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Abstract:
The paper makes the liberal argument for intervening by force to end or prevent serious human rights abuses. It relies on twin assumptions of liberal moral and political theory: that the primary purpose of governments is to protect human rights, and that victims of grievous injustice are entitled to outside help. Humanitarian intervention is legitimate when it is directed at suppressing human rights abuses and complies with the doctrine of double effect. The paper considers and rejects well-known objections: that interventions undermine respect for international law, that interventions are comissive acts and thus more objectionable than non-interventions because these are simple omissions, that humanitarian interventions are objectionable because they kill innocent persons, and that humanitarian interventions undermine global stability. Finally, the paper discusses the libertarian objection that humanitarian interventions are illegitimate because governments do not have the right to send persons to fight for the liberty of foreigners. It concludes that this objections has some force against conscription but not against the use of a voluntary army.

Abstract:
The paper briefly argues, against philosophers of global justice, that in order to reduce world poverty, abolishing barriers to trade and immigration is far preferable than establishing a global welfare agency. It suggests that the arguments for internal redistribution cannot be transposed to the international arena, simply because without unrestricted trade there is no way to know if markets have failed. Finally, the paper suggests that free trade economizes on virtue, as it is based on self-interest and not on (forced) altruism.

Abstract:
Economists generally agree that free trade leads to economic growth. This proposition is supported both by theoretical models and empirical data. Further, while the empirical evidence is more limited on this question, the general consensus among economists holds that trade restrictions are likely to hurt the poor. Even if the latter consensus turns out to be wrong, if free trade leads to superior growth, governments would have more resources to redistribute to the poor. It is surprising then that philosophers and human rights scholars do not advocate liberalizing trade as a way to improve the welfare of the poor as a class. While many scholars in these fields are silent with respect to the effect of free trade on the poor, some actually argue that liberalized trade is harmful for the poor, contrary to the claims of economists. In this article, we argue that any serious scholar concerned with the plight of the poor needs to address the theory and evidence regarding the effects of trade liberalization on economic growth, suggesting that the standard policy prescriptions of the philosophers and human rights scholars are, at best, of second order concern and, at worst, likely to be counterproductive in terms of improving the welfare of the poor.

trade policy, rent seeking, poverty, welfare, institutions

Abstract:
The paper argues that the war in Iraq can be morally justified as humanitarian intervention. It replies to three arguments that have been used to deny this: that the intervention was not really humanitarian because it lacked humanitarian intent; that it was not justified under the humanitarian intervention doctrine because the Iraqi regime was not perpetrating atrocities at the time of the invasion; and that the intervention was not justified because it was not properly authorized. The central part of the paper distinguishes, following John Stuart Mill, between intention and motives, suggests that intention, but not motive, is relevant to characterize and evaluate behavior, and argues that even if the Coalition had dubious motives to intervene, their intention was to liberate Iraq. The intervention was, therefore, humanitarian. A distinction is then drawn between the narrow humanitarian rationale (deposing the regime) and the grand humanitarian rationale (promoting liberal reforms in the Middle East and elsewhere). The paper then rejects the suggestion (made by Human Rights Watch) that only ongoing atrocities justify humanitarian interventions and claims that Saddam Hussein was a proper target. Finally, the paper questions the view that only interventions authorized by the UN Security Council are morally justified.

Abstract:
The debate over the restrictions on civil liberties in the West in the face of the terrorist threat has assumed that democracies have to choose between the competing values of freedom and security. This paper challenges that assumption (called here "The Hobbesian Dilemma".) It argues that restrictions to freedoms are justified (if they are at all) only by the imperative to defend freedom itself, that is, the freedom of individuals and, more generally, liberal institutions under attack by enemies of freedom. Against Hobbes, the paper argues that security is not an independent value. It rejects both the conservative view that security has priority over liberty and the extreme civil-libertarian view that liberty should never be curtailed. The paper further suggests that the evil attendant to the September 11 attacks increases the moral urgency to defeat the perpetrators, and defends the suggested test (restrictions are justified only by the need to maximize the total system of liberties) against the objection that the government's positive violation of our freedoms is morally worse than the government's inaction in the face of the threat. The conclusion is that a properly conducted war against terrorism is not antithetical to human rights but a war for human rights.

Abstract:
Political philosophers in the Kantian tradition often assume that they can use theories of justice to evaluate laws and institutions. For example, many believe that justice requires coercive distribution of wealth, or government-enforced universal access to health care, or minimum wages. This article rejects this fallacy, which I call The Moral Turn. Principles of justice underdetermine judgments about most of the social and economic issues of the day. To be sure, a theory of justice may yield non-contingent or necessary moral content, especially in the area of basic constitutional rights. But in order to evaluate everyday pieces of legislation we need the empirical sciences. Philosophers either purport to derive institutional recommendations directly from principles of justice, or make quick and unsupported empirical assumptions to derive those institutional recommendations. On most areas of public policy, theories of justice have no institutional consequences. Kant's Universal Principle of Justice, or Rawls's Difference Principle, are compatible with a broad range of economic and political institutions, from laissez-faire to the welfare state. Which one is on the whole justified can only be decided by appealing to the empirical sciences (economics, political science, psychology).

Because Immanuel Kant inaugurated the tradition of moral formalism, I first discuss Kant's own views on the matter as presented in his Doctrine of Right, and conclude that while Kant was aware of the problem, he often jumped to institutional conclusions without empirical support. I then discuss some modern neo-Kantian philosophers and show how they, too, perpetrate The Moral Turn. I use the examples of John Rawls and coercive redistribution, Norman Daniels and universal health care, and the minimum wage. Finally, I show that rejecting The Moral Turn does not commit one to utilitarianism in politics.

Abstract:
The article examines the rationality of persons who support public policies in the name of principles that would be frustrated should those policies be enacted. It shows that, contrary to what Robert Nozick and others have claimed, the behavior of those agents need not be explained by appealing to symbolic rationality. Instead, it can be explained by standard theories of rationality. Self-defeating political agents typically value their symbolizing, not the symbolized value. The authors distinguish several different cases of self-defeating political agents and suggest that their behavior is better understood by assuming their ignorance, error, or posturing than their concern for symbolized values.

Abstract:
It is generally assumed that the brain drain (the emigration of skilled citizens from poor countries to rich countries) is a bad thing that needs to be reversed or curbed. In this article I argue against this received view. First, relying on state-of-the-art economic research, I show that the empirical case against the brain drain is flawed. The expectation of emigration in poor countries raises the returns on education, which often causes a brain gain. Second, I show that the normative case against the brain drain is untenable. Critics of the brain drain assume a weak notion of self-ownership (something like Rawls's "collective ownership of talents"). I show that this notion, assuming arguendo that it applies to worldly resources, is inapplicable to natural assets. And finally, taxing the foreign-earned income of the skilled emigrant would amount to unjust double taxation. The upshot is that the state does not own its talented citizens and has therefore no justice-based claim over their talent-generated income (with the possible exception of taxing for the provision of genuine public goods.)

Abstract:
The congenital defects of international law (especially the absence of world authority) has led to a kind of scholarship that falls short of intellectually satisfying standards. On one hand, the excessive attachment to sovereignty has led scholars to defend political power to an extent that would be unthinkable in other areas of the law. On the other hand, international law scholars abuse the language of law, pretending to find legal certainty where there is none. Nonetheless, the animating ideal - respect for the international rule of law - is worth pursuing notwithstanding these problems.