• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
Understanding what motivates participation is a central theme in the research on open source software (OSS) development. Our study contributes by revealing how the different motivations of OSS developers are interrelated, how these motivations influence participation leading to performance, and how past performance influences subsequent motivations. Drawing on theories of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, we develop a theoretical model relating the motivations, participation, and performance of OSS developers. We evaluate our model using survey and archival data collected from a longitudinal field study of software developers in the Apache projects. Our results reveal several important findings. First, we find that developers' motivations are not independent but rather are related in complex ways. Being paid to contribute to Apache projects is positively related to developers' status motivations but negatively related to their use value motivations. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no evidence of diminished intrinsic motivation in the presence of extrinsic motivations; rather, status motivations enhance intrinsic motivations. Second, we find that different motivations differentially impact participation. Developers' paid participation and status motivations lead to above average contribution levels, but use value motivations lead to below average contribution levels, and intrinsic motivations do not significantly impact average contribution levels. Third, we find that developers' contribution levels positively impact their performance rankings. Finally, our results suggest that past performance rankings enhance developers' subsequent status motivations.

Open Source Software, Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation, Software Development Performance

Abstract:
In markets that exhibit network effects, the presence of conversion technologies provides an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility. This study examines the impact of conversion technologies on market equilibrium in the context of sequential duopoly competition and proprietary technology standards.

We analyze this question by departing from the extant literature to endogenize the decision to provide a converter and incorporate explicit negotiations between firms concerning the extent of conversion. We argue that these choices better reflect the environment facing firms in IT-industries and find that these decisions change some of the established results in the literature.

Specifically, we find that unless network effects are very large, the subgame perfect equilibrium involves firms' agreeing on providing converters at a sufficiently low price to all consumers. At this equilibrium, both the entrant and the incumbent are better off since the provision of converters alleviates price competition in the market and leads to both higher product revenues and higher proceeds from the sale of converters. Moreover, under some circumstances the provision of converters is welfare enhancing. These findings have important implications for research and practice in the adoption of new digital goods as the introduction of conversion technologies can reduce the social costs of standardization without compromising the benefits of network effects.

Network effects, standards competition, conversion technologies, flash memory, digital goods