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Abstract:
Copyright's provision of economic incentives is completely consistent with its underlying utilitarian philosophy. A perspective grounded in economic and conventionally understood utilitarian rationales for legal protection emphasizes the commodification and dissemination of intellectual works. This perspective fails to take into account that human enterprise also embodies inspirational or spiritual motivations for creativity. This failure creates turmoil for many authors because it fosters a dominant market exchange reality that ignores the importance of non-economically based motivations for innovation.

This Article demonstrates that narratives illuminating spiritual or inspirational motivations for innovation are integral to understanding more fully the artistic soul, and challenges the dialogue on authors' rights in this country to consider the implications of such narratives. The intrinsic dimension of creativity developed herein is one characterized by spiritual or inspirational motivations that are inherent in the creative task itself as opposed to motivation resulting from the possibility of economic reward.

Inspirational motivations for artistic creation can be understood better through an examination of a variety of narratives illuminating the intrinsic dimension of innovation. This Article examines both theologically based and secular narratives about creativity drawn from a variety of sources. The analysis demonstrates how deeply inspirational motivations are embedded in Western civilization's perceptions about creativity and illustrates how the insights derived from these narratives featuring inspirational motivations for creativity can inform the discourse about the law of authors' rights.

Subsequently, the discussion demonstrates that the American legal system historically has ignored the insights derived from these narratives as fundamental sources of human sensibilities regarding artistic creation, resulting in a legal system manifesting an incomplete view of artistic creativity. It probes how the United States' law governing authors' rights has been shaped in response to a largely different perspective, one that focuses on economic as opposed to inspirational motivations. The analysis also demonstrates that the insights derived from this perspective can facilitate the development of appropriately tailored moral rights laws that would promote the policies underlying authors' rights in this country. Finally, the discussion tackles how the United States' law should be changed so that it can be more responsive to all authorship interests rather than just those that are economically motivated. It proposes a viable framework for stronger moral rights protection consistent with our existing legal system.

Abstract:
This Chapter explores in general terms the treatment accorded authors in foreign jurisdictions. In contrast to the United States, many countries maintain authors' rights protections that enable authors to safeguard the integrity of their texts far more readily than authors in this country. Thus, the United States is out of step with global norms by not recognizing more substantial authors' rights. Moreover, the Internet environment makes the United States' deficiency particularly problematic because violations of textual integrity can occur with unprecedented ease, and the results can be disseminated to countless recipients with the mere press of a key. Yet, these differences cannot be so easily remedied because certain cultural and legal differences preclude the wholesale adoption of another country's approach absent careful consideration of its fit into our existing legal framework.

moral rights, droit morale, international law, right of attribution, right of integrity, civil law

Abstract:
This Article has three objectives. First, it exposes the massive confusion surrounding the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. Second, it makes a case for resolving this conflict by applying a property and liability rule framework such as that found in other areas of the law. Third, it develops a specific mode of analysis within which this framework can be applied and thus supplies the organization that has so far eluded this difficult area.

The overall inquiry of this Article is geared toward resolving those situations in which, but for the First Amendment, there would be a right-of-publicity violation. In such instances, courts must confront the impact of the First Amendment upon what would otherwise be an actionable invasion of property rights. One premise of this Article is that integral to the resolution of this conflict is the application of a combination of property and liability rule principles. Thus, the approach taken here necessitates a choice between three possible resolutions in any given situation: property rule protection (under which the appropriate remedy is an injunction and concomitant damages), liability rule protection (which disallows an injunction but requires the defendant to pay damages), and no protection for a right-of-publicity plaintiff. A second premise of this Article is that, in any given case, the determination of appropriate relief should be made by balancing the relevant harms triggered by allowing unauthorized uses of publicity rights against the benefits that society derives from such uses. In analyzing the nature of the harms to plaintiffs, this Article introduces the application of morally based harms caused by publicity violations.

The proposal developed in this Article calls for the invocation of a more flexible remedial apporach in cases involving the appropriate degree of public access to publicity rights. It also supplies the framework within which the judiciary can exercise this much needed flexibility.

Abstract:
In THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT, Professor Lior Zemer attempts to conceptually reorganize copyright's entitlement structure by positing the public as a joint author of every copyrighted work. This Review delineates and critiques the main points of Zemer's thesis and analyzes the practical implications of his work. It then looks beyond Zemer's specific recommendations and suggests how his perspective may provide a useful basis for further scholarly contemplation. Specifically, it proposes that a different way of addressing Zemer's concern for the public domain is to denominate the colloquial author as a steward. Understanding the colloquial author as a steward of her work is consistent with the view that copyright ownership involves duties to the public as well as rights. This model facilitates the appropriate balance between public access and ownership rights because its underlying premise is that ownership rights exist to further a greater societal need.

Abstract:
Distance education is proliferating, although legal education has been comparatively slow to adapt to this trend. Despite the legal academy's reluctance to embrace distance education, the number of institutions gravitating toward on-line courses mandates attention to important legal issues surroudning the use of this educational medium. The creation of on-line courses presents many novel copyright issues. This Article focuses on the ownership and authorship issues surrouding the creation of on-line courses. First, it explores the parameters of copyright protection generally and specifically how copyright applies to the creation of on-line course materials. It then examines issues regarding the general question of how the doctrines determining the recipients of copyright's incentives should be applied in the context of on-line course materials, and offers some concluding observations.

Abstract:
The purpose of this Essay is to discuss whether moral rights should be accorded to a limited variety of authors. Even those who argue that moral rights protections in the United States are justified might still question whether they should be applicable to all types of "authored" works. International treaties that attempt to situate Intellectual Property rights within the discourse of human rights do not necessarily require a work to be copyrightable in order to be protected by moral rights. Still, in most if not all countries, moral rights protections attach to works that are subject to copyright protection. If we assume that copyright law, at least in the United States, sets a particular floor for the concept of originality, it would not make sense to discuss moral rights in conjunction with works that do not possess at least this minimal level of originality. On the other hand, just because a work is sufficiently original to obtain copyright protection does not mean that it automatically should receive the additional safeguards of moral rights. Sound reasons may support confining the application of moral rights to a smaller category of works than are covered by copyright law. Thus, this discussion asks whether, as a normative matter, moral rights should be applicable to a limited variety of works of authorship and if so, how the law can make viable distinctions.

Abstract:
This Article demonstrates that narrative has significant potential to influence explicitly the ways in which courts, litigants, and legislators think about the process of artistic creation and the voice of the author. It contends that the author's voice is one that has been submerged in the development of copyright law and that copyright law is therefore insufficiently sensitive to authorial perspectives about the creative process. It also argues that narrative, as a strategy for bringing attention to marginalized voices, can greatly assist in the reshaping of certain doctrines especially important to authors such as moral rights and copyright's joint authorship doctrine.

This Article does not argue for a radical change of the normative standards under which our copyright law currently operates, nor does it urge that the narrative of the author should be emphasized over and above the other forces that have shaped our copyright law. It does contend, however, that copyright law needs to recognize more explicitly that the author's voice has been drowned out by other more dominant voices in our culture. This submergence has resulted in the marginalization of the author's honor, dignity, and spirit in important applications of copyright law.

Abstract:
In an age where every man and woman has fifteen minutes of fame, this Article examines ways in which American law should protect celebrities against unwarranted commercial exploitation. It argues that the doctrine of moral rights could be extended to constructed personas to protect the reputational and personality interests of celebrities. As other countries and international treaties move in this direction, it suggests that the United States should examine offering such protection to American personas.

Looking first to the similarities between moral rights and publicity rights, this Article highlights the advantages of protecting personality and reputational interests through copyright's moral rights provision. Such an approach would be constitutionally sound because a constructed persona falls within the definition of a writing as the term is used in the Constitution's Copyright Clause. It argues that a constructed persona is an original work of authorship that is sufficiently tangible to be afforded copyright protection. By protecting constructed personas in this way, people whose livelihoods depend on the preservation and integrity of their personas will be protected. Also, because the limiting doctrines of copyright law would be applied to the protection of constructed personas under moral rights law, issues of free speech and societal access can be considered in connection with damage to the personal interests of the persona.

Abstract:
This Article explores the interplay between the 1976 Copyright Act and the moral rights doctrine. Although it was written prior to the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act, the limited nature of that statute does not significantly alter the analysis or position advanced herein. The Article recogizes that the content of any federal scheme adopted in this country for protecting a creator's personal rights will be influenced greatly by the 1976 Act. It examines the relationship between the 1976 Act and the moral rights doctrine, focusing on three distinct inquiries. The first section of this discussion explores the scope of protection for personal rights currently afforded by the copyright law and concludes that existing copyright law is an inadequate substitute for a cohesive moral rights doctrine. The second section examines the relevant statutory provisions, the legislative history, and judicial interpretations of the 1976 Act to determine the degree of compatibility between the copyright statute and the moral rights doctrine. This analysis demonstrates that, although the 1976 Act has a considerable amount of unrealized potential for protecting a creator's personal rights, the Act also contains some significant limitations, resuting from the recognition of interests conflicting with those of creators, that are likely to influence the scope of any moral rights doctrine adopted in this country. The last portion of this discussion examines whether section 301 of the 1976 Act, which governs preemption of other laws, precludes the adoption of the moral rights doctrine on a state level. Although section 301 does not preempt most forms of state protection for moral rights when such claims are within the framework of substitute legal theories, state statutes that attempt to provide comprehensive protetion for moral rights are vulnerable to preemption. Therefore, the most effective means of safeguarding a creator's personal rights in this country would be the incorporation into the 1976 Act of more provisions governing the special needs of creators distinct from their possible status as copyright owners.

This Article concludes with a proposal for amending the 1976 Act so as to implement an American version of the moral rights doctrine that would balance all the competing interests concerned in extending protection to the personal rights of creators.

Abstract:
The human impulse for attribution symbolizes the linkage between an author and her creative work. In many countries, authors are afforded a right of attribution as part of a broader doctrine known as moral rights. The United States, however, does not adequately protect moral rights. This Article focuses exclusively on the right of attribution as one component of the moral rights doctrine. Initially, it examines the connection between copyright law and the right of attribution and establishes the inadequacy of the current copyright law as a means of safeguarding the right of attribution. Next, it addresses why section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which frequently has been hailed as a viable substitute for the right of attribution, is an inadeauate safeguard for the attribution interest. The underlying theme of this Article is that because United States' copyright law and section 43(a) are grounded in objectives other than the personality and non-monetary interests with which the right of attribution is concerned, the federal enactment of a right of attribution applicable to a broad category of copyrightable works is vital. The adoption of this approach is necessary for protecting fully the authorial interests that currently are insufficiently addressed under our legal system. Such explicit recognition for a right of attribution can be accomplished with a relatively minimal degree of controversy and disruption to our current legal fabric.

Abstract:
This piece is a commentary on Professor Jane C. Ginsburg's 5th Annual Niro Distinguished Intellectual Property Lecture: The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul Law Review 1063 (2003). In her Article, Professor Ginsburg attempts to stimulate discussion of who is an author in copyright law by positing Six Principles. I find her multi-faceted approach to be an extremely useful way of contemplating the authorship issue, an issue that I agree has been largely overlooked in both the copyright jurisprudence and literature in the United States and elsewhere. In this commentary, I explore the Dead Sea Scrolls litigation in the context of Professor Ginsburg's multi-faceted approach to authorship, and argue that her approach would support a finding of authorship in this situation. I conclude that the issues with which Professor Ginsburg grapples require further exploration of the psychological and spiritual dimensions of the creative process.

Abstract:
Moral rights protection exists to recognize authorship autonomy by safeguarding the author's meaning and message. Despite the fact that all authors owe a debt to the past, the authorship construct as we know it today embodies the idea of crafting a work so that it embodies the author's personal stamp of autonomy. Notwithstanding the borrowing inherent in the authorship process, it is still the author who, on an individual or joint basis, composes the creative package.

When a work of authorship manifests a meaning and message specific to the author, the moral right of attribution safeguards the author's original conceptions. Attribution is a vital, and perhaps the most widely endorsed, component of authorship dignity. An author's choice of attribution is very much part of a work's meaning and message and as such, it plays a central role in communicating the essence of an author's work to her audience. Even anonymous or pseudonymous works can be seen as reflecting a branding choice that is a fundamental part of the author's meaning and message. When the author's attribution of choice is omitted without permission of the author, the original work is somehow incomplete. Attribution thus functions as a significant, and widely acknowledged, means of safeguarding the integrity of an author's text.

A large number of copyrighted works are produced outside the framework of an individual author whose identity is known to the public. Works created outside of the traditional authorship trope include those produced by authors who write anonymously or under a pseudonym, works for hire, and even collective works. The relationship between moral rights and works created by authors in disguise is problematic because if the primary objective of moral rights is to safeguard the meaning and message of an author's work, it would seem as though the true author's identity should be publicly known. Yet for the types of works discussed in this Article, this knowledge is not readily available. This Article explores these difficulties as a general matter, with particular focus on the failure of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) to incorporate explicit protection for anonymous and pseudonymous works and its exclusion of works made for hire from the scope of its coverage. VARA is the primary federal codification of moral rights in the United States, and thus its provisions represent the most significant embodiment of the doctrine in this country. I argue that in light of the theoretical predicate for moral rights, VARA's exclusions are misguided.

Abstract:
This Article explores the main provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act that have been the subject of litigation. These include the work made for hire exclusion, the interpretation of certain qualifying phrases such as prejudicial to honor or reputation, and work of recognized stature, and the preemption provisions. It also addresses whether VARA effectuates a taking and the waiver issue. In addition to discussing in detail the relevant litigation, this paper provides commentary on the analytical framework required for evaluating these issues.

Abstract:
The right of publicity is a legal theory which enables individuals to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of their personas. Although the right of privacy and the right of publicity are similar in that both doctrines are aimed at controlling the extent to which one party can use the details of the life of another, they nonetheless have come to represent distinct legal theories. Publicity actions typically are regarded as the means of achieving compensation for the loss of financial gain associated with a defendant’s unauthorized appropriation. In contrast, the right of privacy continues to be regarded as the predicate for actions based on hurt feelings. The reasons for this distinction are partially attributable to the particular fact patterns in seminal cases as well as the result of the legal system’s failure to embrace a cohesive legal doctrine that affords individuals the ability to redress unauthorized appropriations of their identities involving both economic and reputational damage. Allowing the unauthorized use of an individual’s persona potentially poses the maximum harm when the persona is being appropriated in an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose. In these instances, neither an award of injunctive relief nor monetary damages will erase the damage to human dignity which the persona perceives as having already been inflicted by virtue of the user’s unauthorized appropriation. No judicially mandated relief can eliminate the prior effects of the user’s objectionable public exposure of the persona. These are situations involving dignity based, as opposed to economically based, objections to the use. Notwithstanding the confusion between privacy and publicity, and between commercial and personal interests, the reality is that both celebrities and non-celebrities can bring actions based on the unauthorized use of their personas that involve dignity as well as economically based harms. Moreover, in the age of 'reality television' the line between celebrity and non-celebrity has become especially fuzzy. Today more so than ever before, an increasing number of ordinary people have the opportunity to garner their so-called 'fifteen minutes' of fame. Although there may be positive benefits to be derived by individuals from this exposure, one downside is that these 'short-term' celebrities also suffer an increased likelihood of being the subject of right of publicity violations generally and dignity based harms in particular. Much ink has been spilled over the intersection between the right of publicity and the First Amendment generally. To date, however, neither courts nor commentators have focused specifically on how the existence of a dignity based harm should impact the analysis in these cases and so this Essay attempts to open a dialogue on this point. For purposes of this work, I accept the right of publicity’s existence as a given, and therefore do not argue for or against the right. Instead, I propose a way of thinking about those publicity cases where damage to human dignity is a prime — or even the prime — concern of the plaintiff. Part I of this Essay initially examines the relationship between causes of action such as privacy, defamation and the right of publicity that can involve harm to the plaintiff’s dignity. It then explores how conflict can arise in connection with these types of claims and the First Amendment. Part II illuminates the current tests courts have used to determine how the right of publicity specifically should co-exist with the First Amendment, and concludes that none of these tests are suitable in the context of publicity claims involving dignity harms. Part III develops a more suitable framework for evaluating such claims.

right of publicity, privacy, First Amendment, defamation

Abstract:
Property, perhaps more than any other first-year course, comprises a variety of distinct subject areas. To put the matter more colorfully, Property frequently offers students a plate of appetizers rather than a full meal. Property really is the introductory vehicle to a multitude of upper-level courses, including estates or wills and trusts, real estate transactions, land use and zoning, and housing law. In addition, teachers often weave into Property significant strands of other subjects, such a jurisprudence, intellectual property, environmental law, family law, torts, and constitutional law. Because Property can include such a range of material, planning the syllabus can be a danting task, even for a seasoned teacher.

The Property Section of the AALS holds a major conferernce every five years. In preparation for the 1997 conference, we thought it would be useful to make a study of Propery syllabi. We received 40 syllabi from 37 schools. Although we make no claim to scientific accuracy and have no assurance that our small sampling was truly representative, we believe our findings are nonetheless instructive.

The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, it documents the findings about the syllabi that we reported at the conference, particularly in comparing coverage reflected in the syllabi with coverage reflected in a 1976 survey of Property teachers. Second, it suggests some broader issues of coverage in first-year Property which grew not only out of our presentations specifically, but also out of the conference generally.

Abstract:
The content and application of Intellectual Property (IP) is becoming increasingly dominated by new and ever more complex technology. The rapid changes and developments occurring with respect to the subject matter of IP are reflected not only in the substance of what we teach but also in our teaching methodologies. Yet, as the famous saying goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Despite all the glitz and glamour surrounding IP over the past two decades, the fact remains that IP law, like any other area, is best taught and learned through a careful application of the lost art of reading. Law students of this generation are representative of their peers in that they are far more comfortable with visual learning as opposed to plain old reading. In the majority of law school courses, the reading is geared toward mastery of subject matter on a macro scale. The academic experience of reading a law review article, or even an academic press book, in order to absorb its essence typically is not part of the law school experience. But it should be. The seminar format provides the ideal educational vehicle for exposing students to meticulous readings of law review articles in their entirety.

Part I of this Article discusses the merits of the legal literature approach to seminars. Part II addresses the mechanics of the legal literature approach.

Abstract:
Section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act delineates limitations on exclusive rights pertaining to reproductions by libraries and archives. Subsections (b) and (c) of Section 108 provide guidelines under which libraries enjoy even further wiggle room for reproductions for purposes of preservation and replacement of original works. It is the purpose of this Commentary to establish that these subsections are in need of revision for three reasons. First, they draw an unnecessary distinction between unpublished and published works. Second, by limiting the availability of reproduction rights in digital format to no more than three copies and to recipients within the physical premises of the library, they fail to take into account the realitites of the digital era. Finally, by omitting attribution and other integrity safeguards on works reproduced, they fail to include requirements embodying vital authorship norms.

Abstract:
The superwill concept has sparked interest as commentators and legislators have sought to provide increased flexibility to testators in the disposition of their nonprobate assets. The basic premise underlying the superwill is that a testator may, by executing one testamentary document, dispose of both testamentary as well as nonprobate assets. The superwill thus is a substantial departure from existing law, under which a testator generally may not dispose of nonprobate assets through a will.

This Article explores the significant issues raised by the superwill's adoption. It examines questions relating to the mechanics of the superwill such as what type of nonprobate assets should be governed by a superwill and whether a testator should be able to make initial dispositions of nonprobate assets through the use of a superwill. It then focuses on how adoption of the superwill affects the content of the probate estate from the standpoint of subjecting the assets disposed of in a superwill to the claims of the decedent's creditors, surviving spouse and pretermitted heirs. Also, it explores the issues pertaining to the revocation and revivial of superwills. Finally, it treats the appropriate degree of protection for financial institutions, beneficiaries, and other third parties. This Article demonstrates that the superwill can be a beneficial tool and that any difficulties created by its adoption can be resolved through careful drafting of propsed superwill legislation.

Abstract:
This Article examines the largely unexplored relationship between municipal zoning or signage ordinances, trademark law, and the U.S. Constitution. Section 1121(b) of the Lanham Act expressly prohibits any state or political subdivision from requiring the alteration of a federally registered mark. Yet, litigation has confirmed that local signage laws are being applied to compel mark owners to alter components of their federally registered marks displayed on exterior signs. Since many such ordinances exist throughout this country and affect numerous trademarks, it is imperative that a resolution of the legal issues presented by this controversy be formulated.

This Article highlights the growing controvery between the application of 1121(b) and local signage laws and recommends several legal bases for a solution. It examines the nature of trademarkable properties and offers empirical evidence showing how municipalities actually regulate tramarkable properties through their signage laws. It then focuses on the concept of trademark display and argues that the display of a federally registered mark on an exterior sign should be considered an integral component of the mark. It also explores the legal framework courts have invoked to determine when local regulations are preempted by federal law, and argues that the application of signage laws to require alterations of federally registered marks on exterior signs should be preempted by 1121(b) with respect to the most conventional trademarkable properties, such as color and lettering style. In contrast, with respect to less mainstream trademarkable properties such as size, three-dimensional shape, illumination, and even sound, 1121(b) should be interpreted with more flexibility so that courts may balance the appropriate considerations on both sides. Finally, this Article examines arguments that support mark owners under the Commerce Clause and the serious First Amendment implications that arise when local authorities require alterations of federally registered marks on exterior signs.

Abstract:
One's theory of law matters. The approach one takes to how the law develops and should be applied influences both the permissible content of legislation and its interpretation by the judiciary. In NO LAW, Professors David Lange and Jefferson Powell make the case for interpreting the First Amendment's language in absolute terms. They lament the reality that the First Amendment law in the United States has been far more influenced by a balancing oriented ideology since the early twentieth century. This Review not only presents and critiques their thesis, but also illustrates that the premise of NO LAW has a broader force and application by furnishing a comparative analysis of Jewish law jurisprudence. It reveals that Jewish law scholars writing from an Orthodox perspective embrace a theory of law that feels very much like the one proposed by the authors of NO LAW. In contrast, the balancing approach to which they object has found a place in the self-denominated historical approach to Jewish law represented by the Conservative Movement of Judaism. The adoption of one, or the other, of these theories markedly influences how Jewish law is interpreted by rabbinic authorities and Jewish law scholars. NO LAW amply illustrates the same point regarding the importance of a given theory of law in the context of First Amendment and intellectual property law.

First Amendment, copyright law, intellectual property, Jewish law, halakhah, Orthodox, Conservative Movement

Abstract:
No country in the world is so driven by personality as is the United States. Since 1953, when the right of publicity first received explicit legal recognition, courts, legislatures, and academicians have become increasingly interested in the doctrine's application and scope. Noticeably absent from virtually all of the judicial opinions and the volume of legal commentary on the right of publicity, however, is any consideration of the sociological and cultural influences that have prompted the doctrine's initial recognition and increasing application.

The right of publicity has come under attack recently on the ground that it eliminates important semiotic material from the public domain. Critics of the right of publicity charge that allowing celebrities to control the meanings of their constructed personas deprives us all of the ability to recode or reinterpret these texts for our own personal expression.

This Article contends that once the historical, sociological, and cultural influences are duly considered, the right of publicity's place in our legal system becomes more defensible, both theoretially and practically. On the whole, relatively little research exists on the underlying causes of the fame phenomenon in the United States. Moreover, the existing works do not attempt to illuminate the right of publicity in light of the complex explanations underlying our fascination with fame. This Article undertakes such an examination and demonstrates that the right of publicity is consistent not only with our cultural fabric and history, but also with our legal conceptions of property. In addition, this Article explores the socially based criticisms of the right of publicity, and finds them insufficient to negate the well-deserved status of the right of publicity as a property right.

Abstract:
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it makes the case for teaching intellectual property in the first-year property course. Then, it urges property professors to consider teaching the right of publicity as the IP doctrine of choice in the first-year property curriculum.

Abstract:
Colleges and universities provide the homes and training grounds for artists and authors all over the country. Universities, therefore, are in a unique position to nuture and protect the work of their faculty and students. This Article argues that an important component of the function of universities in this respect is to provide assistance to their faculty, students and employees in securing moral rights in connection with their creations. Specifically, within the university confines, universities should attempt to better educate their authors about moral rights and, to the extent possible, to safeguard more effectively their authors' moral rights.

This Article discusses litigation involving moral rights, or quasi moral rights claims, deriving from a university setting. It demonstrates that the world of academia is likely to foster moral rights disputes and that it would be desirable for our law to provide more concrete mechanisms for assisting with these disputes. It also offers some concluding observations on what universities specifically can do to enhance the chances for moral rights protections for their faculty, students and employees.

Abstract:
The IP Section of the AALS held its first workshop in March, 1999. Having been asked to speak about the state of the IP curriculum at law schools across the country, I developed a questionnaire for law teachers and one for practicing attorneys. This Article discusses the results of both questionnaires and provides some suggestions for major curricular reform in IP.

Abstract:
Courts have updated many areas of landlord-tenant law by recognizing the applicability of contract principles to leases of realty. However, a lessor's difficulty in collecting damages caused by a lessee's unwarranted default has been generally ignored. This Article proposes that courts retain jurisdiction so as to more accurately and equitably assess damages in cases involving long-term leases.

This Article explores the settled application of the doctrine of retained jurisdiciton to domestic relations and probate matters, specific performance of long term contracts, and workers' compensation. It concludes that a lessor's collection of damages in landlord-tenant matters is an equally appropriate and fertile field for the application of retained jurisdiction.

Abstract:
This Article develops an analytical framework for evaluating unauthorized governmental uses of copyrighted property. The analytical framework categorizes governmental uses of copyrighted property into three major groups: the free bargaining paradigm, the compensated use paradigm, and the uncompensated use paradign. The free bargainng paradigm includes all voluntary transfers of any of the rights of copyright ownership from the copyright owner to a governmental entity. By contrast, both the compensated use and uncompensated use paradigms consist of involuntary transfers, with a government entity making compensation voluntarily in the former and refusing to compensate in the latter.

This Article focuses on the compensated use and uncompensated use paradigms. In the compensated use paradigm, the nature of the transaction is that of a forced sale. In essense, this paradigm represents the exercise of the eminent domain power over copyrighted property. In contrast, the uncompensated use paradigm covers involuntary transfers in which the government body uses the copyrighted porperty without providing any compensation, thus forcing the copyright owner to litigate her claim for compensation. This paradigm parallels the law of inverse condemnation. Generally, the primary issue in uncompensated use cases is whether the government's actions constituted a taking. If there has been a taking, the court will effect what amounts to a forced purchase of the property and award the copyright proprietor compensation reflecting the purchase price of the copyrighted property.

Part II of this Article demonstrates the propriety of exercising eminent domain over copyrighted property, and lays the groudwork for the difficult issues that arise under the uncompensated use paradigm. Part III explores these issues and argues that federal and state governments have the power to exercise eminent domain over copyrighted property and a transcendent right to use such property. It formulates a framework for distinguishing between governmental uses of copyrighted property that constitute takings mandating compensation and those that constitute fair use - unauthorized but sanctioned, uncompensated uses of copyrighted property. Part III also addresses the nature of a government's liability once a plaintiff establishes a taking of copyrighted property. Finally, it argues that precluding a copyright owner from recovering just compensation for unauthorized use of copyrighted property by a state government results in a due process violation, and thus calls for a modification of the eleventh amendment's traditional application in this context.

Abstract:
This Article explores several controversial issues triggered by the recognition and expansion of the right of publicity. It argues that the right of publicity should be construed expansively so that every person and her heirs and grantees can rely upon it to prevent the commercial exploitation of any personal attribute capable of public recognition. The Article asserts that because such a broad scope of protection for the right of publicity must, at some point, clash with the right of free expression cherished by society, a doctrine must emerge which will balance both interests successfully. It advocates the adoption of a concept analogous to the fair use doctrine present in the copyright laws as a viable resolution of this problem.

Abstract:
This Article explores how constraints operate to impair the use of expert services by privatey retained criminal defense attorneys. The discussion focuses on the use of expert services during the pretrial and sentencing stages of the judicial process. Accordingly, the discussion begins with a hypothetical situation involving a criminal act, and outlines the manner in which a criminal attorney would ideally utilize expert services in preparing a defense for the accused. The Article then examines both the perceived inadequate use of experts by privately retained criminal defense attorneys and the structual factors in our legal system reponsible for this condition, and concludes by suggesting several ways to help eliminate some of the existing impediments to more effective use of expert services.