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Abstract:
Many long-time practitioners muse about what it might be like to retire and teach, not realizing there is no more galvanizing phrase to their counterparts who have long toiled in the academy, nor one less likely to enhance the prospects of the unfortunate seasoned applicant who utters the phrase. I intend this essay not for law professors (though it may either amuse or irritate them), but for those in the practice who aspire, after all these years, to return to the academy. With a good deal of humility acquired along the way, I offer some realistic advice to job seekers, concluding that wistful phrase is precisely the opposite of the true sine qua non of success: demonstrating the capability of, and commitment to, being a productive scholar.

Teaching, scholarship, practicing lawyers, AALS meat market, FAR, FRC, retirement

Abstract:
The governance rules mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, and the SEC regulations thereunder, were in direct response to many of the specific misdeeds of the Enron, WorldCom and other scandals, leaving corporate lawyers scrambling to keep their clients in technical compliance, but wondering whether it would create better governance. In this paper, I contend first that the frustrations with Sarbanes-Oxley have their basis in the jurisprudence underlying Sarbanes - the presence or absence of articulated policies and principles underlying the specific rules. I assess the law under modern positivist and naturalist theories, and point out ironies in its ultimate application. Second, I contend there is a more fundamental issue. Neither the law, nor one of the most cogent theories of non-legal norms - Eric Posner's application of game theory and signaling to principles - accounts fully for the moral aspect of corporate board service and ethical decision-making. I critique the economic model with a real world example of a wealthy director's assessment of his potential gain versus potential exposure. I suggest there is a moral theory that explains compliance outside of law or economics, and that the directors operate simultaneously under moral, legal and economic dictates. Finally, I contend social policy and legal training that in turn fail to recognize the importance of moral bearing on corporate governance will very likely miss the intended objective of good governance: more thoughtful, independent focus by boards on their fiduciary obligations to corporate stakeholders.

Sarbanes-Oxley, governance, philosophy, Kant, jurisprudence

Abstract:
In this article, I expand upon a happy coincidence (for scholars) in reconciling the overlap between contract and fraud. Both the recent book by Ian Ayres and Gregory Klass and the opinion by the Delaware Court of Chancery in Abry Partners Acquisition V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition, LLC addressed the matter of lies within contractual promises, whether as to the promisor's intention to perform or as to the state of the business being sold. Each treatment, however, in focusing on fraudulent affirmative representations, falls short of (1) recognizing the fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (2) articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address it, or (3) capturing the social and linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so insidious.

The archetypal facts in Abry frame the issue. When the parties to a business acquisition agreement purport to limit the buyer's reliance to those representations and warranties set forth in the agreement, just what obligations of truth-telling have the parties contractually released? We need to grapple with the interrelationship of law, language, mutual understanding, and trust. The language of the law (and the contract) is a blunt instrument by which to map the subtle fine lines of a complex agreement. I contend that there is a kind of special arrogance in the illusion onto which lawyers hold - that the uncertainties and contingencies of the world are in their power to be controlled, and to the winner of the battle of words go the spoils. The correct doctrinal result is to presume in the transactional speech acts (including the contract), as we do in everyday life, a default of truth-telling. This permits the parties to contract freely around the rule, but it requires narrow construction of the exceptions and disclaimers.

Delaware, Journal, Corporate, Law, Aquisition, Business, Abry, contract, contractual, promises

Abstract:
In this article, I expand upon a happy coincidence (for scholars) in reconciling the overlap between contract and fraud. Both the recent book by Ian Ayres and Gregory Klass and the Delaware Court of Chancery in Abry Partners Acquisition V, L.P. v. F& W Acquisition, LLC addressed the issue of promissory fraud - the making of a contract as to which the promisor had no intention of performing. Each treatment, however, in focusing on fraudulent affirmative representations, falls short of (a) recognizing the fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (b) articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address it, or (c) capturing the social and linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so insidious.

The archetypal facts in Abry frame the issue. When the parties to a business acquisition agreement purport to limit the buyer's reliance to those representations and warranties set forth in the agreement, just what obligations of truth-telling have the parties contractually released? We need to grapple with the inter-relationship of law, language, mutual understanding, and trust. The language of the law (and the contract) is a blunt instrument by which to map to track the subtle fine lines of a complex agreement. I will contend that there is a kind of special arrogance in the illusion onto which lawyers hold - that the uncertainties and contingencies of the world are in their power to be controlled, and to the winner of the battle of words go the spoils. The correct doctrinal result is to presume in the transactional speech acts (including the contract), as we do in everyday life, a default of truth-telling, to permit the parties freely to contract around the rule, but to require narrow construction of the exceptions and disclaimers.

contract, fraud, misrepresentation, mergers and acquisitions, warranties, disclaimers, reliance

Abstract:
The focus on complexity as a problem of the financial meltdown of 2008-09 suggests that crisis is in part epistemological: we now know enough about financial and economic systems to be threatened by their complexity, but not enough to relieve our fears and anxieties about them. What marks the current crisis is anxiety that the financial world has evolved to the point that there are hidden structures, like concentrated "too big to fail" institutions and mechanisms, or like credit default swaps, that have widespread and adverse downsides. I propose an analogy between medicine and law in the sense of "regulatory technology." If bubbles are the disease, then the analogy is to bipolar syndrome - exuberance, or even a little hypomania is okay on the upswing, but true mania is bad, as is the resulting swing to depression. Good regulation, then, would be something like lithium, which keeps us on an even keel. There are two questions. The first is really whether we understand the forces well enough to regulate them. Regulation is a function of prediction; prediction is a function of observed regularity; observed regularities invoke the problem of scientific (not legal) causation; causation returns us to the question whether the human system being analyzed is capable of being reduced to helpful predictive models. The second question is who does the understanding. What we are dealing with instead is a crisis of confidence in those who purport to be experts in what we cannot fathom merely through common sense. The conundrum, of course, is that if it takes an expert to see the problem caused by complexity, how are we, possessing merely common sense, supposed to do anything but rely on their judgment? The epistemological crisis arises from our own judgments to rely on, believe in, trust, or have faith in, that judgment.

financial crisis, subprime, CDO, credit default swap, epistemology, philosophy of social science, causation, judgment, Hume, Kant

Abstract:
There is value for lawyers in thinking about constructs of rules as games, on one hand, or models, on the other. Games are real in a way models are not. Games have thingness - an independent reality - and they can be played. Models have aboutness - they map onto something else that is real for the sake of simplification and explanation. But models and games are not dichotomous as the preceding claim makes them out to be. Sometimes models look just like games, and sometimes games can serve as models. Because models look like games, we may come to believe they are real - that the models have thingness rather than aboutness. People are prone to think some of the models they deal in all the time are real, like games, and perhaps even more real than the reality the models are supposed to represent. When that happens unreflectively in business, ethical and legal problems can ensue.

There is also a relationship between games and models as a way of thinking, and the position of the thinker as modeler, game creator, or game player. To engage in any of those acts is to use the legally trained mind to make sense of what is going on, and to act on it. But there are different ways of making sense, either by explaining or understanding, and it is not common in legal education to undertake the exercise of thinking about thinking, or theorizing about theory. I explore the consequence of confusing games and models in two contexts, financial accounting and contract interpretation, and consider the possibility of co-optation from models into games and vice versa. I conclude that practicing lawyers (or law professors) need to think about thinking itself or face the possibility of being misled by precisely the same context facing their clients. In short, lawyers need to be pragmatic ontologists.

games, models, Wittgenstein, philosophy of science, complexity, attributive cause, explanatory cause, GAAP, contract interpretation

Abstract:
There is value for lawyers in thinking about constructs of rules as games, on one hand, or models, on the other. Games are real in a way models are not. Games have thingness - an independent reality - and they can be played. Models have aboutness - they map onto something else that is real for the sake of simplification and explanation. But models and games are not dichotomous as the preceding claim makes them out to be. Sometimes models look just like games, and sometimes games can serve as models. Because models look like games, we may come to believe they are real - that the models have thingness rather than aboutness. People are prone to think some of the models they deal in all the time are real, like games, and perhaps even more real than the reality the models are supposed to represent. When that happens unreflectively in business, ethical and legal problems can ensue.

There is also a relationship between games and models as a way of thinking, and the position of the thinker as modeler, game creator, or game player. To engage in any of those acts is to use the legally trained mind to make sense of what is going on, and to act on it. But there are different ways of making sense, either by explaining or understanding, and it is not common in legal education to undertake the exercise of thinking about thinking, or theorizing about theory. I explore the consequence of confusing games and models in two contexts, financial accounting and contract interpretation, and consider the possibility of co-optation from models into games and vice versa. I conclude that practicing lawyers (or law professors) need to think about thinking itself or face the possibility of being misled by precisely the same context facing their clients. In short, lawyers need to be pragmatic ontologists.

games, models, Wittgenstein, philosophy of science, complexity, attributive cause, explanatory cause, GAAP, contract interpretation

Abstract:
In this essay, I suggest the difference between the law of consensual relationships (i.e., contracts) and the morality of those relationships is one of compulsion and freedom. In the former, we find ourselves being compelled by, or compliant with, a rule some distance removed from the basic norm; in the latter we find ourselves in touch, constantly and sometimes in the face of more visceral obligatory rules, with a far deeper and more fundamental (transcendental) sense of fairness. Moral decisions are the ones made without any threat of compulsion from the law. The clearest example in commercial relationship of a moral decision unfettered by the positive law is the promisee's choice not to enforce an otherwise legally binding contract. As a matter of logic, if not practice, a court cannot impose a duty to do so, either as a matter of positive law theory or natural law theory that contends law is not law unless it rests on a deep structure of values like fairness or justice or liberty. Nevertheless, that sense of obligation on the part of the promisee is regularly sensed and even acted upon in commercial relationships, and its source is the will of the autonomous agent who has not traded freedom for compulsion or compliance.

Contracts, Kelsen, positivism, promise, duty, Dworkin, morality, freedom, compulsion, compliance

Abstract:
In this article, I argue that the prevailing literature on contract theory does not adequately address the way real-world lawyers address uncertainty in complex business transactions. I attribute this to the constraints imposed by thinking in legal models, the dominant tendency to turn to economics for analysis and normative prescription, and the focus on adjudicative issues of hindsight interpretation. Commercial uncertainty, and the law's response to it, is only a subset of the broader philosophical issue of contingency. As an alternative to prevailing thought, I trace philosophical approaches to contingency, utility and morality that have come down to us since the Enlightenment, and how those approaches reveal themselves in modern legal and management theory and practice. In particular, I criticize certain characterizations and applications of legal and philosophic pragmatism. While the leading proponents adopt the name legal pragmatism, I suggest that they have nevertheless opted for a dogmatic economic idealism. Successful business leaders (and lawyers) have a more subtle approach: they envision a world as they want it to be (as it ought to be) but are not consumed by the fact that things do not always work out as they should. I argue that lawyers who are legal or economic dogmatists, seeing the world only as they want it to be, or who are only pragmatic or empirical, and will only acknowledge the world as it is, will be far less effective in the highly contingent environment where contracts create more moral than legal markers. The most effective real-world deal lawyers will be prepared to deal with contingency and counsel their clients pragmatically, but with far more idealism than current proponents of the jurisprudence of legal pragmatism have acknowledged.

Contracts, contingency, Hume, Kant, venture capital, mergers, acquisitions, philosophy, economics, rational actor, idealism, skepticism

Abstract:
In this article, I argue that the prevailing literature on contract theory does not adequately address the way real-world lawyers address uncertainty in complex business transactions. I attribute this to the constraints imposed by thinking in legal models, the dominant tendency to turn to economics for analysis and normative prescription, and the focus on adjudicative issues of hindsight interpretation. Commercial uncertainty, and the law's response to it, is only a subset of the broader philosophical issue of contingency. As an alternative to prevailing thought, I trace philosophical approaches to contingency, utility and morality that have come down to us since the Enlightenment, and how those approaches reveal themselves in modern legal and management theory and practice. In particular, I criticize certain characterizations and applications of legal and philosophic pragmatism. While the leading proponents adopt the name legal pragmatism, I suggest that they have nevertheless opted for a dogmatic economic idealism. Successful business leaders (and lawyers) have a more subtle approach: they envision a world as they want it to be (as it ought to be) but are not consumed by the fact that things do not always work out as they should. I argue that lawyers who are legal or economic dogmatists, seeing the world only as they want it to be, or who are only pragmatic or empirical, and will only acknowledge the world as it is, will be far less effective in the highly contingent environment where contracts create more moral than legal markers. The most effective real-world deal lawyers will be prepared to deal with contingency and counsel their clients pragmatically, but with far more idealism than current proponents of the jurisprudence of legal pragmatism have acknowledged.

See accepted paper version at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=651404.

Contracts, contingency, Hume, Kant, venture capital, mergers, acquisitions, philosophy, economics, rational actor, idealism, skepticism

Abstract:
I argue that the debate between deontologists and consequentialists of contract law conflates and therefore unduly confuses the analysis of each of them. The debate is a reprise of the philosophic debate between rationalists and empiricists. Present-day legal contract consequentialists (in the empirical tradition) see reason (pure or practical) as unhelpful or worse in telling us what we ought to do. Pragmatism and consequential analysis of default rules, if anything, dominate the discussion. But the present-day contract rationalists fare no better, seeking to make constitutive claims of knowledge on the basis of reason. The deontological concept of contract as promise may well tell us how we ought to order our private relationships, but it does not really explain why the law is as it is.

There is irony in the overwhelming interest of the consequentialist legal academy in trying to find a scientific answer to our most fundamental questions of duty and deontologists to defend morality consequentially. I argue that there are limits to each and that we operate consequentially and deontologically in the ordering of our private affairs, often simultaneously. The mistakes (typical of reason's drive to a single maximand) are assuming, on one hand, that contractual consequentialism defines our commercial relationships, or, on the other, that contracts are capable of containing our moral obligations. Put another way, there is nothing moral about the contract (versus the underlying promise), and the conflation of the two is the source of the confusion over the limits of the law of contract. The moral or transcendental aspect of the contract is the underlying promise - its soul, so to speak - but the law can only doctor its body, what shows in the contract.

Deonotology, consequentialism, contract, promise, Kant, reason

Abstract:
Why are there two fairly clear chasms that affect practicing lawyers - one between themselves and their clients, and one between themselves and their professors? Both have to do with the irreducibility of judgment - perceiving regularities, applying rules to new situations, and deciding in advance what to do. I suspect Kant was right over two centuries ago, and there has not been much progress theorizing about it since then (even after the behavioral theorists like Tversky and Kahnemann and popular expositors like Malcolm Gladwell); judgment, either the inductive inferences from what we observe to what we generalize, or the leap from what we generalize to what to do next, is not teachable, but only achievable through practice. Practicing lawyers are reductivists in comparison to their clients - reducing the complex world through the science of law to a model; professors are reductivists in comparison to their students - either reducing the practice to a rational science, or avoiding the question of judgment at all.

This is a thought piece preliminary to a more detailed treatment of the idea.

science, jurisprudence, reduction, lawyers, practice, theory, judgment, behavioral theory, cognitive theory

Abstract:
Embedded in the way we use the law is the tendency of human reason to justification; in the words of one philosopher, a thirst for rationality [that] is a major source of lies. I contend that this tendency is exacerbated by the conflation of what is knowable as a matter of science, and that which we might believe is normative. I rely on Kant's critique of theoretical and practical reason to assess claims to objectivity in social science approaches to law, and to suggest it is not surprising that the operation of theoretical and practical reason would tend to the conflation of the descriptive and the normative. When we understand the illusions of which reason is capable, we may be more circumspect about claims of objective knowledge and more willing to challenge assertions of a single right answer on normative issues (the modus operandi of most legal argumentation).

Nevertheless, we have a sense that there are objective standards of right and wrong, bespeaking right answers, if not single right answers, on difficult issues, and these are the basis for ethics, if not law. How does one bring broad universalisms down to practical application, and have the confidence one's judgments are right, and not someone else's view of dogmatism? I discuss the mystery that lies behind the process of judgment, and conclude that the best check against the illusions of reason is our ability to have a relation with, and understand the viewpoints of, others. In particular, I consider Buber's concept of dialogue, and how it might affect common types of ethical decisions in business.

business ethics, reason, Kant, Buber, judgment

Abstract:
Despite valiant (if nascent) efforts to show that law, or at least courts and doctrine, matters in the broader study of entrepreneurship, I am skeptical that it really does. The reason goes to the fundamental orientation to rules and their application of law and lawyers, on one hand, and entrepreneurs, on the other. As much as law students like rules, and social scientists like theories capable of prediction and algorithms and models, there are inherent philosophical (and perhaps psychological) problems with the interaction of the lawyer and the entrepreneur. In the same way that the relationship of law to moral intuition is perennially debated and no less frequently unresolved as between empiricists and rationalists, foundationalists and anti-foundationalists, the social context of rule-following for legal ordering is at odds with the entrepreneur's orientation to rules.

In this Essay (which serves as an introduction to a longer work), I want to explore several themes. First, as the philosophers have shown, there is no rule for the application of a rule, and what we perceive as a given result is a matter of social congruence rather than a result inherent in the rule itself. The social and psychological orientation of those who create law, and those who create innovation, are at odds. Second, the predominant approaches to the science of law fail to account for the inherent paradox (or antinomy) of judgment. Third, the very nature of a legal or regulatory solution, by and large, is cognitive, and fails to address the non-cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship. Finally, there is a fundamental distinction between the definition of one's presently ascertainable rights in property, and private ordering to deal with future contingency. In the former, the law comes as close as it ever does to being constitutive; in the latter, what we say now is merely ammunition for instrumental use later.

Entrepreneurship, contract, property, rules, risk

Abstract:
This short essay addresses the role of securities regulation of mortgage-backed in the present financial crisis. While there is certainly a role for securities regulators to play in curing systemic flaws that contributed to the present situation (for example, the regulation of credit rating agencies), the federal system is primarily based on disclosure, not the merit of the underlying security. My view is that the problem here is not the availability of information in the markets for these securities, now or in the past, but judgments made with respect to that information. To paraphrase Kant, judgment without information is empty; information without judgment is blind. Information without judgment gives us bubbles; judgment without information leaves us at the mercy of Madoffs.

This is an essay prepared for the "Fallout from the Bailout" symposium at the University of Dayton on March 20, 2009.

mortgage-backed securities, disclosure, judgment, SEC, Kant, Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett, induction, rule-following

Abstract:
This is a review of, The Destruction of Young Lawyers: Beyond One L. by Douglas Litowitz (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2006).

While the book may be a credible (if tiresome) account of Mr. Litowitz's own unhappiness as a law student and large firm new associate, and evidence of the fact there are unhappy lawyers in the world, it overpromotes itself on two counts. Although it is written by a law professor and published by a university press, and makes broad and universal claims about evils in the legal profession, it is largely a slapdash pastiche of hyperbole and anecdote. Nor is it a balanced view of the profession. Rather, it is one man's attempt to transpose his own journey through hopelessness and despair into a universal truth under the patina of scholarship.

Litowitz, law profession, critical theory, Habermas, law firms, negativity bias

Abstract:
This is a comment on a definition of religion recently proffered by Brian Leiter in support of different conclusions we ought to draw with respect to religion. His analysis is ultimately circular: the problem with religion is that it is not science. Exposing the circularity requires identifying the trick, which is that he employs an appeal to common sense to distinguish religion and science. Nevertheless, the very belief in common sense is the same as the religion Leiter attacks: it is categorical and insulated from further reasons. My argument in response has three major themes. (1) The argument based on receptiveness to reasons and evidence itself arbitrarily picks and chooses reasons and evidence. (2) It is possible to posit a religion whose categorical demands on action and requirements of foundational bedrock are minimal. (3) Religion uses reason (in the sense of concepts apart from evidence) to grapple with the source of our bedrock beliefs. It differs from other such grappling only in degree and not kind of thought; once we accept the role of concept (or reason) in such work, religious or secular, we necessarily must accord bedrock status (or categoricity) to at least one concept. Finally, I suggest that adoption of Leiter's definition has a troubling implication as to our respect for personhood.

religion, common sense, tolerance, respect, Quine, reasons, evidence

Abstract:
In two recent essays, Professor Mark L. Movsesian has suggested that a significant difference between the classical formalism of Williston and the formalism of contemporary contracts scholars is the extent to which the earlier work was under-theorized. I want to suggest an area in which there is a consistency to the under-theorization between the classical and the modern contract formalists: the extent to which theorization in anything that approaches metaphysics is, and has been, consistently anathema. Modern theorizing is overwhelmingly of a particular form: dispassionate social science inquiry into how we tick, rarely questioned but implicit norms shaped solely around the utilitarian, if not material, consequence of choices, all seasoned by the occasional post-modern expression of futility and desperation around the indeterminacy of moral issues. It does not address the way we might think about solving the problem outside of the formal models (whether classically or economically based) of the law.

In a brief response to Professor Movsesian, I encourage debating over contract law not just in the context of pragmatics of instrumental reason, but as part of a broader inquiry into and struggle with the ends to which any endeavor is directed.

contracts, Williston, metaphysics, pragmatism, Posner, scientism, formalism

Abstract:
This is a response to Seana Shiffrin's recent and important contribution to the continuing debate whether there is a universal moral or economic truth at the heart of contract law. Her most significant advance toward a general theory of promise and contract is not, however, her analysis of the divergence of morality and contract, but instead her identification of the critical moment at which the interposition of the public in a private matter occurs or is contemplated. This essay carries that theme forward, suggesting that a universal justification for contract law is not possible because the law, by its very nature, objectifies (publicly or with that implicit threat) what was heretofore a private relationship.

contract, promise, Shiffrin, justification, public, private

Abstract:
Lawyers who negotiate and litigate over complex deals have an intuitive notion of the value of what they do in connection with the contract. The arguments around technical contract language often are a lawyers' game; in most cases, what is clear would have been clear on a handshake; and what is tightly negotiated bears only a random relationship to the areas of future dispute. If they happen to have drafted tight and clear language around the particular matter in dispute, it is as much luck as foresight. Thereafter complex agreements can have binding effect for years, but most of the relationship transpires without explicit reference to the contract. The problem to which much of contract interpretation scholarship is directed arises only when there is a significant disagreement not resolvable by non-legal means. If the contract is not sufficiently clear on the subject so the parties agree on the outcome, or a court has an easy case, how do courts go about filling gaps that the parties simply did not address, or providing meaning in the present circumstance to words that do not unambiguously resolve the problem?

I want to suggest an answer I believe is intuitive to practitioners but may be provocative in the academy. The search for an illusive ex ante mutually intended meaning is a waste of time, as is worry about the ancillary problem of opportunism. The creation of the complex contract and its later interpretation in a difficult case of ambiguity are distinct events. If a previously negotiated term that is capable of being ambiguous nevertheless has a mutually understood meaning, it will be apparent at the time of the potential dispute, but in that instance there will be no dispute and no jurisprudence. If there truly is a dispute, however, there is no going back to a mutually intended meaning as of the time the contract was made, because the words only take on meaning at the time of their application to the circumstance. It follows that opportunism is a function of extra-legal morals and norms, and is not controllable by language that turns out to be disputable, if the parties choose to dispute it. The proper focus of courts, therefore, is a pragmatic resolution of disputes, and not a search for mutual intention.

Contract, opportunism, intention, Wittgenstein, rule-induction, rule-skepticism, rule-following, Kant, Heidegger

Abstract:
Recently, Ronald Gilson described a transactional lawyer turned law professor as someone who was a beetle, but became an entomologist. This is not the first non-mammalian metaphor used by an economically inclined legal academic to demarcate those who study and those who are studied. As Richard Posner so colorfully explained rational actors as they appear to economists studying them objectively: "it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog." In this short essay, I suggest that both say something about the prevailing view of theorizing that is entitled to privileged epistemic status in the legal academy. Some economic explanations of the activities of beetles, frogs, and lawyers are entitled to this status, and some are not. I assess Professor Gilson's classic 1984 article on value creation by lawyers in terms of its implicit claims to (social) scientific knowledge, and conclude that it is not.

transaction cost engineers, rational actor, law and economics, Gilson, philosophy of science, falsification, Popper, demarcation

Abstract:
In two recent essays, Professor Mark L. Movsesian has suggested that a significant difference between the classical formalism of Williston and the formalism of contemporary contracts scholars is the extent to which the earlier work was under-theorized. I want to suggest an area in which there is a consistency to the under-theorization between the classical and the modern contract formalists: the extent to which theorization in anything that approaches metaphysics is, and has been, consistently anathema. Modern theorizing is overwhelmingly of a particular form: dispassionate social science inquiry into how we tick, rarely questioned but implicit norms shaped solely around the utilitarian, if not material, consequence of choices, all seasoned by the occasional post-modern expression of futility and desperation around the indeterminacy of moral issues. It does not address the way we might think about solving the problem outside of the formal models (whether classically or economically based) of the law.

In a brief response to Professor Movsesian, I encourage debating over contract law not just in the context of pragmatics of instrumental reason, but as part of a broader inquiry into and struggle with the ends to which any endeavor is directed.

contracts, Williston, metaphysics, pragmatism, Posner, scientism, formalism