Economics Department
Frankfurt am Main, 60054
Germany
J.W. Goethe University
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Theory of the firm, implicit contracts, incomplete contracts, vertical integration, non-contractual relations, ownership structures, supply relations
trust, gradualism, repeated games, incomplete information
Risk Dominance, repeated games, Prisoner's Dilemma, relational contracts
Cooperation, collusion, repeated games, relational contracts, risk dominance, cartel stability, strategic risk
large games, anonymous games, characterization, Hall's theorem
co-operation, repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, experiments, strategic risk, risk dominance, sucker's payoff, collusion, corruption
moral hazard, discretion, excess returns, corporate finance, asset pricing with large shareholders
Veiling, social coordination, large anonymous games, non-atomic games, equilibrium characterization
excess returns, underpricing, no-arbitrage, asset pricing, corporate finance