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Abstract:
"Streetlore" has touted the market return in January as a predictor of market returns for the remainder of the year since at least 1973. We systematically examine the predictive power of January returns over the period 1940-2003 and find that January returns have predictive power for market returns over the next 11 months of the year. The effect persists after controlling for macroeconomic/business cycle variables that have been shown to predict stock returns, the Presidential Cycle in returns, and investor sentiment and persists among both large and small capitalization stocks and among both value and glamour stocks. Additionally, we find that January has predictive power for two of the three premiums in the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model of asset pricing.

Abstract:
We develop a new and comprehensive database of firm-level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004. We construct variables that measure the extent of firm support for candidates. We find that these measures are positively and significantly correlated with the cross-section of future returns. The effect is strongest for firms that support a greater number of candidates which hold office in the same state that the firm is based. In addition, there are stronger effects for firms whose contributions are slanted toward House candidates and Democrats.

political connections, stock returns

Abstract:
Prior studies argue that investment by undervalued firms that require external equity is particularly sensitive to stock prices in irrational capital markets. We present a model in which investment can appear to be more sensitive to stock prices when capital markets are rational, but subject to imperfections such as debt overhang, information asymmetries, and financial distress costs. Our empirical tests support the rational (but imperfect) capital markets view. Specifically, investment-stock price sensitivity is related to firm leverage, financial slack, and probability of financial distress, but is not related to proxies for firm undervaluation. Because, in our model, stock prices reflect the NPVs of investment opportunities, our results are consistent with rational capital markets improving the allocation of capital by channeling more funds to firms with positive NPV projects.

Investment policy, financing policy, capital market imperfections

Abstract:
Prior studies of stocks added to the S&P 500 Index report that Index inclusion is associated with a permanent increase in stock price. This result has been interpreted to mean that demand curves for stocks slope downward. A key premise underlying this interpretation is that Index inclusion provides no new information about the future prospects of the newly-included companies. We examine this premise empirically by analyzing changes in analysts' eps forecasts for newly-included companies from before to after Index inclusion and by comparing post-inclusion realized earnings to pre-inclusion earnings forecasts. We find that, relative to various benchmark companies, newly-included companies experience significant increases in eps forecasts and significant improvements in realized earnings. These results indicate that S&P Index inclusion is not an information-free event and, thus, undermine tests of the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis that are based on S&P 500 Index additions.

Abstract:
Prior studies of stocks added to the S&P 500 Index report that Index inclusion is associated with a permanent increase in stock price. This result has been interpreted to mean that demand curves for stocks slope downward. A key premise underlying this interpretation is that Index inclusion provides no new information about the future prospects of the newly-included companies. We examine this premise empirically by analyzing changes in analysts' eps forecasts for newly-included companies from before to after Index inclusion and by comparing post-inclusion realized earnings to pre-inclusion earnings forecasts. We find that, relative to various benchmark companies, newly-included companies experience significant increases in eps forecasts and significant improvements in realized earnings. These results indicate that S&P Index inclusion is not an information-free event and, thus, undermine tests of the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis that are based on S&P 500 Index additions.

Abstract:
Deregulation significantly affects the firms' operating environment and leverage decisions. Firms experience a significant decline in profitability, asset tangibility and a significant increase in growth opportunities following deregulation. Firms respond by reducing leverage. Deregulation also significantly affects the cross-sectional relation between leverage and its determinants. Leverage is much less negatively correlated with profitability and market-to-book and much more positively (negatively) correlated with firm size (earnings volatility) following deregulation. These results are consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory of capital structure. Also consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory, those firms that are more likely to be above their target capital structure issue significantly more equity in the first few years following deregulation.

Capital structure, financing policy, deregulation

Abstract:
Deregulation significantly affects the firms' operating environment and leverage decisions. Firms experience a significant decline in profitability, asset tangibility and a significant increase in growth opportunities following deregulation. Firms respond by reducing leverage. Deregulation also significantly affects the cross-sectional relationship between leverage and its determinants. Leverage is much less negatively correlated with profitability and market-to-book and much more positively correlated with firm size following deregulation. These results are consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory of capital structure. Also consistent with the dynamic tradeoff theory, the speed of leverage adjustment to optimal leverage increases significantly following deregulation.

Capital structure, financing policy, deregulation

Abstract:
According to Streetlore, as embedded in the adage 'As goes January so goes the rest of the year,' the market return in January provides useful information to would-be investors in that the January market return predicts the market return over the remainder of the year. This adage has become known as the January Barometer. In an earlier paper (Cooper, McConnell and Ovtchinnikov, 2006) we investigated the power of the January market return to predict returns for the next 11 months using 147 years of U.S. stock market returns. We found that, on average, the 11-month holding period return following positive Januarys was significantly higher, by a wide margin, than the 11-month holding period return following negative Januarys. In this paper we update that analysis through 2008 and address the question of how an investor can best use that information as part of an investment strategy. We find that the best way to use the January Barometer is not the obvious one of being long following positive Januarys and short following negative Januarys, but to be long following positive Januarys and invest in t-bills following negative Januarys. This strategy beats various alternatives, including a passive long-the-market-all-the-time strategy, by significant margins over the 152 years for which we have data.

January Barometer, return predictability

Abstract:
Investment strategies of buying and holding recently spun off companies and their parents have received significant attention from the investment community in the recent past. Despite their popularity, the existing evidence on the attractiveness of spin-offs appears piecemeal. In this paper, we examine in detail stock price performance of spin-offs and their parents on a comprehensive sample that covers the last 36 years. We show that excess returns are indeed positive for both subsidiary and parent companies over almost all holding periods considered. For subsidiaries, the results appear both economically and statistically significant after various adjustments for risk. This evidence is consistent with investors earning an above normal rate of return by investing in recently spun off subsidiaries. For parents, however, after correcting for one very large positive outlier, returns are not statically or economically different from zero.

Spin-off, long-run event studies, excess stock returns