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Abstract:
This paper develops a theory about the prevalence of anti-takeover defenses (ATDs) as a corporate strategy, while focusing on the non-payoff related aspects of this strategy, that both promote its dissemination, and strengthen its robustness in the face of other strategies. The simple evolutionary game that is presented in the paper shows how in an enabling regime, where all companies initially decline to adopt ATDs, once a company does adopt them, the company's "survival" chances are greater. Therefore the newly introduced strategy is more likely to survive and spread. Moreover, once all companies have adopted ATDs, companies without ATDs, which are more vulnerable to takeover, have lower "survival" chances, and therefore the strategy itself (of not adopting ATDs) is less likely to survive. I introduce concepts and tools that originate in evolutionary theory, evolutionary game theory, and neo-institutionalism theory, which serve as an analytical foundation for my analysis and help to explain why adopting ATDs can be regarded as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy. By shifting the focus from the effects of a strategy upon those who adopt it to the effects a strategy may have upon its own survival and prevalence, this paper present a new angle that has been overlooked in previous treatment of strategy prevalence. Thus, I pose a more general question regarding the inferences that can be drawn as to the efficacy of mechanisms that are prevalent in legal and business practice.
Takeovers, Anti-Takeover Defenses, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Analysis, efficiency, Strategies, Open Source, Copyleft, replication dynamics
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Abstract:
This paper examines the implications of Open Source License (OSL) selection on software innovation, and suggests how modifying the Open Source Definition, or modifying certain provisions in OSLs that have become de-facto standard licenses in open source development, could better accommodate the competing needs and diverse motivations of different would-be software innovators. We make an important distinction between initial developers those developers who decide what license will apply to the code they write, and later developers - those developers who subsequently wish to use code that was previously released under a certain OSL (and are therefore affected by license terms selected by initial developers). This distinction facilitates the analysis of the effect OSL provisions have on the development of new independent code and, importantly, their effect on any subsequent use of code released under an OSL. The changes we propose could considerably increase the likelihood that a wider variety of developers (including commercial firms) would make use of code released under such revised OSLs, as well as the likelihood that code would be released under OSLs to begin with.
open source software, software license, software innovation, innovation, software development, GPL, GNU General Pubilc License, Mozilla Public License
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