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Abstract:
This paper examines the possible association between ownership structure, corporate governance and firm's dividend payout policy. It is also one of the very first examples, which tries to detect any potential association in ownership structure, corporate governance and well-established dividend payout models in context of an emerging market (India). The present study examines the payout behavior of dividends and the association of ownership structure for Indian corporate firms over the period 1994-2000 and attempts to explain the observed behavior with the help of well established dividend models of Linter (1956), Waud (1966), and Fama and Babiak (1968). The results consistently support the potential association between ownership structure and dividend payout policy. Though the relationship differs across different group of owners and at different level of shareholding.

Furthermore, we suggest a more generalized model to explain the dividend payout intensity, incorporating firm's financial structure and investments opportunities along with dividends and earnings trend and ownership structure, after controlling for firm's unobserved heterogeneity. We also find evidence of dividends dependence on past dividends after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that a positive association exists between dividends and earnings trend. Debt equity is found to be negative and associated, whereas past investment opportunities are positive and associated with dividends in some cases. Corporate and directors ownership is positive and related in level, and corporate ownership is negative and related in square. Institutional ownership has inverse effects on dividends in comparison to corporate ownership in levels, as well as in its squares. We find no evidence in favor of association between foreign ownership and divided payout growth.

Ownership structure, dividend payout, India

Abstract:
This paper examines empirically the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance for a panel of Indian corporate firms, from an 'agency perspective'. We examine the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, institutional, and managerial ownership on firm performance. Using panel data framework, we show that a large fraction of crosssectional variation, in firm performance, found in several studies, can be explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. We provide some evidence that the shareholding by institutional investors and managers affect firm performance non-linearly, after controlling for observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity. We find no evidence in favor of endogeneity of shareholding pattern.

Corporate governance, Shareholding pattern, Firm performance, Panel Data, India

Abstract:
Corporate Governance deals with the issue of how the suppliers of finance to various corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Using different data samples from different countries, most of the studies provide evidence that ownership in uence firm performance. This study examines empirically the effects of ownership structure on the firm performance for a panel of Indian corporate firms, from an 'agency perspective'. We examine the effect of interactions between corporate, foreign, institutional, and managerial ownership on firm performance. Using panel data framework, we show that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation, in firm performance, found in several studies, can be explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. We also provide some evidence that the shareholding by institutional investors and managers affect firm performance, after controlling for observed firm characteristics and unobserved firm heterogeneity and the effect is non-linear.

Corporate governance, Shareholding pattern, Firm performance, India.

Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between corporate firm's ownership and capital structure in context of an emerging market economy, India. We use firm-level time series data of listed companies from 1994 through 2000 and analyze the firm's corporate financing behavior in connection with its corporate governance arrangements, specially its shareholding pattern. Our results show that the debt structure is non-linearly linked to the corporate governance (ownership structure). We find that firms with weaker corporate governance mechanisms, dispersed shareholding pattern, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects of group affiliation, tend to have a higher debt level. Firms with higher foreign ownership or with low institutional ownership tend to have lower debt level. We do not find any significant relationship between ownership of directors and corporate with the capital structure.

Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, Emerging Economy, and India

Abstract:
We analyze the probability of an incumbents winning in the consecutive election, under the assumption that all individual candidates are equally likely (i.e. random selection) when that they are from the same party. We are trying to analyze the probability of winning by ruling party (i.e. the party which has won the last election from that constituency), irrespective of whether that party forms a coalition during election, formed the last government in center/state or was the part of the last central/state government in case of coalition government. In particular, we model the voters behavior by Binary Choice Model (Logit Model) using panel data of India's general (parliamentary) elections from 1967 through 1999, without taking into account the effect of the central government's ruling, while we are emphasizing on the effect of constituency wise ruling and the results of that particular constituency. We find evidence that incumbents have better log-odds of getting re-elected if they contest on behalf of the national parties, from reserved seats, from constituencies with large valid votes polled with respect to electorate, if their ruling duration is more. We don't find any significant evidence of getting re-elected if the sex of the competing candidates is same or if the number of candidates contesting election from the constituency is higher.

electoral system, GEE population-averaged model, panel data and incumbents

Abstract:
This study examines the role of pension plan funding status on M&A activity of acquiring/target firms in a large sample of UK corporations. We exploit the funding status of the defined benefit pension plans in order to identify, the dependence of corporate activity in mergers and acquisition market on its pension plan funding status. Pension deficit appear to have a negative impact on the likelihood of target firms being acquired, suggesting pension deficits act as a poison pill.

M&A, Pension Plan Funding, Count Data Model

Abstract:
This paper examines the possible association between ownership structure, corporate governance and firms dividend payout policy. It is also one of the very first example, which tries to detect any potential association in ownership structure, corporate governance and well established dividend payout models in context of an emerging market (India). The present study examines the payout behavior of dividends and the association of ownership structure for Indian corporate firms over the period 1994-2000 and attempts to explain the observed behavior with the help of well established dividend models of Linter (1956), Waud (1966), and Fama and Babiak (1968). The results consistently support the potential association between ownership structure and dividend payout policy. Though the relationship differs across different group of owners and at different level of shareholding. Furthermore, we suggest a more generalized model to explain the dividend payout intensity, incorporating firm's financial structure and investments opportunities along with dividends and earnings trend and ownership structure, after controlling for firm's unobserved heterogeneity. We also find evidence of dividends dependence on past dividends after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We find evidence in support of the hypothesis that a positive association exists between dividends and earnings trend. Debt equity is found to be negative and associated, whereas past investment opportunities are positive and associated with dividends in some cases. Corporate and directors ownership is positive and related in level, and corporates ownership is negative and related in square. Institutional ownership have inverse effect on dividends in comparison to corporate ownership in levels, as well as in its squares. We find no evidence in favor of association between foreign ownership and divided payout growth.

Ownership structure, dividend payout, India

Abstract:
In an election the probability that a ruling party wins the election and forms the government is affected by the electoral system that is, the rule for aggregating constituency wise results into a single outcome (i.e. forming the central government). We find the probability that a particular party wins the election from a constituency given that party has won the last election from that particular constituency, under the assumption that all candidates are equally likely (i.e. random selection) given that they are from the same party. The original goal of our work is to estimate the probability of winning by ruling party (i.e. the party which has won the last election from that constituency), irrespective of whether that party forms a coalition during election, formed the last government in center or was the part of the last central government in case of coalition government. In particular, we are not taking into account the effect of the central government's ruling, while we are emphasizing on the effect of constituency wise ruling and the results of that particular constituency. We estimate the average probability of winning for all India's General elections from 1971 to 1999 under given electoral system, using Binary Choice Model.

coalition, electoral system, ruling party