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Abstract:
In this paper we evaluate the financial performance of virtually all of the branch offices of a large European savings bank for a recent sixmonth accounting period. We employ a complementary pair of nonparametric techniques to evaluate their financial performance, in terms of their ability to conserve on the expenses they incur in the process of building their customer bases and providing customer services valued by the bank. We find substantial variation in the ability of branch offices to perform this task, and substantial agreement on the identity of the branches at the bottom of the performance distribution. We then employ parametric techniques to determine that the list of indicators on which their financial performance is currently evaluated can be substantially reduced without statistically significant loss of information to bank management. Both findings suggest ways in which the bank can increase the profitability of its branch network.

banking, performance indicators, efficiency

Abstract:
Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an elementary economic model the main concepts involved: optimality, non cooperation, coalitional stability. We observe (Section 4) that %22business-as-usual%22, %22no regrets%22 and other domestic policies are alternative ways to conceive of the non cooperative equilibrium prevailing before the negotiations. Which one should be retained; Data suggest that the prevailing situation is a mixed one, exhibiting characteristics of several of these policies. We then turn (Section 5) to interpreting the Protocol. While there is no firm basis to assert that the emission quotas chosen at Kyoto correspond to optimal emissions (although they are a step in the right direction), economic and game theoretical arguments are put forward to support the view that for achieving these emission quotas, trading ensures efficiency, as well as coalitional stability for the agreement provided it is adopted at the largest scale i.e. worldwide. Finally, it is argued in Section 6 that beyond the Kyoto Protocol, the achievement of coalitionally stable optimality at the world level is a real possibility with trading, provided agreement can be reached in the future as to appropriate reference emission levels, in particular as far as developing countries are concerned.

Abstract:
This paper compares the level of uncertainty widely reported in climate change scientific publications with the level of uncertainty of the costs estimates of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the United States. It argues that these two categories of uncertainties were used and ignored, respectively, in the policy making process in the US so as to challenge the scientific basis on the one hand and on the other hand to assert that reducing emissions would hurt the economy by an amount stated without any qualification. The paper reviews the range of costs estimates published since 1998 on implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the US. It comments on the significance of these cost estimates and identifies a decreasing trend in the successive estimates. This implies that initially some of the most influential economic model-based assessments seem to have overestimated the costs, an overestimation that may have played a significant role in the US decision to withdraw from the Protocol. The paper concludes with advocating that future economic estimates always include uncertainty ranges, so as to be in line with a basic transparency practice prevailing in climate science.

United States, Kyoto Protocol, Cost Estimates, Uncertainties

Abstract:
In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation regimes, and then we test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic "core" property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries, should have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. For the numerical specification of the CWS model used here, we obtain the result that this is indeed the case.

Environmental economics, climate change, burden sharing, simulations, core of cooperative games

Abstract:
The paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative steady state in the context of a model of climate change. It also explores the possibility of cooperation and attainment of an optimal steady state. It is shown that the problem is similar to that in the static model (Chander and Tulkens (1997)).

Climate change, dynamic models, steady states, optimality, cooperation

Abstract:
In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of "self enforcement" any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett's (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

International Environmental Agreements, Cooperation, Stability, Self-enforcement

Abstract:
In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full cooperation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all countries at least as well off as they would be by joining coalitions adopting emission abatement policies that maximize their coalition payoff; under the scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries would have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. The simulations show that the transfer scheme yields an allocation in the core of the carbon emission abatement game associated with the RICE model. Finally, we discuss some practical implications of the transfer scheme for current climate negotiations.

Abstract:
"Musgravian" externalities, formulated and illustrated by Musgrave in a 1966 paper on "social goods" are seen in this paper as one form of the interactions that occur between the components of a federation. The original formal apparatus is first exposed briefly. In that context, it is then considered whether and how alternative forms of federal structures are likely to achieve efficiency. Following suggestions from the literature, three such forms are dealt with: "planned", "cooperative" and "majority rule" federalisms. Next, the relevance of non cooperative equilibria is examined, in the light of an interpretation of them as "fall back" positions when disagreement occurs among members of a federation. Finally, the question is evoked of what economics and public finance may have to say on the limits to institutional decentralization, i.e. on the choice between federal, confederal and secessional structures. The paper concludes with a reminder of Musgrave's view on this issue.

Abstract:
Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved - namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed "potential internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of carbon concentration and global welfare) are always composed of both industrialized and developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results.

Climate Change, Coalitions, Simulation, Integrated Assessment

Abstract:
In order to rank universities, rather than aggregating the indicators used by the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) - using weightings which, though reasonable, are at the same time arbitrary and inflexible - one can compare universities in terms of dominance and hence deduce various partial or complete rankings. The resultant dominance ranking method is presented in this note. Data are recalled in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 provides full details of the dominance analysis for each university. From this analysis two listings are derived: (i) a front runners list consisting of 34 nondominated universities, (Table 4) and (ii) a (new) ranking of the 200 universities surveyed by the THES, based on their respective 'active-passive dominance' scores (Table 5). Concluding remarks bear on limits of the data and of the exercise.

Abstract:
Technological choices are multi-dimensional and thus one needs a multidimensional methodology to identify best available techniques. Moreover, in the presence of environmental externalities generated by productive activities, 'best' available techniques should be best from Society's point of view, not only in terms of private interests. In this paper we develop a comprehensive modeling tool, based on methodologies appropriate to serve these two purposes, namely linear programming and internalization of external costs. We conclude that in this context there is in general not a single best available technique (BAT), but well a best combination of available techniques to be used (BCAT).

We take a fictitious but plausible numerical example in the lime industry. For a hypothetical plant that has to meet a given demand, we build an original technical economic model within which two scenarios are considered: minimizing the private costs and minimizing the generalized costs (private costs plus external costs). In the first case, only the cheapest fuel is used in all kilns. But in the second case, where the environmental external costs are included, fuel switches occur and cleaner techniques are used. Extending the analysis to the choice of kilns, we find that the socially best combination of available techniques (S-BCAT) is not a fixed one: it varies as a function of the external costs. We therefore trace in a single diagram the whole profile of these best techniques as successive solutions of our linear programs. We conclude by stressing that external cost internalization does influence not only the choice of techniques, but also their appropriate use. Moreover, local environmental conditions play a major role in that choice and in determining that use.

best available techniques, eco-efficiency, IPPC

Abstract:
The usually assumed two categories of costs involved in climate change policy analysis, namely abatement and damage costs, hide the presence of a third category, namely adaptation costs. This dodges the determination of an appropriate level for them. Including adaptation costs explicitly in the total environmental cost function allows one to characterize the optimal (cost minimizing) balance between the three categories, in statics as well as in dynamics. Implications are derived for cost benefit analysis of adaptation expenditures.

Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to test econometrically the existence of fiscal interactions between Belgian municipalities. At the time of writing, the motivation was to provide scientific support to the lively debate on fiscal competition that took place among Belgian politicians in the late nineties.

Two types of taxes are considered, for which Belgian municipalities have the decision power as to rates: the centimes additionnels on the personal income tax and the précompte immobilier which is a property tax. A dynamic adjustment model is specified and estimated using panel data for 598 municipalities over 15 years.

The empirical results obtained bear upon two main points: (i) Some interaction definitely has prevailed between the municipalities' fiscal choices made during the observation period, for both taxes; (ii) However, the adjustment reactions to the other municipalities' fiscal choices have occurred over time at the very low yearly pace of 6% and 10%, respectively, of the discrepancy between the actual rates and the preferred rates.

Abstract:
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two di- mensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.

Stock Pollutant, Capital Accumulation, International Environmental Agreements, Dynamic Core Solution

Abstract:
The usually assumed two categories of costs involved in climate change policy analysis, namely abatement and damage costs, hide the presence of a third category, namely adaptation costs. This dodges the determination of an appropriate level for them. Including adaptation costs explicitly in the total environmental cost function allows one to characterize the optimal (cost minimizing) balance between the three categories, in statics as well as in dynamics. Implications are derived for cost benefit analysis of adaptation expenditures.

Climate Change, Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering

Abstract:
International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement. In a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co-operative game, by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved. However, the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required. This paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context. The possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed.

Abstract:
Two theses on the likelihood of international cooperation for achieving international optimality in transboundary pollution problems are being confronted: a pessimistic one and an optimistic one. On the one hand a "Small Stable Coalitions" (SSC) thesis ? based on the stability of coalitions literature and put forward in several papers by Barrett, Carraro and Siniscalco ? holds the view that only small subsets of the countries involved in a transfrontier pollution problem can ever emerge as a group and sign a treaty among themselves; on the other hand a "Grand Stable Coalition" (GSC) thesis, inspired by classical cooperative game theory and proposed by Chander and Tulkens, presents the contents of a feasible treaty which the authors show to enjoy some "core property", that is, to be more beneficial not only for all countries taken individually, as compared to a no treaty situation, but also more beneficial for all subgroups of them, for any partial treaty they might sign among themselves.

The two views are formally developed in Section III, after that a presentation is given in Section II of the common underlying economic model of international environmental externalities. Section IV then identifies and discusses several game theoretic differences and similarities between the two approaches, namely those bearing on the notion of "coalition", on the phenomenon of "free riding" in its relation with "threats" in games with externalities, on the uses of the concept of "characteristic function" in cooperative games (with a suggested extension, designed towards reconciling the two approaches), and finally on the role of transfers and "side payments" in the international pollution problem under consideration. The concluding section stresses the fact that essentially two different notions of group stability lie at the root of these diverging views.

Abstract:
When environmental externalities are international - i.e. transfrontier - they most often are multilateral and embody public good characteristics. Improving upon inefficient laissez-faire equilibria requires voluntary cooperation for which the game-theoretic core concept provides optimal outcomes that have interesting properties against free riding. To define the core, however, the characteristic function of the game associated with the economy (which specifies the payoff achievable by each possible coalition of players - here, the countries) must also reflect in each case the behaviour of the players which are not members of the coalition. This has been for a long time a disputed issue in the theory of the core of economies with externalities. Among the several assumptions that can be made to this behaviour, a plausible one is defined in this paper, for which it is shown that the core of the game is nonempty. The proof is constructivein the sense that it exhibits a strategy (specifying an explicit coordinated abatement policy and including financial transfers) that has the desired property of nondomination by any proper coalition of countries, given, the assumed behaviour of the other countries. This strategy is also shown to have an equilibrium interpretation in the economic model.