• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
This paper develops a model in which the rivalry of oligopolistic firms serves as an independent cause of international trade. The model shows how such rivalry naturally gives rise to "dumping" of output in foreign markets, and shows that such dumping can be "reciprocal" -- that is, there may be two-way trade in the same product. Reciprocal dumpingis shown to be possible for fairly general specification of firm behaviour.The welfare effects of this seemingly pointless trade are ambiguous. On one hand, resources are wasted in the cross-handling of goods; on the other hand, increased competition reduces monopoly distortions. Surprisingly,in the case of free entry and Cournot behaviour reciprocal dumping is unanibiuously beneficial.

Abstract:
This paper reviews the literature on strategic trade policy. Strategic trade policy is defined as trade policy that conditions or alters a strategic relationship between firms, implying that strategic trade policy focuses primarily on trade policy in the presence of oligopoly. The key point is that strategic relationships between firms introduce additional motives for trade policy, over and above terms of trade and other effects that arise in all market structures. I demonstrate this general point using a simple game theoretic framework, then present the major results of strategic trade policy using two models: the 'third market' model, in which oligopolistic firms in two exporting nations export the good in question exclusively to a third country; and the 'reciprocal markets' model, in which firms in two countries compete in each others' markets. The paper makes the well-known point that slight differences in model structure can give rise to strikingly different trade policy implications, but also seeks to emphasize the robust general points that emerge from the literature.

Abstract:
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.

Abstract:
This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R&D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Each producing country has an incentive to try to capture a greater share of rent-earning industries using subsidies, but the subsidy-ridden international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. The equilibrium in the strategic game involving firms and governments is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium industry outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms.

Abstract:
We consider trade between a consumer' country with an open access renewable resource and a conservationist' country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse' case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers steady-state losses from trade, as suggested by the conventional wisdom' that weak resource management standards confer a competitive advantage on domestic firms in the resource sector but cause welfare losses. Strikingly, however, when the resource stock is most in jeopardy, the conservationist country exports the resource good in steady state and both countries experience gains from trade.

Abstract:
This paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model of an economy with an open access renewable resource. We characterize the autarkic steady state, showing that autarky prices (and 'comparative advantage') are determined by the ratio of intrinsic resource growth to labor. Under free trade, steady state trade and production patterns for a small open economy are determined by whether the resource good's world price exceeds its autarky price. Strikingly, if the small country exports the resource good while remaining diversified, then steady-state utility is lower than in autarky, and increases in the world price of exports are welfare-reducing.

Abstract:
National governments have incentives to intervene in international markets, particularly in encouraging export cartels and in imposing tariffs on imports from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Although the optimal response to foreign monopoly is usually a tariff, a specific subsidy will be optimal if demand is very convex, as with constant elasticity demand. If ad valorem tariffs or subsidies are considered, a subsidy is optimal if the elasticity of demand increases as consumption increases.The critical conditions in both ad valorern and specific cases hold generally for Cournot ologopoly. Noncooperative international policy equilibrium will be characterized by export cartels and rent-extracting tariffs.

Abstract:
This paper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market.

Abstract:
No abstract is available for this paper.

Abstract:
We analyze the welfare effects of conditional trade adjustment assistance (i.e. assistance that is received only if displaced workers remain unemployed), and compare the conditional program with unconditional assistance. Taking the level of assistance as exogenous, we show that either the conditional or unconditional program may impose greater efficiency costs, depending on underlying parameters. We then introduce an explicit social welfare function and solve for the optimal level of assistance for each program. Finally, we compare the optimized values of the two programs. If the distribution of wage offers is uniform, the unconditional program is welfare superior.

Abstract:
This paper develops a two-good, two-country model with national open access renewable resources. We derive an appropriate analog of `factor proportions' for the renewable resource case and link it to trade patterns and to the likelihood of diversified production. The resource importer gains from trade. However, a diversified resource exporting country necessarily suffers a decline in steady state utility resulting from trade, and may lose along the entire transition path. Thus the basic 'gains from trade' presumption is substantially undermined by open access resources. Tariffs imposed by the resource importing country always benefit the resource exporter, and may be pareto-improving.

Abstract:
The sustainability debate concerns whether the world will experience stable or improving living standards for the foreseeable future, or whether the current trajectory will overtax the natural environment, leading to a "crash" in living standards. This paper selectively reviews relevant research, focusing on both ecological concerns and technological progress, and asks whether sustainability would be problematic without rapid population growth. I suggest that continued demographic transition to lower fertility is the primary requirement for achieving sustainable development. This is, effectively, a modern translation of Malthus (1798). The paper also discusses the role of the Malthusian cycle in human evolution.

Abstract:
Asymmetries in labour relations can have important effects on imperfectively competitive rivalries between firms. Such asymmetries are particularly striking in cross-country comparisons and are therefore of greatest interest in international markets. Using a simple duopoly model, we focus on two asymmetries. First, one firm may face a noncooperative union and second, institutional factors may allow one firm to commit itself to particular labour input before its rival sets output, giving it a natural Stackelberg leadership role. We examine the trade policy incentives resulting from these labour asymmetries, focusing on profit shifting tariffs, quotas and subsidies.

Abstract:
We examine the effect of trade on a small open economy with an open access renewable resource. Within a novel two-sector equilibrium model we first chracterize the autarkic steady state, and then show trade reduces steady state utility for a diversified resource exporting small country. Instantaneous utility rises as trade first opens, but these gains are eroded by ongoing resource depletion. The present value of utility falls for sufficiently small discount rates, and improvements in the world price of exports may be welfare-reducing. We also show that autarky prices, the pattern of trade, and the possibility of diversified production are all linked to a simple ratio of the biological resource growth rate to labor supply.

Abstract:
We present a simple general equilibrium model of renewable resource and population dynamics that might explain the rise and fall of Easter Island's civilization. The model generates a system similar to the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model. In our formulation man is the predator and the resource base is the prey, leading to the possibility of feast and famine cycles of rising and falling population and resource stocks. Such cycles tend to arise when fertility is high and the resource base grows slowly. We speculate that such cycles may often cause violent conflict and describe other civilizations that may have declined because of population overshooting and endogenous resource degradation.