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Abstract:
This Article asks two basic questions: When does, and when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to accommodate family ties, responsibilities, and interests? We address these questions by first revealing a variety of laws that together form a string of family ties subsidies and benefits pervading the criminal justice system. Notwithstanding our recognition of the important role family plays in securing the conditions for human flourishing, we then explain the basis for erecting a Spartan presumption against these family ties subsidies and benefits within the criminal justice system. We delineate the scope and rationale for the presumption and under what circumstances it might be overcome. When the presumption is overcome, we urge distributing the benefit on terms that are neutral to family status, if possible, with a focus instead on functions served by established relationships of care-giving responsibility.

crime, criminal law, family, criminal justice, criminal procedure

Abstract:
More than 5600 children die in this country every year as the result of unintentional injuries. Although these deaths are not all the result of parental negligence, a significant percentage are. Despite the prevalence of this phenomenon, we know almost nothing about how these cases are treated by the criminal justice system. Commentators frequently claim, without empirical support, that parents are rarely prosecuted, and prosecutors are relying on this common perception in making charging decisions in individual cases. This article broadens our understanding of how the criminal justice system treats parental negligence cases by reporting on the results of my empirical study examining one common cause of death, leaving a child unattended in a motor vehicle. The results fly in the face of conventional wisdom: parents were in fact prosecuted in more than fifty percent of the incidents. Moreover, blue collar parents were far more likely to be prosecuted than parents from wealthier socio-economic groups.

The article then shifts from the descriptive to the normative, as it considers the extremely difficult question whether these parents should be prosecuted. Specifically, what should be the relevance of a defendant's emotional suffering when making a prosecution decision? The article argues that consideration of suffering is best left to the time of sentencing, because declining to charge defendants who are experiencing emotional pain as the result of the crimes they committed denigrates the lives of child victims and raises real concerns about equality of treatment.

Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Negligent Homicide, Parental Duties, Victims of Crime

Abstract:
More than 5600 children die in this country every year as the result of unintentional injuries. Although these deaths are not all the result of parental negligence, a significant percentage are. Despite the prevalence of this phenomenon, we know almost nothing about how these cases are treated by the criminal justice system. Commentators frequently claim, without empirical support, that parents are rarely prosecuted, and prosecutors are relying on this common perception in making charging decisions in individual cases. This article broadens our understanding of how the criminal justice system treats parental negligence cases by reporting on the results of my empirical study examining one common cause of death, leaving a child unattended in a motor vehicle. The results fly in the face of conventional wisdom: parents were in fact prosecuted in more than fifty percent of the incidents. Moreover, blue collar parents were far more likely to be prosecuted than parents from wealthier socio-economic groups.

The article then shifts from the descriptive to the normative, as it considers the extremely difficult question whether these parents should be prosecuted. Specifically, what should be the relevance of a defendant's emotional suffering when making a prosecution decision? The article argues that consideration of suffering is best left to the time of sentencing, because declining to charge defendants who are experiencing emotional pain as the result of the crimes they committed denigrates the lives of child victims and raises real concerns about equality of treatment.

Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Negligent Homicide, Parental Duties, Victims of Crime

Abstract:
This Article focuses upon two basic but under-explored questions: when does, and when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to burden individuals on account of their familial status? We address the first question in Part I by revealing a variety of laws permeating the criminal justice system that together form a string of family ties burdens, laws that impose punishment upon individuals on account of their familial status. The seven burdens we train our attention upon are omissions liability for failure to rescue, parental responsibility laws, incest, bigamy, adultery, nonpayment of child support, and nonpayment of parental support.

Part II develops a framework for the normative assessment of these family
ties burdens. We first ask how these laws can properly be understood to be
burdens. We then look at these sites synthetically and contextually to
uncover a pattern underlying most of these family ties burdens; namely, they tend to promote voluntary caregiving relationships. We endeavor to explain why this rationale is instructive and normatively attractive for the design of family ties burdens within a criminal justice system committed to what we call liberal minimalism. We conclude Part II by articulating the contours and basis of a critical scrutiny that should attach to family ties burdens in the criminal justice system.

Finally, in Part III, we apply our proposed framework to see under which
conditions these burdens should be rejected, retained, or redrafted in terms that are neutral to family status but are still capable of promoting and vindicating voluntary caregiving relationships.

This article is the subject of a mini-symposium in the December 2008 issue of the Boston University Law Review. Professors Rick Hills (NYU) and Michael O'Hear (Marquette) will publish responses and we will offer a brief reply.

A draft of Professor O'Hear's response is available here:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260891

A draft of our reply is available here:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261563

criminal law, family law, criminal justice, criminal procedure, legal theory

Abstract:
On January 26, 2009, the nation's second set of live-born octuplets was delivered. The public fascination with this event quickly turned ugly when the media revealed that the mother was thirty-three year-old Nadya Suleman, who is single, unemployed, and already caring for six children under the age of eight.

The cultural backlash against Suleman has focused on three separate issues. The first revolves around Suleman herself, and her ability as a single, unemployed mother to parent fourteen young children successfully. A second set of concerns revolves around the medical procedures at her fertility clinic. How could the clinic agree to implant a woman under the age of thirty-five with at least six embryos? A final set of issues concerns more fundamental questions about screening parents. How could a clinic provide a single woman with six children with treatment that could double the number of children she has? As a result, commentators and legislators are calling for new, more restrictive regulation of the fertility industry.

We support some of these initiatives, specifically more meaningful limits on the number of embryos that may be transferred in any single IVF procedure. But we are far more troubled by another set of proposals: some commentators are now urging the imposition of restrictions on which individuals may receive fertility treatment. Under this theory, women with a certain number of children, or with limited financial resources, should be precluded from receiving further treatment. Our conclusion here differs from our position about regulating the medical procedures themselves: as we explain, neither fertility clinics nor the state should be in the business of restricting access to reproductive technology.

Abstract:
This Article is an attempt to begin a conversation about the way children who have been victimized by their parents are treated by the criminal justice system. I suggest that even though as a society we are obsessed with our children, that obsession has not translated into criminal justice policies that adequately protect them. Parental offenders are systematically treated better by the criminal justice system than are extrafamilial offenders, and we need to grapple with whether that preferential treatment is appropriate. I suggest that in many instances it is not, and I therefore propose some principles that I hope provide some guidance for the future formulation of criminal justice policy. The Article unfolds in five Parts. Part I describes the romanticization phenomenon, drawing on sources both from law and from popular culture to demonstrate how we idealize the parent-child bond. As a result, we have come to believe that we can ordinarily rely upon the strength of that bond, without messy interference from the criminal justice system, to protect our children from harm. In other words, the belief that love, not law, is sufficient to protect our children permeates our approach to family violence. Part II gives concrete examples of the adverse consequences of this phenomenon and demonstrates how this phenomenon has harmed children. I have chosen in this Part to focus on the most serious crimes that parents can commit against their children: the crimes of murder and rape. These crimes are the focus of the Article because the conduct at issue without question can be characterized as criminal; indeed, these crimes receive our greatest wrath outside the realm of the family. Unfortunately, the romanticization phenomenon affects the criminal justice system's treatment of even these most serious of crimes. This Part also includes a discussion of the parental discipline defense, both because defendants often raise that issue in child homicide cases and because I believe that our continued willingness to endorse the use of corporal punishment against children is contributing to the larger problems discussed in this Article. Part III addresses some of the objections raised to using the criminal justice system more vigorously to protect children from parental violence. For example, perhaps parental offenders simply are less dangerous than stranger offenders. Other objections include the idea that we do not need the incentives of the criminal law to protect children because the fear of losing a child is incentive enough to induce appropriate parental behavior, or that parents who have lost a child are suffering enough and the infliction of additional punishment through the criminal justice system is simply gratuitous and cruel. This Part also grapples with the very real harms that greater use of the criminal justice system could potentially create, such as disruption of families or a disproportionate impact on families of color. Part IV sets forth some principles that hopefully can better guide policymakers and practitioners in the future as they grapple with how best to protect our children from harm. This Part argues that if we are serious about protecting children as a class from physical injury, we must reorient our thinking about criminal justice policy toward the home, rather than away from it. This Part also addresses some of the particular issues related to motherhood and child abuse. Finally, Part V offers some brief concluding thoughts.

parent, child, abuse, criminal justice, sexual abuse, parental discipline, homicide, poverty, race, home, reform, motherhood

Abstract:
This Response addresses the criticisms of our project by Professors Rick Hills and Michael O'Hear. Before we address those challenges, we first want to reiterate our gratitude to the B.U. Law Review for hosting an exchange based on our article, Punishing Family Status (forthcoming BU LR, December 2008), and to Professors Hills and O'Hear for their careful and subtle analysis of that article.

Additionally, it's worth recapitulating what our bottom-line conclusions are so we can better see if there are any practical disagreements with our critics. Summarizing quickly: we support decriminalization in the cases of parental responsibility laws (based on strict and vicarious liability), bigamy, adultery, and non-payment of parental support; we endorse decriminalizing incest between most adults, though we are divided on certain sub-issues in the incest context; and we are highly skeptical of criminalization in the non-payment of child support context, though concede that more research needs to be done on just how effective criminalization is in achieving compliance. The only area in which we are more or less unconflicted about criminalization is the omissions liability (duty to rescue) context - and, that is where our critics primarily aim their critiques.

This Response focuses on three general points; most of the discussion of those general points, however, comes up in the context of disagreement over the scope and rationale for omissions liability. We begin by explaining how Professors Hills and O'Hear tend to overstate our commitment to voluntariness as a basis for allocating criminal law liability. Second, we address their concern regarding the criminal law's ability to shape people's care-giving choices. Third, we discuss what our commitment to criminal law minimalism requires when it comes to designing family ties burdens. While some differences persist, we hope our Response clarifies a few features of our argument and at the same time narrows the gap between our positions and those of Professors Hills and O'Hear.

A draft of Professor O'Hear's reply can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260891

A final version of Punishing Family Status can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120877

criminal law, family law, care-giving, voluntarism, vulnerability