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Abstract:
Using a dictator game, we examine the other-regarding behavior of allocators who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two-person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. We also explore other-regarding perceptions of passive recipients, who are asked to give behavioral forecasts of how they would behave if assigned the allocator role and how they think their allocators would behave. Gender differences are found in both behavior and perceptions. Males are significantly more self-interested and less other-regarding when they are responsible for a group, while females behave similarly under both conditions. Female recipients' forecasts of their own behavior are significantly higher than both their expectations of allocators and the actual female behavior observed in the experiment. Both male and female recipients underestimate the other-regarding behavior of allocators.

Other-regarding behavior, gender, behavioral forecast, perception bias

Abstract:
To investigate the effects of gender and national culture on economic behavior, we compare all-male and all-female groups from Japan and Canada in the context of a threshold public goods game with a strong free-riding equilibrium and many socially efficient threshold equilibria. Females and Canadians exhibit higher levels of conformity when compared with males and Japanese respectively. However, such symmetric group behavior translates into significantly tighter equilibrium convergence only for Canadian females. Canadians, particularly Canadian females, are more successful at providing the public good than Japanese. The results suggest that the prevalence of different notions of self-construal, may affect behavior.

Abstract:
Employing a two-by-two factorial design that manipulates whether dictator groups are single or mixed-sex and whether procedures are single or double-blind, we examine gender effects in a standard dictator game. No gender effect was found in any of the experimental treatments. Moreover, neither single - versus mixed - sex groups nor level of anonymity had any impact on either male or female behavior.

dictator game, gender, anonymity

Abstract:
Using real-effort laboratory experiments with salient incentives, we examine the impact of performance-based versus lump-sum compensation schemes on self-selection and productivity. A laboratory firm offering pay-for-performance compensation achieved significantly higher productivity than an identical firm offering lump-sum compensation for two reasons: first, more highly skilled workers selected it, and second, workers on average, regardless of their self-selections, were more productive under the pay-for-performance scheme. Although skill level significantly affected self-selection, individual attitudes toward risk, elicited using a lottery-selection task, also mattered with less risk-averse individuals more likely to choose the productivity-based scheme.

Abstract:
Understanding norms of fairness is essential for explaining many phenomena in organizations. Using a dictator game, we examine the behavior of individuals who are given the responsibility of individually making an allocation decision on behalf of a two-person group in a dictator game without consultation. We find that men are significantly more self-interested and less fair when they are responsible for a group, while women behave similarly under both conditions. Both males and females underestimate the fairness of others whose decisions can affect their earnings, but only among females are self-predictions significantly greater than expectations of others. In sum, other-regarding considerations may affect decisions in radically different ways depending not only on whether the decision is made on behalf of an individual or group, but also on the way the group decision is operationalized, whether the decision is hypothetical or real, and on the gender of the decision makers.

Fairness, Discontinuity, Gender

Abstract:
Understanding social motives and norms of trust and reciprocity is essential for explaining many phenomena in organizations. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts, within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, my research concerns whether norms of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions, when inter-team decisions are operationalized by individuals making decisions for their teams as team representatives. Methodologically, by employing the widely-used experimental framework of the trust game with salient monetary payoffs, I examine the within-person variation of behavior and perceptions of trust and reciprocity in these two types of interactions that are pervasive in organizational life. Findings of the experimental study suggest that norms of trust and reciprocity can be affected by many subtle contextual details.

Trust, Reciprocity, Individual-Group Discontinuity, "Holier-than-thou" Bias

Abstract:
This paper presents evidence that trust and reciprocity behavior and perceptions is sensitive to whether people are making decisions solely on their own behalf or when they are given the responsibility to act on behalf of their groups. Employing the widely-used experimental framework of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) with salient monetary payoffs, I examine and contrast the level of trust and reciprocity exhibited by individuals in inter-individual interactions with those exhibited by the same individual when he/she is responsible for a group decision. The results suggest that people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision. I also explore perceptions about trust and reciprocity behavior of one's own and that of others in the study and find that there are disconnections between perspectives of parties involved about the interaction and the actual observed behavior. The evidence reported here, consistent with the idea that people are poor at making hypothetical predictions, highlights the disconnections between behavioral forecasts and behavior. Lastly, this paper also makes an important advance in our understanding of the norm of reciprocity. Theoretical and practical implications are offered.

Trust, reciprocity, group representative, individual-group discontinuity, perspective-taking