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Stanley S. Reynolds's
Scholarly Papers
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Aggregate Statistics |
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Total
Downloads
236 |
Total
Citations
15 |
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1.
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Talat Genc
University of Guelph - Department of Economics Stanley S. Reynolds
University of Arizona - Department of Economics
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19 Oct 04
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Last Revised:
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03 Nov 04
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133
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Abstract:
The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to study generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted the important role that pivotal suppliers, those who can substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding generation output, sometimes play. However the literature on SFE has not considered the potential impact of pivotal suppliers on equilibrium predictions. We formulate a model in which generation capacity constraints can cause some suppliers to be pivotal. In symmetric and asymmetric versions of the model we show that the presence of pivotal suppliers reduces the set of supply function equilibria. We show that the size of the equilibrium set depends on observable market characteristics such as the amount of industry excess capacity and the load ratio (ratio of minimum demand to maximum demand). As the amount of excess capacity falls and/or the load ratio rises, the set of supply function equilibria becomes smaller; the equilibria that are eliminated are the lowest-priced, most competitive equilibria.
Supply function equilibrium, pivotal supplier, wholesale electricity market
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2.
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Stanley S. Reynolds
University of Arizona - Department of Economics John C. Wooders
University of Arizona
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28 Jan 05
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Last Revised:
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11 Mar 05
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88
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Abstract:
Internet auctions on eBay and Yahoo allow sellers to list their auctions with a buy-now option. In such auctions the seller sets a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately and end the auction. In the eBay version of a buy-now auction, the buy-now option disappears as soon as a bid is placed, while in the Yahoo version of the auction the buy-now option remains in effect throughout the auction. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies in eBay and Yahoo buy-now auctions. We show that for both auctions, when bidders are risk averse, introducing a buy price raises seller revenue for a wide range of buy prices. In addition, when the reserve prices and the buy prices are the same in both auctions, the Yahoo format raises more revenue than the eBay format, while the auctions are utility equivalent from the bidders' perspective.
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3.
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Bart J. Wilson
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute (ESI) Stanley S. Reynolds
University of Arizona - Department of Economics
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27 Jun 05
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Last Revised:
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11 Aug 05
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15
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Abstract:
This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly-pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly-pricing model.
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