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Abstract:
We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environment where legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the expertise of judges and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyze a model in which a judicially influenced bankruptcy process can enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioning the allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality. We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interests as a function of the legal environment and show that the optimal degree of “creditor-friendliness” in the bankruptcy code increases as judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as the quality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model shows that a bankruptcy law that attempts to preserve going-concern value, such as US Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise to be effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law that focuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. (JEL D86, G33, G34, K22)

Abstract:
We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environment where legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the ability of judges, and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyze a model in which a judicially-influenced bankruptcy process can enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioning the allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality. We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interests as a function of the legal environment, and show that the optimal degree of "creditor-friendliness" in the bankruptcy code increases as judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as the quality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model contributes to the existing bankruptcy law design literature in demonstrating that a "debtor-friendly" law that focuses on preserving going-concern value, such as U.S. Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise to be effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law that focuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. Our model is also able to explain cross-country patterns in the content and usage of bankruptcy laws around the world as reported in existing empirical research.

Bankruptcy, investor protection, law and finance

Abstract:
The usual reaction if one mentions bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution's default is incredulity. Those who favor the rescue of troubled financial institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier institution, treat bankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can come from bankruptcy. Indeed, the Chapter 11 filing by Lehman Brothers has been singled out by many as the primary cause of the severe economic and financial contraction that followed, and proof that bankruptcy is disorderly and ineffective. As a result, ad hoc rescue lending to avoid bankruptcy has been the preferred solution.

In this Article, we seek to provide the first careful assessment of the belief that governmental rescues are preferable to bankruptcy. While the interaction of financial firms, systemic risk, and Chapter 11 is complex, our analysis suggests that the widespread belief that bankruptcy should not be used to resolve the distress of financial firms is misguided, and that it has had serious costs in the recent crisis. Although bankruptcy is not always the optimal response to financial distress, it is more effective than is generally realized.

In Parts I and II of the Article, we describe the principal problems created by financial distress - debt overhang and creditor runs - and the mechanisms bankruptcy provides for addressing these problems. We then provide historical context in Part III, looking to Drexel Burnham's bankruptcy in 1990 for further lessons about the efficacy of bankruptcy. In Part IV, we turn to firm-specific bailouts, describing this strategy's benefits and the distortions it causes. We then shift our focus back to bankruptcy, considering the (legitimate) concern that it may not adequately counteract systemic risk in Part V, and exploring its treatment of derivatives, one of the chief new habitats of systemic risk, in Part VI. Part VII is a brief conclusion.

Chapter 11 reorganization, insolvency, financial crisis, intervention in financial markets, government rescue, ad hoc rescues, bailout, Federal Reserve, investment banking, Lehman Brothers, debt overhangs, creditor runs, systemic risk, derivatives

Abstract:
This paper focuses on a key property of asset-backed securities (ABS); namely, that ABS are designed to achieve bankruptcy remoteness of the securitized assets from the borrowing firm. This provides lenders with maximal protection from dilution in bankruptcy that is not available with other contracts, such as secured debt. ABS can have real effects in allowing firms to commit to more efficient investment decisions in bankruptcy. We show that securitization of replaceable assets, such as accounts receivable, prevents inefficient continuation in bankruptcy, but securitization of necessary assets can lead to inefficient liquidations. In these circumstances, secured debt and/or leases can be preferred.

We provide empirical support for the importance of bankruptcy remoteness in ABS contracts using a controversial decision in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of LTV Steel, in which a securitization contract was unexpectedly treated as a secured loan. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that ABS spreads for securitizers eligible for Chapter 11 increased significantly more than spreads for insured bank securitizers, who are not Chapter 11-eligible, in the period following the LTV filing. The results demonstrate that the creditor protection provided by bankruptcy remoteness is indeed valuable and priced in financial markets.

asset-backed securities, securitization, bankruptcy, Chapter 11, capital structure, secured debt, leases

Abstract:
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors gain leverage through objections and other court motions. We also find that bargaining between secured and unsecured creditors can distort the reorganization process. A Chapter 11 case is significantly more likely to result in a sale if secured lenders are oversecured, consistent with a secured creditor-driven fire-sale bias. A sale is much less likely when these lenders are undersecured or when the firm has no secured debt at all. Our results suggest that the advent of creditor control has not eliminated the fundamental inefficiency of the bankruptcy process: resource allocation questions (whether to sell or reorganize a firm) are ultimately confounded with distributional questions (how much each creditor will receive) due to conflict among creditor classes.

creditor, control, conflict, chapter 11, bankruptcy, equity, lenders, Ayotte, Morrison

Abstract:
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equityholders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process: Seventy percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing; very few reorganization plans (at most eight percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule in order to distribute value to equityholders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants contained in DIP loans, such as line-item budgets. Unsecured creditors gain leverage through objections and other court motions. We also find that bargaining between secured and unsecured creditors can distort the reorganization process. A Chapter 11 case is significantly more likely to result in a sale if secured lenders are oversecured, consistent with a secured creditor-driven fire-sale bias. It is much less likely when these lenders are undersecured or when the firm has no secured debt at all. Our results suggest that the advent of creditor control has not eliminated the fundamental inefficiency of the bankruptcy process: resource allocation questions (whether to sell or reorganize a firm) are ultimately confounded with distributional questions (how much each creditor will receive), due to conflict among creditor classes.

Bankruptcy, corporate reorganization, Chapter 11, creditor control, DIP lending, creditor conflict

Abstract:
We analyze a sample of large Chapter 11 cases to determine which factors motivate the choice of filing in one court over another when a choice is available. We focus in particular on the Delaware court, which became the most popular venue for large corporations in the 1990s. We find no evidence to suggest that Delaware's popularity was driven by managers or equity holders seeking a procedure friendly to their interests. Instead, debt structure differences, specifically, the fraction of assets financed with secured debt, and court characteristics, particularly a court's level of experience, are the most important factors driving the choice of venue. While Delaware does not appear significantly different with respect to deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity or likelihood of producing reorganizations, it does differ along the dimension of speed. Controlling for other factors, we find that a Delaware reorganization is between 140 and 190 days faster than an equivalent case in another court. Given that speed benefits secured creditors most, we conclude that Delaware's popularity in the 1990s was unlikely to have resulted from a pro-debtor bias combined with a manager or equity holder preference for Delaware.

bankruptcy, Chapter 11, venue choice, forum shopping, Delaware, reorganization

Abstract:
This article considers bankruptcy law design in a setting that is appropriate for entrepreneurial firms. These firms are characterized by a dependence on an owner-manager who is essential to the firm and must be given incentive through an ownership stake to maximize the value of the project. In a relationship-lending environment, the banks that fund entrepreneurs cannot capture the gains from providing the entrepreneur with this stake, and this leaves the entrepreneur emerging from bankruptcy with a larger debt burden than is socially efficient. In this setting, a fresh-start bankruptcy policy provides greater debt relief than the bank would approve voluntarily, and this generates greater social surplus. The results suggest the value of separate procedures for small business bankruptcies that allow some mandatory debt relief to preserve ex post incentives.

Abstract:
This paper considers bankruptcy law design in a setting that is appropriate for entrepreneurial firms. These firms are characterized by a dependence on an owner-manager who is essential to the firm and must be given incentive through an ownership stake to maximize the value of the project. The relationship banks that fund entrepreneurs cannot capture the gains from providing the entrepreneur with this stake and this leaves the entrepreneur emerging from bankruptcy with a larger debt burden than is socially efficient. In this setting, a fresh start bankruptcy policy provides greater debt relief than the bank would approve voluntarily, and this generates greater social surplus. The results shed light on the ongoing debate over a separate small-business bankruptcy chapter resembling the current Chapter 13.

Bankruptcy, entrepreneurship, Chapter 11, Chapter 13, absolute priority, fresh start

Abstract:
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights, that are also enforeceable against third parties outside the contract. Our analysis starts with the following question: which contractual agreements should the law allow parties to enforce as property rights? Our proposed answer to this question is shaped by the overall objective of minimizing due diligence (reading) costs and investment distortions that follow from the inability of third-party lenders to costlessly observe pre-existing rights in a borrower's property. Borrowers cannot reduce these costs without the law's help, due to an inability to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution. We find that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties when these rights are i) more costly for third-parties to discover, ii) more likely to redistribute value from third-parties, and iii) less likely to increase efficiency. We find that these qualitative principles are often reflected in observed legal rules, including the enforceability of negative covenants; fraudulent conveyance; corporate veil-piercing; and limits on assignability.

Abstract:
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Following recent contributions in the property law literature, we emphasize the distinction between contractual rights, that are only enforceable against the parties themselves, and property rights, that are also enforeceable against third parties outside the contract. Our analysis starts with the following question: which contractual agreements should the law allow parties to enforce as property rights? Our proposed answer to this question is shaped by the overall objective of minimizing due diligence (reading) costs and investment distortions that follow from the inability of third-party lenders to costlessly observe pre-existing rights in a borrower's property. Borrowers cannot reduce these costs without the law's help, due to an inability to commit to protecting third-parties from redistribution. We find that the law should take a more restrictive approach to enforcing rights against third-parties when these rights are i) more likely to redistribute value from third-parties ii) less likely to increase efficiency, and iii) more costly for third-parties to discover. We find that these qualitative principles are often reflected in observed legal rules, including the enforceability of negative covenants; fraudulent conveyance; corporate veil-piercing; and limits on assignability.

property rights, contracts, legal rules, covenants, bankruptcy

Abstract:
Many firms have filed for bankruptcy to manage liabilities stemming from mass tort claims, most notably asbestos producers. This paper develops a model of an optimal bankruptcy procedure that balances the need to provide liquidity to the present claimants already injured with the need to set aside funds for the uncertain number of future claimants who may develop injury or illness at a later date. We also consider the appropriate division of value and risk between tort claimants and pre-existing contractual creditors of the firm. Our model suggests several significant improvements to current practice. In particular, we find that future claimants should receive greater awards in expectation than present claimants, due to precautionary savings motives. Comparing claimants and creditors, we find that allocating a greater share of the firm's value to contractual creditors makes an earlier bankruptcy filing more likely, which may increase overall welfare. We also find that optimal risk-sharing implies that creditors should receive this value through an equity claim in the trust fund, with tort claimants receiving senior claims resembling debt.

Bankruptcy, mass tort, future claimants, asbestos

Abstract:
Mass tort bankruptcy trust funds generally have failed to attain fair treatment for future claimants - those individuals who have been exposed to a harmful product but have yet to manifest any injuries. This article examines the causes of unfair distributions to future claimants from mass tort trust funds in bankruptcy and other contexts. The article also offers several recommendations for achieving equitable treatment of future claimants in upcoming trust funds, such as the asbestos trust fund proposed by the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution ("FAIR") Act now debated in Congress. First, we argue that future claimants are inadequately represented in mass tort bankruptcy proceedings. We recommend that representatives for future claimants be compensated based on a percentage of the total funds placed in trust for these claimants. This approach motivates representatives to self-interestedly pursue a favorable allocation for future claimants, in contrast to the current system which compensates future claimants' representatives using other methods. We then discuss a hitherto overlooked aspect of inequitable allocations for future claimants - their overexposure to risk relative to present claimants. To guarantee that future claimants are treated fairly, we suggest that future claimants receive a greater average award than present claimants to compensate the future claimants for bearing additional risk. Finally, we examine the allocation of risk between tort claimants and other creditors. Previous mass tort bankruptcy trust funds (as well as the FAIR Act fund) allocated considerable risk to future claimants, who are poor risk bearers. To remedy this deficiency, we recommend that tort claimants be allocated as little risk as possible. In return, tort claimants should receive a lower average payment.