• Selected
• Entire List

Abstract:
Notice pleading is dead. Last Term in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly the Supreme Court dramatically reinterpreted Federal Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a "short and plain" statement of a plaintiff's claim, to require the pleading of facts that demonstrate the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim. The Court was unabashed about this change of course: it explicitly abrogated a core element of the classic case of Conley v. Gibson, a longstanding staple of first-year civil procedure courses and until recently the bedrock case undergirding the idea that ours is a system of notice pleading in which detailed facts need not be pleaded. This Article explicates the Court's new jurisprudence of plausibility pleading and offers a critique that finds fault with several of its components. Beyond representing an insufficiently justified break with its own precedent and with the intent of those who drafted the language of Rule 8, the Court's new understanding of the pleading obligations of plaintiffs is motivated by policy concerns more properly vindicated through the rule amendment process, places an undue burden on plaintiffs to present information not obtainable until at least some discovery has been permitted, and will permit courts to throw out claims before they can determine whether they are indeed groundless. Ultimately, the imposition of plausibility pleading further contributes to the civil system's long slide away from its original liberal ethos towards an ethos of restrictiveness more concerned with efficiency and judicial administration than access to justice.

civil procedure, civil practice, federal practice, pleading, federal rules, Twombly, Bell Atlantic, Rule 8(a), Rule 12(b)(6), motion to dismiss, Conley v. Gibson, Leatherman, Sorema, notice pleading, heightened pleading, particularized pleading

Abstract:
Personal jurisdiction doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court is in disarray. As a constitutional doctrine whose contours remain imprecise, the law of personal jurisdiction has generated confusion, unpredictability, and extensive satellite litigation over what should be an uncomplicated preliminary issue. Many commentators have long lamented these defects, making suggestions for how the doctrine could be improved. Although many of these proposals have had much to offer, they generally have failed to articulate (or adequately justify or explain) a simple and sound approach to jurisdiction that the Supreme Court can embrace. This Article revises the law of personal jurisdiction by reconceiving the proper role of due process within the doctrine - which is to ensure that defendants receive adequate notice of an action and are protected against arbitrary assertions of governmental power - and reasserting the role of state sovereignty and interstate federalism as concepts that permit jurisdiction over all disputes in which a state has a legitimate interest. The doctrines of venue and forum non conveniens are left to redress any meaningful burdens on defendants arising out of having to litigate in inconvenient fora. The result is a coherent analysis that will provide litigants and courts clear guidance regarding the scope of a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate.

Personal jurisdiction, adjudicatory jurisdiction, jurisdiction to adjudicate, in personam jurisdiction, choice of law, international shoe, Pennoyer, due process, civil procedure

Abstract:
Courts have been evaluating the issue of personal jurisdiction based on Internet or "network-mediated" contacts for some time. The U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on this issue, permitting the federal appeals courts to develop standards for determining when personal jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts is appropriate. Unfortunately, the circuit approaches - which emphasize a website's "interactivity" and "target audience" - are flawed because they are premised on an outdated view of Internet activity as uncontrollably ubiquitous. This view has led courts to depart from traditional jurisdictional analysis and impose elevated and misguided jurisdictional standards. This Article argues that courts should reinstitute traditional principles to analyze jurisdiction based on network-mediated contacts because of current technology that enables Internet actors to restrict the geographical reach of their virtual conduct. Such a return will be fairer for plaintiffs while recognizing the legitimate due process rights of defendants.

Personal Jurisdiction, Internet, Website, Jurisdiction, Zippo, International Shoe, Pennoyer

Abstract:
Where does pleading doctrine, at the federal level, stand today? The Supreme Court's revision of general pleading standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly has not left courts and litigants with a clear or precise understanding of what it takes to state a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss. Claimants are required to show "plausible entitlement to relief" by offering enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Translating those admonitions into predictable and consistent guidelines has been illusory. This Article proposes a descriptive theory that explains the fundaments of contemporary pleading doctrine in a way that gives it some of the clarity and precision it otherwise lacks. The major descriptive thesis posited here is that the central animating principle of contemporary pleading doctrine is the requirement that a complaint - through the use of objective facts and supported implications - describe events about which there is a presumption of impropriety. Getting to that presumption requires different degrees of factual specificity depending upon the factual and legal context of the claim. A secondary descriptive claim is that the doctrine in its current iteration privileges efficiency interests over the justice-related concerns of accuracy and procedural fairness. Unfortunately, this preference unduly harms the right of access to courts for those plaintiffs having claims that require the pleading of information they do not or cannot know. Further, it may be that certain types of claims, such as civil rights and antitrust claims, are more disadvantaged by this preference than others, suggesting that the doctrine needs to be recalibrated to better serve the interests of justice more evenly across different types of cases.

civil procedure, pleading, Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2), Conley v. Gibson, heightened pleading, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Erickson

Abstract:
Much has been made of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on federal civil pleading standards during the latter half of the 2006-2007 Term. Specifically, what will be the fallout from the Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a case that abrogated Conley v. Gibson's famous no set of facts formulation and supplanted it with a new plausibility pleading standard? This Article attempts to examine and distill the impact of Twombly on the pleading standards that lower federal courts are applying when scrutinizing civil rights claims. Two main approaches emerge: that of courts that choose to continue to apply a notice pleading standard and that of courts requiring factual substantiation of claims at the pleading stage. The aims of this Article are to clarify the pleading standards that civil rights claimants must now satisfy across the circuits, to assess what impact Twombly has had on shaping those standards, and to evaluate from a policy perspective whether any changes wrought by Twombly in this area are welcome or troubling. This Article was prepared for inclusion in the forthcoming Howard Law Journal Symposium issue entitled Civil Rights and Civil Procedure: The Legacy of Conley v. Gibson.

conley, civil procedure, pleading, rule 8, twombly, bell atlantic, plausibility, civil rights

Abstract:
The Supreme Court, in a line of several cases over the past decade, has established a rigorous federal constitutional excessiveness review for punitive damages awards based on the Due Process Clause. As a matter of substantive due process, says the Court, punitive awards must be evaluated by three guideposts set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore: the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and a comparison of the amount of punitive damages to any civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. Following up on this pronouncement in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, the Court indicated that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages to a significant degree will satisfy due process. Unfortunately, neither the guideposts nor the single-digit multiple rule have any basis in the law of due process and represent nothing more than the imposition of the Court's own standards for punishment in place of those of the states.

This Article reveals the defectiveness of this jurisprudence by exposing the absence of precedential foundation for the Court's current view. More significantly, this Article demonstrates that the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause is at odds with important rules of constitutional construction, mainly those supplied by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which protect unenumerated rights and limit the national government to exercising delegated powers, respectively. Together, these amendments prohibit expansive interpretations of the Constitution that disparage rights retained by the people and that arrogate to the national government powers that neither the states nor the people ever relinquished. The Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause with respect to punitive damages transgresses both of these limitations. This Article suggests that a proper understanding of due process reveals that it requires only that punitive awards be reserved for wrongdoing beyond simple negligence, that jurors be instructed that any punitive award they impose must be designed to further states' legitimate interest in punishment of in-state conduct and deterrence, and that judicial review of the awards be available to check adherence to these requirements. Beyond that, the Due Process Clause fails to require that punitive damages awards be constrained to a particular level.

Due Process, Punitive Damages, Exemplary Damages, Civil Procedure, Remittitur, Tort Reform, BMW v. Gore, State Farm v. Campbell, civil jury, Ninth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Seventh Amendment, Constitutional Law, Damages Caps, Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Right to Jury

Abstract:
The last decade has witnessed the rise and growth of a surprising and disconcerting trend: Congress has pursued legislation, and the Supreme Court has rendered decisions, that impose upon, supplant, or usurp the judicial authority of states and their courts. This trend is surprising because those who have implemented it have been the foremost proponents of limited federal government and respect for state sovereign authority. The trend is disconcerting because it jeopardizes those very principles. Federal attempts to control state court jurisdiction or judicial procedure—what I refer to as "anti-federalist procedure" —not only offend state sovereignty and principles of constitutional federalism but have also been achieved through improper exercises or interpretations of the Commerce Clause authority or through expansive and untenable doctrinal contrivances of the Supreme Court. Moreover, anti-federalist procedure threatens state republicanism in violation of the Constitution's Guarantee Clause while expanding federal jurisdiction beyond the scope of authority conferred by Article III. In short, anti-federalist procedure unduly intrudes upon the sovereign authority of states, often has dubious constitutional validity, and is frequently driven more by substantive policy preferences that trump fealty to federalist principles. This Article reviews and critiques this phenomenon and offers a set of federalism-respecting procedural reforms that should properly confine federal procedural policymaking.

Federalism, States' Rights, Civil Procedure, State Sovereignty, Tort Reform, Tenth Amendment, Guarantee Clause, Commerce Clause, Constitutional Law, Damages Caps, Schiavo, Bush v. Gore, Preemption, Federal Jurisdiction, Supplemental Jurisdiction

Abstract:
Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to more stringent pleading standards in the ordinary federal civil case. Although the decision is not a watershed, since it merely underscores the substantial changes to pleading doctrine wrought in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Iqbal is disconcerting for at least two reasons. First, the Court treated Iqbal’s factual allegations in a manner that further erodes the assumption-of-truth rule that has been the cornerstone of modern federal civil pleading practice. The result is an approach to pleading that is governed by a subjective, malleable standard that permits judges to reject pleadings based on their own predilections or “experience and common sense.” Such an approach undermines consistency and predictability in the pleading area and supplants, in no small measure, the traditional fact-finding role of the jury. Second, the Court struck a blow against the liberal ethos in civil procedure by endorsing pleading standards that will make it increasingly difficult for members of societal out-groups to challenge the unlawful practices of dominant interests such as employers, government officials, or major corporations. Thus, although Iqbal ultimately does not go much further than Twombly in reshaping civil pleading standards, the decision is an important milestone in the steady slide toward restrictiveness that has characterized procedural doctrine in recent years.

Iqbal, Ashcroft, Twombly, pleading, Rule 8, complaint

Abstract:
Those of us who study civil procedure are familiar with the notion that federal procedure under the 1938 civil rules was generally characterized by a "liberal ethos," meaning that it was originally designed to promote open access to the courts and to facilitate a resolution of disputes on the merits. Most of us are also aware of the fact that the reality of procedure is not always access-promoting or fixated on merits-based resolutions as a priority. Indeed, I would say that a "restrictive ethos" characterizes procedure today, with many rules being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal court. In this brief Essay, after discussing some of the familiar components of the liberal ethos of civil procedure, I hope to set forth some of the aspects of federal civil procedure that reflect the restrictive ethos, following up with some thoughts on whether a dialectical analysis can help us understand the nature of the relationship between procedure's liberal and restrictive components.

civil procedure, pleading, summary judgment, discovery, class action fairness act