• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
About half of all American children can expect to live with both of their biological parents at age fifteen, compared to two-thirds of children born in Sweden, Germany, and France, and nine-tenths of those born in Italy. This form of American exceptionalism reflects both higher rates of divorce and higher rates of breakup among cohabiting couples in the US. The increase in divorce, which began in the early 1960s but leveled off in the early 1980s, affected women at all educational levels. The increase in nonmarital childbearing, which was concentrated between the early 1960s and early 1990s, mainly affected non-white women and white women without college degrees. These changes appear to be a product of changes in sexual mores, which reduced the role of sexual attraction and increased the importance of economic calculations in decisions about whether to marry. The increased importance of economic factors coincided with a decline in non-college men's ability to support a family and perhaps also with an increase in conflict over men and women's roles.

Economics, Econometric Theory, Political Science, Welfare, Social Policy

Abstract:
Pooling data for 1905 to 2000, we find no systematic relationship between top income shares and economic growth in a panel of 12 developed nations observed for between 22 and 85 years. After 1960, however, a one percentage point rise in the top decile’s income share is associated with a statistically significant 0.12 point rise in GDP growth during the following year. This relationship is not driven by changes in either educational attainment or top tax rates. If the increase in inequality is permanent, the increase in growth appears to be permanent, but it takes 13 years for the cumulative positive effect of faster growth on the mean income of the bottom nine deciles to offset the negative effect of reducing their share of total income.

inequality, growth, income distribution, national income

Abstract:
We analyze changes in the determinants of family income between 1961 and 1999, focusing on the effect of parental education, occupational rank, income, marital status, family size, region of residence, race, and ethnicity. Our data, which cover respondents between the ages of thirty and fifty-nine, come from two Occupational Changes in a Generation surveys, the General Social Survey, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

The multiple correlations between respondents' family income and their parents' characteristics fell between 1961 to 1999. During the 1960s the overall dispersion of respondents' family incomes also fell, so the income gap between respondents from advantaged and disadvantaged families narrowed dramatically. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the overall dispersion of respondents' family income rose again. But because the correlation between respondents' family income and their parents' characteristics was still falling, the income gap between respondents from advantaged and disadvantaged families showed no consistent trend.

All else equal, the economic cost of being Black, Hispanic, or born in the South fell between 1961 and 1999. The cost of having a parent who worked in an unskilled rather than a skilled occupation fell between 1961 and 1972 but not after that. Indeed, occupational inequality among parents has probably become more important since 1972. Neither the effect of parental education nor the effect of parental income changed significantly during the years for which we have data.

Daughters were considerably less mobile than sons in the 1970s, but this difference diminished in the 1980s and 1990s. Respondents with parents in the bottom quarter of the socioeconomic distribution were more likely to remain in their quartile of origin than respondents with parents in the top quarter of the distribution.

We conclude by arguing that while both justice and economic efficiency require a significant amount of exchange mobility, neither justice nor efficiency implies that the correlation between family income and parental advantages ought to be zero. The case for programs that seek to reduce intergenerational inheritance depends on whether they reduce poverty and inequality.

Welfare, Healthcare, Social Policy

Abstract:
Adult economic status is positively correlated with parental economic status in every society for which we have data, but no democratic society is entirely comfortable with this fact. As a result, all democratic societies have adopted policies aimed at reducing the effect of family background on life chances, and most left-of-center political parties think that governments should do even more. This paper makes two main arguments. First, equal opportunity does not imply eliminating all sources of economic resemblance between parents and children. Specifically, equal opportunity does not require that society eliminate the effects of all inherited differences in ability. Nor does it require that society prevent parents from transmitting different values to their children regarding the importance of economic success relative to other goals. Second, the size of the correlation between the economic status of parents and their children is not a good indicator of how close a society has come to equalizing opportunity. Measuring equality of opportunity requires data on why successful parents tend to have successful children. In particular, it requires data on the degree to which a society has minimized obstacles to economic success that we know how to alter, such as parental neglect and ineptitude, inequitable distribution of effective teachers, and labor market practices that favor the well-born.

Education Policy, Ethics/Political Philosophy, Welfare / Health Care/ Social Policy

Abstract:
One can use the Census Bureau's income statistics to show either that low-income children were considerably worse off or considerably better off in 1999 than in 1969. Likewise, one can use Census statistics to show that middle-income children gained very little or a great deal between 1969 and 1999. Resolving these disagreements requires agreeing on the best price index, the best adjustment for changes in household size, and the best treatment of noncash benefits. In addition, one must reconcile discrepancies between trends in income and consumption. Since there is no consensus on any of these matters, we investigate trends in children's well-being using more direct measures of material well-being, such as housing conditions, neighborhood safety, motor vehicle ownership, telephone service, regular medical checkups, and food consumption. Almost all these measures suggest that low-income children's material well-being rose between the early 1970s and the late 1990s. This finding implies that traditional price indices such as the CPI-U overstated inflation.

Abstract:
We investigate whether changes in economic inequality affect mortality in rich countries. To answer this question we use a new source of data on income inequality: tax data on the share of pretax income going to the richest 10 percent of the population in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US between 1903 and 2003. Although this measure is not a good proxy for inequality within the bottom half of the income distribution, it is a good proxy for changes in the top half of the distribution and for the Gini coefficient. In the absence of country and year fixed effects, the income share of the top decile is negatively related to life expectancy and positively related to infant mortality. However, in our preferred fixed-effects specification these relationships are weak, statistically insignificant, and likely to change their sign. Nor do our data suggest that changes in the income share of the richest 10 percent affect homicide or suicide rates.

health, inequality, mortality, top incomes, homicide, suicide, Welfare / Health Care/ Social Policy

Abstract:
Although many opponents of welfare reform predicted that it would increase hardship, the official poverty rate for female headed families with children fell from 42 percent in 1996 to 34 percent in 2002. Skeptics have nonetheless argued that declines in official poverty rates may have been accompanied by increases in material hardship, since single mothers who entered the labor market often incurred new expenses and lost valuable noncash benefits. We investigate this possibility using the Current Population Survey's Food Security Supplement. Food-related problems declined among mother-only families between 1995 and 2000 and rose between 2000 and 2002, but the decline was far larger than the subsequent increase. These changes parallel changes in the official poverty rate during the same years. In contrast to previous economic expansions, the proportional decline in poverty during the late-1990s was at least as large among mother-only families as among two-parent families. We argue that this change was linked to welfare reform and other social policy changes that encouraged single mothers to enter the labor force. As a result, single mothers' material standard of living probably improved more during this economic expansion than during earlier ones.

Welfare / Health Care/ Social Policy