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David Strömberg's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
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Citations
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1.
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Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida
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David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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14 Mar 02
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20 Jun 02
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99 ( 83,308) |
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David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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20 Jun 02
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20 Jun 02
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Abstract:
This Paper delivers a precise recommendation for how presidential candidates should allocate their resources to maximize the probability of gaining a majority in the Electoral College. A two-candidate, probabilistic-voting model reveals that more resources should be devoted to states which are likely to be decisive in the Electoral College and, at the same time, have very close state elections. The optimal strategies are empirically estimated using state-level opinion polls available in September of the election year. The model's recommended campaign strategies closely resemble those used in actual campaigns. The Paper also analyses how the allocation of resources would change under the alternative electoral rule of a direct national vote for president.
Elections, political campaigns, public expenditure
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David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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14 Mar 02
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20 Jun 02
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Abstract:
This paper delivers a precise recommendation for how presidential candidates should allocate their resources to maximize the probability of gaining a majority in the Electoral College. A two-candidate, probabilistic-voting model reveals that more resources should be devoted to states which are likely to be decisive in the electoral college and, at the same time, have very close state elections. The optimal strategies are empirically estimated using state-level opinion-polls available in September of the election year. The model's recommended campaign strategies closely resemble those used in actual campaigns. The paper also analyses how the allocation of resources would change under the alternative electoral rule of a direct national vote for president.
Elections, political campaigns, public expenditures
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Andrea Prat London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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09 Aug 05
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09 Aug 05
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31 (148,289)
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What is the effect of liberalizing a country's broadcasting system on the level of information of its citizens? To analyze this question, we first construct a model of state monopoly broadcasting where the government selects the amount of television news coverage of different public policy outcomes, and then sets public policy and political rents. Voters vote retrospectively given the news provided. In equilibrium, the incumbent provides some news coverage, and more so to groups for which reducing policy uncertainty is more important. We then introduce a profit-maximizing commercial channel. It provides more news coverage to groups of voters valuable to advertisers or underprovided by the state monopoly. We test our predictions on a panel of individuals interviewed in the elections before and after the entry of commercial TV in Sweden. We find that people who start watching commercial TV news increase their level of political knowledge more than those who do not. They also increase their political participation more. The positive informational effects are particularly valuable since commercial TV news attracts ex ante uniformed voters.
Commercial television, mass media, public service broadcasting, voter information
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James M. Snyder Jr. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science & Department of Economics David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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19 Mar 08
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04 Apr 08
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28 (153,621)
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In this paper we estimate the impact of press coverage on citizen knowledge, politicians' actions, and policy. We find that a poor fit between newspaper markets and political districts reduces press coverage of politics. We use variation in this fit due to redistricting to identify the effects of reduced coverage. Exploring the links in the causal chain of media effects - voter information, politicians' actions and policy - we find statistically significant and substantively important effects. Voters living in areas with less coverage of their U.S. House representative are less likely to recall their representative's name, and less able to describe and rate them. Congressmen who are less covered by the local press work less for their constituencies: they are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings, to serve on constituency-oriented committees (perhaps), and to vote against the party line. Finally, this congressional behavior affects policy. Federal spending is lower in areas where there is less press coverage of the local members of congress.
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David Strömberg Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
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24 Mar 04
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24 Mar 04
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Abstract:
If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters.
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