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Abstract:
Although informal networks are often emphasized as facilitating knowledge transfer, we use network data obtained from a multi-unit high-tech firm to show that the formal network also significantly contributes to inter-unit knowledge transfer. Individuals centrally placed in a network are, in addition, more involved in knowledge transfer, especially, the evidence suggests, in the case of the formal network. Focusing on the brokerage roles that individual fulfill, we find that knowledge transfer between units is more likely to occur through externally oriented brokers than internally oriented brokers in the formal network, but not in the informal network. Overall, the results show that there is more than one path to transfer knowledge.

knowledge transfer, inter-unit knowledge transfer, communication networks, centrality, brokerage roles

Abstract:
We review the emerging field of multiple issue e-auctions and discuss their design features and performance criteria. We primarily consider B2B transactions in a reverse auction, that is, a procurement setting. In traditional auctions, the matching of buyers and sellers is typically based just on price. However, when there are quality and other differences in the merchandize and differences in the terms of the transaction, which are common in Request for Quotes (RFQs), additional issues besides price should be considered. Such multiple issue, multiple unit e-auctions/ negotiations, and their characteristics are the focus of our paper. We also discuss the role that OR has played and undoubtedly will play in the design and implementation of such e-auctions.

online auctions, multiple issue auctions, B2B, e-procurement, e-negotiations

Abstract:
Empirical research in Information Systems (IS) is dominated by the use of explanatory statistical models for testing causal hypotheses, and by a focus on explanatory power. Predictive statistical models, which are aimed at predicting out-of-sample observations with high accuracy, are rare, and so is attention to predictive power. The distinction between explanatory and predictive statistical models is key, as both types of models play a different, yet essential, role in advancing scientific research. Similarly, explanatory power and predictive accuracy are two distinct qualities of a statistical model, and are measured in different ways. A literature review of MISQ and ISR shows that predictive goals, predictive claims, and predictive statistical models are scarce in mainstream empirical IS research. In addition, we find three questionable common practices: First, even when the stated goal of modeling is predictive, explanatory statistical modeling is often employed. Second, the predictive power of a model is often inferred from its explanatory power. And third, the vast majority of explanatory statistical models lack proper predictive assessment, which is a key scientific requirement. In light of the distinction between explanatory and predictive statistical modeling and power, and current practice in IS, we highlight the main differences between them, focusing on practical issues that confront an empirical researcher in the data analysis process.

predictive models, inference, information systems, statistical methods

Abstract:
Following their larger counterparts, an increasing number of small firms outsource their IT tasks to lower cost offshore destinations. For small firms, however, offshore outsourcing is a difficult undertaking as it involves high transaction costs. Online marketplaces for IT services, which have recently become available to small firms, make offshore IT outsourcing more accessible and manageable, although differences in the marketplace design result in varying outcomes across the marketplaces. This has consequences for SMEs decision as to which online marketplace to use, because different markets may have different types of benefits and costs. This paper sets to analyze some of the similarities and differences between online marketplaces for IT services and their effects for small firms. First, we analyze if and how online marketplaces reduce small firms' transaction costs in offshore IT outsourcing. Second, we examine the effects of market entry barriers on outcomes of online marketplaces and their implications for small firms. The results indicate that online marketplaces for IT services do reduce transaction costs for small firms in offshore outsourcing across ten specific market processes. More surprising, however, is the finding that the lower market entry barriers for suppliers result in lower prices for buyers without compromising other aspects of market performance.

Offshore IT Outsourcing, Online Market, Reverse Auction, Process-Stakeholder Analysis

Abstract:
Following their larger counterparts, an increasing number of small firms outsource their IT tasks to lower cost offshore destinations. For small firms, however, offshore outsourcing is a difficult undertaking as it involves high transaction costs. Online marketplaces for IT services, which have recently become available to small firms, make offshore IT outsourcing more accessible and manageable, although differences in the marketplace design result in varying outcomes across the marketplaces. This has consequences for SMEs decision as to which online marketplace to use, because different markets may have different types of benefits and costs. This paper sets to analyze some of the similarities and differences between online marketplaces for IT services and their effects for small firms. First, we analyze if and how online marketplaces reduce small firms transaction costs in offshore IT outsourcing. Second, we examine the effects of market entry barriers on outcomes of online marketplaces and their implications for small firms. The results indicate that online marketplaces for IT services do reduce transaction costs for small firms in offshore outsourcing across ten specific market processes. More surprising, however, is the finding that the lower market entry barriers for suppliers result in lower prices for buyers without compromising other aspects of market performance.

Offshore IT Outsourcing, Online Market, Reverse Auction, Process-Stakeholder Analysis

Abstract:
Following their larger counterparts, an increasing number of small firms outsource their IT tasks to lower cost offshore destinations. For small firms, however, offshore outsourcing is a difficult undertaking as it involves high transaction costs. Online marketplaces for IT services, which have recently become available to small firms, make offshore IT outsourcing more accessible and manageable, although differences in the marketplace design result in varying outcomes across the marketplaces. This has consequences for SME's decision as to which online marketplace to use, because different markets may have different types of benefits and costs. This paper sets to analyze some of the similarities and differences between online marketplaces for IT services and their effects for small firms. First, we analyze if and how online marketplaces reduce small firms' transaction costs in offshore IT outsourcing. Second, we examine the effects of market entry barriers on outcomes of online marketplaces and their implications for small firms. The results indicate that online marketplaces for IT services do reduce transaction costs for small firms in offshore outsourcing across ten specific market processes. More surprising, however, is the finding that the lower market entry barriers for suppliers result in lower prices for buyers without compromising other aspects of market performance.

Offshore IT Outsourcing, Online Market, Reverse Auction, Process-Stakeholder Analysis

Abstract:
Recognizing advantageous network positions is key for firms to obtain and sustain competitive advantage. Exploiting these opportunities requires that firms have information about the network structure. We introduce a construct called network horizon to capture this information. We demonstrate, using a computational model of network dynamics, that a firm's network horizon as well as the heterogeneity of network horizons in the network, are two important determinants for the sustainability of network-based competitive advantage.

structural hole, bridging position, competitive advantage, network dynamics

Abstract:
Companies increasingly outsource IT-related tasks using reverse auction mechanisms embedded into online marketplaces. However, a considerable proportion of auctions at these marketplaces do not result in a contract between buyer and supplier. Extant literature mostly refers to costly bidding and bid evaluation to explain this phenomenon. Another possible explanation is that because of the low entry barriers, buyers with a low commitment to exchange can use the marketplace solely for information gath-ering purposes such as price benchmarking and obtaining free consultations, having little or no intention to contract a supplier. We test this explanation by looking at how different types of costs incurred by the buyer during the sourcing process, are related to the outcome of reverse auctions in terms of contract award. We argue that higher levels of search, preparation and negotiation costs are associated with higher commitment to exchange and find that opportunistic behaviour does indeed play a part in the non-contracted projects, while committed buyers are more likely to enter into a contract with a supplier. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 2,574 reverse auctions at a leading online marketplace for IT services and further verified across projects of different value and different levels of buyer experience. On the practical side, we recommend setting up entry barriers for buyers with a low level of commitment.

Reverse Auctions, Online Markets, IT Outsourcing, Opportunism, Transaction Costs

Abstract:
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer's choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as contract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers' past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior repeat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyers' inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendors' performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm's history and supplier strategy.

reverse auctions, online marketplace, IT services, outsourcing

Abstract:
Small firms face distinct problems and opportunities when procuring IT resources. Whereas previous work focused at the level of firm or buyer-supplier dyad, we address portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships at an online marketplace for IT services. Using the portfolio approach, we develop a buyers taxonomy and analyze properties of resulting clusters. Our investigation reveals four clusters of buyers with distinct mixes of long-term and short-term supplier relationships. Although reverse auctions are found to be associated with short-term relationships and negotiations support long-term relationships, buyers in different clusters use the two mechanisms in combination to a different extent.

Online markets, IT services, Outsourcing, Buyer-supplier relationships, Reverse auctions, Performance

Abstract:
Electronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of these changes and not the effect of each separate change. For instance, electronic bidders face lower transaction costs, but also have less information about product quality and about the state of the market such as the number of bidders. In this paper, we report a study of bidding behavior at a large Dutch flower auction in which we are able to separate some of these effects. We compare electronic bidders with traditional bidders and when correcting for quality differences and seasonal effects, we find that they to bid lower on average than traditional buyers, as predicted by Bakos (1991, 1997). The electronic bidders were divided in two subgroups, internal bidders and external bidders. The external bidders had less product quality information and market state information than the internal bidders. This led the external bidders to not only bid significantly higher than the internal bidders, but in fact as high as the traditional bidders. Both these effects run counter to theoretical predictions and some possible alternative explanations are offered. In general, it highlights the importance of focusing the information flows that occur in a market.

electronic auctions, market state information, product quality information, transaction costs

Abstract:
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer's choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as contract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers' past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior repeat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyer's inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor's performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm's history and supplier strategy.

reverse auctions, online marketplace, IT services, outsourcing

Abstract:
The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer's choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as contract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers' past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior repeat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyer's inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor's performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm's history and supplier strategy.

reverse auctions, online marketplace, IT services, outsourcing

Abstract:
Electronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of these changes and not the effect of each separate change. For instance, electronic bidders face lower transaction costs, but also have less information about product quality and about the state of the market such as the number of bidders. In this paper, we report a study of bidding behavior at a large Dutch flower auction in which we are able to separate some of these effects. We compare electronic bidders with traditional bidders and when correcting for quality differences and seasonal effects, we find that they to bid lower on average than traditional buyers, as predicted by Bakos (1991, 1997). The electronic bidders were divided in two subgroups, internal bidders and external bidders. The external bidders had less product quality information and market state information than the internal bidders. This led the external bidders to not only bid significantly higher than the internal bidders, but in fact as high as the traditional bidders. Both these effects run counter to theoretical predictions and some possible alternative explanations are offered. In general, it highlights the importance of focusing the information flows that occur in a market.

electronic auctions, market state information, product quality information, transaction costs

Abstract:
Electronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of these changes and not the effect of each separate change. For instance, electronic bidders face lower transaction costs, but also have less information about product quality and about the state of the market such as the number of bidders. In this paper, we report a study of bidding behavior at a large Dutch flower auction in which we are able to separate some of these effects. We compare electronic bidders with traditional bidders and when correcting for quality differences and seasonal effects, we find that they to bid lower on average than traditional buyers, as predicted by Bakos (1991, 1997). The electronic bidders were divided in two subgroups, internal bidders and external bidders. The external bidders had less product quality information and market state information than the internal bidders. This led the external bidders to not only bid significantly higher than the internal bidders, but in fact as high as the traditional bidders. Both these effects run counter to theoretical predictions and some possible alternative explanations are offered. In general, it highlights the importance of focusing the information flows that occur in a market.

electronic auctions, market state information, product quality information, transaction costs

Abstract:
Online markets have dramatically decreased costs of search and communication for buyers. By contrast, costs of evaluating purchasing alternatives have become critical due to an overwhelming range of available options. When high, evaluation costs can offset potential gains from transactions and cause inefficiencies, e.g. by forcing buyers to abandon transactions without allocating contracts. While most previous studies treat evaluation costs as an exogenous factor, this study considers them endogenous. We identify several tactics (search, request for proposal preparation, budget announcement, bid filtering, and negotiation) that buyers at online markets can use to reduce their evaluation costs and hence influence project allocation. Using data from nearly 10 thousand transactions at a leading online marketplace for IT services, we show that buyers who use these tactics are more likely to allocate their project to a winner than buyers not using these tactics. Buyer experience also has a positive effect on allocation and, in addition, moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics. As experience grows, budget announcement becomes more effective in coping with evaluation costs and increases the likelihood of allocation, while the effectiveness of request for proposal preparation decreases. Together, these results shed more light on the buyer side of online reverse auctions, which leads to guidelines for improving the efficiency of online marketplaces.

evaluation costs, reverse auctions, online markets, IT services, outsourcing, buyer behavior, vendor selection

Abstract:
Online markets have dramatically decreased costs of search and communication for buyers. By contrast, costs of evaluating purchasing alternatives have become critical due to an overwhelming range of available options. When high, evaluation costs can offset potential gains from transactions and cause inefficiencies, e.g. by forcing buyers to abandon transactions without allocating contracts. While most previous studies treat evaluation costs as an exogenous factor, this study considers them endogenous. We identify several tactics (search, request for proposal preparation, budget announcement, bid filtering, and negotiation) that buyers at online markets can use to reduce their evaluation costs and hence influence project allocation. Using data from nearly 10 thousand transactions at a leading online marketplace for IT services, we show that buyers who use these tactics are more likely to allocate their project to a winner than buyers not using these tactics. Buyer experience also has a positive effect on allocation and, in addition, moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics. As experience grows, budget announcement becomes more effective in coping with evaluation costs and increases the likelihood of allocation, while the effectiveness of request for proposal preparation decreases. Together, these results shed more light on the buyer side of online reverse auctions, which leads to guidelines for improving the efficiency of online marketplaces.

evaluation costs, reverse auctions, online markets, IT services, outsourcing, buyer behavior, vendor selection

Abstract:
Online markets have dramatically decreased costs of search and communication for buyers. By contrast, costs of evaluating purchasing alternatives have become critical due to an overwhelming range of available options. When high, evaluation costs can offset potential gains from transactions and cause inefficiencies, e.g. by forcing buyers to abandon transactions without allocating contracts. While most previous studies treat evaluation costs as an exogenous factor, this study considers them endogenous. We identify several tactics (search, request for proposal preparation, budget announcement, bid filtering, and negotiation) that buyers at online markets can use to reduce their evaluation costs and hence influence project allocation. Using data from nearly 10 thousand transactions at a leading online marketplace for IT services, we show that buyers who use these tactics are more likely to allocate their project to a winner than buyers not using these tactics. Buyer experience also has a positive effect on allocation and, in addition, moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics. As experience grows, budget announcement becomes more effective in coping with evaluation costs and increases the likelihood of allocation, while the effectiveness of request for proposal preparation decreases. Together, these results shed more light on the buyer side of online reverse auctions, which leads to guidelines for improving the efficiency of online marketplaces.

evaluation costs, reverse auctions, online markets, IT services, outsourcing, buyer behavior, vendor selection

Abstract:
Online markets have dramatically decreased costs of search and communication for buyers. By contrast, costs of evaluating purchasing alternatives have become critical due to an overwhelming range of available options. When high, evaluation costs can offset potential gains from transactions and cause inefficiencies, e.g. by forcing buyers to abandon transactions without allocating contracts. While most previous studies treat evaluation costs as an exoge-nous factor, this study considers them endogenous. We identify several tactics (search, request for proposal preparation, budget announcement, bid filtering, and negotiation) that buyers at online markets can use to reduce their evaluation costs and hence influence project allocation. Using data from nearly 10 thousand transactions at a leading online marketplace for IT services, we show that buyers who use these tactics are more likely to allocate their project to a winner than buyers not using these tactics. Buyer experience also has a positive effect on allocation and, in addition, moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics. As experience grows, budget announcement be-comes more effective in coping with evaluation costs and increases the likelihood of allocation, while the effectiveness of request for proposal preparation decreases. Together, these results shed more light on the buyer side of online reverse auctions, which leads to guidelines for improving the efficiency of online marketplaces.

evaluation costs, reverse auctions, online markets, IT services, outsourcing, buyer behavior, vendor selection

Abstract:
Companies increasingly outsource IT-related tasks using reverse auction mechanisms embedded into online marketplaces. However, a considerable proportion of auctions at these marketplaces do not result in a contract between buyer and supplier. Extant literature mostly refers to costly bidding and bid evaluation to explain this phenomenon. Another possible explanation is that because of the low entry barriers, buyers with a low commitment to exchange can use the marketplace solely for information gath-ering purposes such as price benchmarking and obtaining free consultations, having little or no intention to contract a supplier. We test this explanation by looking at how different types of costs incurred by the buyer during the sourcing process, are related to the outcome of reverse auctions in terms of contract award. We argue that higher levels of search, preparation and negotiation costs are associated with higher commitment to exchange and find that opportunistic behaviour does indeed play a part in the non-contracted projects, while committed buyers are more likely to enter into a contract with a supplier. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 2,574 reverse auctions at a leading online marketplace for IT services and further verified across projects of different value and different levels of buyer experience. On the practical side, we recommend setting up entry barriers for buyers with a low level of commitment.

Reverse Auctions, Online Markets, IT Outsourcing, Opportunism, Transaction Costs

Abstract:
Companies increasingly outsource IT-related tasks using reverse auction mechanisms embedded into online marketplaces. However, a considerable proportion of auctions at these marketplaces do not result in a contract between buyer and supplier. Extant literature mostly refers to costly bidding and bid evaluation to explain this phenomenon. Another possible explanation is that because of the low entry barriers, buyers with a low commitment to exchange can use the marketplace solely for information gath-ering purposes such as price benchmarking and obtaining free consultations, having little or no intention to contract a supplier. We test this explanation by looking at how different types of costs incurred by the buyer during the sourcing process, are related to the outcome of reverse auctions in terms of contract award. We argue that higher levels of search, preparation and negotiation costs are associated with higher commitment to exchange and find that opportunistic behaviour does indeed play a part in the non-contracted projects, while committed buyers are more likely to enter into a contract with a supplier. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 2,574 reverse auctions at a leading online marketplace for IT services and further verified across projects of different value and different levels of buyer experience. On the practical side, we recommend setting up entry barriers for buyers with a low level of commitment.

Reverse Auctions, Online Markets, IT Outsourcing, Opportunism, Transaction Costs

Abstract:
Although informal networks are often emphasized as facilitating knowledge transfer, we use network data obtained from a multi-unit high-tech firm to show that the formal network also significantly contributes to inter-unit knowledge transfer. Individuals centrally placed in a network are, in addition, more involved in knowledge transfer, especially, the evidence suggests, in the case of the formal network. Focusing on the brokerage roles that individual fulfill, we find that knowledge transfer between units is more likely to occur through externally oriented brokers than internally oriented brokers in the formal network, but not in the informal network. Overall, the results show that there is more than one path to transfer knowledge.

knowledge transfer, inter-unit knowledge transfer, communication networks, centrality, brokerage roles

Abstract:
Small firms face distinct problems and opportunities when procuring IT resources. Whereas previous work focused at the level of firm or buyer-supplier dyad, we address portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships at an online marketplace for IT services. Using the portfolio approach, we develop a buyers taxonomy and analyze properties of resulting clusters.Our investigation reveals four clusters of buyers with distinct mixes of long-term and short-term supplier relationships. Although reverse auctions are found to be associated with short-term relationships and negotiations support long-term relationships, buyers in different clusters use the two mechanisms in combination to a different extent.

Online markets, IT services, Outsourcing, Buyer-supplier relationships, Reverse auctions, Performance

Abstract:
Small firms face distinct problems and opportunities when procuring IT resources. Whereas previous work focused at the level of firm or buyer-supplier dyad, we address portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships at an online marketplace for IT services. Using the portfolio approach, we develop a buyers taxonomy and analyze properties of resulting clusters.Our investigation reveals four clusters of buyers with distinct mixes of long-term and short-term supplier relationships. Although reverse auctions are found to be associated with short-term relationships and negotiations support long-term relationships, buyers in different clusters use the two mechanisms in combination to a different extent.

Online markets, IT services, Outsourcing, Buyer-supplier relationships, Reverse auctions, Performance