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Souphala Chomsisengphet's
Scholarly Papers
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Total Downloads
2,403 |
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Citations
49 |
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1.
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Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business Nicholas S. Souleles University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department
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13 Nov 05
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Last Revised:
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19 May 08
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475 ( 15,300) |
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business Nicholas S. Souleles University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department
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05 Dec 06
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19 May 08
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172
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Abstract:
A number of studies have pointed to various mistakes that consumers might make in their consumption-saving and financial decisions. We utilize a unique market experiment conducted by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and costly such mistakes are in practice. The bank offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts, one with an annual fee but a lower interest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. To minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting to borrow a sufficiently large amount should choose the contract with the fee, and vice-versa. We find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post minimized their net costs. A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal contract, with some incurring hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest costs. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error, and consumers with larger errors were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal contract. Thus most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the exception that a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-optimal contracts without switching.
consumption, borrowing, debt, balance sheets, consumer credit, credit cards, banking
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business Nicholas S. Souleles University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department
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13 Nov 05
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19 May 08
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303
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Abstract:
A number of studies have pointed to various mistakes that consumers might make in their consumption-saving and financial decisions. We utilize a unique market experiment conducted by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and costly such mistakes are in practice. The bank offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts, one with an annual fee but a lower interest rate and one with no annual fee but a higher interest rate. To minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting to borrow a sufficiently large amount should choose the contract with the fee, and vice-versa.
We find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post minimized their net costs. A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal contract, with some incurring hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest costs. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error, and consumers with larger errors were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal contract. Thus most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the exception that a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-optimal contracts without switching.
consumption, borrowing, debt, balance sheets, consumer credit, credit cards, banking
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An Empirical Analysis of Home Equity Loan and Line Performance
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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17 Sep 04
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19 Apr 05
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277 ( 30,029) |
3
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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14 Apr 05
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19 Apr 05
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Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.
Home Equity Loans and Lines, Prepayment, Capital Regulations
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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17 Sep 04
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14 Apr 05
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277
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Abstract:
Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. This paper addresses this need through analysis of a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages. Our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. On the other hand, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value. Our analysis offers insights into bank minimum capital requirements associated with home equity credit lending.
Home Equity Loans and Lines, Prepayment, Capital Regulations
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3.
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Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Anthony N. Pennington-Cross Marquette University - Dept. of Finance
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20 Apr 06
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20 Apr 06
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275 (30,303)
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Abstract:
This paper examines the choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment of the mortgage market while refinancing and assesses the prepayment and default performance of these cash-out refinance loans relative to the rate refinance loans. Consistent with survey evidence the propensity to extract equity while refinancing is sensitive to interest rates on other forms of consumer debt. After the loan is originated, our results indicate that cash-out refinances perform differently from non cash-out refinances. For example, cash-outs are less likely to default or prepay, and the termination of cash-outs is more sensitive to changing interest rates and house prices.
Mortgage, Refinance, Cash-out, Consumption
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4.
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Earnings Management Behaviors under Different Economic Environments: Evidence from Japanese Banks
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business S. Ghon Rhee University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business
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Posted:
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26 Jan 05
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07 Apr 06
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262 ( 31,994) |
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business S. Ghon Rhee University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business
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27 Dec 05
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07 Apr 06
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This paper investigates Japanese banks' earnings management behavior under three distinct economic environments: (1) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985-1990); (2) stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991-1996); and (3) severe recession with credit crunch economy (1997-1999). Using bank balance sheet information of 78 Japanese banks, we find that earnings management behavior by Japanese banks differ considerably across the three periods. Our results indicate that banks used security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods. We also find that banks used loan loss provisions to manage earnings; however, this behavior is only prevalent during the first two periods. Due to the fact that banks faced record-high non-performing loans during the latter severe recession period, banks on average may have been restrained from using loan loss provisions to smooth income and/or to replenish regulatory capital. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the Japanese banks significantly lowered their lending with increased provisions.
Loan-Loss Provision, Security Gains, Earnings Management
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business S. Ghon Rhee University of Hawaii at Manoa - Shidler College of Business
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26 Jan 05
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04 Oct 05
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262
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Abstract:
This paper investigates Japanese banks' earnings management behavior under three distinct economic environments: (1) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985-1990); (2) stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991-1996); and (3) severe recession with credit crunch economy (1997-1999). Using bank balance sheet information of 78 Japanese banks, we do not find that earnings management behavior by Japanese banks significantly differs across the three periods. Our results indicate that banks used security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods. We also find that banks used loan loss provisions to manage earnings; however, this behavior is only prevalent during two periods. Due to the fact that banks faced record-high non-performing loans during the latter severe recession period, banks on average may have been restrained from using loan loss provisions to smooth income and/or to replenish regulatory capital; instead, we detect that the Japanese banks lowered their lending.
Loan-loss provision, security gains, earnings management; and regulatory capital
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5.
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Do Financial Counseling Mandates Improve Mortgage Choice and Performance? Evidence from a Legislative Experiment
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Gene Amromin Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Itzhak Ben-David Ohio State University - Finance Department, Fisher College of Business Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Douglas D. Evanoff Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Posted:
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20 Oct 08
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30 Oct 09
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201 ( 42,387) |
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Gene Amromin Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Itzhak Ben-David Ohio State University - Finance Department, Fisher College of Business Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Douglas D. Evanoff Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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30 Oct 09
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30 Oct 09
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Abstract:
We explore the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on the terms, availability, and performance of mortgage credit. Our study is based on a legislative experiment in which the State of Illinois required “high-risk” mortgage applicants acquiring or refinancing properties in 10 specific zip codes to submit loan offers from state-licensed lenders to review by HUD-certified financial counselors. We document that the legislation led to declines in both the supply of and demand for credit in the treated areas. Controlling for the salient characteristics of the remaining borrowers and lenders, we find that the ex post default rates among counseled low-FICO-score borrowers were about 4.5 percentage points lower than those among similar borrowers in the control group. We attribute this result to actions of lenders responding to the presence of external review and, to a lesser extent, to counseled borrowers renegotiating their loan terms. We also find that the legislation pushed some borrowers to choose less risky loan products in order to avoid counseling.
Financial literacy, Counseling, Subprime crisis, Household finance
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Gene Amromin Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Itzhak Ben-David Ohio State University - Finance Department, Fisher College of Business Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Douglas D. Evanoff Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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20 Oct 08
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08 Jul 09
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201
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Abstract:
We explore the effects of mandatory third-party review of mortgage contracts on the terms, availability, and performance of mortgage credit. Our study is based on a legislative experiment in which the State of Illinois required ‘high-risk’ mortgage applicants acquiring or refinancing properties in 10 specific zip codes to submit loan offers from state-licensed lenders to review by HUD-certified financial counselors. We document that the legislation led to declines in both the supply of and demand for credit, with state licensed lenders and lower-quality borrowers disproportionately exiting the affected area. Controlling for the salient characteristics of the remaining borrowers and lenders, we find that the legislation succeeded in reducing ex post default rates among counseled borrowers by 3 to 4 percentage points (about 30% decline). We attribute this result to actions of lenders responding to the presence of external review and, to a lesser extent, to counseled borrowers renegotiating their loan terms. We also find that the legislation nudged some borrowers to choose less risky loan products in order to avoid counseling.
Financial education,Financial literacy,Subprime crisis,Household finance,agency,natural experiment,lending,liquidity,market,mortgages,interest only,fixed rate,adjustable rate,fraud,default,strategic default,legislation,regulation,crisis,bailout,lender,lending,monitoring,screening,delinquincy,agent
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Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Timothy Murphy affiliation not provided to SSRN Anthony N. Pennington-Cross Marquette University - Dept. of Finance
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28 Oct 08
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28 Oct 08
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156 (54,409)
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Abstract:
The introduction of subprime mortgage lending helped fill an unmet demand for mortgage credit by those who did not qualify for prime credit. The rapid growth of the subprime market provides indirect evidence that there were in the past (before subprime) and probably are again (after the subprime meltdown) many households who cannot purchase a home due to the lack of available mortgage products. Mortgage product innovation has made mortgage terms of art such as io (interest only) or neg-am (negative amortization) part of everyday parlance in the real estate business, but the last few years have also shown that very few institutional investors, underwriters, originators, or servicers fully understood the risks associated with these types of products. If these sophisticated market participants struggled with recent innovations it should come as no surprise that borrowers also struggled to understand them and utilize them effectively. Indeed, the great promise of subprime lending -- making homeownership feasible and an affordable reality for most Americans -- has instead turned into a financial debacle and a massive drag on the American economy.
Since the use of exotic or alternative mortgage products played a role in the subprime meltdown, it is important to understand when these products make sense and how far the market deviated from rationality. The research presented here begins this analysis using a county level empirical examination of the mechanisms used to select different types of subprime mortgages from 2000 through July 2007. In particular we examine the use of adjustable rate loans, hybrid rate loans, interest only loans, non-amortizing loans, and loans with balloon payments. The empirical results indicate that the economic and financial incentives play a large part in determining what types of loans people used to finance their home. We also examine how the use of these types of mortgages changed over time and how much of those changes were driven by economic and financial fundamentals. We find substantial evidence of the misallocation of mortgage types over the 2004-2007 time period. This may help us to project what a sensible subprime mortgage market should look like in the future and how far the mortgage market deviated from that path.
mortgage, subprime, alternative
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division John C. Driscoll Federal Reserve Board - Division of Monetary Affairs
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22 Sep 04
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22 Sep 04
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142 (59,398)
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Abstract:
Bank lending is an important source of funding for firms. Most loans are in the form of credit lines. Empirical studies of line demand have been complicated by their use of data on publicly traded firms, which have a wide menu of financing options. We avoid this problem by using a unique proprietary data set from a large financial institution of loan commitments made to 712 privately-held firms. We test Martin and Santomero's (1997) model, in which lines give firms the speed and flexibility to pursue investment opportunities. Our findings are consistent with their predictions. Firms facing higher rates and fees have smaller credit lines. Firms with higher growth commit to larger lines of credit and have a higher rate of line utilization. Firms experiencing more uncertainty in their funding needs commit to smaller credit lines. Almost all firms convert unused credit line portions into spot loans and take out new lines.
Bank loan commitment; credit lines, private firms
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Ronel Elul Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division
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03 Oct 04
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26 May 06
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139 (60,546)
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We develop and test a model of mortgage underwriting, with particular reference to the role of credit bureau scores. In our model scores are used in a standardized fashion, which reflects the prevalence of automated underwriting in industry practice. We show that our model has implications for the debate on the effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on secured lending. Recent literature (Berkowitz and Hynes (1999), Lin and White (2001)) has developed conflicting theories - and found conflicting results - seeking to explain how exemptions affect the mortgage market. By contrast, our model implies that when lenders use credit scores in a standardized manner, exemptions should be irrelevant to the mortgage underwriting decision. Merging data from a major credit bureau with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset, we confirm this prediction of our model. We also show that while ignoring borrower credit quality may make exemptions appear to be significant, once one controls for credit scores then exemptions have no effect on the likelihood that a mortgage application is approved. We confirm this empirically and argue that this may help explain some of the results of the previous literature.
Personal Bankruptcy, Mortgage Underwriting, Credit Scores
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division
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19 Sep 08
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19 Sep 08
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110 (73,450)
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Abstract:
The authors examine whether a borrower's choice of automobile reveals information about future loan performance. They find that loans on most luxury automobiles have a higher probability of prepayment, while loans on most economy automobiles have a lower probability of default, even when holding traditional risk factors, such as income and credit score, constant.
consumer debt, auto loans, household finance, prepayment, default, Financial Institutions and Services, Duration Analysis, Personal Finance, Asymmetric and Private Information
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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02 Oct 07
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02 Oct 07
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106 (75,580)
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Abstract:
We analyze more than 108,000 home equity loans and lines of credits to study the role of information asymmetry in a credit market where borrowers face a menu of contract options and a lender uses a counteroffer to further mitigate contract frictions. Our results reveal that a less credit-worthy applicant is more likely to select a credit contract that requires less collateral. Further analysis on borrower repayment behavior ex post indicates that the lender may face adverse selection due to private information, controlling for observable risk attributes. We also find that systematic screening ex ante by a lender to mitigate contract frictions can effectively reduce overall credit losses ex post.
Asymmetric Information, Contract Frictions, Screening, Banking, Home Equity Lending
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Lawrence Mielnicki De Lage Landen Financial Services
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08 Jul 05
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17 Jan 08
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88 (86,357)
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Abstract:
In this paper, we examine how reinstated (i.e., re-aged) credit card accounts are likely to default again. Our sample data reveal that about 22% of the re-aged accounts default again, mostly in the first 24 months after reinstatement. We also find that a FICO score (public information) is a better predictor of a second default, while a payment behavioral score (private information) is a better predictor of a first default. Furthermore, the average FICO score of the 78% of the re-aged borrowers who did not default again rises about 20 points, an improvement in their relative risk profile overall. These findings suggest that the re-aging program provides a second chance for liquidity-constrained borrowers who would have otherwise defaulted on their debt.
Credit card default, forbearance, loss mitigation, hazard models
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Raphael W. Bostic University of Southern California - School of Policy Planning and Development (SPPD) Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Kathleen C. Engel Suffolk University Law School (eff. 7/1/09) Patricia A. McCoy University of Connecticut - School of Law Anthony N. Pennington-Cross Marquette University - Dept. of Finance Susan M. Wachter University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School - Real Estate Department
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26 Aug 09
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02 Oct 09
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69 (100,756)
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Abstract:
Mounting foreclosures and recent disclosures of abusive lending practices have led many states to adopt new anti-predatory lending laws. Researchers have examined the impact of such laws on credit flows and the cost of credit. This research extends the literature by examining if the market responded to these laws by substituting different mortgage products for those restricted by anti-predatory lending provisions. The evidence indicates that the new laws were effective in restricting loans with targeted characteristics and that the market substituted other product types to maintain affordability in the face of these restrictions.
Real estate, mortgages, housing, abusive lending, predatory lending, mortgage products, product substitution, adjustment to prohibition
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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23 May 09
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23 May 09
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44 (125,409)
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Abstract:
An individual's decision to maximize his investment in social capital is determined by his socioeconomic characteristics, such as homeownership and mobility (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002). In this paper, we empirically assess the role of individual social capital formation characteristics on personal bankruptcy and default outcomes in the consumer credit market. After controlling for a borrower's risk score, debt, income, wealth, and legal and economic environments, we find that default/bankruptcy risk rises and then falls over the lifecycle, while a borrower who owns a home or is married has a lower risk of default/bankruptcy. Moreover, a borrower who migrates 190 miles from his "state of birth" is 17 percent more likely to default and 15 percent more likely to file for bankruptcy, while a borrower who continues to live in his state of birth is 14 and 10 percent less likely to default and file for bankruptcy, respectively. A borrower who moves to a rural area is 9 and 7 percent less likely to default and declare bankruptcy, respectively. We also find that measures of social networks, norms, and cooperation and trust (i.e., aggregate social capital) are inversely related to consumer bankruptcy.
Social Capital, Consumer Bankruptcy, Default, Credit Risk, Credit Cards, Banking
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business Nicholas S. Souleles University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department
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31 Jul 09
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27 Sep 09
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42 (127,789)
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Abstract:
This paper empirically examines the benefits of relationship banking to banks, in the context of consumer credit markets. Using a unique panel dataset that contains comprehensive information about the relationships between a large bank and its credit card customers, we estimate the effects of relationship banking on the customers’ default, attrition, and utilization behavior. We find that relationship accounts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition, and have higher utilization rates, compared to non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. Such effects become more pronounced with increases in various measures of the strength of the relationships, such as relationship breadth, depth, length, and proximity. Moreover, dynamic information about changes in the behavior of a customer’s other accounts at the bank, such as changes in checking and savings balances, helps predict and thus monitor the behavior of the credit card account over time. These results imply significant potential benefits of relationship banking to banks in the retail credit market.
Relationship Banking, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, Deposits, Investments, Household Finance
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Anthony N. Pennington-Cross Marquette University - Dept. of Finance Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division
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24 May 07
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24 May 07
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17 (175,656)
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Abstract:
This article examines the choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment of the mortgage market and assesses the prepayment and default performance of these cash-out refinance loans relative to the rate of refinance loans. Consistent with survey evidence, the propensity to extract equity is sensitive to the relative interest rates of other forms of consumer debt. After the loan is originated, our results indicate that cash-out refinances perform differently from noncash-out refinances. For example, cash-outs are less likely to default or prepay, and the termination of cash-outs is more sensitive to changing interest rates and house prices.
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Olivier Hassler World Bank - Financial Sector Department
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21 Jul 05
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22 Dec 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Following the 2001 financial crisis, the government of Argentina instituted economic policies to soften the adverse impact of the crisis on the economy. In this paper, we use loan-level data to empirically assess the impact of the currency devaluation and the economic response policies on subsequent indexation of the mortgage rates on prepayment and default patterns of residential mortgages in Argentina. On the one hand, our results reveal a significant higher prepayment rate of borrowers who are relatively wealthy or have a US$-denominated mortgage. On the other hand, we observe a significantly higher default rate of borrowers who are less wealthy or have Peso-denominated mortgage.
Argentine mortgage market, prepayment and default, financial crisis
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17.
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business
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11 Jul 05
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11 Jul 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
In this paper, we empirically assess the importance of various credit risk characteristics in determining default behavior of more than 31,000 small business loans and lines both under $100K and between $100K-$250K. Overall, our results indicate that the main drivers of small business default include: checking account balances, collateral indicators, credit risk scores, and firm age. However, once we differentiate between spot loans and lines of credit and between loan sizes, small business default behavior differs significantly.
Spot loans, line of credit, scored lending, loan size, small business defaults
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18.
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Brent W. Ambrose Pennsylvania State University Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division
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08 Jul 05
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Last Revised:
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08 Jul 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
Information revelation can occur in a variety of ways. For example, in the home mortgage market, borrowers reveal their expected house tenure through their choice of mortgage contracts. As a result, lenders offer a menu of mortgage interest rate and point combinations in an effort to learn private information about borrowers' potential mobility. This paper uses a unique dataset of individual automobile loan performance to assess whether borrower consumption choice reveals information about future loan performance. Results indicate that the automotive make and model a consumer selects provides information about the loan's performance - that is, we observe differential loan performance after we control for borrower characteristics. The results from this study suggest that lenders, instead of charging a house-rate for all auto loans, could profitably pursue risk-based pricing based on the type of car the borrower purchases.
Consumer debt, consumption decisions, prepayment, default
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19.
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Sumit Agarwal Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research Souphala Chomsisengphet Office of the Comptroller of the Currency - Credit Risk Analysis Division Chunlin Liu University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business Lawrence Mielnicki De Lage Landen Financial Services
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07 Dec 04
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Last Revised:
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02 Jul 05
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
To provide some insights to the current debate on consumer bankruptcy laws, this article empirically assesses the importance of state bankruptcy exemption levels on the likelihood of small business owners filing for bankruptcy. We accomplish this with the help of a unique panel data set of over 43,000 small business credit card holders over a two-year period from May 2000 - May 2002. We estimate a proportional hazard model of small business bankruptcy and show that for every $10,000 increase in a state's homestead exemptions, the risk of small business bankruptcy increases by 8 percent. Moreover, our results also indicate that small business owners will increase the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy by 4 percent with a $1000 change in personal property exemption levels.
Banks, Credit Cards, Small Business Bankruptcy, State Exemption Laws
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