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Abstract:
This article discusses the use of Bayesian methods for estimating logit demand models using aggregate data, i.e. information solely on how many consumers chose each product. We analyze two different demand systems: independent samples and consumer panel. Under the first system, there is a different and independent random sample of N consumers in each period and each consumer makes only a single purchase decision. Under the second system, the same N consumers make a purchase decision in each of T periods. The proposed methods are illustrated using simulated and real data, and managerial insights available via data augmentation are discussed in detail.

Discrete Choice Models, Data Augmentation, Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation, Random Coefficients

Abstract:
Critics have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet the practice continues. In this paper, we propose a price-discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incentives to price-discriminate between the dominant retailer and smaller independents. While offering all retailers the same pricing policy, price-discrimination can be implemented through trade promotions as trade promotions induce different inventory-ordering behaviors on the part of retailers. Differences in inventory holding costs have been shown to be an important determinant of consumer promotions. Our analysis suggests that differences in holding costs are also potentially an important driver for the use of trade promotions. The implications from our model explain a number of anecdotal and/or empirically observed puzzles about how trade promotions are practiced. For example, our analysis explains why chain stores welcome trade promotions but independents do not. Our analysis outlines implications for managing trade promotions.

channels of distribution, channel power, trade promotion, forward-buying

Abstract:
In this paper, we incorporate the concept of fairness in a conventional dyadic channel to investigate how fairness may affect channel coordination. We show that when channel members are concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above its marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.

Distribution Channels, Fairness, Channel Coordination, Behavioral Economics

Abstract:
In mature markets with competing firms, a common role for advertising is to shift consumer preferences towards the advertiser in a tug-of-war, with no effect on category demand. In this paper, we analyze the effect of such "combative" advertising on market power. We show that, depending on the nature of consumer response, combative advertising can reduce price competition to benefit competing firms. However, it can also lead to a pro-competitive outcome where individual firms advertise to increase own profitability, but collectively become worse off. This is because combative advertising can intensify price competition such that an "advertising war" leads to a "price war." Similar to price competition, advertising competition can result in a prisoner's dilemma where all competing firms make less profit even when the effect of each firm's advertising is to enhance consumer preferences in its favor. Given such pro-competitive effects, we further show that cost of combative advertising could be a blessing in disguise -- higher unit cost of advertising resulting in lower equilibrium levels of advertising, leading to higher prices and profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how combative advertising by competing brands influences consumer preferences. Our experimental analysis offers strong support for our conclusions.

advertising, persuasion, game theory, competitive strategy, prisoner's dilemma, preference shifts