this pattern does not hold for newly public firms, which tend to have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. We show that firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing, that these decreases appear in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new share issuance. We consider the implications of these findings for financing choices and patterns in firm growth and analyze alternative explanations for the diffusion of ownership that could distort our interpretations. We conclude that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO in countries with strong investor protection because firms in these countries raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders in the process.
Ownership, Blockholding, Liquidity, Float, Shareholder Rights, Investor Protection
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5.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School David Thesmar HEC Paris (Groupe HEC)
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21 Oct 09
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04 Nov 09
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461 (16,100)
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We investigate the relationship between ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it susceptible to non-fundamental trading shocks. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership, or because its owners face correlated liquidity shocks, ie., they must buy or sell at the same time. Two assets are “co-fragile” if their owners have correlated trading needs, even if the holdings of these owners do not directly overlap. We formalize this idea and apply it to the ownership of US stocks between 1990 and 2007. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts future price volatility, and co-fragility predicts cross-stock return comovement.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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02 Jan 05
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07 Apr 05
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322 (25,247)
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Aggregate investment in cash and liquid assets as a share of total corporate investment is negatively related to subsequent U.S. stock market returns between 1947 and 2003. The share of cash in total investment is a more stable predictor of returns than scaled price variables and performs well in out-of-sample predictability tests. Cash investment is a stronger predictor of market returns in years in which external financing is also high. The results support a theory in which firms in the aggregate actively time security issuance relative to investment needs, taking advantage of a time varying cost of capital.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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09 Apr 05
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02 Aug 05
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321 (25,327)
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In the presence of limits to arbitrage, cross-sectional variation in periodic investor demand should be related to the degree of comovement of returns. I exploit the unusual weighting system of the Nikkei 225 index in Japan to identify cross-sectional variation in periodic demand for index stocks. Relative to their weights in a value weighted index, some stocks in the Nikkei are overweighted by a factor of ten or more. Using overweighting as an instrument for the proportionality between demand shocks for index stocks, I find a strong positive relation between overweighting and the comovement of a stock with other stocks in the index, and a negative relationship between index overweighting and comovement with stocks outside of the index. Put simply, overweighted stocks have high betas. The results suggest that excess comovement of stock returns is a consequence of an institutionalized commonality in trading behavior, rather than inefficiencies related to the speed at which index stocks incorporate economy-wide information.
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Nathan Sosner Harvard University - Department of Economics Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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10 Jan 03
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22 Jan 09
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305 (26,908)
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In April 2000, in one day, 30 stocks were replaced in the Nikkei 225 index in Japan. We analyze the change in comovement of returns of stocks added to and deleted from the index with the returns of stocks remaining in the index. A simple model shows that upon inclusion into (deletion from) a stock index, stocks should begin to comove more (less) with the index, due to a change in their trading pattern. The empirical findings provide sound support for these predictions: In the sample, daily index betas of the added stocks rose by an average of 0.60, while the average beta of the deleted stocks fell by 0.71. Our results confirm additional predictions of the model for changes in R2, turnover, and the autocorrelation of returns upon index inclusion and deletion, and hold at daily, weekly and bi-weekly return horizons. Fundamentals based explanations fail to account for these findings. We conclude that correlated trading of index stocks causes excess comovement of stock returns. We argue that the distinct trading mechanism on the Tokyo Stock Exchange contributes to the significance and magnitude of our results.
comovement, beta, stock market index
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9.
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Trading Restrictions and Stock Prices
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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Posted:
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17 Mar 06
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26 Sep 09
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293 ( 28,220) |
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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25 Jan 09
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26 Sep 09
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I examine a series of stock splits in Japan in which firms restrict the ability of their investors to sell their shares for a period of approximately 2 months. By removing potential sellers from the market, the restrictions have the effect of increasing the impact of trading on prices. The greater the desire of investors to trade, and the greater the restrictions, the larger the impact of the restrictions. In the data, particularly severe restrictions are associated with returns of over 30% around the ex-date, most of which are reversed when investors are allowed to sell again. Firms are more likely to issue equity or redeem convertible debt during the restricted period, suggesting strong incentives for manipulation.
G12, G14
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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17 Mar 06
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16 Feb 07
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293
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Firms can manipulate their stock price by limiting the ability of their investors to sell. I examine a series of corporate events in Japan in which firms actively reduced their float - the fraction of shares available to trade - for periods of one to three months, locking investors into their long positions. Standard theory predicts that the greater are the restrictions, the greater is the impact of trading on price. Particularly severe restrictions are associated with positive event returns of over 30 percent, most of which are reversed when the restrictions are removed. Firms are more likely to issue equity or redeem convertible debt during the restricted period, suggesting strong incentives for manipulation.
Asset Pricing, Float, Short sales constraints, Behavioral Finance, Limits to arbitrage
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10.
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Bond Supply and Excess Bond Returns
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Dimitri Vayanos London School of Economics
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11 Sep 07
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22 Jan 09
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278 ( 29,946) |
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Dimitri Vayanos London School of Economics
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09 Jun 08
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09 Jun 08
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We examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and excess returns. Our analysis is based on a theoretical model of preferred habitat in which clienteles with strong preferences for specific maturities trade with arbitrageurs. Consistent with the model, we find that (i) the supply of long- relative to short-term bonds is positively related to the term spread, (ii) supply predicts positively long-term bonds' excess returns even after controlling for the term spread and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, (iii) the effects of supply are stronger for longer maturities, and (iv) following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money, both supply and the term spread are stronger predictors of excess returns.
bond prices, limited arbitrage, preferred habitat, return predictability
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Dimitri Vayanos London School of Economics
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13 Feb 08
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14 Apr 08
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Abstract:
We examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and excess returns. Our analysis is based on a theoretical model of preferred habitat in which clienteles with strong preferences for specific maturities trade with arbitrageurs. Consistent with the model, we find that (i) the supply of long-relative to short-term bonds is positively related to the term spread, (ii) supply predicts positively long-term bonds' excess returns even after controlling for the term spread and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, (iii) the effects of supply are stronger for longer maturities, and (iv) following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money, both supply and the term spread are stronger predictors of excess returns.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Dimitri Vayanos London School of Economics
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11 Sep 07
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22 Jan 09
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266
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Abstract:
We examine empirically how the maturity structure of government debt affects bond yields and excess returns. Our analysis is based on a theoretical model of preferred habitat in which clienteles with strong preferences for specific maturities trade with arbitrageurs. Consistent with the model, we find that (i) the supply of long-relative to short-term bonds is positively related to the term spread, (ii) supply predicts positively long-term bonds' excess returns even after controlling for the term spread and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, (iii) the effects of supply are stronger for longer maturities, and (iv) following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money, both supply and the term spread are stronger predictors of excess returns.
Term Structure, Bond Risk Premia, Supply Effects, Limited Arbitrage
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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17 Jun 03
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23 Jun 03
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225 (37,837)
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In the simplest frictionless theory, an increase in real interest rates causes a symmetric decline in investment for all firms because they discount new projects at a higher cost of capital. I develop and test a specific debt-market financing channel in which differences in the maturity structure of debt result in varied responses of investment to changes in real and nominal interest rates. Firms with high levels of short-term debt suffer a decline in cash flows, relative to firms financed with long-term debt, when nominal interest rates increase. In U.S. firm-level data between 1953 and 2001, I find that the investment of firms with a high current portion of debt is more sensitive to changes in real and nominal interest rates when compared with firms that have only long-term debt. Consistent with my predictions, firms with high levels of short-term debt also display higher investment sensitivity to inflation.
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12.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Samuel Hanson Harvard Business School
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26 Dec 08
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09 Jun 09
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184 (46,450)
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Abstract:
When investors overvalue a particular firm characteristic, corporations endowed with that characteristic can absorb some of the demand by issuing equity. We use time-series variation in differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to shed light on characteristic-related mispricing. During years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms, for example, we show that large firms subsequently underperform. This holds true even when we restrict attention to the returns of firms that do not issue at all, suggesting that issuance is partly an attempt to cater to broad time-varying patterns in characteristics mispricing. Our approach helps forecast returns to portfolios based on book-tomarket (HML), size (SMB), price, distress, payout policy, profitability, and industry. Our results are consistent with the view that firms play an important role as arbitrageurs in the stock market.
Limits-to-arbitrage, characteristics, mispricing, capital structure, cross-section of stock returns
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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16 Jan 08
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12 Jan 09
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148 (57,308)
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We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuations on low-price firms, managers will maintain share prices at lower levels, and vice-versa. Using measures of time-varying catering incentives based on valuation ratios, split announcement effects, and future returns, we find empirical support for the predictions in both time-series and firm-level data. Given the strong cross-sectional relationship between capitalization and nominal share price, an interpretation of the results is that managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favor small firms.
Stock splits, catering, payout policy, investor demand, nominal share prices
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14.
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Sergey Chernenko Harvard Business School C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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13 Nov 09
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13 Nov 09
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34 (138,174)
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Standard agency theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders bear the costs of diverting resources from outside investors. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, the controlling shareholder lists more equity, and in equilibrium diverts more from outside investors. The greater is the scope for expropriation, the greater is the mispricing that is required for the controlling shareholder to list shares. We test predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed corporate subsidiaries in Japan. We show that when there is greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm, minority shareholders fare poorly post-listing, experiencing risk-adjusted stock returns of between -60 and -71 basis points per month. Parent firms commonly repurchase subsidiaries, usually at large discounts to listing value, and they experience positive abnormal returns when these repurchases are announced.
Ownership, Agency Costs, Mispricing
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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03 Nov 08
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12 Jan 09
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27 (149,491)
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We document that firms tend to borrow at the lowest-cost maturity. In aggregate timeseries data, the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is negatively related to subsequent excess bond returns, meaning that firms substitute toward long-term debt when the cost of long-term debt is low relative to the cost of short-term debt. The longterm share is also contemporaneously negatively related to the components of the longterm interest rate that predict higher excess bond returns, including inflation, the real short-term rate, and the term spread. The results suggest that firms use predictable variation in excess bond returns in an effort to reduce the cost of capital.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Samuel Hanson Harvard Business School Jeremy C. Stein Harvard University - Department of Economics
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22 Jun 08
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03 Jul 08
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25 (153,864)
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We argue that time-series variation in the maturity of aggregate corporate debt issues arises because firms behave as macro liquidity providers, absorbing the large supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity structure of government debt. We document that when the government funds itself with relatively more short-term debt, firms fill the resulting gap by issuing more long-term debt, and vice-versa. This type of liquidity provision is undertaken more aggressively: i) in periods when the ratio of government debt to total debt is higher; and ii) by firms with stronger balance sheets. Our theory provides a new perspective on the apparent ability of firms to exploit bond-market return predictability with their financing choices.
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17.
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Catering Through Nominal Share Prices
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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Posted:
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30 Jan 08
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12 Jan 09
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25 (153,864) |
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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03 Nov 08
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12 Jan 09
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Abstract:
We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuations on low-price firms, managers will maintain share prices at lower levels, and vice-versa. Using measures of time-varying catering incentives based on valuation ratios, split announcement effects, and future returns, we find empirical support for the predictions in both time-series and firm-level data. Given the strong cross-sectional relationshipbetween capitalization and nominal share price, an interpretation of the results is that managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favor small firms.
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Malcolm P. Baker Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Jeffrey A. Wurgler NYU Stern School of Business
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30 Jan 08
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25 Feb 08
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Abstract:
We propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices. The theory predicts that when investors place higher valuations on low-price firms, managers will maintain share prices at lower levels, and vice-versa. Using measures of time-varying catering incentives based on valuation ratios, split announcement effects, and future returns, we find empirical support for the predictions in both time-series and firm-level data. Given the strong cross-sectional relationship between capitalization and nominal share price, an interpretation of the results is that managers may be trying to categorize their firms as small firms when investors favor small firms.
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C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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15 Jan 09
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19 Jan 09
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11 (193,281)
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Abstract:
Recent research documents that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weak investor protection. However, drawing on panel data on corporate ownership in 34 countries between 1995 and 2006, we show this pattern does not hold for newly public firms, which tend to have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. We show that firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing, that these decreases appear in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new share issuance. We consider the implications of these findings for financing choices and patterns in firm growth and analyze alternative explanations for the diffusion of ownership that could distort our interpretations. We conclude that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO in countries with strong investor protection because firms in these countries raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders in the process.
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19.
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Daniel B. Bergstresser Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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11 Nov 09
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11 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Washington Mutual issued 6 billion Euro of covered bonds in 2006. The objective of the case is to ask whether these bonds are mispriced in late 2008. The case is set in September 2008, and Washington Mutual is facing considerable distress due to mounting losses on its mortgage portfolio. Following investment bank Lehman Brother's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection filing in mid September, the price of Washington Mutual's covered bonds has fallen to 75 per 100 of face value. As these bonds are overcollateralized, the case asks students to evaluate the underlying collateral portfolio in the event of liquidation, as well as assessing the likelihood of different outcomes. The case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in the global capital markets.
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20.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Daniel Goldberg Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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11 Nov 09
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11 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
A New York-based hedge fund must decide whether to invest in TravelCenters of America (TA), a recent spin-off from a U.S.-based real estate investment trust. The case confronts students with the question: To what extent is this spin-off opportunity attractive from a value-investing standpoint? Historically, spin-offs have been attractive investments because of supply-demand dynamics associated with their investor base. The case is an opportunity to ask whether the same dynamics will operate for TA.
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21.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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09 Nov 09
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09 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C cases, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
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22.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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09 Nov 09
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Last Revised:
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09 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
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23.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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| Posted: |
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09 Nov 09
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Last Revised:
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09 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Citigroup faced considerable distress in early 2009. In late 2008, the bank had accepted $45 billion in preferred equity from the United States government via the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Yet, the stock had continued to slide in early 2009. In late February, the company announced that it would convert as much as $50 billion of preferred stock into common stock, at $3.25 per share. The case asks students to evaluate the pricing of preferred stock relative to common stock at this time. As the case takes place during a period of considerable uncertainty in global capital markets, and conventional sources of arbitrage capital have been depleted, the apparent mispricing may not be as attractive as it initially seems. In the B and C case, students must decide whether their view of the appropriate pricing changes, when the apparent mispricing worsens. A final additional teaching point relates to the formation of a synthetic short position using the options markets.
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24.
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C. Fritz Foley Harvard Business School Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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05 Nov 09
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16 Nov 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Why do shares in NEC Electronics, a publicly listed subsidiary of Japan conglomerate NEC trade at a discount to their fundamental value? Can Perry Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, restructure this subsidiary and generate significant returns? This case provides students with an opportunity to analyze Perry's decision to invest in NEC Electronics. In doing so, it asks for the reasons that NEC might take actions that destroy value and shift value away from NECE's minority shareholders. The events covered allow for a discussion of how ownership concentration constrains restructuring alternatives, how hedge fund investors might confront controlling shareholders, and how the mispricing of agency costs can give rise to ownership structures that allow for minority shareholder expropriation.
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25.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Michael Schor Morgan Stanley
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22 Sep 08
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Last Revised:
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22 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Equity capital, Equity financing, Securities trading, Securities markets, International finance, Tender offers, Environmental regulations, Government regulations, Regulations, Regulatory environments. The president of Fuji Television must decide how to respond to a competing bid for the shares of Nippon Broadcasting Systems (NBS). Livedoor, the other bidder, is a highly valued Internet company that has been accused of financial wizardry to keep its stock price high.
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26.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School David S. Scharfstein Harvard Business School Arthur I. Segel Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit
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22 Sep 08
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22 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Bids, Analysis, Hedge funds, Investments. A local real estate developer has to decide how much to bid for a Boston office building in 2005.
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27.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School James Quinn Harvard Business School
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18 Sep 08
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Last Revised:
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22 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Finance, Hedge funds, Investments, Tender offers, Behavioral economics, Behavioral finance. Philip Goldstein, the principal in a growing hedge fund and prominent activist investor, has taken a position in a Mexico-based closed-end fund. Following a hard-fought proxy contest in which he advocated for management to eliminate the fund's substantial discount, Goldstein earns a seat on the board of directors. Now he and the board are faced with the decision of how best to "unlock value" in the fund by delivering Net Asset Value (NAV) to shareholders. The case, which provides rich detail on the workings of closed-end funds (CEFs), invites students to examine the trade-offs among liquidating the fund, converting it to an open-end fund, or carrying out a self-tender offer. It also raises topics of fund selection and investing in country-specific funds such as Mexico.
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28.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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18 Sep 08
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Last Revised:
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22 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
SUBJECT AREAS: Arbitrage, Risk, Risk management, Securities, Stocks. Taka Haneda, a proprietary trader at the Tokyo office of Goldman Sachs, has just learned that the Nikkei 225 will undergo a significant redefinition over the coming week. He faces several billion dollars of customer orders, as well as the opportunity to commit the firm's capital to provide liquidity for the event. He must decide what positions to establish, and at what price he is willing to get out.
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29.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School
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02 Jul 08
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Last Revised:
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20 Feb 09
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0 (0)
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9
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Abstract:
Relative to their weights in a value-weighted index, a number of stocks in Japan's Nikkei 225 stock index are overweighted by a factor of 10 or more. I document a strong positive relation between overweighting and the comovement of a stock with other stocks in the Nikkei index, and a negative relationship between index overweighting and comovement with stocks outside of the index. The cross-sectional approach resolves endogeneity problems associated with event study demonstrations of excess comovement. A trading strategy that bets on the reversion of stock prices of overweighted stocks generates economic profits, confirming that the observed comovement patterns are excessive, and providing further evidence that comovement of stock returns can be a consequence of commonality in trading behavior.
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30.
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Robin Marc Greenwood Harvard Business School Nathan Sosner AQR Capital Management, LLC
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28 Sep 07
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Last Revised:
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22 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
In April 2000, 30 stocks were replaced in the Nikkei 225 Index. The unusually broad index redefinition allowed for a study of the effects of index-linked trading on the excess comovement of stock returns. A large increase occurred in the correlation of trading volume of stocks added to the index with the volume of stocks that remained in the index, and opposite results occurred for the deletions. Daily index return betas of the additions rose by an average of 0.45; index return betas of the deleted stocks fell by an average of 0.63. Theoretical predictions for changes in autocorrelations and cross-serial correlations of returns of index additions and deletions were confirmed. The results are consistent with the idea that trading patterns are associated with short-run excess comovement of stock returns.
Equity Investments, Fundamental Analysis and Valuation Models, Portfolio Management, Equity Strategies, Asset Allocation, Trading and Execution, Portfolio Construction, Rebalancing, and Implementation, Investment Theory, Behavioral Finance, Efficient Market Theory, Risk Measurement and Management
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