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Lauren Cohen's
Scholarly Papers
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Aggregate Statistics |
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Total Downloads
937 |
Total
Citations
78 |
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1.
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Karl B. Diether Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School
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08 Jul 05
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13 Jan 09
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489 (14,722)
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33
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Abstract:
Using proprietary data on stock loan fees and quantities from a large institutional investor, we examine the link between the shorting market and stock prices. Employing a unique identification strategy, we isolate shifts in the supply and demand for shorting. We find that shorting demand is an important predictor of future stock returns: an increase in shorting demand leads to negative abnormal returns of 2.54% in the following month. Second, we show that our results are stronger in environments with less public information flow, suggesting that the shorting market is an important mechanism for private information revelation into prices.
Short selling, stock lending, short sale constraints
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2.
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Andrea Frazzini University of Chicago - Graduate School of Business Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School
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20 Feb 08
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13 Jan 09
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286 (28,920)
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5
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Abstract:
We study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell-side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant.
Social networks, connections, analysts, directors
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3.
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Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School Joshua D. Coval Harvard Business School Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School
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30 Jun 09
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30 Jun 09
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64 (105,095)
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Abstract:
This paper employs a new empirical approach for identifying the impact of government spending on the private sector. Our key innovation is to use changes in congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures. In doing so, we show that fiscal spending shocks appear to significantly dampen corporate sector investment and employment activity. These corporate behaviors follow both Senate and House committee chair changes, are partially reversed when the congressman resigns, and are most pronounced among geographically-concentrated firms. The effects are economically meaningful and the mechanism - entirely distinct from the more traditional interest rate and tax channels - suggests new considerations in assessing the impact of government spending on private sector economic activity.
government spending, seniority, corporate behavior, investment, earmarks
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4.
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Andrea Frazzini University of Chicago - Graduate School of Business Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School
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27 Jun 07
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15 Aug 07
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54 (114,567)
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27
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Abstract:
This paper uses social networks to identify information transfer in security markets. We focus on connections between mutual fund managers and corporate board members via shared education networks. We find that portfolio managers place larger bets on firms they are connected to through their network, and perform significantly better on these holdings relative to their non-connected holdings. A replicating portfolio of connected stocks outperforms a replicating portfolio of non-connected stocks by up to 8.4% per year. Returns are concentrated around corporate news announcements, consistent with mutual fund managers gaining an informational advantage through the education networks. Our results suggest that social networks may be an important mechanism for information flow into asset prices.
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5.
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Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School Andrea Frazzini University of Chicago - Graduate School of Business Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School
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18 Aug 08
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23 Jul 09
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37 (133,855)
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4
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Abstract:
Using a unique, hand-collected database of independent directors, we provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, micro-level data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the board of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong-buy/buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We find that appointed analysts’ optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms’ benefits are larger, and that appointing firms increase earnings management, and perform poorly, following these board appointments.
Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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6.
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Andrea Frazzini University of Chicago - Graduate School of Business Christopher J. Malloy Harvard Business School Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School
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12 May 08
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Last Revised:
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12 May 08
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7 (203,218)
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5
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Abstract:
We study the impact of social networks on agents' ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational backgrounds of sell side equity analysts and senior officers of firms, we test the hypothesis that analysts' school ties to senior officers impart comparative information advantages in the production of analyst research. We find evidence that analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. A simple portfolio strategy of going long the buy recommendations with school ties and going short buy recommendations without ties earns returns of 5.40% per year. We test whether Regulation FD, targeted at impeding selective disclosure, constrained the use of direct access to senior management. We find a large effect: pre-Reg FD the return premium from school ties was 8.16% per year, while post-Reg FD the return premium is nearly zero and insignificant. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the UK), the analyst school-tie premium has remained large and significant over the entire sample period.
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7.
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Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School
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17 Mar 09
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Last Revised:
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26 Sep 09
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0 (0)
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3
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Abstract:
I evaluate the effect of loyalty on individuals' portfolio choice using a unique dataset of retirement contributions. I exploit the statutory difference that, in 401(k) plans, stand-alone employees can invest directly in their division, while conglomerate employees must invest in the entire firm, including all unrelated divisions. Consistent with loyalty, employees of stand-alone firms invest 10 percentage points (75%) more in company stock than conglomerate employees. Support is also found using variation in loyalty between different groups of employees, across and within firms. The cost to employees of loyalty is large, amounting to nearly a 20% loss in retirement income.
D31, J26, J32
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8.
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Lauren Cohen Harvard Business School Breno Schmidt Emory University - Goizueta Business School
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14 Nov 08
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13 Jan 09
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0 (0)
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Abstract:
We explore a new channel for attracting inflows using a unique dataset of corporate 401(k) retirement plans and their mutual fund family trustees. Families secure substantial inflows by being named trustee. We find that family trustees significantly overweight, and are reluctant to sell, their 401(k) client firm's stock. Trustee overweighting is more pronounced when the relationship is more valuable to the trustee family, and it is concentrated in those funds receiving the greatest benefit from the inflows. We quantify this flow benefit and find that inclusion in the 401(k) plan has an economically and statistically large, positive effect on inflows.
Portfolio Choice, Mutual Funds, Overweight, Fund Flows
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