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Abstract:
In determining domestic water prices, policy makers often need to use information about the demand side rather than only relying on information about the supply side. Household surveys have frequently been employed to collect demand-side information. This paper presents a multiple bounded discrete choice household survey model. It discusses how the model can be utilized to collect and analyze information about the acceptability of different water prices by different types of households, as well as households'willingness to pay for water service improvement. The results obtained from these surveys can be directly utilized in the development of water pricing and subsidy policies. The paper also presents an empirical multiple bounded discrete choice study conducted in Chongqing, China. In this case, domestic water service quality was seriously inadequate, but financial resources were insufficient to improve service quality. With a survey of about 1,500 households in five suburban districts in Chongqing Municipality, this study shows that a significant increase in the water price is feasible as long as the poorest households can be properly subsidized and certain public awareness and accountability campaigns can be conducted to make the price increase more acceptable to the public. The analysis also indicates that the order in which hypothetical prices are presented to respondents systematically affects their answers, and should be taken into account when designing survey instruments.

Town Water Supply and Sanitation, Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions, Environmental Economics & Policies, Water and Industry, Water Supply and Systems

Abstract:
Locally motivated air quality programs have only minor collateral benefits for the global climate. If agencies with global and local agendas did business together, then individuals and firms - and even cities - would act globally when thinking locally, and one would see greater synergy.

Eskeland and Xie find that locally motivated air quality programs for urban transport have limited collateral benefits in terms of protecting the global climate. This could puzzle some, since these two public goods - one global, one local - seem to be jointly produced. However, air quality in Mexico City, Santiago, and elsewhere is predominantly pursued by technical improvements (making cars and fuels cleaner), and not by reducing demand for polluting goods and services (though in Europe high fuel taxes help reduce demand).

Control programs developed under joint stimulus to protect the global and local environment have not yet been seen, and they may surprise us when they come. However, they will likely rely more on reducing demand, using instruments such as corrective (Pigovian) taxes on fuels. The authors show how, if locally and globally charged agencies can do business together, consumers, producers, and cities will act globally when thinking locally. Only then will we know the extent to which local and global benefits are produced jointly.

This paper - a joint product of Public Economics, Development Research Group, and the Global Environment Unit, Environment Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to analyze environmental problems and policies in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at geskeland@worldbank.org or jxie@worldbank.org.

Abstract:
Xie, Shah, Capannelli and Wang use a contingent valuation method to study the design of economic incentives to phase out polluting motorcycles in Bangkok. Like in many other cities, the government of Bangkok has been considering a series of control measures to discourage and eventually eliminate the use of heavily polluting motorcycles. Two of the possible policy instruments under consideration are charges on those polluting vehicles which are operating in the streets and compensation to those polluting vehicles which would stay off the roads. The policy research questions then include (1) what are the charges implied or compensation provided, given a policy target, and (2) what are the reactions of motorcycle owners to those charges or compensation. To answer those policy questions, the authors conducted a stochastic contingent valuation survey in Bangkok to question motorcycle owners on the likelihood they would keep or give up riding their motorcycles in the streets given certain charges or compensations. Results show that among others, about 80 percent of those motorcycles which did not pass the emission tests would be off the streets if a charge of 1,000 baht a year was levied, while under a one-time compensation of 10,000 baht, the number would be about 50 percent. The authors also estimate the average values of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for staying on the road and minimum willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for staying off the street, and analyze the determinants of WTP and WTA. Their econometric analysis shows that, among other factors, household income, fuel costs, use of motorcycles, and/or public transit affect the value of WTP and WTA.

This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental policy issues in developing countries.

Abstract:
Locally motivated air quality programs in Santiago and Mexico City have only minor collateral benefits for the global climate. If agencies with global and local agendas did business together, then individuals and firms and even cities would act globally when thinking locally, and one would see greater synergy. Eskeland and Xie find that locally motivated air quality programs for urban transport have limited collateral benefits in terms of protecting the global climate. This could puzzle some, since these two public goods one global, one local seem to be jointly produced. However, air quality in Mexico City, Santiago, and elsewhere is predominantly pursued by technical improvements (making cars and fuels cleaner), and not by reducing demand for polluting goods and services (though in Europe high fuel taxes help reduce demand). Control programs developed under joint stimulus to protect the global and local environment have not yet been seen, and they may surprise us when they come. However, they will likely rely more on reducing demand, using instruments such as corrective (Pigovian) taxes on fuels. The authors show how, if locally and globally charged agencies can do business together, consumers, producers, and cities will act globally when thinking locally. Only then will we know the extent to which local and global benefits are produced jointly.